Federalism obstacles to Puerto Rico’s Fiscal and Physical recovery.

February 28, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the federalism obstacles to Puerto Rico’s fiscal and physical recovery.

Puerto Rico’s Obstacles to Recovery. 78 mayors are set to meet today with Governor Ricardo Rossello Nevarez and representatives of the Army Corps of Engineers to discuss the delay in the restoration of the island’s energy system—a meeting at which they intend to present the Governor with other problems they confront in their municipios or municipalities in the wake of the hurricane. Since last November, and only weeks after the goal to restore 95% of power by last Christmas has fallen way short, the government yesterday reported restoration had reached over 84%; however, the figures did not make clear whether that percentage reflected generation or subscribers with electricity. Today’s session is focused on providing the Governor the opportunity to make clear his concern that the Corps has so far not addressed the island’s issues and to receive a full explanation why not and “how to correct the situation that is still serious,” according to Rolando Cruz, the president of the Association of Mayors and first executive of Cayey. Also participating are the Mayor Francisco López López of Barranquitas and William Alicea of Aibonito, said that although their primary claim is the restoration of light, their concerns are broader. The key concern relates to the perceived inability, to date, of help from FEMA—especially with regard to bridges and highways, mental health of affected citizens, and the dire challenges of so many who have lost their homes or suffered unaffordable damages—and who have been unable to prove ownership of their property—or, as Mayors López López put it: “Here in the mountains, we are still going through very difficult situations: sectors without electricity, without drinking water, roads destroyed.” The apprehension is, if anything, worsening: yesterday, Governor Rosselló Nevares denounced the decision by the U.S. Treasury to reduce, without explanation, the amount of initial financing of $4,700 million by more than half to $2,030 million from the line of Congressionally approved credit for Puerto Rico. In his letter to Congressional leaders, the Governor wrote that the U.S. had “effectively blocked access to some $4.7 billion from the CDL (Commercial Driver’s License) program,” urging intervention to avoid “further damage and suffering to the residents of Puerto Rico,” noting that any material interruption of public services would only exacerbate the emigration of its population to the continental United States. He added that the Treasury has imposed conditions incompatible with the purpose of the program, while criticizing that the federal agency has canceled the ability to cancel any CDL issued to Puerto Rico “in clear contravention of the applicable law,” writing that the U.S. territory is approaching spring in the same precarious fiscal situation, with the possibility that the Treasury will cancel federal aid approved by law,” notwithstanding the Financial Advisory Authority and Fiscal Agency’s compliance with each request from Treasury. His epistle noted that despite the immediate cooperation of the agency, the Treasury did not provide the agency with economic terms or other material terms for the CDL program (In an effort to help Puerto Rican citizens relocating to the mainland in the wake of hurricanes Irma and Maria, the Federal Motor Carrier Administration had waived certain requirements in an effort to help them obtain commercial learner’s permits or commercial driver’s licenses: according to the Governor, last January 9th, the Treasury and FEMA had sent a letter to the local government regarding the implementation of a cash balance policy in order to facilitate access the CDL financing—but a letter requesting Puerto Rico to exhaust its own resources before the Treasury and FEMA would provide access to CDL program funds.

Chapter Nueve? Even as Puerto Rico is struggling to address its severe physical challenges, notices with regard to the deadline for filing proofs of claim in Puerto Rico’s five Title III bankruptcy cases are going out this week, as U.S. Judge Laura Taylor Swain had set a Monday deadline for the notices to be delivered. Notwithstanding, and not to be blamed on the mailman, FAFA Executive Director Gerardo Portela Franco reported the notices would start to be sent out this week—with five of the Title III entities having at least $52.5 billion in debt outstanding, in what has now become  the largest quasi municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history: the notices in question will inform creditors that they will have until May 29th to file a proof of claim in the cases. The debt issuers here include: the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corp. (COFINA), the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority, and the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority. Responding will matter: those who fail to file a timely-filed proof of claim or trustee proof of claim will lose any claim for compensation for their municipal bonds, as well as their rights to vote on any plan of debt adjustment. Indeed, yesterday, PREPA bond trustee U.S. Bank National Association posted a notice to EMMA stating it planned to file a proof of claim on behalf of the bondholders, specifying: “[I]f you believe that you may have separate or additional claims against the Authority other than the claims with respect to principal, interest and other amounts owing on your bonds or have claims against other Title III debtors or other persons or entities concerning your bonds or otherwise, you should consult with your legal professionals regarding those claims and take appropriate action within the applicable time period.”

On the physical, as opposed to the fiscal storm front, in the wake of the U.S.’s worst blackout in American history, the complicated and costly effort for a quasi-chapter 9 entity, major chunks of infrastructure and power restoration appears to have reached a plateau: while most, today, have electricity, it is unclear how much longer those in the dark will have to wait. Jay Field, a spokesman for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, notes: “The bulk of the work that is left is the hardest, requiring helicopter support and long commutes to remote, hard-to-access job sites…Weather is also an issue due to rain and heavy winds.” Last week, Puerto Rico’s unified grid-restoration command reported it expects to have 90 to 95% of the territory’s power restored by March 31st: it estimates that the hard-hit municipality of Arecibo will have its electricity restored by mid-April, and the municipality of Caguas by late May. He offered no timeline for other darkened municipios. A critical part of the physical recovery challenge has been the complicated overlapping lines of authority, as well as Puerto Rico’s insolvency: even though the U.S. Army Corps is in charge of overall recovery, PREPA has been in charge of much of the repair work—a Puerto Rican authority which is $9 billion in debt—and which, last week, suffered a fiscal blow when Judge Laura Taylor Swain  rejected its plea for a $550 million loan—leading the utility to respond it would start reducing output at some of its power plants, because it could not afford fuel. In its court filing, the utility stated that the scenario “exacerbated the risk to an already fragile system and leaves it vulnerable to outages and resulting in brownouts on the island.” That work involves nearly 6,000 repair workers now on the island, but where, seemingly on a daily basis, the workers keep finding new problems.

