Municipal Governance: The Challenges of Severe Fiscal Distress

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eBlog, 11/30/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the difficult trials and tribulations of governance in a municipality confronting severe fiscal distress—in this case in the historic municipality of Petersburg, Virginia, before heading West to San Bernardino where the old expression “When it rains, it pours,” might be an apt description as a physical rather than fiscal earthquake appears to be adding to the city’s fiscal challenges as it seeks to emerge early next year from the nation’s longest ever chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Then we journey back to Ohio, where a municipal election next week in the virtually insolvent municipality of East Cleveland appears to offer little optimism of any resolution of its insolvency. Then we continue east to Connecticut, a state now confronting serious fiscal pressures. Finally, we head south, not to escape winter, but rather to observe the difficulty of governance created by a federal oversight board and an incoming new Governor.    

Is It a Municipal Government of the People? The ACLU of Virginia released a letter Monday criticizing the Petersburg City Council for meeting practices it said violate “the spirit of open government laws.” The organization claimed the City Council over-relied on special meetings, sometimes called at the last-minute, during the work day, or held in cramped quarters, to vote on matters of governance and financial management even as the city veered into insolvency. In the letter, ACLU executive director Claire Guthrie Gastañaga warned: “Holding meetings at inconvenient times and in small spaces that cannot accommodate the public violates the spirit of open government laws that serve to promote an increased awareness by all persons of government activities and afford every opportunity to citizens to witness the operations of government.” Part of the reaction reflects the growing anger of city residents and taxpayers with regard to the ways in which the Mayor and Council allowed the fiscal crisis to grow unattended—and then to hire at steep prices turnaround specialists from Washington, D.C. Indeed, some believe that the Council’s decision to hire the Robert Bobb Group—especially the way it did so—to try to avert insolvency and potential chapter 9 bankruptcy violated the municipality’s own rules and possibly the city charter, because of the procedure of forcing the matter to a second vote days after an initial vote for the partnership failed to pass, with two council members absent. The Petersburg City Council’s rules require a month delay; the city’s charter provides that a reconsideration vote must have as many members present as were there for the initial vote. The city attorney has defended the vote, asserting that nothing illegal or untoward transpired during the second consideration of the Bobb Group contract, which sealed the $350,000, five-month fee from the nearly bankrupt municipality with the firm. The aftertaste led citizens to publicly lambaste Mayor W. Howard Myers at a council meeting following the vote: now those citizens are actively circulating a recall petition to force the Mayor to step down. As Barb Rudolph, an organizer of the community group Clean Sweep Petersburg, put it: “For the many citizens of Petersburg who want to better understand what our elected leaders are deciding and why, this letter is most welcome…It puts City Council on notice that they can’t hide behind their misinterpretation of FOIA laws and inadequate commitment to open government.”

The vote last month on hiring the Bobb Group took place at one of 13 special meetings called by the City Council between March and October, according to the ACLU’s review. The Council publicized some in advance as being called solely for closed-session discussions, which “has the result of suppressing interest in attending and participating,” according to Ms. Gastañaga, who is pressing for the Council to be more open and resort less to executive sessions, or, as she puts it: “Even if legally permitted, the Council should hold all meetings in public unless there is a specific and important policy reason for the Council to meet outside of the hearing of the residents and public the Council was elected to serve.”

A Physical, not a Fiscal Quake. San Bernardino municipal employees are one step closer to completely moving out of City Hall, not because of the city’s chapter 9 bankruptcy—from which the city expects to emerge next March, but rather in response to a substantial earthquake risk: the City Council voted 7-0 Monday night to authorize City Manager Mark Scott to lease office space in two adjacent buildings in the wake of seismic experts’ warnings that the 43-year-old City Hall building is likely to collapse during a strong earthquake. The plan is to seek a grant to retrofit City Hall so that it could comply with modern earthquake standards and employees can return; however, for the municipality hoping to emerge from the nation’s longest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy early next year, the physical disruption will be costly: it will take more than $14 million and an extended period of time, according to the city’s engineering study. Moreover, because the city was unable to obtain a lease for less than two years, the city will pay a total of $42,688 and $21,566—per month for the first year of the two-year lease, and a bit more for the second year. Additional costs associated with the move, including Information Technology costs and a moving company, approach $500,000, according to the staff report. Mayhap unsurprisingly, the plan was blasted at a Council session Monday by all of the members of the public who spoke—with one member of the public telling the Mayor and Council: “Anybody that votes yes on (the lease proposal) at this time, with as little studying as has been done, deserves to be removed from their office.”

The city, now addressing its fiscal earthquake, has received two independent engineering evaluations, in 2007 and 2016, which warn that City Hall sits atop two large faults, making it unsafe in an earthquake. The February study concluded that a magnitude 6.0 earthquake would lead to “a likelihood of building failure” for City Hall, which was designed before code updates following the 1971 Sylmar and 1994 Northridge earthquakes. With a greater than 90 percent chance of an earthquake of 6.0 or greater striking the region within 50 years, it would appear that steps not anticipated in the city’s chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment will require spending not included in that plan—spending not well received by the city’s taxpayers, who fear such spending will likely come at the expense of what they already complain is inadequate spending to combat crime, homelessness, and other issues. Moreover, the time contemplated—nine years—has added to citizen frustrations. Or as one citizen testified before the Council referring to the seismic information provided to the city nearly a decade ago: “Nine years?…I’ve heard of slow bureaucracy, but what kind of an emergency is it, if it’s nine years down the road?”

Municipal Integrity. The old expression that “when it rains, it pours,” might be apt for East Cleveland Mayor Gary Norton, who is seemingly waiting for Godot—that is, the State of Ohio to respond to the City’s request for authorization to file for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, but, instead, is confronted by an Ohio state board’s large fines for filing incomplete and late campaign finance reports related to next week’s municipal elections—in this case a recall election. Last month, the Ohio Elections Commission fined the Mayor $114,000—nearly sextuple the levy imposed by Ohio’s Attorney General last year. The most recent fines were levied in response to complaints from the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections that Mayor Norton did not file an annual report for 2015, turned in his 2014 report late, and did not resolve issues with his 2013 reports. In a series of letters, the Board of Elections asked Mayor Norton to fix a number of discrepancies in his 2013 reports—including incorrect fundraising totals and missing addresses. The board also requested proof of mileage, bank fees, phone expenses, and other spending for that year. Mayor and candidate Norton also is confronted by complaints over several missing finance reports from years prior to 2013, according to elections commission case summary records. Many of those reports have since been submitted and posted on the county board of elections website: a year ago last August, the elections commission imposed a $20,000 fine in connection with many of those cases. Mayor Norton’s last reported fundraising was in 2013, when he won a second term. He reported raising no money in 2014. Election commission fines balloon quickly. Mayor Norton’s grew by $100 for every day the problems remained unaddressed.

State Fiscal Sustainability? In Connecticut, where the state motto is Qui transtulit sustinet, or he who is transplanted still sustains, fiscal sustainability appears to be uncertain. Indeed, downgrades and related underperformance of the state’s debt are anticipated in the near-term, in no small measure due to weaker than expected revenue performance and rising fixed costs. The state confronts an expected expenditure reduction of more than 12 percent in FY2018, or $1.2 billion in non-fixed costs in FY18—a fiscal gap made more stressful because this year’s state budget relied on nearly $200 million in non-recurring revenues. The state’s Office of Fiscal Accountability recently revised state income and sales and use tax estimates down for FY17 by an aggregate of -$115.4 million; general fund revenues for FY18 are expected to post a decline of approximately $190 million from FY17 and aggregate revenue growth assumptions for FY19 and FY20 have also been downgraded. A significant factor has been fixed costs, especially from public pension obligations and other post-employment or OPEB benefits—in addition to municipal debt service and entitlements—which, together—like a Pac-Man are projected to account for 53% of expenditures in FY18. The state projects that pensions, OPEB, and debt service costs will rise by nearly 15%, while entitlements grow by nearly 5% in FY18. Worse, anticipated higher interest rates will add to future fixed costs in the form of debt service costs, while at the same time reducing bond premiums which the state has used over the past several years to reduce debt service appropriations. If there is any upside, it is that Connecticut has fully funded its pensions since 2012, albeit it has computed the liability using a relatively aggressive discount rate of 8 percent. Should the funds return less than this rate, pension costs will rise more than projected as the higher liability is amortized.

The Promise of PROMESA. Our insightful colleagues at Municipal Market Analytics note that the federally created PROMESA board has demanded that any fiscal reform plan adopted by the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico be:

  • honest with regard to any incremental federal aid Congress and the new Trump administration might provide,
  • that recurring revenues must actually be set to afford recurring expenses and vice-versa, and
  • that traditional capital market access cannot be assumed, but rather must be cultivated through balanced settlements.

