What Could Be the State Role in Averting Municipal Fiscal Distress & Bamkruptcy?

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eBlog, 1/27/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing challenge in Petersburg, Virginia—and the role of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Because, in our federal system, each state has a different blueprint with regard to whether a municipality is even allowed to file for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy (only 18), and because there is not necessarily rhyme nor reason with regard to fiscal oversight and response mechanisms—as we have observed so wrenchingly in the forlorn case of East Cleveland—the role of states appears to be constantly evolving. So it is this a.m. that we look to Virginia, where the now insolvent municipality of Petersburg had routinely filed financial information with the Virginia auditor of public accounts—but somehow the accumulating fiscal descent into insolvency never triggered alarm bells.   

Virginia Auditor Martha Mavredes this week, testifying before the House Appropriations Committee, told Chairman S. Chris Jones (R-Suffolk) it was “just hard for us to really get our minds around how that was missed,” telling the committee the state currently has no requirement for municipalities to furnish the kind of comprehensive information that would trigger awareness of insolvency; there appears to be no mechanism for the Commonwealth to step in and help. Indeed, that was the very purpose of Chairman Jones to call for the hearing: he wants to better understand options Virginia might consider to not just create some kind of trip wire, but, mayhap more importantly, to act on provisions which could avert future such municipal insolvencies. Auditor Mavredes indicated to the Committee she is scrambling to scrabble together some kind of tripwire or early warning system that would flag financial problems in Virginia’s municipalities at an earlier stage, telling the committee she is using a system devised by the state of Louisiana to help Virginia identify cities and counties in dire fiscal straits. Thus she plans to create a database of all localities in the commonwealth to rate or score their relative fiscal health. Under what she is proposing, her office will approach cities that show warning signs in order to assess more information. Her real issue, she told the committee, is what fiscal assistance tools might be available—or as she put it: the “piece I can’t solve right now is what kind of assistance might be there” once such problems come to light.” Virginia, like a majority of states, has no provision for the state to step in if a locality goes into default. Indeed, it was the thoughtful step of Virginia’s Finance Secretary Ric Brown, who took the unusual step last year to investigate Petersburg’s finances, which led him to discover the city had some $18 million in unpaid bills, an unbalanced budget, and a fiscal practice of papering over deficits with short-term borrowing—a practice that not only jeopardized the city’s bond rating, but also affected the cost of borrowing for the regional public utility. Secretary Brown stressed the need for training local elected officials about budgeting and best practices, and he suggested a program to allow outside management firms to help get cities on a better fiscal foundation. Interestingly, the Committee might want to avail itself of the pioneering work underway by the irrepressibly insightful Don Boyd of the Rockefeller Institute of Government to assess state responses to municipal fiscal distress, seeking to answer the kinds of thoughtful queries Secretary Brown is asking. In a chart for Rockefeller, we tried our own answer:

Understanding Municipal Fiscal Stress

Assessing State Responses to Growing Municipal Fiscal Distress and Insolvency:

  • The Ostriches (head in the sand): Do Nothings/modified harm: e.g. Illinois
  • Denigrators (Alabama is a prime example: when Jefferson County requested authority to raise its own taxes, the Legislature refused, forcing the county into chapter 9 bankruptcy);
  • Learners (Rhode Island is a very good candidate here—in the wake of Central Falls, the state evolved into a much more constructive partnership;
  • Thinkers (I put Colo. & Minn. here—especially because both seem to recognize potential benefits of tax sharing & innovation in intergovernmental fiscal policy);
  • Preemptors (Michigan, because it provides for the usurpation of any local authority through the appointment of an Emergency Manager); New Jersey seems to be fitting in with that category re: Atlantic City;
  • Substitutors: Pa.: Act 47
  • Maybe Do-Nothings: Ohio, even though it authorizes municipal bankruptcy, appears to have been totally non-responsive the petition by East Cleveland to file—and has appeared to play no role in the so-far dysfunctional discussions between Cleveland and East Cleveland).

Are American Cities at a Financial Brink?

eBlog, 1/13/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing fiscal and physical challenges to the City of Flint, Michigan in the wake of the disastrous state appointment of an Emergency Manager with the subsequent devastating health and fiscal subsequent crises, before turning to a new report, When Cities Are at the Financial Brink” which would have us understand that the risk of insolvency for large cities is now higher than at any point since the federal government first passed a municipal bankruptcy law in the 1930’s,” before briefly considering the potential impact on every state, local government, and public school system in the country were Congress to adopt the President-elect’s proposed infrastructure plan; then we consider the challenge of aging: what do longer lifespans of city, county, and state employees augur for state and local public pension obligations and credit ratings?

Not In Like Flint. Residents of the City of Flint received less than a vote of confidence Wednesday about the state of and safety of their long-contaminated drinking water, precipitated in significant part by the appointment of an Emergency Manager by Governor Rick Snyder. Nevertheless, at this week’s town hall, citizens heard from state officials that city water reaching homes continues to improve in terms of proper lead, copper, alkaline, and bacteria levels—seeking to describe Flint as very much like other American cities. The statements, however, appeared to fall far short of bridging the trust gap between Flint residents and the ability to trust their water and those in charge of it appears wide—or, as one Flint resident described it: “I’m hoping for a lot…But I’ve been hoping for three years.” Indeed, residents received less than encouraging words. They were informed that they should, more than 30 months into Flint’s water crisis, continue to use filters at home; that it will take roughly three years for Flint to replace lead water service lines throughout the city; that the funds to finance that replacement have not been secured, and that Flint’s municipal treatment plants needs well over $100 million in upgrades: it appears unlikely the city will be ready to handle water from the new Karegnondi Water Authority until late-2019-early 2020. The state-federal presentation led to a searing statement from one citizen: “I’ve got kids that are sick…My teeth are falling out…You have no solution to this problem.”