As of last Wednesday, 343,000 electricity customers were without grid power, the lowest number yet: in the wake of the storm, there were nearly 1.6 million customers experiencing a blackout. So, on the one hand, there has been significant progress; however, much of the progress has been followed by drops, as PREPA’s old and fragile grid has occasionally failed and plunged swaths of newly restored customers back into darkness. Most recently, a fire at a substation two weeks ago, for instance, plunged more than 343,000 and much of the capital of San Juan into darkness. Thus it means, still today, that thousands of homes and businesses are running either full or part-time on backup diesel generators—meaning those families or businesses are running generators, forcing them to pay for fuel. For PREPA, the challenge is aggravated by the uncertainty with regard to certainty about how many customers are without grid power: from the onset of Maria until early November, PREPA gave a rough estimate; then it simply stopped trying: the damage to the grid was so extensive that the utility could simply no longer determine  how many of its customers were drawing electricity. It was only near the end of last month that PREPA started reporting its percentage of “normal peak load” which had been restored. Nevertheless, that reporting indicates the percentage of power restored has risen from 19% in early October to almost 84% last week. Yet, even that restoration has been unreliable: even though parts of PREPA’s grid have crashed on numerous occasions during the recovery, only a few of those outages are shown by the data—a deficiency, because power was often restored within hours or days and, ergo, was not captured in the weekly reports.

Another serious challenge has been substations: Puerto Rico has 342 distribution substations, which convert power from transmission to distribution use: improvement has occurred slowly since November, but has been basically flat in 2018: the grid’s 56 transmission substations have seen no improvement since December: these stations step up voltage for long-distance delivery or prepare it for transport along transmission lines of different voltages. Progress is a challenge: Fernando Padilla, a senior PREPA adviser, reported that damage to the substations still offline was so devastating that they need to be rebuilt from the ground up: “A portion of the substations, specifically those that are close to where the eye of the hurricane passed, remain totally destroyed. Those require complete reconstruction (engineering, design, mitigation, etc.)…The PREPA system has points of interconnection that permit energy to be carried through various zones without having to pass by these particular substations: This isn’t the norm, and it augments the risk to the reliability of the system. But in general, it can be done.”

The Steep & Winding Road Out of Municipal Bankruptcy and State Oversight

February 26, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the hard road out of chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy and state oversight.

Motor City Races to Earn the Checkered Flag. Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan last Friday presented his proposed annual budget to the City Council, informing Councilmembers that, if approved, his $2 billion budget would be the keystone for formal exit from Michigan state oversight: that is, he advised he believed it would lay the ground work for ending the Financial Review Commission created in the wake of the city’s chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy: “Once we get this budget passed, we have the opportunity to get out from active state oversight…I don’t have enough good things to say about how the administration and Council has worked together.” As we had noted last month, Michigan Treasurer Nick Khouri, the Chair of the state oversight commission, made clear that the trigger to such an exit would be for the city to post its third straight budget surplus—with the Treasurer noting: “I think everyone, including me, has just been impressed with the progress that’s been made in the city of Detroit, both financially and operationally.”

For Detroit to fully emerge from the nation’s largest ever municipal bankruptcy, it must both comply with the provisions of the federal chapter 9 bankruptcy code, which provides that the debtor must file a plan (11 U.S.C. §941); neither creditors nor the U.S. Bankruptcy Court may control the affairs of a municipality indirectly through the mechanism of proposing a plan of adjustment of a municipality’s debts that would in effect determine the municipality’s future tax and/or spending decisions: the standards for plan confirmation in municipal bankruptcy cases are a combination of the statutory requirements of 11 U.S.C. §943(b) and portions of 11 U.S.C. §129. Key confirmation standards provide that the federal bankruptcy court must confirm a plan if the following conditions are met: the plan complies with the provisions of title 11 made applicable by sections 103(e) and 901;the plan complies with the provisions of chapter 9; all amounts to be paid by the debtor or by any person for services or expenses in the case or incident to the plan have been fully disclosed and are reasonable; the debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the plan; except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed to a different treatment of such claim, the plan provides that on the effective date of the plan, each holder of a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(1) will receive on account of such claim cash equal to the allowed amount of such claim; any regulatory or electoral approval necessary under applicable non-bankruptcy law in order to carry out any provision of the plan has been obtained, or such provision is expressly conditioned on such approval; and the plan is in the best interests of creditors and is feasible.

Unlike in a non-municipal corporate bankruptcy (chapter 11), where the requirement that the plan be in the “best interests of creditors,” means in the “best interest of creditors” if creditors would receive as much under the plan as they would if the debtor were liquidated; under chapter 9, because, as one can appreciate, the option of Detroit to sell its streets, ambulances, and other publicly owned municipal assets is simply not an option, in municipal bankruptcy, the “best interests of creditors” test has generally been interpreted to mean that the plan must be better than other alternatives available to the creditors. It is not, in a sense, different from a Solomon’s Choice (Kings 3:16-28): that is, in lieu of the alternative to municipal chapter 9 bankruptcy of permitting each and every creditor to fend for itself, the federal bankruptcy court instead seeks to interpret what is in the “best interests of creditors” as a means to balance a reasonable effort by the municipality against the obligations it has to its retirees, municipal duties, service obligations, and its creditors—albeit, of course, leaving the door open for unhappy parties to object to confirmation, (see, viz. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 943, 1109, 1128(b)). The statute provides that a city or municipality may exit after a municipal debtor receives a discharge in a chapter 9 case after: (1) confirmation of the plan; (2) deposit by the debtor of any consideration to be distributed under the plan with the disbursing agent appointed by the court; and (3) a determination by the court that securities deposited with the disbursing agent will constitute valid legal obligations of the debtor and that any provision made to pay or secure payment of such obligations is valid. (11 U.S.C. §944(b)). Thus, the discharge is conditioned not only upon confirmation, but also upon deposit of the consideration to be distributed under the plan and a court determination of the validity of securities to be issued. (The Financial Review Commission is responsible for oversight of the City of Detroit and the Detroit Public Schools Community District, pursuant to the Michigan Financial Review Commission Act (Public Act 181 of 2014); it ensures both are meeting statutory requirements, reviews and approves their budgets, and establishes programs and requirements for prudent fiscal management, among other roles and responsibilities.)

As part of Detroit’s approved plan of debt adjustment, the State of Michigan mandated the appointment of a financial review commission to oversee the Motor City’s finances, including budgets, contracts, and collective bargaining agreements with municipal employees—a commission, ergo, which Mayor Duggan, last Friday, made clear would not simply disappear in a puff of smoke, but rather go into a “dormancy period: They do continue to review our finances, and if we in the future run a deficit, they come back to life, and it takes another three years before we can move them out.”