MMA noted this to be “an unexpectedly earnest expression by the board and a very positive development for Puerto Rico in the long-term, although it also exacerbates short-term volatility by making standard extend-and-pretend restructuring strategies more difficult to pull off.” In response (or really non-response), outgoing Alejandro Javier García Padilla noted that although his own plan assumes massive injections of new federal aid, leaves current commonwealth spending levels unchanged, and disregards the market access issue entirely; he would not be submitting an amended version—a response that makes more difficult the PROMESA Board’s ambitious December 15th deadline for submitting its plan. MMA perspicaciously notes that the federal oversight board’s perspective could also pose a threat to the recent price appreciation in Puerto Rico’s municipal bonds, noting that to the extent to which the Commonwealth, nearing next month’s change of administrations, is forced to meaningfully address its massive structural budget deficit, there will be little room to project payment of debt service in the near– or medium-terms, with MMA noting: “In theory, more sustainable projections will reduce the size of any bondholder recovery, but will allow for higher bond ratings once a restructuring has been completed. Adding to medium-term issues, an acceptable plan’s likely need for sweeping layoffs, service austerity, and, potentially, pension payout reductions increases the potential for social unrest on the island: a development that will aid no parties besides partisans for independence.”  

Is There Promise in PROMESA? The Puerto Rico PROMESA Financial Oversight and Management Board has appealed a U.S. District Court ruling that stopped it from intervening in several consolidated suits filed against the government, having filed a motion in October to intervene in four consolidated lawsuits in order to make known its views on the plaintiffs’ pending motions to lift the automatic stay imposed under §405 of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). Thus, two weeks ago, U.S. District Court Judge Francisco Besosa denied the oversight board’s request to intervene in the suits filed by U.S. Bank Trust, Brigade Leveraged Capital Structures Fund Ltd, National Public Finance Guarantee Corp. and the Dionisio Trigo group of bondholders—a suit in which the plaintiffs were challenging the constitutionality of the Moratorium Act, which stopped payments to bondholders. Judge Besosa, early this month, had upheld a block on creditors’ ability to file lawsuits against the government of Puerto Rico in an attempt to extract repayment on defaulted municipal bonds to give time to the territory to restructure its $69 billion debt load—with the stay order part of the PROMESA Act: Judge Besosa consolidated the lawsuit filed by Altair with the suits by three other claimants and imposed a stay on them, writing: “The Court hastens to add that the Commonwealth defendants must not abuse or squander the ‘breathing room’ that the Court’s decision fosters. The purpose of the PROMESA stay is to allow the Commonwealth to engage in meaningful, voluntary negotiations with its creditors without the distraction and burden of defending numerous lawsuits.” (Besides Altair, the lawsuit was brought by Peaje Investments LLC and Assured Guaranty Corp against the government and outgoing Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla.)

Unpromising? Puerto Rico Governor-Elect Ricardo Rosselló has opted to select his campaign manager, Elías Sánchez Sifonte, to replace public finance veteran Richard Ravitch as Puerto Rico’s non-voting representative to the PROMESA Oversight Board. Commencing next year, Senor Sánchez Sifonte will replace Mr. Ravitch, and losing the experience and expertise of a public finance veteran of the Detroit oversight board, as well as someone who played a key oversight role in the cases of both New York City and Washington, D.C. Mr. Sánchez Sifonte has held a variety of positions in recent years. Most recently he was campaign manager for Gov.-elect Rosselló’s bid for governorship. Prior to that he was human resources director for the city of Toa Baja, which according to the El Nuevo Día news web site had a payroll from $16 million to $23 million per year in the last 10 years. Senor Sifonte, a Republican, is a licensed attorney and provided legal advice to the Puerto Rico Senate from 2009 to 2011. He has run Veritas Consulting since 2011. According to El Nuevo Día he worked as a lobbyist to the Puerto Rico legislature without properly being registered as a lobbyist.

The Hard Challenges of Fiscal Sustainability

eBlog, 11/29/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing—and evolving–state role in addressing municipal fiscal distress in Atlantic City: what is the role of a state and the impact on fiscal sustainability? Then we turn to the grim fiscal and governance situation in East Cleveland, Ohio—where state un-governance and next week’s looming Mayoral election appear to bode fiscal ills. Then we head south to the challenge of determining whether and how there might be promise in the implementation and unrolling of Congress’ recently enacted PROMESA legislation—the quasi chapter 9 for the U.S. Territory of Puerto Rico.

Not the Moody Blues. Moody’s Investors Service was uncharacteristically unmoody in determining that the state takeover of Atlantic City was a “credit positive” for the city, citing the unlikely threat of immediate default through 2017 as the largest contributing factor in its outlook. The credit positive comes during the first month of Gov. Chris Christie’s appointment of Jeffrey Chiesa to oversee the city: under his appointment, he has wide-ranging fiscal authority—indeed, as Moody’s described it: “While the state has not officially guaranteed Atlantic City’s debt, [the State] intends to prevent any default.” The state takeover comes as the city confronts a $2.3 million payment this week, followed by a $4.8 million debt payment on December 15th—but in the wake of the New Jersey Local Finance Board’s unanimous vote to grant its director, Timothy Cunningham, far-reaching governing powers over the beleaguered city under the authority granted by the state’s Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act, was the worst-case scenario for the city, which has been fighting a takeover for the last year, even as it barely escaped going broke; Moody’s described Mr. Cunningham’s expressed “willingness to go to the state treasury for assistance if necessary to pay debt service” as a credit positive—or, as Moody’s described it: “While the state has not officially guaranteed Atlantic City’s debt, Director Cunningham has said the state intends to prevent any default.”

Trouble in River City. In the wake of last month’s hefty fine ($114,100) by the Ohio Election Commission of East Cleveland, Ohio Mayor Gary Norton over incomplete, late, and missing fundraising reports—fine nearly quintuple last year’s—with this year’s levied in response to complaints from the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections that the Mayor failed to file a 2015 annual report, turned in his 2014 report late, and has yet to resolve issues with his 2013 reports. In a series of letters, the board of elections asked Mayor Norton to fix a number of discrepancies in his 2013 reports—including incorrect fundraising totals and missing addresses; the board has now also requested proof of mileage, bank fees, phone expenses, and other spending for that year. In response to the reports, the Mayor—and December candidate for re-election, responded: “I am aware of the situation regarding delinquent campaign finance reports…All required reports will be completed and filed. The decision of the elections commission will be appealed. Campaign finances and reporting are completely separate from city finances. No city or public funds are involved.”

It’s not as if the fiscally insolvent city is new at this game: Mayor Norton also faced complaints in the wake of several missing finance reports from years prior to 2013, according to elections commission case summary records. Many of those reports have since been submitted and posted on the county board of elections website. Last year, the Ohio elections commission imposed a $20,000 fine on the Mayor in connection with many of those cases. The problems come at an inopportune time: Mayor Norton faces a recall election next Tuesday.

Is There Promise in PROMESA? At a third session of the PROMESA oversight board, Puerto Rico Gov. Alejandro García Padilla warned the Board he will not cooperate with it to administer a fiscal plan which subjects his constituents to greater sacrifice, but offers no federal financial assistance. The response comes in the wake of last Friday’s warning by Board members that the solution to the U.S. territory’s problems will have to include deep government spending cuts and structural changes. None of the Board members emphasized the importance of paying Puerto Rico’s debt. Indeed, several board members emphasized that substantial federal aid was neither likely, but rather impossible. In the wake of last month’s implicit and at times explicit rejection of the fiscal plan presented by Gov. Alejandro García Padilla last month, PROMESA Board Member Ana Matosantos noted that “deep” restructuring was necessary—adding that additional reforms and spending cuts would also be necessary, warning that federal assistance was unlikely and that without it, there would have to be an additional $16 billion in spending cuts “before you pay a dime of debt service.” Indeed, Board member Andrew Biggs noted that the PROMESA Board will have to put together a recovery package which does not assume a federal bailout; but he also noted that in cases of sovereign debt crises, most attempts to turn the situation around fail, because they fail to examine and address the “big questions.” Thus, he warned: the successful turnarounds question the existence of the big social programs. PROMESA Board Chairman José Carrión III warned that he believed it unlikely Puerto Rico would receive all of the fiscal assistance the Governor was seeking—especially vis-à-vis health care, where the U.S. territory is not treated on a par with states—noting that the board must come up with multiple scenarios, and the Board would have to be bold and use the plan to encourage economic growth.

The PROMESA Board December 15th deadline would seem, as our colleagues at Municipal Market Analytics note, “in peril,” but also raise the specter of the legal authority of the PROMESA Board should a new gubernatorial regime prove unwilling to comply with or carry out mandates from the PROMESA Board. MMA notes, also, the near term impossible straddle between addressing its structural debt whilst making projected debt payments, adding that “an acceptable plan’s likely need for sweeping layoffs, service austerity, and, potentially, pension payout reductions increases the potential for social unrest on the island.”

Finding Hope in Flint. Brian Willingham, for the New York Times last week wrote of his services two decades ago with the Flint Police Department “because I believed I could make a difference,” asking: “How can a city fall so far that we lose sight of the possibility of solutions?”  Noting that wages and benefits in the city have been reduced by more than 25% since 2011—a period during which he was laid off and rehired thrice—he noted the police force today is one-third of its former size—adding that while the national average is three officers for every one thousand citizens, in Flint is half an officer for that number of citizens, writing: “In one of America’s most dangerous cities, the people who secure the city are less secure than they’ve ever been. Yet we continue serving, as we did through the loss of General Motors, through the crack cocaine epidemic and, most recently, through the mass lead poisoning of Flint citizens. The crisis around Flint’s poisoned water points to a larger issue of structural racism and poverty in urban society. How can citizens in Flint trust the police to protect them when they can’t even trust their government to provide them with clean water? This is the kind of question that has placed police officers and African-Americans on a collision course. Police officers are seen as outsiders in urban America. White officers are seen as racist, while black officers like me are seen as traitors to our race.”