Nevertheless, progress is happening: in the last six months of water sampling in Flint, lead readings averaged 12 parts per billion, below the federal action level of 15 ppb, and down from 20 ppb in the first six months of last year. Marc Edwards, a Virginia Tech researcher who helped identify the city’s contamination problems, said: “Levels of bacteria we’re seeing are at dramatically lower levels than we saw a year ago.” However, the physical, fiscal, public trust, and health damage to the citizens of Flint during the year-and-a-half of using the Flint River as prescribed by the state-appointed Emergency Manager has had a two-fold impact: the recovery has been slow and residents have little faith in the safety of the water. Mayor Karen Weaver has sought to spearhead a program of quick pipeline replacement, but that process has been hindered by a lack of funding.

State Intervention in Municipal Bankruptcy. In a new report yesterday, “When Cities Are at the Financial Brink,” Manhattan Institute authors Daniel DiSalvo and Stephen Eide wrote the “risk of insolvency for large cities in now higher than at any point since the federal government first passed a municipal bankruptcy law in the 1930’s,” adding that “states…should intervene at the outset and appoint a receiver before allowing a city or other local government entity to petition for bankruptcy in federal court—and writing, contrary to recent history: “Recent experiences with municipal bankruptcies indicates that when local officials manage the process, they often fail to propose the changes necessary to stabilize their city’s future finances.” Instead, they opine in writing about connections between chapter 9, and the role of the states, there should be what they term “intervention bankruptcy,” which could be an ‘attractive alternative’ to the current Chapter 9. They noted, however, that Congress is unlikely to amend the current municipal bankruptcy chapter 9, adding, moreover, that further empowering federal judges in municipal affairs “is sure to raise federalism concerns.” It might be that they overlook that chapter 9, reflecting the dual sovereignty created by the founding fathers, incorporates that same federalism, so that a municipality may only file for chapter 9 federal bankruptcy if authorized by state law—something only 18 states do—and that in doing so, each state has the prerogative to determine, as we have often noted, the process—so that, as we have also written, there are states which:

  • Precipitate municipal bankruptcy (Alabama);
  • Contribute to municipal insolvency (California);
  • Opt, through enactment of enabling legislation, significant state roles—including the power and authority to appoint emergency managers (Michigan and Rhode Island, for instance);
  • Have authority to preempt local authority and take over a municipality (New Jersey and Atlantic City.).

The authors added: “The recent experience of some bankrupt cities, as well as much legal scholarship casts doubt on the effectiveness of municipal bankruptcy.” It is doubtful the citizens in Stockton, Central Falls, Detroit, Jefferson County, or San Bernardino would agree—albeit, of course, all would have preferred the federal bailouts received in the wake of the Great Recession by Detroit’s automobile manufacturers, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Similarly, it sees increasingly clear that the State of Michigan was a significant contributor to the near insolvency of Flint—by the very same appointment of an Emergency Manager by the Governor to preempt any local control.

Despite the current chapter 9 waning of cases as San Bernardino awaits U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury’s approval of its exit from the nation’s longest municipal bankruptcy, the two authors noted: “Cities’ debt-levels are near all-time highs. And the risk of municipal insolvency is greater than at any time since the Great Depression.” While municipal debt levels are far better off than the federal government’s, and the post-Great Recession collapse of the housing market has improved significantly, they also wrote that pension debt is increasingly a problem. The two authors cited a 2014 report by Moody’s Investors Service which wrote that rising public pension obligations would challenge post-bankruptcy recoveries in Vallejo and Stockton—perhaps not fully understanding the fine distinctions between state constitutions and laws and how they vary from state to state, thereby—as we noted in the near challenges in the Detroit case between Michigan’s constitution with regard to contracts versus chapter 9. Thus, they claim that “A more promising approach would be for state-appointed receivers to manage municipal bankruptcy plans – subject, of course, to federal court approval.” Congress, of course, as would seem appropriate under our Constitutional system of dual sovereignty, specifically left it to each of the states to determine whether such a state wanted to allow a municipality to even file for municipal bankruptcy (18 do), and, if so, to specifically set out the legal process and authority to do so. The authors, however, wrote that anything was preferable to leaving local officials in charge—mayhap conveniently overlooking the role of the State of Alabama in precipitating Jefferson County’s insolvency.  

American Infrastructure FirstIn his campaign, the President-elect vowed he would transform “America’s crumbling infrastructure into a golden opportunity for accelerated economic growth and more rapid productivity gains with a deficit-neutral plan targeting substantial new infrastructure investments,” a plan the campaign said which would provide maximum flexibility to the states—a plan, “American Infrastructure First” plan composed of $137 billion in federal tax credits which would, however, only be available investors in revenue-producing projects—such as toll roads and airports—meaning the proposed infrastructure plan would not address capital investment in the nation’s public schools, libraries, etc. Left unclear is how such a plan would impact the nation’s public infrastructure, the financing of which is, currently, primarily financed by state and local governments through the use of tax-exempt municipal bonds—where the financing is accomplished by means of local or state property, sales, and/or income taxes—and some user fees. According to the Boston Federal Reserve, annual capital spending by state and local governments over the last decade represented about 2.3% of GDP and about 12% of state and local spending: in FY2012 alone, these governments provided more than $331 billion in capital spending. Of that, local governments accounted for nearly two-thirds of those capital investments—accounting for 14.4 percent of all outstanding state and local tax-exempt debt. Indeed, the average real per capita capital expenditure by local governments, over the 2000-2012 time period, according to the Boston Federal Reserve was $724—nearly double state capital spending. Similarly, according to Census data, state governments are responsible for about one-third of state and local capital financing. Under the President-elect’s proposed “American Infrastructure First” plan composed of $137 billion in federal tax credits—such credit would only be available to investors in revenue-producing projects—such as toll roads and airports—meaning the proposed infrastructure plan would not address capital investment in the nation’s public schools, libraries, etc. Similarly, because less than 2 percent of the nation’s 70,000 bridges in need of rebuilding or repairs are tolled, the proposed plan would be of no value to those respective states, local governments, or users. Perhaps, to state and local leaders, more worrisome is that according to a Congressional Budget Office 2015 report, of public infrastructure projects which have relied upon some form of private financing, more than half of the eight which have been open for more than five years have either filed for bankruptcy or been taken over by state or local governments.