Mayor Duggan’s proposed budget includes an $8 million boost to Detroit’s Police Department budget—enough to hire 141 new full-time positions. With the increase, the Mayor noted, the city will be able to expand its Project Greenlight and Ceasefire programs—adding that the Motor City had struggled to fill police department vacancies until about two years ago when the City Council passed a new contract. Detroit had improved from its last place ranking in violent crime in 2014, moving up to second worst in 2015, vis-à-vis rates per resident in cities with 50,000 or more people: in 2014, Detroit had recorded 13,616 violent crimes, for a rate of about 994 incidents per 50,000 people, declining to 11,846 violent crimes in 2015, and to a violent crime rate of about 880. Since then, the city has been able to hire 500 new officers, albeit, as the Mayor noted: “This city is not nearly where it needs to be for safety.”  Additionally, Mayor Duggan said his budget allows Detroit to double the rate of commercial demolitions with a goal of having all “unsalvageable” buildings on major streets razed by 2019. That would put the city on track for cleaning up its commercial corridors, he added. The budget allocates $100 million of the unassigned fund balance to blight remediation and capital projects, which is double the resources allocated last fiscal year. Other budget plans include more funding for summer jobs programs and Detroit At Work; neighborhood redevelopment plans for areas such as Delray, Osborn, Cody Rouge, and East English Village; and boosting animal control so it can operate seven days a week.

The $2 billion budget dedicates $1 billion to the city’s general fund. Chief Financial Officer John Hill said it is able to maintain its $62.3 million budget reserve, which exceeds the $53.6 million requirementCouncilman Scott Benson said the Mayor presented a “conservative fiscal budget” which allows Detroit to live within its means. The Councilmember said prior to the meeting that he had hoped the budget would address funding for poverty and neighborhood revitalization. However, council members received the budget 20 minutes before the meeting and Councilmember Benson said he needed more time to review it. “We’re seeing some good things,” he said of Mayor Duggan’s proposals, “But I want to dig into the numbers and actually go through it with a fine-tooth comb.” Officials say city council has until March 9 to approve the budget.

That early checkered flag for the Motor City ought to help salve the city’s reputational wounds in the wake of the KO administered to the city’s bid to host Amazon. Indeed, as Quicken Loans Chairman Dan Gilbert wrote, it was Detroit’s negative reputation, not a lack of talent which knocked it out of the running for an Amazon headquarters, as he tweeted to the 60-plus member bid committee who crafted Detroit’s bid: “We are all disappointed,” referring to the city’s failed bid to make the cut for the top 20 finalists. Nevertheless, Mr. Gilbert urged members not to accept the “conventional belief” that Detroit had fallen short because of its challenges with regional transportation and attracting talent; rather, he wrote, the “elephant in the room” was the nasty reputation associated with the post-bankruptcy city’s 50-plus years of decline: “Old, negative reputations do not die easily. I believe this is the single largest obstacle that we face…Outstanding state-of-the-art videos, well-packaged and eye-catching proposals, complex and generous tax incentives, and highly compelling and improving metrics cannot, nor will not overcome the strong negative connotations that the Detroit brand still needs to conquer.” Regional leaders had been informed that Detroit’s bid had failed to move on because of inadequate mass transit and questionable ability to attract talent.

As part of Detroit’s approved plan of debt adjustment, the State of Michigan mandated the appointment of a financial review commission to oversee the Motor City’s finances, including budgets, contracts, and collective bargaining agreements with municipal employees—a commission, ergo, which Mayor Duggan, last Friday, made clear would not simply disappear in a puff of smoke, but rather go into a “dormancy period: They do continue to review our finances, and if we in the future run a deficit, they come back to life, and it takes another three years before we can move them out.”

Mayor Duggan’s proposed budget includes an $8 million boost to Detroit’s Police Department budget—enough to hire 141 new full-time positions. With the increase, the Mayor noted, the city will be able to expand its Project Greenlight and Ceasefire programs—adding that the Motor City had struggled to fill police department vacancies until about two years ago when the City Council passed a new contract. Detroit had improved for its last place raking in violent crime in 2014, moving up to second worst in 2015, vis-à-vis rates per resident in cities with 50,000 or more people: in 2014, Detroit had recorded 13,616 violent crimes, for a rate of about 994 incidents per 50,000 people, declining 11,846 violent crimes in 2015, and to a violent crime rate of about 880. Since then, the city has been able to hire 500 new officers, albeit, as the Mayor noted: “This city is not nearly where it needs to be for safety.”  Additionally, Mayor Duggan said his budget allows Detroit to double the rate of commercial demolitions with a goal of having all “unsalvageable” buildings on major streets razed by 2019. That would put the city on track for cleaning up its commercial corridors, he said. The budget allocates $100 million of the unassigned fund balance to blight remediation and capital projects, which is double the money allocated last fiscal year. Other budget plans include more funding for summer jobs programs and Detroit At Work; neighborhood redevelopment plans for areas such as Delray, Osborn, Cody Rouge and East English Village, and boosting animal control so it can operate seven days a week. 

The $2 billion budget dedicates $1 billion to the city’s general fund. Chief Financial Officer John Hill said Detroit is able to maintain its $62.3 million budget reserve, which exceeds the $53.6 million requirementCouncilman Scott Benson said the mayor presented a “conservative fiscal budget” that allows Detroit to live within its means, having said, prior to the meeting, that he hoped the budget would address funding for poverty and neighborhood revitalization. However, council members received the budget 20 minutes before the meeting and Councilmember Benson said he needed more time to review it. “We’re seeing some good things,” he said of Mayor Duggan’s proposals. “But I want to dig into the numbers and actually go through it with a fine-tooth comb.” Officials say city council has until March 9 to approve the budget.

Fiscal Recoveries from Fiscal & Physical Storms

eBlog

February 23, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the municipal fiscal threats to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, before taking a fiscal spin on the roulette tables of Atlantic City.

Fiscal Hurricane Fallout. Jaison R. Abel, Jason Bram, Richard Deitz, and Jonathan Hastings of the New York Federal Reserve this week, in their examination of the fallout in the wake of Hurricanes Irma and Maria on the economies of the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands noted that both were suffering from significant economic downturns and fiscal stress well before the storms hit nearly six months ago—noting that in their wake, the initial job losses in Puerto Rico totaled about 4 percent; in the U.S. Virgin Islands, job losses were double that—and there has been no rebound thus far. The authors wrote that these losses are considerably steeper than what has typically been experienced in the wake of most significant U.S. natural disasters, albeit not nearly as devastating as Hurricane Katrina’s unprecedented impact on the New Orleans economy more than a decade ago. The Fed three noted that domestic air passenger data indicate that from last September through November, more than 150,000 people left Puerto Rico, net of arrivals, and that the number who left the U.S. Virgin Islands was proportionally even larger. Thus, they opined, looking ahead, recovery will be affected by a variety of factors: especially: the level degree of out-migration, the level of external aid these economies receive, and the effectiveness of fiscal and other reforms—especially in Puerto Rico. They noted that Hurricane Maria was the most devastating hurricane to slam Puerto Rico in nearly a century—leaving an enormous toll of lives, homes, and businesses lost or suffering enormous damage, devastation of most crops and other agricultural assets, and severe havoc to its public infrastructure, adding that both for responding to the human and economic misery, the island’s experiencing of the most severe power outage in U.S. history means “it may still take months to fully restore electricity and other critical infrastructure,” describing the devastation to the U.S. Virgin Islands as similar, especially St. Croix, where I taught school long before most readers were born.