What Is the State Role in Municipal Solvency/Recovery?

 

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eBlog, 11/21/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the state role in addressing municipal fiscal distress and bankruptcy: what are the different models—and how are they working? Then we consider one especially dysfunctional model: Ohio, where the City of East Cleveland could find its two Mayoral candidates in municipal jail before the voters go to the polls early next month. From thence, we strike east to consider this month’s elections in Massachusetts on charter schools—examining an issue that goes to the heart not only of state local relations and authority, but also to the potential impact on municipal assessed property values. What may be learned? Finally, we wish readers a Happy Thanksgiving!

What Is the State Role in Municipal Solvency/Recovery? Under our country’s system of dual federalism created by the founding fathers, while federal law authorizes municipalities to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy, a city, county, or school district may only do so if authorized by a state. Today, only 18 of the 50 states provide such authority. Ergo, one of the issues we have sought to consider through this eBlog has been the evolving State role in municipal distress in a field of seeming constant flux. This month, for instance, we experienced the uncertain governance situation in New Jersey in the wake of the state takeover of the City of Atlantic City—a state takeover in which the process and how it will play out could be further impacted by the potential selection by President-elect Trump of New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, who might be a potential Cabinet or other senior advisor to the President-elect.

Actual governance has shifted from local accountability to the state’s Division of Local Government Services—but with the state already having imposed a state emergency manager in the city, what the new state takeover means continues to be uncertain. In Ohio, which authorizes chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, the City of East Cleveland’s request to do so appears to be on the desk of Rod Serling in the Twilight Zone: there has simply been no response of any kind. Similarly, in California, state policies have clearly contributed to some of the fiscal distress that led Stockton and San Bernardino into chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, but the state played absolutely no role in helping either Stockton or San Bernardino to emerge. Michigan, a state which has been deeply enmeshed in municipal fiscal distress—albeit not necessarily in a constructive manner—has acted in different ways—going from its imposition of an emergency manager—a process with deadly consequences in Flint, but seemingly key to Detroit’s turnaround. Alabama, by refusing to allow Jefferson County to raise its own taxes, directly aided and abetted the County’s chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Rhode Island, on the day of Central Falls’ chapter 9 filing—the very day Providence, the state’s capitol city, was itself poised on the rim of filing, but opted not to—and the state, thanks to the exceptional ingenuity of its then Treasurer (now Governor), created an ingenious model of creating teams of city managers and retired state legislators to act in teams to offer assistance to cities in danger of insolvency—so that there was a team effort before—instead of after such a precipitous event.

Part of what has made this effort to assess what is happening in the arena of severe municipal fiscal challenges and bankruptcy so much more difficult is the surprise that, in the wake of recovery from the Great Recession, one would have assumed severe municipal fiscal distress and insolvency would have dissipated. It has not. What has changed? Why are States not reacting more uniformly? With only 18 states permitting municipal bankruptcy, what state models exist which offer a clearly defined legal or legislated route to address not just insolvency, but also to avoid the spread of fiscal contagion? What is a state’s role in recovery from a chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy? What is a state’s role in addressing increasing fiscal disparities?

Ungoverning in a Fiscal Twilight Zone. In East Cleveland, Ohio, the mall city which is seeking authority from the State of Ohio to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy—a plea to which it remains unclear whether there will ever be a response, and where there have been on and off discussions with adjacent Cleveland about a consolidation of the two municipalities; the city’s election day activities provide a sense of the increasing dysfunctional nature of the small city: it was, after all, on election day this month at Mayfair Elementary School where both candidate Devin Branch and current Mayor Gary Norton were working the polls trying to convince registered voters to go with their respective causes. Mayor Norton was pressing potential voters not to recall him at the city’s upcoming election on December 8th; Devin Branch was going door-to-door to obtain the 550 requisite signatures to ensure the recall would officially be on the ballot. Their respective efforts, however, came up against each other when they encountered each other going after the same person and their battle became an event where they pressed their respective clip boards in front of registered voters—leading to a confrontation so that Mayor Norton decided to order the Chief of Police and a squad of police to arrest Mr. Branch. Moreover, dissatisfied with the police response, Mayor Norton then ordered his personal lawyer, Willa Hemmons, to issue a warrant for the arrest of Mr. Branch. Thus, in an insolvent municipality, several squads of police and detectives were directed to make the arrest of Devin Branch last Thursday. Mr. Branch was arrested and placed in East Cleveland’s jail; last Friday, Judge William Dawson opened the door for his release after posting bond. This morning, Judge Dawson will hear from both men, albeit, what the voters and city’s taxpayers will hear seems unlikely to be enlightening for the city’s fiscal future.

Schooled in Fiscal Solvency? Massachusetts voters this month overwhelmingly rejected a major expansion of charter schools, rejecting Question 2 by nearly a 2-1 margin, in what was perceived as a significant setback for Governor Charlie Baker, who had aggressively campaigned for the referendum, saying it would provide a vital alternative for families trapped in failing urban schools. As proposed, the measure would have allowed for 12 new or expanded charters per year, adding significantly to the existing stock of 78 charters statewide. Had the measure been approved, it would have—as state-imposed charter schools in Detroit are, shifted thousands of dollars in state aid from public to charter schools—shifting as much as an estimated $451 million statewide this year. During the campaign, opponents such as Juan Cofield, president of the New England Area Council of the NAACP, warned that charters were creating a two-tiered system, draining money from the traditional schools that serve the bulk of black and Latino students, telling voters “a dual school system is inherently unequal.” Worcester Mayor Joseph Petty, an opponent, noted: “Here in Worcester we will spend $24.5 million dollars on charter schools in our city…that is money that could be used to hire more teachers, improve our facilities, and invest in our students,” in effect underscoring the reason municipal leaders in the Bay State opposed the measure: their apprehension with regard to the fiscal impact on cities, towns, and school districts when more children attend charter schools. Had the measure been adopted, district schools would have received less money: the money to educate a child would have followed the child: over time, expanding access to charter schools could cost local property taxpayers more, since district schools will need more funding, forcing local elected leaders to either raise property taxes more, or cut public services. Indeed, opponents of charter school expansion claimed, based on state data, that school districts would have lost some $450 million this year to charter school tuition, even after accounting for state reimbursements.

Unsurprisingly, ergo, municipal officials generally opposed expanding charter schools, with the mayors of Springfield, Boston, Chicopee, Holyoke, Northampton, Pittsfield, Westfield, and West Springfield all coming out publicly opposed. Geoff Beckwith, the Executive Director of the Massachusetts Municipal Association, said the current funding system is already difficult for cities and towns to deal with, noting that, for one, the formula transferring money from district to charter schools does not take into account the fact that many of a school’s costs are fixed and do not vary by child, noting that with regard to the fiscal impact on cities, towns and school districts: “You have to a have a classroom, you have to heat the building, you still have principals…It’s extremely hard for communities to actually cut costs…The only thing they can do is cut back on the overall quality of the programming they’re offering the vast majority of kids who stay behind in the regular public school system.” Ergo, he noted: “Until the financing system is fixed, the ballot question providing for the expansion of charter schools would exacerbate and deepen the financial trouble that these local school systems are dealing with…And the communities that are most impacted by charter school expansion are in most cases the most financially challenged communities.” (Unsurprisingly, the Massachusetts Municipal Association board voted unanimously to oppose the ballot question.) Indeed, Moody’s reported the rejection to be a credit positive for the Commonwealth’s urban local governments: “It will allow those cities and towns to maintain current financial operations without having to adjust to increased financial pressure from charter school funding.” According to Moody’s, since the last charter school expansion in 2010, cities such as Boston, Fall River, Lawrence, and Springfield have experienced significant growth in charter school assessments, averaging 83% due to increasing charter school enrollment. To which, Moody’s notes: “So far, the growing cost of charter schools on municipalities has not been a direct credit challenge; rather the effect is more indirect because Massachusetts school districts are integrated within cities and towns with relatively healthy credit profiles.” The agency went on to write: “Education in the commonwealth is a primary budget item within a municipality’s overall budget, which allows city budgets to absorb some of the education financial stress with other municipal sources….This integration is a key distinction from school districts in other states that operate separately from the communities they serve.”

Muhnicipal Bankruptcy in the Home Stretch

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eBlog, 11/18/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider San Bernardino’s home stretch to emerging from the nation’s longest-ever chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy—and guidance by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury to steps the city might consider to avoid its emergence early next year from being appealed—a la Jefferson County, Alabama. Indeed, we then visit Jefferson County, where it appears the County’s elected leaders appear on the verge of finally getting their day in court with regard to the appeal related to the county’s plan of debt adjustment. From thence, we observe the political waves rolling ashore where Donald Trump’s bankrupt casinos grace Atlantic City’s beaches—and where the New Jersey League of Municipalities featured Gov. Chris Christie in town and some more discussion of the evolving state takeover of Atlantic City by what Mayor Don Guardian deemed the “occupation force.” We consider the role of the state and mechanisms for a state takeover—as well as the options for the municipality. Finally, we journey back to Detroit where a federal investigation is underway with regard to the city’s unique and innovative demolition program: The challenge for a city in which in 1950, there were 1,849,568 people, but, by 2010, only 713,777, ergo, at the time of its chapter 9 filing, a city home to an estimated 40,000 abandoned lots and structures: Between 1978 and 2007, Detroit lost 67 percent of its business establishments and 80 percent of its manufacturing base. In its efforts to address the issue, Detroit undertook extraordinary measures to address vast tracts of abandoned homes—nests of crime—but maybe triggering a federal investigation.