Moody Southern Pension Blues. S&P Global Ratings Wednesday lowered Dallas’s credit rating one notch to AA-minus while keeping its outlook negative, with the action following in the wake of Moody’s downgrade last month—with, in each case, the agencies citing increased fiscal risk related to Dallas’ struggling Police and Fire Pension Fund, currently seeking to stem and address from a recent run on the bank from retirees amid efforts to keep the fund from failing, or, as S&P put it: “The downgrade reflects our view that despite the city’s broad and diverse economy, which continues to grow, stable financial performance, and very strong management practices, expected continued deterioration in the funded status of the city’s police and fire pension system coupled with growing carrying costs for debt, pension, and other post-employment benefit obligations is significant and negatively affects Dallas’ creditworthiness.” S&P lowered its rating on Dallas’ moral obligation bonds to A-minus from A, retaining a negative outlook, with its analysis noting: “Deterioration over the next two years in the city’s budget flexibility, performance, or liquidity could result in a downgrade…Similarly, uncertainty regarding future fixed cost expenditures could make budgeting and forecasting more difficult…If the city’s debt service, pension, and OPEB carrying charge elevate to a level we view as very high and the city is not successful in implementing an affordable plan to address the large pension liabilities, we could lower the rating multiple notches.” For its part, Fitch Ratings this week reported that a downgrade is likely if the Texas Legislature fails to provide a structural solution to the city’s pension fund problem. The twin ratings calls come in the wake of Dallas Mayor Mike Rawlings report to the Texas Pension Review Board last November that the combined impact of the pension fund and a court case involving back pay for Dallas Police officers could come to $8 billion—mayhap such an obligation that it could force the municipality into chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, albeit stating that Dallas is not legally responsible for the $4 billion pension liability, even though he said that the city wants to help. The fund has an estimated $6 billion in future liabilities under its current structure. In testimony to the Texas State Pension Review Board, Mayor Rawlings said the pension crisis has made recruitment of police officers more difficult just as the city faces a flood of retirements.

 

What Is the State Role in Municipal Solvency/Recovery?

 

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eBlog, 11/21/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the state role in addressing municipal fiscal distress and bankruptcy: what are the different models—and how are they working? Then we consider one especially dysfunctional model: Ohio, where the City of East Cleveland could find its two Mayoral candidates in municipal jail before the voters go to the polls early next month. From thence, we strike east to consider this month’s elections in Massachusetts on charter schools—examining an issue that goes to the heart not only of state local relations and authority, but also to the potential impact on municipal assessed property values. What may be learned? Finally, we wish readers a Happy Thanksgiving!

What Is the State Role in Municipal Solvency/Recovery? Under our country’s system of dual federalism created by the founding fathers, while federal law authorizes municipalities to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy, a city, county, or school district may only do so if authorized by a state. Today, only 18 of the 50 states provide such authority. Ergo, one of the issues we have sought to consider through this eBlog has been the evolving State role in municipal distress in a field of seeming constant flux. This month, for instance, we experienced the uncertain governance situation in New Jersey in the wake of the state takeover of the City of Atlantic City—a state takeover in which the process and how it will play out could be further impacted by the potential selection by President-elect Trump of New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, who might be a potential Cabinet or other senior advisor to the President-elect.

Actual governance has shifted from local accountability to the state’s Division of Local Government Services—but with the state already having imposed a state emergency manager in the city, what the new state takeover means continues to be uncertain. In Ohio, which authorizes chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, the City of East Cleveland’s request to do so appears to be on the desk of Rod Serling in the Twilight Zone: there has simply been no response of any kind. Similarly, in California, state policies have clearly contributed to some of the fiscal distress that led Stockton and San Bernardino into chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, but the state played absolutely no role in helping either Stockton or San Bernardino to emerge. Michigan, a state which has been deeply enmeshed in municipal fiscal distress—albeit not necessarily in a constructive manner—has acted in different ways—going from its imposition of an emergency manager—a process with deadly consequences in Flint, but seemingly key to Detroit’s turnaround. Alabama, by refusing to allow Jefferson County to raise its own taxes, directly aided and abetted the County’s chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Rhode Island, on the day of Central Falls’ chapter 9 filing—the very day Providence, the state’s capitol city, was itself poised on the rim of filing, but opted not to—and the state, thanks to the exceptional ingenuity of its then Treasurer (now Governor), created an ingenious model of creating teams of city managers and retired state legislators to act in teams to offer assistance to cities in danger of insolvency—so that there was a team effort before—instead of after such a precipitous event.

Part of what has made this effort to assess what is happening in the arena of severe municipal fiscal challenges and bankruptcy so much more difficult is the surprise that, in the wake of recovery from the Great Recession, one would have assumed severe municipal fiscal distress and insolvency would have dissipated. It has not. What has changed? Why are States not reacting more uniformly? With only 18 states permitting municipal bankruptcy, what state models exist which offer a clearly defined legal or legislated route to address not just insolvency, but also to avoid the spread of fiscal contagion? What is a state’s role in recovery from a chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy? What is a state’s role in addressing increasing fiscal disparities?

Ungoverning in a Fiscal Twilight Zone. In East Cleveland, Ohio, the mall city which is seeking authority from the State of Ohio to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy—a plea to which it remains unclear whether there will ever be a response, and where there have been on and off discussions with adjacent Cleveland about a consolidation of the two municipalities; the city’s election day activities provide a sense of the increasing dysfunctional nature of the small city: it was, after all, on election day this month at Mayfair Elementary School where both candidate Devin Branch and current Mayor Gary Norton were working the polls trying to convince registered voters to go with their respective causes. Mayor Norton was pressing potential voters not to recall him at the city’s upcoming election on December 8th; Devin Branch was going door-to-door to obtain the 550 requisite signatures to ensure the recall would officially be on the ballot. Their respective efforts, however, came up against each other when they encountered each other going after the same person and their battle became an event where they pressed their respective clip boards in front of registered voters—leading to a confrontation so that Mayor Norton decided to order the Chief of Police and a squad of police to arrest Mr. Branch. Moreover, dissatisfied with the police response, Mayor Norton then ordered his personal lawyer, Willa Hemmons, to issue a warrant for the arrest of Mr. Branch. Thus, in an insolvent municipality, several squads of police and detectives were directed to make the arrest of Devin Branch last Thursday. Mr. Branch was arrested and placed in East Cleveland’s jail; last Friday, Judge William Dawson opened the door for his release after posting bond. This morning, Judge Dawson will hear from both men, albeit, what the voters and city’s taxpayers will hear seems unlikely to be enlightening for the city’s fiscal future.