Nevertheless, the Fed Gang of Three wrote that recovery is underway in both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, reporting that, as of last month, satellite images of nighttime lights suggest roughly 75 percent power restoration for Puerto Rico overall, with the southern and western parts of the island seeing nearly full restoration, and San Juan close to that level. In contrast, however, they determined that the eastern end of Puerto Rico and many interior areas have lagged substantially. As of the end of last year, they reported that the labor market has begun to recover in Puerto Rico: employment in leisure and hospitality (largely restaurants), the sector usually most affected by natural disasters, have started to bounce back in Puerto Rico, albeit not yet in the U.S. Virgin Islands. And, as often happens following natural disasters, jobs are being added in both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in industries involved in clean-up, restoration, and rebuilding efforts—most notably, construction. Thus, they believe Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are confronted with a long and difficult recovery process ahead—a fiscal and physical process made all the more difficult because of poor economic and fiscal conditions prior to the storms.  

Financing a Recovering City’s Emergence from a State Takeover. The Atlantic City Council has voted approval the issuance of debt to pay off millions the municipality owes to pay off deferred pension and health care contributions from 2015—after, in 2015, state officials had urged the delay of some $37.2 million in pension and health care contributions—a delay which, today, officials note has added up to about $47 million with the added interest. In the ordinance the Council voted Wednesday 6-3 to authorize, Atlantic City can now issue as much as $55 million worth of municipal bonds to help finance those accrued debts, with the vote coming in the wake of a lengthy discussion between the Council and 13 residents, each of whom spoke in opposition: some urged the elected leaders to table the matter for further review, while others questioned who had authorized the deferment, whether the city was obligated to pay the interest rate, and whether there were other options to finance the debt—debt which, as of the end of the calendar year, had reached more than $344 million in outstanding debt. Timothy Cunningham, New Jersey’s local government services director and now the state appointed takeover appointee, has explained to residents the option to bond for the deferred payments would prevent it from having to go into the general fund—that is in lieu of the city being forced to raise tax rates: the municipal bond interest payments would instead be financed via the Investment Alternative Tax from casinos, which, under state takeover regulations, are redirected to be used in Atlantic City for debt service, he noted. The City Council had originally slated the issue for a vote last month, but withdrew the scheduled vote in order to host two public hearings on the matter.

At the session, Councilman Jesse Kurtz said he would have preferred a different resolution to making the payments, questioning whether Atlantic City would be obligated to pay back the payments’ interest if the deferment was at the suggestion of the State, noting it did not “sit right” with him to vote for the ordinance without a formal statement from Gov. Phil Murphy’s administration authorizing it: “When we’re short on money, the answer is to borrow money…I don’t like that.” Atlantic City Council President Marty Small responded that after the ordinance was pulled last month, city and state officials asked the Governor’s administration for forgiveness on the payment; however, the response was negative, adding that the city knew the day was coming to pay the deferred payments—and that such payment was the city’s obligation: to act otherwise, he noted, would be “putting the taxpayers in harm’s way” if they did not act to borrow to make the payments: “It’s not us versus you: What affects you, affects us.” Councilmember Kurtz, along with Councilmen Moisse Delgado and Jeffree Fauntleroy II, voted against the measure, while Councilmembers Small, George Tibbitt, Chuen “Jimmy” Cheng, William Marsh, Kaleem Shabazz, and Aaron Randolph voted aye. For his part, Mayor Frank Gilliam, told his colleagues in opposing the matter, the city needs to come up with “better ways to deal with our finances,” regardless of whether council passed the bond ordinance: “We’re still $400 million in debt.”

Municipal Fiscal & Professional Erosion in Puerto Rico

February 20, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the municipal fiscal threats to Puerto Rico’s municipios or municipalities, before turning to the continuing threats to the island’s future of its “brain drain” through the emigration of an increasing number of some of the island’s young professionals.

Severe Revenue Erosion. Since the last revenue quarter, Puerto Rico’s 78 municipios—cities and towns governed under Puerto Rico’s Autonomous Municipalities Act of 1991, which establishes that every municipality (those with populations in excess of 50,000 are designated as incorporated—those with less as incorporated towns: cities provision their own services, while towns typically depend on nearby cities for certain services) and must have a strong mayor form of government with a municipal legislature. All have experienced a consistent undermining of revenues: according to the most recent estimates, that includes a reduction of $56 million which will be reflected this fiscal year relating to the payment of movable and immovable property taxes, with the increasing losses related to business closures and the mass exodus of Puerto Ricans to the mainland, even as the capital and operating costs imposed in the wake of Hurricane Maria have left, in their wake, a fiscal hurricane of their own with, likely, long-term fiscal consequences. Some estimate that the losses related to property taxes have been as much as $55 million just in the last fiscal quarter, according to Javier Carrasquillo, President of the Governing Board of the Municipal Revenue Collection Center (CRIM), and the current Mayor of Cidra, a municipio known as La Ciudad de la Eterna, or the City of Eternal Spring.

CRIM is itself governed by a board composed of the President of GDB, the Commissioner of Municipal Affairs, and seven mayors of municipios: those elected mayors hold office for a term of four years (and not more than two consecutive terms) and until their successors have been appointed. CRIM’s principal offices are located at State Road 1, Km. 17.2, San Juan, Puerto Rico 00926. In addition, CRIM operates nine regional centers located in the municipalities of Aguadilla, Arecibo, Bayamón, Caguas, Carolina, Humacao, Mayagüez, Ponce, and San Juan.