The Last Hurdle? U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury this week has ordered San Bernardino officials into mediation with one of the municipality’s few creditors still challenging the city’s chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment, writing that she is weeks away from the “final confirmation hearing” of what has been the longest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in history. Judge Jury added she had been prepared to make a ruling on some of the issues still blocking her ability to confirm San Bernardino’s plan, more than fifty-one months after the city filed with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. Judge Jury made clear she now intends to rule on December 6th on both issues raised by one creditor, the Big Independent Cities Excess Pool (BICEP), as well as on other remaining issues, noting, efficiently, that that ought to prevent the mediations from prolonging what is already the record holder for the longest municipal bankruptcy in the nation’s history. Moreover, Judge Jury noted, the mediation could save time, in no small part by preventing an appeal—an outcome with which Jefferson County, Alabama leaders would surely agree. As Judge Jury noted: “This really doesn’t slow down the process, and it might, over the years, if you reach a mediated solution, speed things up.” Judge Jury added that the confirmation hearing would be labeled on the calendar as final, which, while not a 100 percent guarantee it would be the final, does offer hope it shall, writing: “I’m not requesting anything from the city, except to come prepared to potentially put a bow on this case on the 6th – but potentially not.” The mediation in question commences today in Reno, Nevada with retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Gregg Zive. (San Bernardino and creditors have noted with respect Judge Zive’s previous mediation sessions as having been key to brokering major settlements as part of the city’s chapter 9 case, including the resolution with the city’s largest creditor, CalPERS. Nonetheless, the proposed mediation has both sides publicly discounting its chances of success: San Bernardino’s attorney, Paul Glassman, noted: “BICEP could have sought mediation six months ago, but instead placed the legal dispute before the court and pressed to block confirmation of the plan unless it got its way…Caving in to BICEP’s intransigence and efforts at delay is not in the best interests of the City’s creditors. It’s too late for mediation.” (BICEP is a risk-sharing pool of large Southern California cities for claims against any of the member cities, and its disputes with San Bernardino involve whether the city or BICEP is responsible for claims of more than $1 million.) Providing an idea of how complex the challenge of extricating one’s municipality from chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy can be, the BICEP issue is related to another outstanding issue in this record-length, complicated chapter 9 case: objections from the group referred to in court as the civil rights creditors. Juries previously awarded those creditors compensation for their claims, such as the $7.7 million awarded to Paul Triplett after a jury found San Bernardino police in 2006 broke Mr. Triplett’s jaw, arm, ribs, leg, ankle, and foot, leaving him comatose for three days. Under the city’s proposed plan of debt adjustment, because these creditors are in the unsecured class, the pending plan of debt adjustment would pay 1 percent or $77,000, in Mr. Triplett’s case. Nevertheless, Judge Jury, in a previous hearing, noted that while she sympathized with Mr. Triplett, she saw no legal reason to argue he did not belong in the unsecured class of creditors, 95 percent of whom voted in favor of the city’s plan of debt adjustment. That would mean any avenue of relief would be for the challenge to demonstrate that experts the city hired were wrong when they argued, with extensive documentation, that San Bernardino could not afford to pay more than 1 percent to its unsecured creditors. However, Judge Jury this week noted that those creditors’ interest now aligned with the city in its battle with BICEP, and that they could attend the mediation in Reno. On a high note, from the city’s perspective, Judge Jury also rejected the proposal by another of the challenging civil rights attorneys, Richard Herman, that the plan be modified in light of the possible “financial bonanza” recently legalized marijuana would bring: Judge Jury said the amount of those revenues would not be known for years, and she was unwilling to delay the case that long, especially when city services were underfunded in many other ways.

An Appealing Route to Full Recovery? Jefferson County Commission President Jimmie Stephens yesterday noted: “I am delighted that our case is now set and that we will have our day in court,” referring to yesterday’s announcement that the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has scheduled oral arguments on the appeal of Jefferson County’s chapter municipal bankruptcy plan. The court set December 16th as the date—albeit, this marks the eighth time the court has set a date, so that whether this will finally prove to be the date which could offer the final exit from the county’s municipal bankruptcy remains incompletely certain. It has now been nearly three years since Jefferson County filed with the court an adjustment to its post-chapter 9 filing to adjust debt primarily related to it sewer system obligations (the county had exited its chapter 9 bankruptcy in the wake of issuing some $1.8 billion in sewer refunding warrants to write down $1.4 billion of the sewer system’s debt.) As structured, the agreement incorporates a security provision for the county’s municipal bondholders to allow investors to return to federal bankruptcy court should County Commissioners fail to comply with their promise to enact sewer system rates that will support the 40-year warrants. It was that commitment which provoked a group of sewer ratepayers—a group which includes local elected officials and residents—to challenge the constitutionality of the provision. Ergo, they filed their appeal to Jefferson County’s plan of debt adjustment in January of 2014 with the U.S. District Court in the Northern District of Alabama. Jefferson County has argued that the U.S. Bankruptcy court oversight has been a key security feature to give investors in its bonds reason to purchase its 2013 warrants, and that the ratepayers’ appeal became moot when the chapter 9 plan of adjustment was implemented with the sale of new debt; however, U.S. District Court Judge Sharon Blackburn two years ago opined in the opposite, writing that she could consider whether portions of the County’s plan are constitutional, including the element allowing the federal bankruptcy court to retain oversight. It is Judge Blackburn’s decision that the County has appealed; and it is Jefferson County President Stephens who notes: “I am very confident that the facts and prevailing law support Jefferson County’s position.”

What Does a State Takeover of a City Mean? Atlantic City convened its first City Council meeting since the state officially took the municipality over earlier this week—and since it appeared to be clear that Gov. Chris Christie will not become a member of President-elect Donald Trump’s cabinet—so that the state’s unpopular Governor was himself in Atlantic City for the annual meeting of the New Jersey State League of Municipalities—indeed, where six mayors representing urban areas gathered at the conference to discuss what they would like to see in a new governor and how he or she can help people who are living and struggling in cities across the state—but where, as one writer noted, the elephant in the room, and throughout the entire conference, has been the state’s decision to take over Atlantic City’s government. Indeed, Mayor Don Guardian addressed that and other issues during a speech at The Governor’s Race and the Urban Agenda seminar, noting: “We need a governor that won’t take over Atlantic City, but rather one that will lend us a helping hand,” adding: “I talk to 10 business leaders and developers every single week, and all they tell me is they can’t afford to do business in New Jersey.” Mayor Albert Kelly, of Bridgeton, said he’s frustrated because he feels towns like his get forgotten with the current administration. He said Bridgeton has lost state funding for various programs: “Because we’re a smaller town in New Jersey, we often get overlooked.”

As for the city itself, Mayor Guardian, speaking to his colleagues from around the state, noted, referring to the state takeover: “They can use all of the power, they can use some of the power, and in a very shocking instance, they can use none of the power…This is uncharted territory in our city.” He noted this unrestricted power means any of the items named in the so-called state takeover act enacted earlier this year, including breaking union contracts, vetoing any public-body agenda, and selling city assets. Atlantic City’s state takeover leader, former New Jersey Attorney General and U.S. Senator Jeffrey Chiesa, was in Atlantic City, where he noted he had impressed upon himself the importance of making himself known to the city and the City Council. Earlier in the week, during a radio interview, Governor Christie had lauded Mr. Chiesa as “someone who has provided extraordinary service to the state” and is now determined to revive one of New Jersey’s most iconic cities, adding: “More importantly than that, he’s an outstanding person who cares about getting Atlantic City back on track and working with the people of Atlantic City and the leaders of Atlantic City to get the hard things done. Because if we make the difficult decisions now and do the difficult things, there is no limit to Atlantic City’s future.”

Under the terms of the state takeover, Mr. Chiesa is granted vast power in the city for up to five years, including the ability to break union contracts, hire and fire workers, and sell city assets and more. In his first session with Mayor Don Guardian and members of the city council, Mr. Chiesa noted he had “a chance to listen to (the mayor’s) concerns” and looks forward to gathering more information “so we can make decisions in the city’s best interest,” adding he did not know what his first decisions would be. Atlantic City Councilman Kaleem Shabazz said after the meeting he remains optimistic the city and state can still work together to pull the resort back on its feet: “I’m taking (Chiesa) at his word, what he said he wanted to do, which is work in cooperation with the city.”

With Gov. Christie in Atlantic City yesterday for the League meeting, the Mayor preceded Gov. Christie in speaking to the session, and later sat to the Governor’s right; however, the two avoided any takeover talk at the annual conference luncheon at Sheraton Atlantic City Convention Hotel: that is, the elephant in the room of greatest interest to every elected municipal leader in the room went unaddressed. Or, as Mayor Guardian put it: “Obviously, I was surprised he did not.” Instead of Atlantic City, Gov. Christie discussed his possible future in a Donald Trump White House and defended raising the gas tax to fund road and bridge projects. For his part, the Mayor, in what was described as a fiery speech at an urban mayors’ roundtable discussion, said he needed a new governor with heart, brains and courage—and one who “won’t take over Atlantic City, but rather one that will lend us a helping hand.” New Jersey Senate President Steve Sweeney, who introduced the so-called takeover law, was also a guest at the conference: he noted that, in retrospect, Atlantic City officials would have been better advised to have provided a draft recovery plan to the state much sooner, rather than wait until just before the deadline, adding: “You hope that we can move forward and find a way to put this city back together in a place where the taxpayers can afford it.”