Schooled in Fiscal Solvency? Massachusetts voters this month overwhelmingly rejected a major expansion of charter schools, rejecting Question 2 by nearly a 2-1 margin, in what was perceived as a significant setback for Governor Charlie Baker, who had aggressively campaigned for the referendum, saying it would provide a vital alternative for families trapped in failing urban schools. As proposed, the measure would have allowed for 12 new or expanded charters per year, adding significantly to the existing stock of 78 charters statewide. Had the measure been approved, it would have—as state-imposed charter schools in Detroit are, shifted thousands of dollars in state aid from public to charter schools—shifting as much as an estimated $451 million statewide this year. During the campaign, opponents such as Juan Cofield, president of the New England Area Council of the NAACP, warned that charters were creating a two-tiered system, draining money from the traditional schools that serve the bulk of black and Latino students, telling voters “a dual school system is inherently unequal.” Worcester Mayor Joseph Petty, an opponent, noted: “Here in Worcester we will spend $24.5 million dollars on charter schools in our city…that is money that could be used to hire more teachers, improve our facilities, and invest in our students,” in effect underscoring the reason municipal leaders in the Bay State opposed the measure: their apprehension with regard to the fiscal impact on cities, towns, and school districts when more children attend charter schools. Had the measure been adopted, district schools would have received less money: the money to educate a child would have followed the child: over time, expanding access to charter schools could cost local property taxpayers more, since district schools will need more funding, forcing local elected leaders to either raise property taxes more, or cut public services. Indeed, opponents of charter school expansion claimed, based on state data, that school districts would have lost some $450 million this year to charter school tuition, even after accounting for state reimbursements.

Unsurprisingly, ergo, municipal officials generally opposed expanding charter schools, with the mayors of Springfield, Boston, Chicopee, Holyoke, Northampton, Pittsfield, Westfield, and West Springfield all coming out publicly opposed. Geoff Beckwith, the Executive Director of the Massachusetts Municipal Association, said the current funding system is already difficult for cities and towns to deal with, noting that, for one, the formula transferring money from district to charter schools does not take into account the fact that many of a school’s costs are fixed and do not vary by child, noting that with regard to the fiscal impact on cities, towns and school districts: “You have to a have a classroom, you have to heat the building, you still have principals…It’s extremely hard for communities to actually cut costs…The only thing they can do is cut back on the overall quality of the programming they’re offering the vast majority of kids who stay behind in the regular public school system.” Ergo, he noted: “Until the financing system is fixed, the ballot question providing for the expansion of charter schools would exacerbate and deepen the financial trouble that these local school systems are dealing with…And the communities that are most impacted by charter school expansion are in most cases the most financially challenged communities.” (Unsurprisingly, the Massachusetts Municipal Association board voted unanimously to oppose the ballot question.) Indeed, Moody’s reported the rejection to be a credit positive for the Commonwealth’s urban local governments: “It will allow those cities and towns to maintain current financial operations without having to adjust to increased financial pressure from charter school funding.” According to Moody’s, since the last charter school expansion in 2010, cities such as Boston, Fall River, Lawrence, and Springfield have experienced significant growth in charter school assessments, averaging 83% due to increasing charter school enrollment. To which, Moody’s notes: “So far, the growing cost of charter schools on municipalities has not been a direct credit challenge; rather the effect is more indirect because Massachusetts school districts are integrated within cities and towns with relatively healthy credit profiles.” The agency went on to write: “Education in the commonwealth is a primary budget item within a municipality’s overall budget, which allows city budgets to absorb some of the education financial stress with other municipal sources….This integration is a key distinction from school districts in other states that operate separately from the communities they serve.”

What Is the Role of A State When a Municipality Nears Insolvency?

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eBlog, 9/21/16

In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the difficult challenge for a state when one of its municipalities is on the brink of insolvency—and where its authority to file for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy is uncertain—and the kinds of hard questions about its future. As we are noting, part of fiscal federalism involves signal differences in laws and authorities—on a state-by-state basis, with regard to options for municipalities on the brim of insolvency. Because only 18 states specifically provide authority to municipalities, that leaves a signal void in the remaining states and leaves those states in more awkward positions when a municipality within its borders likely will not be able, on its own, to avoid insolvency. Mayhap appropriately, we then delve further south to Jefferson County, Alabama, where the state’s actions were the critical lever to pushing the county into municipal bankruptcy—and where the County’s appeal efforts have been stymied for years.  

What Is a State to Do? The Richmond Free Press this morning ran an editorial about the foundering and near insolvency of the City of Petersburg, the small, independent city in Virginia, where the median income for a household in the city is under $29,000, and where the City Council this month adopted most of a package of tax increases and budget cuts, but rejected a proposal to close one of the city’s four fire stations—and where, it seems clear, the Commonwealth of Virginia is most unlikely to offer any fiscal relief. At heart, we noted, the Council was really holding a hearing about whether the small municipality has a future. Thus, this a.m., the editorial noted: “We remember the chilling headline in a New York newspaper when the Big Apple was facing bankruptcy…It was 1975, and President Gerald Ford declared he would veto any legislation calling for a federal bailout of New York City. The headline in the New York Daily News — ‘FORD TO CITY: DROP DEAD.’” Then the editorial noted that when Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe was asked by a reporter earlier this month if there were plans to propose legislation to help financially stricken Petersburg, “the governor’s reply was a tad bit better than President Ford’s to New York City, but it may have had the same result: ‘I’m sure we’re not going to see legislation proposed to deal with this situation…We have no authority to give any money. But we do have the authority to send our team in to help get the books together, get the finances together…Our team has been here, they’ve been staying here, and we want to give all the assistance we can.’” However, as the editorial notes: “Clearly, the city needs technical experts in a lot of fields, including the state’s audit team. But it needs a lot more than that.”