CRIM estimated revenues for this fiscal year at $827,148,824 after the discount of the municipal Special Additional Contributions funds for the repayment of municipalities debts and the 5% for CRIM operational expenses. (Revenues of the municipalities of Puerto Rico are principally derived from ad valorem property taxes and Commonwealth contributions: Act No. 83 authorizes municipalities to impose the following property taxes: the Special Additional Tax, without limitation as to rate or amount, which as mentioned above is available primarily for the payment of a municipality’s general obligation debt; and a basic property tax to fund operating expenses up to a maximum amount of 6% of the assessed valuation on all real property within such municipality and up to a maximum amount of 4% of the assessed valuation on all personal property within such municipality (collectively, the “Basic Tax”)). Act No. 83 also continued in effect a special property tax imposed by the government of 1.03% of the assessed valuation of all real and personal property within Puerto Rico (other than exempted property) (the “Special Tax”) for the exclusive purpose of servicing the government’s general obligation debt. A portion of the Basic Tax levied by a municipality may be transferred to other municipalities by virtue of the operation of the Matching Fund.) In addition, under Act No. 64, each municipality is required to levy the Special Additional Tax in such amounts as shall be required for the payment of its general obligation municipal bonds and notes; principal of and interest on all general obligation municipal bonds and notes and on all municipal notes issued in anticipation of the issuance of general obligation bonds also constitute a first lien on the municipality’s Basic Tax. Accordingly, the municipality’s Basic Tax would be available to make debt service payments on general obligation municipal bonds and notes to the extent that the Special Additional Tax, together with moneys on deposit in the municipality’s Redemption Fund, are not sufficient to cover such debt service. Similarly, Act No. 83 provides for an exemption from the Special Additional Tax and Basic Tax on the first $15,000 of assessed valuation of primary personal residences of individuals (the so-called “$15,000 Real Property Exemption”) and an exemption from personal property taxes on the first $50,000 of assessed valuation of property owned by businesses that have gross revenues of less than $150,000 per annum (the “$50,000 Personal Property Exemption”). Recognizing the importance of the real and personal property tax for the fiscal requirements of the municipalities, the government makes annual appropriations to the municipalities from its General Fund as compensation for the amount of the revenues foregone owing to these exemptions. However, under Act No. 83, such appropriations will not be provided to cover any amount of property taxes, which any municipality elects to forgive for primary personal residences registered for the first time after January 1, 1992, and personal property of certain businesses registered for the first time after July 1, 1991.

Acts 83 and 80, which the Legislature approved in 1991, also provide for the following central government contributions to the municipalities: 2.50% of the net internal revenues of the General Fund for fiscal year 2004-2005 and thereafter; 35% of the annual net revenues derived from the operation of the additional lottery system created by Act No. 10, of the Legislature of Puerto Rico (approved in 1989). There are also so-called “Designated Commonwealth Contributions,” which provide an annual amount from the central governments’s General Fund to compensate the municipalities for the $15,000 Real Property Exemption and the $50,000 Personal Property Exemption; and an annual amount from the Commonwealth’s General Fund to compensate the municipalities for the exemption of 0.20% of the assessed valuation of all taxable property within the municipalities (the amounts in the clauses, with the exception of the annual contributions from the Commonwealth as compensation to the municipalities for the Special Additional Tax portions of the $15,000 Real Property Exemption and the $50,000 Personal Property Exemption (defined as the “Commonwealth Contributions”). Act 80, for its part, established the Municipal Matching Fund, into which CRIM is required to deposit with GDB the total amount collected on account of Basic Taxes and the Commonwealth Contributions. Certain funds in the Matching Fund (the “Equalization Moneys”) are available to CRIM in order to guaranty that each municipality will receive revenues in an amount at least equivalent to that received from Equalization Moneys in the previous fiscal year. The Equalization Moneys are comprised of: the Designated Commonwealth Contributions; and a portion of the Basic Tax equal to 1% of the assessed value of personal property and 3% of the assessed value of real property collected by each municipality (the “Designated Basic Tax”)—with all All Equalization funds distributed to the municipalities as follows: first, as may be required so that each municipality receives at least the same amount of aggregate revenues received during the previous fiscal year on account of Equalization Moneys, using first the Designated Commonwealth Contributions, and then, to the extent necessary, the Designated Basic Tax (it has never been necessary to use the Designated Basic Tax to perform such equalization); second, Designated Basic Taxes remaining in the Equalization Moneys are allocated to the municipalities in proportion to the amount by which revenues from their Basic Taxes in such fiscal year exceed their revenues from Basic Taxes in the previous fiscal year; and third, to all municipalities based on certain economic and demographic criteria specified in Act No. 80. The remaining Matching Fund moneys are returned to the municipalities whose Basic Tax levies gave rise to such remaining moneys, and are used, with their other revenues, to meet operating expenses. (Prior to July 1, 1993, the Secretary of the Treasury collected all municipal taxes upon real and personal property, including intangible property) in each municipality; since July 1, 1993, and pursuant to Act No. 80, CRIM has undertaken all of the Secretary of the Treasury’s responsibilities relating to the collection and distribution of such taxes. CRIM is responsible for the appraisal, assessment, notice of imposition, and collection of all municipal property taxes. All property taxes collected by CRIM are deposited at GDB, which acts as fiscal agent to the government and its municipalities. Real property is assessed by CRIM and personal property is self-assessed. These assessment values have not been adjusted to reflect the various applicable real property and personal property exemptions, such as those described under Municipal Revenues above and other exemptions granted under Puerto Rico tax incentives laws. As mentioned above, no real property reassessment has been made in Puerto Rico since 1958. All real property taxes are assessed on the basis of the replacement cost of the related real property in fiscal year 1957-58 values, regardless of when such property was constructed.

Unsheltered from the Storm. For some municipios, the cut in their remittances in the wake of Hurricane Maria reached as much as $6 million, as is the case of San Juan; however, in percentage terms, the most affected were Guayanilla and Manatí, with a reduction of 11.7% and 11.4%, respectively—meaning those municipios were forced to make signal fiscal adjustments even as expenses were swiftly rising. Indeed, as Mr. Carrasquillo had already warned, there would be a $30 million reduction from lotteries, even as collections between July and December were projected to be down by 15%. And even that amount has been assessed as only a start: In addition to the $ 56 million, municipios will have to deduct the money they have stopped receiving due to the elimination of the Sales and Use Tax on processed foods approved by the government in the wake of Hurricane Maria—as well as the exemption of the SUT collection for small businesses, with sales volumes for less than a million dollars, which was applied between November 20 and December 31. (Usually that 1% of SUT goes to municipalities to be used for essential services, such as garbage collection.) Mr. Carrasquillo said that the impact of the SUT exemption will not be measurable until they receive the Municipal Finance Corporation report; nor will the reduction which municipalities will have in their public coffers from the licenses payment: “Businesses file the license form once the economic activity year passed, so that will not be defined until January of 2019. We can only speculate now,” he added—with his own municipio having experienced the closure of some 123 businesses in the wake of the storm.