Fiscal Demolition Threat? The U.S. Attorney’s Office yesterday ordered FBI agents to acquire documents yesterday from the Detroit Land Bank Authority, an authority which is under federal criminal investigation relating to Detroit’s demolition program, albeit the office clarified it was a “scheduled visit to provide records, not a raid.” Ironically, the raid occurred in a building owned by Wayne County, which had received a courtesy call from building security that the FBI was present inside the building. The FBI actions relate to a federal investigation related to the city’s federally funded demolition program, which has been under review since last year when questions were raised about its costs and bidding practices. The raid comes just a month after Mayor Mike Duggan revealed that U.S. Treasury had prohibited the use of federal Hardest Hit Funds for demolitions for two months beginning last August in the wake of an investigation conducted by the Michigan Homeowner Assistance Nonprofit Housing Corp., in conjunction with Michigan State Housing Development Authority, which turned up questions with regard to “certain prior transactions” and indicated specific controls needed to be strengthened. In addition, a separate independent audit commissioned last summer by the land bank revealed excessive demolition costs were hidden by spreading them over hundreds of properties so it appeared no demolition exceeded cost limits set by the state—turning up mistakes over a nine month period between June 2015 and February, including inadequate record keeping, bid mistakes, and about $1 million improperly billed to the state. Mayor Duggan has admitted the program has had “mistakes” and “errors.” That admission came after the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or SIGTARP, sent the city a federal subpoena for records.

Auditor General Mark Lockridge acknowledged his office received the federal subpoena after it released preliminary findings from a months-long audit into the city’s demolition activities. The federal subpoena was seeking documents supporting the preliminary audit; now a Wayne County Circuit judge next month is expected to revisit a battle over the release of the subpoena the land bank received from SIGTARP, after Judge David Allen had, last August, ruled the subpoena could stay secret for the time, albeit he believed it ultimately was “the public’s business.” Judge Allen has scheduled an update on the stage of the investigation during a hearing slated for Pearl Harbor Day. In addition, Detroit’s Office of Inspector General is also conducting a review of an aspect of the program.

The city has taken down more than 10,600 blighted homes since 2014.

Monitoring Municipal Fiscal Stress

eBlog, 11/17/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the evolving state takeover of Atlantic City, with the appointment by the state of what Mayor Don Guardian deemed the “occupation force.” We consider the role of the state and mechanisms for a state takeover—as well as the options for the municipality. Then we look west to an innovative state-local tax collection sharing effort between the State of Michigan and City of Detroit—mayhap appropriate in the emerging sharing economy; then west where, in the wake of municipal elections in post-chapter 9 Stockton, the newly elected Mayor begins thinking about the city’s further post municipal bankruptcy fiscal future. Then we swing back southeast to the historic small city of Petersburg, Virginia—where a private team has been hired to try to pilot the city—and the region—out of near insolvency. Then we look north, to the land of the incomparable Don Boyd of the Rockefeller Institute, who yesterday was a host to a fascinating session with New York Assistant Comptroller Tracey Hitchen Boyd who discussed with us the Empire State’s “groundbreaking Fiscal Stress Monitoring System to identify local governments and school districts experiencing financial strain.” Finally, with winter beginning to bite, we seek warmth in the Caribbean, venturing back to Puerto Rico, where the Puerto Rico Oversight Board created under the new PROMESA law preps for its meeting tomorrow—a meeting that will come during transition periods of administrations both in the federal and Puerto Rican governments—adding still greater challenges to the U.S. territory’s transition.

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State Preemption of a Municipality? The twilight period during which Atlantic City has awaited its state takeover now appears to be over, or, as Mayor Don Guardian posed it, the “occupation force” of a “governor we don’t like” has been named. New Jersey has tasked Jeffrey Chiesa, a longtime ally and associate of Gov. Chris Christie—indeed, an associate the Governor once named to fill in as one of the state’s U.S. Senators in the wake of the death of former U.S. Sen. Frank Lautenberg, and who also served as New Jersey’s Attorney General, to serve as the “director’s designee” to execute the state takeover of Atlantic City, from which position he will report to New Jersey’s Department of Community Affairs, under the leadership of Tim Cunningham, the Director of New Jersey’s Local Finance Board. In this new capacity, Mr. Chiesa will have far-reaching powers, including the authority to unilaterally hire, fire, eliminate departments and authorities, sell assets, terminate union contracts, and veto any action by City Council, according to the state’s Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act. In its release, the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs said Mr. Chiesa would use his authority “judiciously.”

In the statement, Mr. Chiesa said: “It is my hope to work together with firm conviction and not disrupt the democratic process…I am committed to improving essential government and community services for the people of the Atlantic City…“I will listen to the people and work hand in hand with local stakeholders to create solutions that will prevent waste and relieve generations of taxpayers from the burden of long-term debt. We will put Atlantic City back on a path to fiscal stability.”

With regard to governance, the Department said Atlantic City Mayor and City Council will “maintain day-to-day municipal functions.”  Mr. Chiesa’s role will be to oversee “fiscal recovery efforts, ” with the release from the Department noting his immediate steps would include entering into PILOT (payment in lieu of taxes) agreements with casinos, ensuring that debt service and county and school payments are made on time, in addition to exploring “right-sizing the City’s work force.” What and how Atlantic City’s elected government leaders will do—and what they may do could now be the outcome of the third branch of the state’s government: the courts, especially in the wake of Mayor Guardian’s making clear yesterday that the city was poised to go to court to block any actions by the state that it regards as civil rights violations. Early yesterday, Mayor Guardian said the city would go to court if the state takes actions “we see as unconstitutional.”

The road ahead promises to be steep: the state takeover comes with the Governor potentially leaving to join the new Trump Administration; Atlantic City has a roughly $100 million annual budget deficit and about $500 million in total debt. The city’s ratable base has declined from $20 billion in 2010 to $6 billion today as the casino town faced more competition in neighboring states: five of the city’s famed boardwalk casinos have closed since 2014—with significant implications for unemployment, per capita income, and assessed property values.

State Preemption. In the wake of last week’s state Local Finance Board vote to usurp major decision-making powers from Atlantic City’s elected leaders week, Local Government Services Director Timothy Cunningham noted: “The simple fact is Atlantic City cannot afford to function the way it has in the past…I look forward to meeting with Mayor Guardian and members of the City Council and starting the process of bringing this great city back to financial stability. It is my hope to work together with firm conviction and not disrupt the democratic process.”

As we have previously noted, the Board’s vote for the takeover came in the wake of the state Department of Community Affairs Commissioner Charles Richman rejecting the city’s fiscal-recovery plan last week—a plan which the Department criticized, because it failed to balance the city’s 2017 budget, ran a five-year shortfall of $106 million, and did not accurately estimate cost and revenue projections. In addition, the Department expressed concerns over the Bader (airport) Field sale, calling the water authority’s plan to issue $126 million in low-interest, long-term bonds to pay for the land “dubious at best.”

The Sharing Economy? The State of Michigan Tuesday committed to begin processing Detroit city business tax returns for the first time next January, enhancing a state-local partnership between the Motor City and the Michigan Department of Treasury that began last year with individual income tax returns and which will extend to business returns starting with the 2016 tax year. Under the new partnership, any business required to withhold city income taxes and any taxpayer who files under Detroit’s corporate partnership and fiduciary rules will be affected by the change: it will allow corporate filers to electronically submit their returns and use other online department services. In addition, partnership and fiduciary filers will submit their returns to the Treasury Department. As part of the reforms, the State’s handling of individual tax returns will allow filers to electronically submit both city and state returns. (Detroit residents pay a 2.4 percent individual income tax rate, while nonresidents pay a 1.2 percent rate. Detroit’s business income tax rate is 2 percent.)

Taking Stock in Stockton. In his first public comments since last week’s election, Mayor Anthony Silva this week said “the hate and the political battles” must end “if Stockton is truly going to heal and move forward.” Noting that: “Stockton is still a divided city,” the new Mayor said: “We have a new mayor, and he is now my mayor.” The outgoing Mayor spoke for five minutes at this week’s City Council meeting, the first such meeting since his lopsided loss last week to City Councilman Michael Tubbs. He graciously added: “I would expect anyone out there who claims to be my friend or one of my supporters not to participate in any sort of hate against the new mayor and to allow him the opportunity to lead.” (Mayor-elect Tubbs will take office January 1st.) Mayor Silva added: “I want you to pray and root for his success. Mayor-elect Tubbs, you have my support and you have my commitment for a smooth transition during the next month and a half. Congratulations.” The Mayor-elect did not refer to the outgoing Mayor’s comments during his own public remarks; rather he said Stockton has much to be grateful for as Thanksgiving approaches, referring especially to voters’ approval in the election of a one-quarter-cent sales and use tax to benefit Stockton’s library and recreation services: “Think of the gifts the voters gave us…That shows me that the residents in the city of Stockton are ready to get to work, that they want to be part of the solution. I think that bodes well for us at the end of this year as we move forward to next year.” (The Mayor-elect won his election by a 70-30 margin.) He added: “In Stockton, we love diversity. We don’t tolerate bigotry. If you’re LGBT, if you’re Muslim, if you’re undocumented, if you’re documented, if you’re immigrant, Stockton is your home, we love you, you’re part of our community.” Outgoing Mayor Silva noted that he had sent a text message to Councilmember Tubbs immediately after the election, and added that the two had “a great meeting” post-election meeting—a meeting he noted which “was important…because four years ago I never got a text message or a phone call or an email from my opponent (then-Mayor Ann Johnston), and then when I reached out to her I still never got one.” He added: “I would never wish this same action upon anyone, and Mayor-elect Tubbs and the new City Council do not deserve this type of hate, either.”