The editorial adds that the state audit team learned, and disclosed in a public meeting, that Petersburg’s fiscal abyss was deeper hole than originally thought: it had about $14 million in unpaid bills as of June 30th: the auditors determined the municipality had been spending far more than it was bringing in nearly every year since 2012; the state team determined the city was planning to sink even deeper into red ink in its FY’2017 budget: that approved budget calls for the city to spend $12.5 million more than it expects to receive in revenue. The state team provided recommendations, such as pursue short-term financing to help meet immediate needs, but, as the editorial notes, “But so far, that has not worked, because the city is in such bad fiscal condition.” The editorial notes that state lawmakers, including House Majority Leader Kirk Cox (R-Colonial Heights), said a bailout for Petersburg was highly unlikely, in part, because it would set a bad precedent.

Caught between a Rock & a Hard Place: Virginia does not specifically authorize its municipal entities to file a petition for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy—and only one entity, has ever attempted to file—an economic development authority, but its case was dismissed in 2001. The Virginia Constitution bars a city or town from incurring debt exceeding 10 percent of the assessed value of properties within its boundaries (see Virginia Constitution, article VII, §10); ergo, the editorial asks: “So what’s Petersburg to do?” Noting that the small municipality has slashed spending, including a $3.4 million cut to the city’s public schools budget, cut pay for its employees, frozen hiring, and raised taxes on everything from cigarettes, meals and lodging taxes to personal property taxes to bring the current budget into balance—but left untouched most of the $14 million in debt from previous years.”

It seems like a hot potato for Virginia lawmakers who appear to be apprehensive that the small municipality’s fiscal crisis could create a precedent for other cities, towns, or counties to seek bailouts from the state, or, as Del. R. Steven Landes (R-Augusta), Chairman of a newly formed task force studying the impact of fiscally stressed localities on the state and how to deal with such situations, put it: “I just hope we are not heading down this road where we are digging the state into a hole.” The Delegate’s question came in the wake of this week’s report to the legislature by Virginia’s Secretary of Finance Richard D. Brown on the city’s struggle to regain its financial footing, before members of the House of Delegates Appropriations Committee—even as Delegate Landes said that as far as he understood, Petersburg has not asked the state for financial help during its crisis. The audit findings presented by Sec. Brown had identified a projected $12 million budget deficit for the current fiscal year and found that by last June 30th, Petersburg had incurred $18.8 million in bills, of which $14.7 million were mostly unpaid obligations to “external entities” such as contractors, vendors, and a state agency. Secretary Brown alerted the committee to a looming October 1st payment deadline for $1.4 million owed to the Virginia Resources Authority, a premier funding source for local government infrastructure financing through bond and loan programs, reporting this was “a principal-and-interest payment,” adding that he would have to “take certain steps to intercept aid” from the state to Petersburg to make sure those payments are made, adding: “The state has never had to do that with our localities, so I think that this is a precedent that nobody really wants. That is why it is important for us to not even have to go there,” he testified, assuring the Committee members his department has provided “only technical assistance” to the city.

Unsurprisingly, some of the state lawmakers disbelieve the state’s aid has stopped there. Delegate Landes followed up: “You mentioned that we are not providing any direct financial assistance, but indirectly we are: Your time, your staff’s time and all these state agencies that are helping them move forward, it cost the Commonwealth money. Other localities have gotten into difficulties, and I don’t recall that we provided this kind of involvement…We are trying to help Petersburg on the school end, providing additional resources for their school system, and if they can’t pay their bills, how are they going to pay their superintendent?” Committee Chairman S. Chris Jones (R-Suffolk), said that although he agreed with Secretary Brown’s decision to intervene, he was concerned about Petersburg’s outstanding obligations to the Virginia Resources Authority: “We got to figure out what change we need to make from a state’s perspective; we need to protect ourselves…VRA debt can be an issue that can affect our bottom line. We cannot allow that to occur. It’s very distressing when you see what has occurred, and hopefully (the city) will continue to try to — in a very straightforward way — to deal with the issues.” To which, Secretary Brown responded that “[W]e wrestle with it, too,” but ultimately the state is tied to the city in terms of some of the debt obligations: “We can run, but we can’t hide from that. From my standpoint, it is better to be involved and help them over that hump…I have no intention to stay there long-term, but the consequences for the Commonwealth by not being involved, at this stage in the game with this critical Oct. 1 time frame on debt, is probably much worse than being involved.”

What is a County to do? The federal appeals court overseeing Jefferson County’s chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy appeal has, once again, delayed the case, with the previously scheduled December 12th arguments deferred by the 11th U.S. Court of Appeals to an uncertain future date—still another in a long, and increasingly costly, series of delays—of which there have been six so far this year. Jefferson County Commission President Jimmie Stephens noted: “It is very unusual to have this many delays, and I have expressed my frustration to counsel…Our team is ready and eager to have our day in court. We stand at their mercy.” Commission President Stephens has not addressed questions with regard to what these judicial delays are costing the county. Jefferson County exited Chapter 9 bankruptcy in December 2013, after selling $1.8 billion in sewer warrants to write down $1.4 billion of the sewer system’s debt. The plan of adjustment gives bondholders the right to go back to the bankruptcy court if the county fails to enact sewer system rate increases that service the debt. After the plan was implemented, a group of local ratepayers filed an appeal before U.S. District Judge Sharon Blackburn in the Northern District of Alabama. County attorneys argued that the appeal should be struck down, saying that it became moot when the plan of adjustment was implemented with the sale of new debt. In October 2014, Judge Blackburn rejected the county’s mootness contention, and ruled that she could consider the constitutionality of the plan—a decision Jefferson County appealed, and on which it now seems waiting for Godot.  