The current budget of Caguas, a municipio of about 142,000, is $ 92 million, an amount which reflects a reduction of $26,000 in the wake of rental space declines, as well as business related income losses and a court loss after an anticipated gain from a municipal initiative imposed on businesses which generated more than $3 million annually was struck down by the courts. In the municipio, some 25% of the nearly 5,000 shops remain closed, meaning, as the Mayor worries: “I cannot guarantee essential services for the population if the funds we need do not come.” The president of the Mayors Federation, Carlos Molina, estimated the direct impact in his municipality, Arecibo, to be $5 million, including the 20% in CRIM reduction. Thus, he reflects, municipios have no choice but to reduce operational expenses and establish consortiums to provide services to achieve lower costs: “We have to be realistic about how the island lives today, but we have to look for options and not wait for a miracle to happen.”

Mayor Rolando Ortiz of Cayey adds that the urgency of the municipalities is no longer limited to furloughs, but to shutdowns and closings: “There is no way out, because the municipal institution is misunderstood by the Governor. They see how effective we were before, during and after the hurricane, but now, when apparently that crisis has already passed and we say ‘we want to help,’ they are not there.” In his city, the CRIM reduction will be $700,000: “When they reduce money for municipalities, they are taking money from the most needy people of the island. Poverty is increasing.” But hope for a turnaround, in the wake of the PROMESA Board’s non-certification of Senate Bill 774 which would create a $100 million Municipal Recovery Fund, has been dashed.

Undercutting Hopes for a Recovery from the Storm. In the aftermath of Hurricane Maria, Florida Hospital, which operates 26 hospitals throughout the Gator state, the hospital has recruited as many as 45 health care professionals from Puerto Rico, including nurses, medical technologists, and nutrition specialists. With a mainland nursing shortage and an aging U.S. population, which is fueling demand for health care services, estimates are that the U.S. will need to produce over one million new registered nurses by 2022 to fill newly created jobs and replace a legion of soon-to-be retirees, meaning, that Florida, the premier retiree state in the nation, commenced an international recruitment program for nurses a decade ago, but, in recent years, has looked increasingly at Puerto as one of its most promising pipelines for talent. Prior to Hurricane Maria, about 3% of Florida Hospital’s nurses came from Puerto Rico as a growing number of its residents migrated to the U.S. to escape the economic problems plaguing the island; however, that percentage is expected to double; in fact, Florida Hospital has even developed an outreach program, partnering with community groups to find and help healthcare professionals from Puerto Rico find jobs. The hospital also fast tracks the hiring process: interviews, applications, as well as getting the state requirements for nursing are all expedited. In nearby Missouri, CoxHealth, a nonprofit regional healthcare system operating six hospitals and 80 clinics, initiated a nurse recruitment effort in Puerto Rico last spring, describing recruitment as an easier option compared to other countries because of work visa, language, and other issues. For nursing professionals from Puerto Rico, where pay can be $14.15 an hour, long shifts, and attending to as many as 15 patients at a time because of hospital was understaffing, the move to Florida would seem almost a no-brainer: the pay in Florida is $25.71 per hour—and the case load far lower. Mary Perrone, the international recruiter for Florida Hospital, said 20 more nurses from Puerto Rico will finish training and be on staff in the coming weeks; CoxHealth sent a recruiting team to Puerto Rico last weekend for on-site interviews with nursing candidates. If all goes well, it hopes to hire 30 more nurses soon.

Let there Be Light & Emergency Relief

February 12, 2018

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the courtroom efforts to secure emergency relief so that electric service is not disrupted in Puerto Rico—threatening critical services and the island’s only hopes for recovery from its quasi chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy.

Dark Fiscal Imbalances.  U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain last night rejected a motion filed by the PROMESA Oversight Board for the central government to grant an emergency loan to the Electric Power Authority (PREPA), indicating that the federal agency failed to demonstrate the need for this financing although there is an immediate need for liquidity, albeit, she indicated the Board may file a new amended motion requesting a lesser amount and make adjustments to clarify the payment priority that financing will have without affecting the rights of the creditors—with her ruling coming down in the wake of a six and a half hour hearing at which the court was unconvinced of their respective arguments that PREPA needed the nearly $1 billion it had requested in its initial motion. Judge Swain indicated that any new financing requested should not exceed about $ 300 million—telling the court: “The lights cannot be turned off in Puerto Rico,” as she advised the parties she will need a clearer understanding of the priorities for any new financing. She made that ruling notwithstanding the warning from PREPA financial advisor Todd Filsinger, who advised the court that if a loan were not received as soon as possible, PREPA would be forced to activate its emergency plan to begin the cessation of operations and an eventual suspension of electric service.

The courtroom drama came as the Chief Financial Advisor of the Electric Power Authority (AEE), Todd Filsinger, yesterday indicated that the public corporation intends to implement an emergency plan starting today which could lead to the suspension of its employees as well as disruption of the operations of its generating plants—actions which would force the “rationing” of electric services, likely plunging homes, businesses, and industries into darkness” an emergency loan from the central government.  Mr. Filsinger made clear that should the plan be triggered, there would be a warning, as early as this morning, followed by a rolling suspension of operations, and a gradual suspension of employees; services to hospitals, police stations, firefighters, and gas stations would continue.

PREPA is seeking a loan of as much as $1.3 billion—a request the Board did not reject out of hand, but rather indicated a lesser amount of as much as $1 billion might be considered. In principle, the loan would be around $ 1,300 million, but last night the Board of Fiscal Supervision (JSF), acting on behalf of the government and the AEE, modified its request to about $ 1,000 million. There is urgency: Mr. Filsinger warned that unless PREPA receives an emergency loan by this weekend, the utility would only be able to maintain its operations for several additional weeks, after which it would no longer even be able to pay for the fuel it needs to generate electricity, testifying: “If we do not have the loan, and we do not receive the cash, we could be implementing the contingency measures on Saturday.”

Earlier in the hearing, Joseph Davis, the lawyer representing the Financial Advisory Authority and Fiscal Agency, warned of the fiscal cliff the agency faces, advising the panel it has delayed payments to suppliers as much as possible in an effort to preserve as much of its funds as possible, in attempt to render the cash they have available, but that there will be little option but to trigger additional contingencies, such as rationing services, partly because fuel suppliers have already threatened to halt service. The power authority’s emergency plan would be enforced even as some 400,000 subscribers remain without power, and after approximately 1.1 million subscribers had already experienced the longest interruption of electric service in Puerto Rico’s history in the immediate wake of Hurricane Maria. The threat to human life and safety came as the respective parties in the New York City courtroom—parties representing the Board, bondholders, and Puerto Rico, as well as insurers continued to file motions.

As if these human risks were insufficient, Judge Swain has also been confronted with arguments from contractors, such as ARC, Lord Electric, and Whitefish Holdings, who claim that PREPA must meet its payment obligations for restoration of the electricity grid after Hurricane Maria, as well as bondholders—who, for the most part, live far, far from Puerto Rico, but are seeking compensation for impairment of the rights of municipal bondholders.