Addressing Municipal Dysfunction. Robert Bobb, the former Richmond, Virginia city manager whose consulting team has been hired on for hundreds of thousands of dollars by the nearly insolvent small, but historic city of Petersburg, Virginia told the City Council this week “There’s a lot of work to do, a lot of clean-up to do. We’re at it every day…There are a lot of dedicated people here who are working hard to help us.” Nevertheless, the challenge is significant: Mr. Bobb estimated the city has just $78,000 in cash in the wake of a debt payment due; yet it confronts critical payments to select vendors; a mandatory $427,000 payment to the school system; and tomorrow’s payroll—and that is after an unexpected fiscal gift: some $1.3 million that the team was able to scrounge up working with the administration of Virginia Gov. Terry McAuliffe and the Virginia Resources Authority from unused municipal bonds dating back to 2013. The challenge is made greater, moreover, in a city where nearly half the city’s children are estimated to live below the federal poverty line, according to U.S. Census data. Mr. Bobb also warned the Council that he remains unable to ascertain how much of the $18 million backlog in past-due bills the city owes that Virginia state officials identified over the summer has been resolved. About $10 million in accounts payable bills remain outstanding; however, there are many other categories of expenses. Moreover, as Nelsie Birch, Petersburg’s deputy interim City Manager and acting Finance Director noted: “That’s only for bills we’ve received,” adding that as of earlier this week there was more than $1 million in the city’s checking account, but “it’s more than spoken for,” noting that payroll costs about $1 million every two weeks. Unsurprisingly, the Council voted unanimously to allow the city manager to make the moves necessary to secure the funding. In addition, the Council authorized acting City Manager to move forward and secure $6.5 million in short-term financing to help Petersburg remain operating through the end of the year, with part of those funds to go toward a lump-sum payment of $1.2 million due by mid-December to help settle a lawsuit filed against the city by the regional South Central Wastewater Authority—where the municipality has been delinquent since last May, threatening the budgets of the other municipalities in its region. Petersburg has agreed to address its outstanding balance within two years, according to the statement, albeit how it will do so is something which remains to be resolved.

Good Gnus, Bad Gnus. Mr. Bobb advised the Council that his team’s fiscal analysis had, to date, discovered both good and bad news: in the latter category, among the most disappointing findings, they determined that a $92,000 cut made this year to the city’s Department of Social Services had triggered a loss of $600,000 in state funds needed to help Petersburg’s most vulnerable residents—especially its children. On the good gnus side, he told them that the dismissal of the South Central region’s lawsuit would clear the path for the city to move forward with short-term solutions that would offer his group the time and space to implement long-term plans to move the city back towards solvency, noting that the city, for the first time since the beginning of the fiscal year, had posted its current fiscal year budget online. However, he also reported that it was not just the city’s taxpayers who had been left in the fiscal dark in recent months: the municipality’s department heads had been operating without spending plans revised to address the $12 million in cuts made by the City Council last September to balance the budget for the first time in nearly a decade. The report, however, also advised Councilmembers that the City Council had voted to approve road projects Petersburg could not afford and that the city’s decentralized system of paying for goods and services was such that finance workers hoping to avoid further overspending could not see what resources had been committed until the office received an invoice. That meant, the team reported to the elected leaders, Petersburg will need to defer some past priorities, including postponing some utility upgrades such as water tank upgrades and overhauling sewage main and lines; museum and golf course upgrades; replacing City Hall; and planned work on other city facilities.

Early Fiscal Storm Warnings. New York Assistant Comptroller Tracey Hitchen Boyd this week, in a communication to New York local elected leaders, wrote that since the state, three years ago, had implemented a “groundbreaking Fiscal Stress Monitoring System to identify local governments and school districts experiencing financial strain,” the state had received suggestions from local leaders on ways to enhance that system, so that the state has opened a comment period to enhance the state’s ability to provide an early fiscal warning to local leaders in order to provide an opportunity to take corrective actions. The program, now in its fourth year, aims to provide an early warning of fiscal problems to local officials and citizens so that corrective actions can be taken before a true financial crisis occurs. The state is completing its fourth year of such reviews, evaluating every city, county, town, village, and school district based on a series of standard financial indicators. Each entity is scored annually to determine if, according to the measures, it falls within one of three levels of fiscal stress. The System also evaluates the general environmental factors affecting municipalities, or, as Ms. Boyd wrote: “We are completing our fourth year of FSMS reviews, evaluating every city, county, town, village, and school district based on a series of standard financial indicators. Each entity is scored annually to determine if, according to the measures, they are in one of three levels of fiscal stress. The System also evaluates the general environmental factors affecting municipalities.”

Federal Preemption. The Puerto Rico Oversight Board has scheduled its first session in Puerto Rico for tomorrow, with the meeting set outside of Fajardo, Puerto Rico. While the session will be by invitation only, it is scheduled to be streamed online at www.oversightboard.pr.gov, and to be followed by a press conference. It follows two earlier meetings convened in New York City. At this week’s session, the agenda includes a presentation by Conway MacKenzie Inc. on the government’s liquidity; a presentation by the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority; public testimony on Puerto Rico’s proposed fiscal plan; and the creation of procedures to approve transactions of the board’s “covered entities.” The session comes as the U.S. territory confronts a $3 billion cash shortfall in its current fiscal year—having disclosed that sum yesterday as part of its report it will be presenting to the PROMESA Board tomorrow—with that tidy sum coming due next February—assuming that would be the proximate date of the lifting of the current debt payment moratorium, but also optimistically assumes Puerto Rico will not have reached agreements with its creditors by that date: the tidy sum, after all, represents nearly 33% of Puerto Rico’s current approved fiscal year budget. Moreover, the island faces some $2.2 billion in municipal bond debt service between then and the end of its fiscal year—not to mention some nearly $850 million in unpaid municipal debt service. The territory’s government has sought to address its growing financial crisis via any number of avenues, including the deferral of payments to suppliers and the deferral of tax payments; however, it is running out of fiscal options.

What Are the Challenges of Governance Takeovers?

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the evolving state takeover of Atlantic City, with the appointment by the state of what Mayor Don Guardian deemed the “occupation force.” We consider the role of the state and mechanisms for a state takeover—as well as the options for the municipality. Then we look far south to a seemingly comparable federal takeover of a quasi-state, as the Puerto Rico Oversight Board created under the new PROMESA law preps for its first meeting at the end of this week in Puerto Rico—a meeting that will come during transition periods of administrations both in the federal and Puerto Rican governments—adding still greater challenges to the U.S. territory’s transition.

State Preemption of a Municipality? The twilight period during which Atlantic City has awaited its state takeover now appears to be over, or, as Mayor Don Guardian posed it, the “occupation force” of a “governor we don’t like” has been named. Last night, New Jersey tasked Jeffrey Chiesa, a longtime ally and associate of Gov. Chris Christie—indeed, an associate the Governor once named to fill in as one of the state’s U.S. Senators in the wake of the death of former U.S. Sen. Frank Lautenberg, and who also served as New Jersey’s Attorney General, to serve as the “director’s designee” to execute the state takeover of Atlantic City, from which position he will report to New Jersey’s Department of Community Affairs, under the leadership of Tim Cunningham, the Director of New Jersey’s Local Finance Board. In this new capacity, Mr. Chiesa will have far-reaching powers, including the authority to unilaterally hire, fire, eliminate departments and authorities, sell assets, terminate union contracts, and veto any action by City Council, according to the state’s Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act. In its release, the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs said Mr. Chiesa would use his authority “judiciously.”

In the statement, Mr. Chiesa said: “It is my hope to work together with firm conviction and not disrupt the democratic process…I am committed to improving essential government and community services for the people of the Atlantic City…I will listen to the people and work hand in hand with local stakeholders to create solutions that will prevent waste and relieve generations of taxpayers from the burden of long-term debt. We will put Atlantic City back on a path to fiscal stability.”

With regard to governance, the Department said Atlantic City Mayor and City Council will “maintain day-to-day municipal functions.”  Mr. Chiesa’s role will be to oversee “fiscal recovery efforts,” with the release from the Department noting his immediate steps would include entering into PILOT (payment in lieu of taxes) agreements with casinos, ensuring that debt service and county and school payments are made on time, in addition to exploring “right-sizing the City’s work force.”