 

Bump in the San Bernardino Road to Bankruptcy Exit?

 As we have noted and explored in this eBlog, the diverse ways in which those states which authorize municipalities to file for municipal bankruptcy can have distinct repercussions. In Detroit and Central Falls, Rhode Island, for instance, the state enabling laws provide for the appointment of a receiver or emergency manager—effectively suspending or preempting the roles of such a city or county’s elected leaders, as happened in both cities. In contrast, in California, Alabama, and some other states, elected officials remain in charge. Thus, we observe different processes and different kinds of challenges. The issue, moreover, is, to some extent, at the heart of discussions in the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate this month, as the two bodies near House Speaker Paul Ryan’s deadline at the end of this month to act on some mechanism to address the nearing insolvency of the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico.

Jeopardizing a City’s Plan of Debt Adjustment? The San Bernardino City Council Monday night voted 4-3 to delay making a final decision to confirm the city’s plan to annex the city’s fire service into a county fire protection district and add a parcel tax, potentially undercutting a critical provision of its proposed plan of debt adjustment and undercutting its ability to exit from the longest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history. The Council could revisit the issue at its March 21 meeting; however, the very official action to debate and delay approval clearly creates doubts with regard to whether there will be majority support. Rejection of the deal would mark a significant setback for the city’s efforts to exit chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy: its mark a reversal of the 4-3 vote last August to approve the change to consolidate firefighting responsibility in San Bernardino County and impose a $148 FY16-17 parcel tax, with the subsequent annual increases of up to 3 percent annually. Moreover, because of last Fall’s elections, the makeup of the City Council when it votes in March will be altered: current Councilmember Rikke Van Johnson, who has been a strong advocate of the annexation plan, will have retired: he will be replaced by newly-elected Councilwoman Bessine Littlefield Richard, who has yet to take a public position on the critical issue. Moreover, Councilman Jim Mulvihill, who offered the motion for delay, just re-elected last month, raised his own questions with regard to the viability and benefits of the agreement at the hearing, noting: “This is the first time we’re seeing these specific numbers — it’s a whole new ballgame…We’re being sold a bill of goods…From the public’s point of view, they save no money.” Councilmember Mulvihill said, in doing the math, the projected savings of $7 million to $8 million in the first year of the annexation would be essentially equivalent to the $7.4 million tax parcel owners in the city would have to start paying—and that the agreement would last “in perpetuity.” (Albeit, it is hard to conceive of an annexation that would be other than in perpetuity.)

In response, the city’s consultant on the issue, Andrew Belknap of Management Partners, testified that annexation, by its nature, is “in perpetuity,” although, he told the Mayor and Council that a vote could be taken to un-annex. Mr. Belknap added that the numbers before the Council were the same ones the Local Agency Formation Commission used when it last January had unanimously approved the plan—a plan under which San Bernardino parcel owners would have to pay a new tax, but under which San Bernardino’s general fund would save at least $7 million annually—even as it offered the city’s citizens and homeowners improved fire and emergency medical services. In addition, San Bernardino City Attorney Gary Saenz warned that a Council decision to renege on the plan—a plan incorporated in the city’s plan of debt adjustment, adopted on a 6-1 vote by the Council last May—could well jeopardize its ability to emerge from municipal bankruptcy, advising Councilmembers: “First, if this plan passes, the everyday constituent will be safer,” referring to a saved step in the dispatch process, new money for equipment maintenance, and use of a county fire station in addition to the municipally operated stations, and, as he put it: “Second, this will be cheaper… (and) we’ll apply the savings to other types of services, including police, so they will have improved police and fire services.” Councilman John Valdivia, however, claimed the annexation plan would have the opposite effect: “Politics will be removed and annihilated, which is really what the mayor and some here want. Response times will be longer, taxes will be higher, and fire stations in minority communities are still going to be shuttered and closed.” In response, Mr. Saenz said that neither he, the city attorney, nor Councilmembers were fire protection experts, but that those who were — including San Bernardino’s fire chief and fire union — favored the plan. Councilman Fred Shorett, who has been a long-time advocate of outsourcing the city’s Fire Department, said the plan was important. Residents would vote down the new tax if they had the chance, he said, but they also want service the city cannot afford—adding: “They can’t have a free lunch.” he said.

The issue could be further roiled were more than 50 percent of the city’s registered voters—a very high bar—were to return a letter saying they are protesting the decision. An election will be called if protest is received from at least 25 percent, but less than 50 percent of the registered voters, or if 25 percent to 100 percent of the number of landowners — who own at least 25 percent of the total land value — submit written protest.

Michigan’s Role in Municipal Fiscal Fates

February 23, 2016. Share on Twitter

Out Like Flint. Does Flint have a fiscal future? University of Michigan-Flint Professor Marty Kaufman, who has been leading a research team studying the city’s denigrated water lines, has reported there are as many as 8,000 lead service lines—making the announcement yesterday at a news conference at City Hall, in the wake of his team’s painstaking analysis of handwritten records, paper maps, and scanned images to create a digital database of lead pipes. Professor Kaufman stressed that while the project is a full compilation of available data, the records, compiled from a 1984 survey, do not always indicate the types of pipes used—vastly complicating Mayor Karen Weaver’s efforts to get those lines removed as quickly as possible from what, once, was the state’s second largest city, but where, today, the fear of lead contamination, especially for children, can only threaten significant adverse fiscal consequences for the city as families with children become increasingly fearful of remaining in the city—not to mention the apprehension of other families about moving to Flint: fears that cannot bode well for the city’s assessed property values. Because at the time of the switch of its water supply, under then state-appointed emergency manager Darnell Earley, Flint did not treat the water with anti-corrosion chemicals: the omission allowed river water to scrape too much lead from aging pipes and into some residents’ homes. Nevertheless, yesterday, Gov. Snyder said 89 percent of water samples collected from key locations in Flint measured below the “action level” of 15 parts per billion for lead in an initial round of testing, adding that samples from the so-called “sentinel” sites will help determine when it is safe to drink unfiltered water again.