The Board, at the end of last month, alleging that PREPA faces losses in excess of $1 billion, had requested Judge Swain to approve a post-requisition loan for the public utility—a loan critical to . According to the motion issued by the JSF, seeking a super priority, as PREPA sought the fiscal and physical capacity to insure its operations until the end of the fiscal year and avoid closing operations this month—in effect, asking the court to provide a super priority of payment to the central government.

Yesterday, in a last-ditch effort to assist the power authority, the Ad Hoc-AEE group and the insurance company, Syncora, which guarantee part of the public corporation’s debt, presented a new financing proposal, a proposal which the oversight Board rejected outright, noting: “The notification of the group of bondholders of the ESA is not a valid proposal and does not have a strong reason to deny the motion for post-petition financing for the PREPA.”

A Valentine’s Day Message?

St. Valentine’s Day, 2018

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the continued scrutiny by the PROMESA Board and Puerto Rico’s progress in not just recovering from Hurricane Maria—but also from its quasi chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. That progress has been achieved through federal assistance, the Board’s vigorous oversight, and, as we note, tax and spending changes undertaken by the government of Puerto Rico.  

Fiscal Imbalances.  While states, cities, and counties operate in regular order, the federal shutdown, far into the federal fiscal year, illustrated the challenge to state and local governments of the unpredictability of federal funding that state and local governments would otherwise count upon. Now, in the wake of Congress’ vote to suspend the national debt ceiling, the package included nearly $100 billion in disaster aid, as well as extend a number of expired tax provisions, including a Jan. 1, 2022 extension of the rum cover-over for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands—an extension projected to generate an estimated $900 million for the two U.S. territories, as well as a related tax provision which would, at long last, allow low-income Puerto Rican muncipios to be treated as qualified opportunity zones: that disaster aid includes $4.9 billion to provide 100% federal funding for Medicaid health services for low-income residents of Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands for two years and $11 billion of Community Development Block Grants for the two territories, including $2 billion of CDBG money to rebuild Puerto Rico’s electrical grid. Puerto Rico anticipates it will be the recipient of as much as $18 billion—with an option to access a line of credit of as much as $4 billion—albeit, to the extent the territory can continue to demonstrate its lack of liquidity. Those amounts, including $4.8 billion in Medicaid, and $11 billion from HUD, however, are subject to conditions of both the federal government and the PROMESA Board. HUD Deputy Secretary Pamela Hughes Patenaude last week stated HUD would award $1.5 billion to assist in the repair of damaged homes and business structure, while FEMA has already awarded $300 million, half of which is via a loan. In addition, the aid includes $14 million in the Women, Infants & Children (WIC) program assistance. The package provides some $14 million for the Army Corps of Engineers to award contracts to U.S. electric companies to repair the power grid. Importantly, the FEMA funding will provide not just for improvements in the island’s public power system, but also for repairs: Puerto Rico has guestimated it will require $ 94.4 billion to rebuild the island’s public infrastructure.

Puerto Rico’s non-voting Representative in Congress, Jenniffer González, noted the next disaster relief resolution may be discussed in Congress later this Spring—at which point she anticipates the critical focus Will be on Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. She noted: “Speaker Paul Ryan told me that there is going to be a fourth bill on supplementary allocations for Puerto Rico with specific projects for transportation and electric power.” U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) noted that claims of states such as Florida and Texas were very helpful in recent efforts in favor of funds for Puerto Rico; however, he warned that Congress needs to allocate additional funds for disasters regularly: “There are other places that, by then, will have needs.”

Negocios. Meanwhile, with regard to the fiscal storm, the fiscal amendments Governor Ricardo Rosselló presented to the PROMESA this week presented a more positive outlook for creditors to reach an accumulated surplus of $3,400 million, even as his offer retained virtually unchanged the terms of fiscal measures and severe cuts in government revenues over the next 5 fiscal years. The plan the Governor presented, moreover, did not comply with the requirements to reduce the pensions of government retirees, nor to eliminate additional labor protections for private sector workers, after the notification of violation of the federal PROMESA law—demands calling for a series of amendments, including a 25% reduction in pensions exceeding $1,000 per month (in combination with social insurance), in addition to the elimination of a series of protections for private sector employees. Indeed, in an interview with El Vocero, Gov. Rosselló replied that his administration is neither contemplating reductions to pensions nor including legislation to eliminate the employer’s obligation to pay the Christmas bonus and compensation for unjustified dismissal or to reduce the requirements for vacation leave and sick leave, stating: “We are not contemplating reductions in pensions.” As for eliminating labor protections, the Governor made clear: “We have not included that in the reform of human capital… certainly, it is an area that is important for us to work: how do we raise labor participation in Puerto Rico? How do we encourage them to transition to work? “

The most dramatic modification of the tax plan proposed by Gov. Rossello is the elimination of the aggregate deficit of $3,400 million for the FY2022 budget, since the previous version of its fiscal plan was in default with the objective of eliminating structural deficits: as early as FY2019, he projects the government will achieve a surplus of $750 million, thanks in large part, according to the Governor, to the federal assistance provided by Congress. Even though it had been estimated that the aid to date has reached $16.5 million, Puerto Rican authorities assert only $12,800 million has been incorporated as a result of supplementary allocations in the fiscal plan—allocations related to the FEMA $ 35.3 billion in the public assistance program and $21 billion in private insurance. The Governor noted his administration plans to spend $13 million of disaster recovery funds for Hurricane Maria, enabling, he added, a GDP growth projection of 8.4%. He also noted he expects a reduction in the rate of emigration from Puerto Rico down to 2.4%.

Unsurprisingly, he warned, the most difficult challenge will be what he termed the FY2020 Medicaid fiscal cliff –the year when the current Congressional appropriated funds will be exhausted. To address that abyss, he said the government has intensified cuts to government programs, as well as adopted measures to increase revenues, resulting, he asserted, in a positive or surplus balance of $800 million for FY 2023, noting: “Stabilization (the surplus) continues with other structural measures and impacts that have: the reduction in expenditures by government items and the rightsizing (shrinking) that is being done.” It appears that the $800 million projected surplus was included in the analysis of the sustainability of the public debt, an element which will be considered by the PROMESA quasi-bankruptcy court for the payment arrangement to the creditors—or, as he put it: “The discussion with the creditors will go by Title III, in everything that has not been agreed by Title VI. It is a numerical exercise, without differentiating creditors, about the numbers that reflect the fiscal plan, and that will certainly be part of the elements of judgment…that the judge would use in her determinations.”