What Atlantic City’s elected government leaders will do—and what they may do could now be the outcome of the third branch of the state’s government: the courts, especially in the wake of Mayor Guardian’s making clear yesterday that the city was poised to go to court to block any actions by the state that it regards as civil rights violations. Early yesterday, Mayor Guardian said the city would go to court if the state takes actions “we see as unconstitutional.”

The road ahead promises to be steep: the state takeover comes with the Governor potentially leaving to join the new Trump Administration; Atlantic City has a roughly $100 million annual budget deficit and about $500 million in total debt. The city’s ratable base has declined from $20 billion in 2010 to $6 billion today as the casino municipality faced more competition in neighboring states: five of the city’s famed boardwalk casinos have closed since 2014—with significant implications for unemployment, per capita income, and assessed property values.

State Preemption. In the wake of last week’s state Local Finance Board vote to usurp major decision-making powers from Atlantic City’s elected leaders week, Local Government Services Director Timothy Cunningham noted: “The simple fact is Atlantic City cannot afford to function the way it has in the past…I look forward to meeting with Mayor Guardian and members of the City Council and starting the process of bringing this great city back to financial stability. It is my hope to work together with firm conviction and not disrupt the democratic process.”

As we have previously noted, the Board’s vote for the takeover came in the wake of the state Department of Community Affairs Commissioner Charles Richman rejecting the city’s fiscal-recovery plan last week—a plan which the Department criticized, because it failed to balance the city’s 2017 budget, ran a five-year shortfall of $106 million, and did not accurately estimate cost and revenue projections. In addition, the Department expressed concerns over the Bader (airport) Field sale, calling the water authority’s plan to issue $126 million in low-interest, long-term bonds to pay for the land “dubious at best.”

Federal Preemption. The Puerto Rico Oversight Board has scheduled its first session in Puerto Rico for this Friday, with the meeting set outside of Fajardo, Puerto Rico. While the session will be by invitation only, it is scheduled to be streamed online at www.oversightboard.pr.gov, and to be followed by a press conference. It follows two earlier meetings convened in New York City. At this week’s session, the agenda includes a presentation by Conway MacKenzie Inc. on the government’s liquidity; a presentation by the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority; public testimony on Puerto Rico’s proposed fiscal plan; and the creation of procedures to approve transactions of the board’s “covered entities.”

The timing of the meeting comes during both U.S. mainland and Puerto Rican transition periods—where the position of the incoming Trump administration vis-à-vis Puerto Rico remains to be developed—albeit a spokesperson for the U.S. Treasury noted: “We all have a role to play in the coming months: the current and future governor, the oversight board, local legislature, Congress, and the current and future administrations in Washington…At Treasury, this is a top priority and we are committed to ensuring a smooth transition to the next administration.” The bar is high: Puerto Rico is facing some $70 billion in debt and at least $46 billion in unfunded pension liabilities: the U.S. territory’s public pension systems currently have more than 330,000 members and serve as the primary source of income for more than 150,000 retirees, according to the Treasury.

For his part, Puerto Rico Governor-elect Ricardo Rosselló faces the awkward position of being a newly elected U.S. governor—but one whose power and authority is circumscribed by the new federal law, so that he will have to work with the new seven-member oversight board, imposed by the PROMESA law to address some hybrid form of governance: that board has the power to require balanced budgets and fiscal plans from commonwealth leaders, as well as to file debt restructuring petitions on behalf of Puerto Rico and its entities in federal district court as a last resort, if voluntary negotiations with creditors fail. It comes as the PROMESA Board is reviewing the fiscal plan submitted by outgoing Puerto Rico Gov. Alejandro García Padilla last October. In this ‘feeling out’ process of governance—all parties have a narrow window in which to govern even during the respective U.S. and Puerto Rican governance transitions: the new federal law, PROMESA, includes an automatic stay on debt-related litigation until February 15th, a stay intended to provide time to address what a Treasury official deemed “the most urgent aspects of the problems facing the island,” even though acknowledging the federal government and new PROMESA law lack key tools to prevent another crisis when, for example, federal healthcare funding is exhausted. The U.S. territory currently receives $1.5 billion in funding under the Affordable Care Act—funds scheduled to expire next year absent additional federal action—funding in an island wracked by Zika and other serious health care challenges where expiration could impact about 900,000 Puerto Ricans, according to the Treasury.

Thus, in the transition process between now and January 20th, the Treasury is looking to the eight-member Congressional Task Force on Economic Growth in Puerto Rico to help address urgent healthcare and tax solutions on the federal level. The task force, made up of equal numbers of Republicans and Democrats, has been tasked with identifying federal laws and programs that impede Puerto Rico’s growth and recommending changes that could spur economic growth—changes which could be incorporated as part of a potential year-end omnibus bill designed to keep the government open and operating.

 

State-Local Governance in the Balance or Imbalance: Uncharted New Territory

eBlog, 11/11/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the uncertain governance situation in New Jersey in the wake of Wednesday’s yesterday’s granting of authority for a state takeover of the City of Atlantic City—a state takeover which could be further impacted by the potential selection by President-elect Trump, because New Jersey Governor Chris Christie appears to be a potential Cabinet or other senior advisor to the President-elect. As we noted yesterday, actual governance will shift from local accountability to the state’s Division of Local Government Services—but with the state already having imposed a state emergency manager in the city, what the new state takeover means continues to be uncertain.  Then we turn to a very different change of governance—in bankrupt San Bernardino, where the state has played absolutely no role, but where voters Tuesday, by a wide margin, voted to change the city’s charter and move to a city manager form of government, even as the city nears, early next year, emerging from the longest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy ever. Then we venture to post-chapter 9 Detroit, where voters pored through an exceptionally long list of candidates to elect a new school board—a board confronted with a state-imposed double school system of charter and public schools—and in a city whose school system has been under a state imposed manager, the ever so rhythmic retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes, who oversaw the long judicial process from which Detroit emerged from the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history. Given the critical import of restoring a school system that would bring families back into Detroit—and thereby enhancing assessed property values, the new DPS school board members will have to learn very fast. Finally, we venture to Flint, where, yesterday, a U.S. District court decision could have difficult and costly consequences for the fiscally challenged city.

State Preemption of a Municipality? In the wake of this week’s 5-0 vote by the New Jersey Local Finance Board, Gov. Chris Christie’s administration has been granted the authority to immediately seize control of financially distressed Atlantic City, with the unanimous vote paving the way for a five-year state takeover—a takeover Governor Christie referred to as the best way to keep the city from becoming the first New Jersey municipality since 1938 to go into chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. The vote came, of course, just prior to the Presidential election of Donald Trump—an election which has many guessing that Governor Christie might abruptly be named as a senior adviser or even member of a new Presidential cabinet—he has been discussed as a potential Attorney General. Thus, even as the state of New Jersey has moved to usurp the authority to assume key functions usually controlled by local elected leaders: renegotiating union contracts, hiring and firing employees, and selling municipal assets, the question is how. The right to wrest governance authority was power included under the Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act, but exactly how that state takeover will work remains fuzzy. Under the terms of the state preemption, Timothy Cunningham, the Director of the Division of Local Government Services, will assume responsibility during the takeover—in effect not unlike the authority granted under Michigan’s Emergency manager law—except that in Michigan, said emergency manager can—and did in the case of Detroit—assume absolute power. Within the first twenty-four hours, the then Mayor and Council were barred from meeting and preempted from any governance authority.

In New Jersey, however, the State of New Jersey, with only one previous takeover as experience, means, as Mr. Cunningham appears to be the first to admit: he is uncertain what duties or responsibilities would remain with the city’s elected local leaders—describing the decision as moving into “unchartered territory,” as well as an “unbelievable responsibility.” Thus the state takeover, comes at this time of uncertainty in the statehouse, and with the state emergency manager already having been in place in Atlantic City for over a year: what happens next? The ever so insightful Marc Pfeiffer, the Assistant Director of the Bloustein Local Government Research Center at Rutgers University, puts it succinctly: “This is a new process…We’ve never done a process like this before.” While New Jersey has previous experience, as we have written, with a state takeover of Camden, in this instance, as Mr. Pfeiffer notes, the state has granted itself more authority to take direct control in Atlantic City, adding that while more than a decade ago in Camden, the state assigned a chief operating officer to help sort out Camden’s financial problems—a change which resulted in the dissolution of the city’s police department and the transfer of authority to patrol Camden to the county police—and which, today, he notes,means: “Camden is effectively not on the critical list anymore,” adding it is, fiscally, in better shape than either Trenton or Paterson—even as he cautions: “Atlantic City’s fiscal problems are far more critical that those of Trenton or Paterson: The city’s not dead: They haven’t been able to get their expenses under control to live within their circumstances.” Mr. Pfeiffer opines that the state might opt to dissolve Atlantic City’s Municipal Utilities Authority and sell it or enter into a long-term contract with an outside entity for its operation—even as the city’s leadership has countered they would sue to stop such a move.

Who’s in Charge? Again, unlike in Michigan, the state preemption authority is not spelled out with regard to who will be in charge, what will happen to the state’s existing quasi emergency manager who has been in Atlantic City for well over a year, much less what actions it will take and which powers, if any, will remain with city officials. And, as Mr. Pfeiffer notes, there are also legal questions about how the state can execute the major decision-making powers it usurped from the city and gave to Local Government Services Director Timothy Cunningham.