Out Like Snyder? Meanwhile, the Michigan State Board of Canvassers, which is responsible for canvassing and certifying statewide elections, elections for legislative districts that cross county lines and all judicial offices, except Judge of the Probate Court, conducting recounts for state-level offices, canvassing nominating petitions filed with the Secretary of State, canvassing state-level ballot proposal petitions, assigning ballot designations and adopting ballot language for statewide ballot proposals, and approving electronic voting systems for use in the state, has approved another petition seeking to recall Gov. Snyder, citing the governor’s declaration of a state of emergency in Flint after lead leached from the pipes into the city’s water supply. The Board approved the petition yesterday from the Rev. David Bullock of Detroit, who had filed his petition two weeks ago yesterday after the board rejected eight petitions to recall the Governor. Notwithstanding the approval, Rev. Bullock now must obtain at least 789,133 signatures. If approved, the recall effort would become a ballot question which would then need majority support from Michigan’s voters.

Schooling on Municipal Bankruptcy. As every city or county elected leader knows, the quality of a jurisdiction’s public schools are fundamental to such a jurisdiction’s fiscal balance: if the schools are excellent: they attract families to the city or county, with important, positive implications for assessed property values and property tax collections. If, in contrast, they appear to be physically dangerous or threatening, or incompetent; the schools can create the opposite fiscal outcome. Thus, even though many public school systems are nominally distinct from city or county-elected jurisdictions; those locally elected leaders have a very great stake in the perceived excellence of their public schools.

The city and Detroit Public Schools (DPS) have entered a consent agreement setting a timetable to address hundreds of safety and health violations in DPS’ school buildings. The agreement covers the first 26 schools inspected by the city that require repairs; additional schools will be added as inspections progress. Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan stated: “What we wanted was a commitment from DPS with specific time lines for making each repair and a binding agreement enforceable in court if those time lines are not met.” The action by the city comes in the wake of Detroit’s Building, Safety, Engineering & Environmental Department’s four-month inspection program for all 97 DPS buildings after complaints by teachers and parents about problems including water leaks, mold and heating—and rat infestation: at six schools with reported rodent infestations — Blackwell Institute, Clark Preparatory Academy, Cody High, Sampson-Webber Leadership Academy, Ronald Brown Academy and Spain Elementary-Middle — inspections are being done monthly by pest control contractors, according to the city report. Building checks were promptly conducted in 20 DPS buildings believed to be most problematic. Inspections of the remaining district buildings, plus Detroit charter schools, are to be completed by the end of April. The consent agreement, signed by Detroit’s City Attorney and Marios Demetriou, the DPS deputy superintendent of finance and operations, includes a spreadsheet listing progress on scores of projects and completion deadlines. City officials report that city inspectors have visited 64 DPS properties so far. In addition, the Detroit Health Department also conducted follow-up inspections in some cases. It is uncertain how the action taken by the city to deal with the dysfunctional DPS might impact—at least from a fiscal perspective—the suit filed last month by the Detroit Federation of Teachers with regard to building conditions, and seeking the removal of state-appointed Emergency Manager Darnell Earley, although Ivy Bailey, interim president of the DFT, said: “We do not plan to withdraw it until we are confident that the consent agreement’s commitments have been fulfilled.” Mr. Earley, who has previously served, or mayhap mis-served, as Gov. Rick Snyder’s appointed Emergency Manager for the City of Flint, will step down on Monday.

Recovery! Wayne County, the largest county in Michigan—and the home not just to Detroit, but also to 33 other cities and 9 townships—and where Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder last July had declared a financial emergency, and which is still operating under a consent agreement with the state—is now, according to the unmoody Moody’s, stable, with Moody’s Investors Service having revised its credit rating outlook on Wayne’s junk-level rating upward from negative in recognition of the Wayne County’s remarkable success in making substantial cuts to its public pension liabilities and other operating expenses, noting: “Revision of the outlook to stable from negative reflects diminished near-term fiscal challenges.” In response, Wayne County Executive Warren Evans noted: “Moody’s decision to upgrade our credit outlook to stable is a step in the right direction…Our successes last year in eliminating the structural deficit and reducing unfunded health care liabilities were definitely noteworthy, but, we aren’t resting on those successes. My administration continues to work to restore long term fiscal stability to Wayne County.”

The county has succeeded in reducing nearly $50 million in spending, achieved with elimination or modification of retirement benefits, a contraction of payroll, and other operating efficiencies over the last six months—having announced earlier this month that it is expecting $23 million in fiscal 2016 budget relief from cuts to retiree healthcare benefits—cuts which trimmed $850 million from its unfunded liabilities. In addition, the county now projects its annual savings are expected to grow, citing its post-employment benefit liabilities as one of the factors which had driven its deficit enough to raise the specter of municipal bankruptcy. Indeed, County Executive Evans noted: “The restructuring of the county retiree healthcare was the single largest contributor to restoring solvency.” Wayne County reduced its actuarial accrued OPEB liability by 65% in 2015, lowering it to $471 million from $1.32 billion, according to an actuarial analysis from Nyhart Actuary & Employment Benefits: the restructuring is projected to reduce Wayne County’s pay-as-you-go contribution this year down to $17.6 million from $40.4 million. In its upgrading, Moody’s analysts noted: “Enhanced control over expenditures was key to addressing the county’s fiscal concerns given limited options to raise revenue.”