The Governor noted that cuts to agencies such as Education, Corrections, Health, as well as across the board via shrinking services and utilizing tighter payroll control have succeeded in increasing revenues by $29 million; nevertheless, he added, because the new revenues failed to meet the anticipated goals, the agency, Mi Salud, will continue to be required to face an FY2022 reduction of some $795.

Fiscal & Physical Imbalances

Lincoln’s Birthday, February 12, 2018

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the outcome of last week’s actions to avoid another federal government shutdown, we consider the ongoing fiscal and physical plights of Puerto Rico.

Fiscal & Physical Imbalances.  Puerto Rico’s non-voting Member of Congress, Jenniffer Gonzalez, and Gov. Ricardo Rosselló have met with a group of New Progressive Mayors to describe the terms of the new federal assistance under the just passed $16 billion recovery assistance approved by Congress—funds ranging from what Secretary of Public Affairs Ramón Rosario Cortés noted would “range from construction to agriculture programs that will allow each municipality to develop its economy and create jobs.” The Secretary anticipates there will be a second meeting with associate mayors. Naguabo Mayor Noé Marcano said that the allocation of these funds represents “a unique opportunity” to repair and/or build infrastructure projects (including roads and bridges) and housing: “Part of the projects that we-at a given moment-had planned as improvements to the municipalities, we understand that this is the best opportunity.”

That could mean a new fiscal chance for this small muncipio of just over 23,000, one founded on July 15, 1821 near the mouth of the Daguao River—founded with the intent of providing a defense for the region from the Caribe Indians, based upon, 27 years earlier, the request of several influential neighbors of the Spanish Crown: on January 9, 1798, the erection of the Naguabo parish was authorized—but construction did not commence on its church until 1841. The muncipio’s name originated from the cacique and chieftainship named Daguao—as the territory was originally populated by Taíno Indians. Naguabo is also known as Cuna de Grandes Artistas (the birthplace of Great Artists) and Los Enchumbaos, “the Soaked Ones.”

For his part, Mayor William Aliceo of Aibonito, the City of Flowers, with the city’s appellation derived from the Taíno word “Jatibonicu,” the name of a Cacique leader of the region; a name also used to refer to a river in the area—and, in addition, a name used by the tribe of Orocobix. At the same time, there is a legend that tells of a Spanish soldier, Diego Alvarez, who, on May 17, 1615, reached one of the highest peaks in the area: upon taking in the view, he exclaimed: “Ay, que bonito!” The exclamation eventually led to the name of the region. Nearly two centuries later, Pedro Zorascoechea, in 1630, was one of the early Spaniards to settle on the island—apparently establishing one of the first fincas or ranches in the region; however, it was not until 1822, when Don Manuel Veléz presented himself before the government, representing the inhabitants of the area, to request that Aibonito be officially declared a town—a request which then Governor Miguel de la Torre granted on March 13, 1824.

Hurricane Maria’s eye tore through the region’s hills on September 20th: it was especially fierce along the exposed ridgelines, whipping in at a hundred and fifty-five miles an hour: it tore apart wooden houses; along the road leading up to Aibonito from San Juan, normally a two-hour drive, Maria tore a panorama of ruined houses and businesses, toppled and twisted trees, and downed utility poles. Mayor Aliceo said he would like to use part of the recovery funds for agriculture, roads, and electrical infrastructure: “In Aibonito, we have a project submitted to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the canalization of the Aibonito River. And with poultry farming, which was well affected by Hurricane Maria, I’m interested (the funds) will find a way to help Aibonito’s poultry farmers, given the million-dollar losses they’ve had.”

The federal allocation came just prior to Puerto Rico’s resubmission of its revised fiscal plans to the PROMESA oversight Board—plans due today, with Puerto Rico’s representative, Christian Sobrino, simply advising the board that the plans comply with the public policy of the government, noting: “[W]e will comply with the stipulated date for the delivery of the fiscal plans. It has been an intense job, but the government will comply with the appointed time. The plans will continue in accordance with the Governor’s public policy of protecting the most vulnerable and that this document serves as a tool of fiscal responsibility and at the same time a path of long-term socio-economic development for the island.”

Nevertheless, uncertainty reigns, especially in the wake of the federal government shutdown. With last week’s Congressional approval of a package to keeps federal agencies running through March 23rd, the date of certainty has now been pushed off while House and Senate appropriators in Washington, D.C. work on final 2018 spending bills. The package suspends the debt ceiling through March 1, 2019, provides $89.3 billion in disaster aid, and extends a number of expired tax provisions, including a Jan. 1, 2022 extension of the rum cover-over for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which is projected to generate an estimated $900 million for the two U.S. territories. In addition, a related tax provision calls for all low-income communities in Puerto Rico to be treated as qualified opportunity zones. The disaster aid includes $4.9 billion to provide 100% federal funding for Medicaid health services for low-income residents of Puerto Rico and  the U.S. Virgin Islands for two years, $11 billion in CDBG block grants for the two territories, including $2 billion of CDBG money to rebuild Puerto Rico’s electrical grid—with Resident Commissioner Gonzalez reporting that, in total, $16.55 billion of the disaster aid is earmarked for Puerto Rico.

With the new allocations to mitigate last year’s natural disasters, the federal government has already authorized just over $140.7 billion within the past six months to be distributed mainly between Texas, Florida, California, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands—with Puerto Rico’s government projecting its share will be approximately $18 billion, plus access to a credit line of $4 billion—albeit, to access that line, the U.S. territory would be mandated to prove lack of liquidity. Of the total, almost $16 billion will surely go to the island from the funds allocated in the budget bill and to mitigate disasters—provided the territory complies with the conditions of both the federal government and the PROMESA Oversight Board. The projected package includes $4.8 billion for Medicaid and $11 billion for CDBG: last week, HUD Deputy Secretary Pamela Hughes Patenaude announced, during a visit to San Juan, that HUD will award $1.5 billion to help repair damaged houses and businesses. In addition, another $ 300 million, half of which would be allocated as a loan, has been allocated to match the FEMA project’s cost. The package includes $6 billion, funds under the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, provided to U.S. electric companies to repair the power grid. FEMA has stated, moreover, its intent to grant an additional $13 billion to the island.

Puerto Rico’s Federal Affairs Executive Director, Carlos Mercador, notes that an official damage estimate from federal agencies is still pending; Commissioner González notes that Congress’ next disasters relief resolution may be discussed in Congress between April and May, noting: “Speaker Paul Ryan told me that there is going to be a fourth bill on supplementary allocations for Puerto Rico, with specific projects for transportation and electric power.”