Presumably, Director Cunningham, or his designee, can now sell city assets, hire or fire workers and break union contracts, among other powers, for up to five years as the state tries to fix the city’s finances—all part of a brave new world of distressed municipal finance the state is still trying to work out—even down to questions not just with regard to who will be in charge of the city, but also whether that supervising state official will be based in Trenton or in Atlantic City. Mr. Cunningham has so far declined to comment on whether he would run the city himself or appoint a designee, but said he would consider looking “outside and inside” the division. He noted yesterday: “I do have a very competent staff that has the majority of the municipalities under control while my attention has been on Atlantic City…If a designee was brought on, I don’t know if I have the resources in-house.”

From the city’s perspective, as it seeks to keep its legal options to sue the state open, it remains unclear what authority remains: the New Jersey preemption authority does, however, include a long list of powers the state could use, from suing on behalf of the city to purchasing goods and services. Thus, Council President Marty Small noted: “We have to sit down with the Commissioner and see what powers we still have to continue to represent the people who elected us,” adding that the Commissioner has “all the powers to do everything that was in the (takeover law), and we’re just hoping it isn’t as draconian.” But, as Mr. Cunningham noted, there will remain a role for the Mayor and Council, as he committed to meet with city officials to discuss the powers granted to him under the takeover law, noting: “I think there are still some authorities and actions that will be retained by the executive and legislative branches.”

 “If there was such a plan for the state, we could say ‘They’re planning to implement this power,’” as Michael Darcy, Executive Director of the New Jersey League of Municipalities put it: “It creates a lot of questions.” Mr. Darcy said the League would await to see how the state intervenes in Atlantic City and what the possible statewide implications might mean to the future of state-local relations before deciding to get involved, adding: “We’re not the league of one municipality, we’re the league of all municipalities…We are going to keep a close look at it.” In this unclear and unsettled set of complex governance choices, as Mr. Pfeiffer makes clear, New Jersey’s third branch of government, the courts, could play a role, as the state’s actions may trigger a lawsuit, citing, for example, that if the State of New Jersey were to break city union contracts, such an action could be grounds for litigation.

Bracing for a New Beginning. San Bernardino voters Tuesday voted overwhelmingly to adopt a new city charter to move to a city manager form of governance, reversing rejections of that direction in 2014 and 2010. With more than a 60% margin, they voted for Measure L, which replaces the city’s governing document. The new charter replaces the 111 year old charter—a charter adopted when the city was a small municipality of less than 10,000, with a charter for the 21st century which provides the framework with regard to which positions are elected and which are appointed, the responsibilities of those officials and certain other restrictions. A key change will increase the power of the city manager and shift that day-to-day responsibility away from the elected officials directly—that is, move to a council-manager form of government, the structure for 58 percent of cities with a population over 100,000, or, as Mayor Davis described it during the campaign: “This is how modern governments work, with the mayor and council setting the policy and professionals implementing it,” even as his predecessor, former Mayor Judith Valles had warned that such a change would weaken San Bernardino: “There’s a pecking order among cities, and the cities where the mayor is a strong mayor are able to take leadership.” The new charter eliminates elections for three positions, so that, in future, the Mayor and Council will appoint the city attorney.

Interestingly, during the campaign, former city attorney, James F. Penman, in opposing the measure, had argued that the people will not and should not give up their power to vote, stating: “When he was a Congressman in the House of Representatives, on July 27, 1848, Abraham Lincoln gave a speech in which he said, quote, ‘In leaving the people’s business in their hands, we cannot be wrong’…It’s such a fundamental part of American democracy.” Under the newly adopted charter, San Bernardino will move its election cycle to even-numbered years, the years when state legislators, the governor, and President are up for election, a change with regard to which former San Bernardino Councilwoman Susan Lien Longville had said: “Combining elections will even save San Bernardino taxpayer dollars—money the city can spend on reducing crime, improving parks and libraries, and fixing our roads.” Also, interestingly, the new charter will replace the old charter’s personnel rules—rules which mandated that police and firefighter pay be set as the average of 10 like-sized California cities, rather than by collective bargaining like nearly all other cities. Under the new charter, employee pay will be set through collective bargaining. Similarly, pay for the City Councilmembers, previously set at $600 per year, now will be set by the Mayor and Council after a public hearing, and after hearing from an advisory commission. Any raises will go into effect following the next election after the increase. The new charter also imposes a balanced budget requirement, strict financial controls, and an annual independent audit which must be shared publicly. The now discarded charter read: “The Mayor shall have the books and records of all public departments, pertaining to the finances of the City, experted by a competent person at least once in every year.” Clearly that “experted” part proved out-of-order as the city collapsed in 2012 into what has stretched to the longest municipal bankruptcy in American history with the city’s books crushed in 2012 under a $45.8 million deficit and its books unaudited for years. The newly adopted charter provides that the city’s Water Department and Library Board will remain independent. In the wake of the vote, Mayor Davis said he looked forward to seeing the reaction of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury, who has been presiding over the city’s chapter petition, noting: “It sends a good message…I think she’ll be overjoyed.”

Learning for a City’s Future. Detroit voters, facing record numbers of candidates (sixty-three!) for its re-constituted public school system, elected newcomers to a majority of the seven public school board seats that were open: among the winners were one former school board member and his wife. Those vying included ten persons who sat on the previous school board, as well as newcomers hailing from backgrounds in business, education, and the ministry. (All seats were at-large.) Of those elected, the top two vote-getters will serve for six years, the next three will serve four-year terms, and the final two will serve for two years. Their unenviable task will be to steer the 45,000-student district following years of severe financial turmoil, poor academic performance, a series of widely criticized state-appointed emergency managers, and the signal disruption by the Michigan Legislature’s creation of a dual school system in Detroit made up of charter and public schools—as part of the controversial and historic $617-million financial restructuring package which divided the  Detroit Public Schools (DPS) in two, creating the new DPSCD: the old of former DPS district now exists only to collect tax revenue to pay down debt. That new legislation also restored power to an elected board, albeit authority subject to the prerogatives of the Detroit Financial Review Commission, which monitors the city’s finances, and now will add oversight of the newly created district to its report card.

The new DPS school board will be able to hire a new superintendent and have policy-making authority; however, it cannot fire the superintendent on its own. How the new schooling system works as the Motor City is emerging from the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history, will, perhaps, be the single most critical determinant pf the city’s long-term post-bankruptcy future. And it will require heavy lifting: the city’s public schools have suffered enrollment losses over 66 percent over the last sixteen years: enrollment has dropped by more than two-thirds since 2000—a combination of the city’s sharp population decline, but also the flood of departures to charter schools and suburban districts: more than 100 schools have closed since 2005. During this period, state-appointed emergency managers have run the district since 2009—and that followed the period from 1999 to 2005, when the system was also under state control. Now, with the board facing a severely impeded school system of charter and public schools mandated by the state, the question is whether this seemingly jerry-rigged patchwork of charter and public schools can recover their reputation sufficiently to lure young families in from the suburbs to create an enhanced municipal tax base for the future.

Out Like Flint? U.S. District Judge David Lawson yesterday ruled that the State of Michigan and the City of Flint must provide home-delivered bottled water to residents if they cannot prove faucet filters are working to remove harmful lead from the drinking water, ordering home delivery of four cases of water per resident each week unless state and city officials can verify each resident has a properly installed and maintained faucet water filter, writing: “The defendants need not deliver water to homes that have properly installed and maintained faucet water filters, as long as the defendants can monitor and verify the effectiveness of the filters,” in his 37-page opinion. Judge Lawson’s preliminary injunction had been pressed for by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, and Flint residents who had sued Michigan and Flint officials in an effort to try to speed up the slow process of removing lead service lines blamed for contaminating the city’s water. ACLU’s Michigan Legal Director Michael J. Steinberg, in the wake of the decision, noted: “It is an important, but rare, victory for the people of Flint, who have suffered one set back after the next since poison started flowing out their faucets more than two years ago.” Both Flint and Michigan officials had opposed door-to-door water service: they testified that the costly and time-consuming weekly distribution would delay efforts to remove and replace lead and galvanized metal pipes that are leaching toxic metal into the drinking water supply. In his opinion, however, Judge Lawson wrote: “It is in the best interest of everyone to move people out of harm’s way before addressing the source of the harm.” Indeed, it will be costly: the Michigan State Police’s emergency operations division estimated it would cost $9.4 million for weekly delivery of bottled water to the 30,000 to 34,000 occupied homes in Flint. Judge Lawson also ordered state and city officials to file a report by December 16th detailing how they are complying with his order. In his decision, Judge Lawson wrote that the city and state’s water resource sites were insufficient for the daily needs of Flint residents, while the water remains unsafe to drink without lead filters: “The fact that such items are available does not mean that they are reliably accessible or effective in furnishing safe drinking water to every household…Indeed, the endeavor of hunting for water has become a dominant activity in some Flint residents’ daily lives.” The judge also wrote that a safe and reliable water supply “has always been critical to civilization,” as he blamed the city’s water pipe leaching of lead directly on the shoulders of the City of Flint while under control by a state-appointed emergency manager: “It appears beyond dispute that the city of Flint failed to meet its responsibilities under the corrosion control regulations of the Lead and Copper Rule,” adding it “appears that Flint is continuing to violate” rules for monitoring lead levels in Flint’s drinking water system based water sampling protocols not being followed.