Spinning the Debt Wheel in Atlantic City: “The city’s fiscal crisis is severe and immediate.” A new Atlantic City rescue bill, the “Municipal Stabilization and Recovery Act,” would give the State of New Jersey increased authority over Atlantic City’s finances as part of an effort to avoid the city going into chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy: the proposed legislation would empower the state to renegotiate Atlantic City’s outstanding municipal debt and municipal contracts for up to five years, while also giving the state the ability to leverage city assets and make staff cuts. Under the proposal, Atlantic City would be given one year to find a way to monetize its water authority. The quasi-state takeover of the city, coming in the wake of last month’s veto by then-Presidential candidate Gov. Gov. Chris Christie—a package which would have enabled Atlantic City’s eight remaining casinos to enter into a payment-in-lieu of taxes program for 15 years and aggregately pay $120 million annually during that period instead of a traditional property tax. The introduction of the bill came in the midst of ongoing governance confusion—with the role of the Governor’s appointed emergency manager for the city still in question. There has been, however, little question from the city’s perspective: Mayor Donald Guardian, joined by city council members and other elected officials, harshly criticized the takeover plan yesterday in a press conference, urging instead a new financial assistance bill which would allow the city to maintain “sovereignty,” with Mayor Guardian stating: “We cannot stand here today and accept any bill with the broad, overreaching powers as the one presented to us last week contained.” Or, as Atlantic City Council President Marty Small put it: “We were all troubled by this draft bill: It takes our sovereign right to govern our own city away.”

The legislation was introduced by New Jersey State Senate President Steve Sweeney (D-Gloucester), with Senators Kevin O’Toole (D-Wayne), and Paul Sarlo (D-Wood-Ridge), in an effort to avoid an Atlantic City chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy—with time beginning to run out at the home of the gaming tables: According to a January 21 report from Gov. Christie’s appointed emergency manager Kevin Lavin, Atlantic City could default as early as April absent a state rescue package. That is, there looms an Atlantic City fiscal hurricane—the red flag warnings of which now appear to have disrupted the year-beginning “new partnership” between Mayor Guardian, Gov. Christie, and Sen. Sweeney to avoid municipal bankruptcy—or, as Mayor Guardian described it: “The final piece of legislation that the State presented to us was far from a partnership…It was worse. Some would even say fascist.” Atlantic County Freeholder Ernest Coursey was no less upset, noting: “It will be a cold day in hell before we just stand by idly and just allow folks to run over the people of Atlantic City…I think we ought to work in partnership with the state of New Jersey and stop this hostile talk of a takeover.”

In Rome, they would say: tempus fugit, or time is flying: In this case, time is running out: in addition to addition to municipal bond debt, Atlantic City confronts a debt of $170 million to the Borgata casino from its tax appeals and a missed $62.5 million payment owed last December; moreover, Atlantic County Court Judge Julio Mendez ordered a 45-day mediation period commencing February 5th: Mayor Guardian yesterday said that if no resolution can be reached by then, he will have no choice but to petition the state’s Local Finance Board for a bankruptcy declaration, adding: “The sad irony is that we have a casino industry that wants to redirect their funds to the City of Atlantic City to help avoid all these doomsday scenarios,…There is a reasonable and practical solution out there, but that path has not been chosen by the state yet.”

Saving Puerto Rico. The U.S. House will convene simultaneous hearings on Puerto Rico Thursday as part of an accelerating effort to meet House Speaker Paul Ryan’s (R-Wi.) deadline for final House action by April first: The House Financial Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will hold a hearing on the possible effects of Puerto Rico’s debt crisis on the municipal bond market; the House Natural Resources Committee will convene its hearing to discuss the Treasury Department’s analysis of the situation in Puerto Rico. The subcommittee hearing will feature three witnesses: Anne Krueger, a senior research professor of international economics at John Hopkins University who led a recent economic study of Puerto Rico; Juan Carlos Batlle, senior managing director of CPG Island Servicing, LLC; and William Isaac, senior managing director and global head of financial institutions for FTI Consulting. House Financial Services Subcommittee Chair Sean Duffy (R-Wis.) has, to date, been a key player in seeking to determine an exit from Puerto Rico’s looming insolvency: he introduced legislation last December to give Puerto Rico’s public authorities Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection in return for the creation of a five-person, Presidentially appointed financial stability council, seeking to balance the municipal bankruptcy authority Democrats have been pushing with the oversight authority for which Republicans have pressed. The Treasury proposal the Natural Resources Committee is scheduled to discuss is not dissimilar to Rep. Duffy’s, but it would propose restructuring for the entire commonwealth, a legislative concept deemed by some “Super Chapter 9” bankruptcy—a proposal which has not gained support in Congress over misplaced apprehensions by some that such a proposal could open up the possibility for states, such as Illinois, to try to restructure their constitutionally backed general obligation debts. These members are, apparently, unfamiliar with the dual sovereignty system unique to the United States of America. The Treasury position supports restructuring for the entire commonwealth, but that the extension of restructuring could come through Congress’s power under the Constitution’s Territorial Clause—a clause which gives Congress the power to “dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.” U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew has backed comprehensive restructuring legislation for the territory, partially to make it easier for its officials to bring all the commonwealth’s creditors to the table.

It Ain’t Over ‘Til It’s Over: One would think that after the long, tortuous, expensive process of gaining approval for a plan of debt restructuring from a U.S. Bankruptcy Court to exit municipal bankruptcy, a municipality could get back to focusing on recovery. But then you might be misjudging. Jefferson County, Alabama, however, finally at least has its new day in court set to determine whether its approved bankruptcy plan of debt adjustment is final: The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals has tentatively set the week of May 16 for its expected schedule of oral arguments in an appeal of the county’s successful exit from Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy—albeit the 11th Circuit has no timeframe within which it must rule after arguments are heard. But one could anticipate a long and arduous road: it has taken well over a year to prepare the record for the court to consider hearing arguments, meaning that Jefferson County has now been in appeal longer than it was in municipal bankruptcy case. The lingering issue relates to the county’s approved plan of debt adjustment which .enabled it to issue $1.8 billion in sewer refunding warrants to write down $1.4 billion in related sewer debt two years ago last December—an approval which provoked a group of ratepayers on the sewer system to appeal U.S. (now retired) Bankruptcy Judge Thomas Bennett’s approval, and after, nearly 18 months ago, U.S. District Judge Sharon Blackburn rejected the Jefferson County’s contention that the ratepayers’ bankruptcy appeal was moot, based in part on the fact that the plan was largely consummated when the refunding debt was sold.

Municipal Bankruptcy–Constitutional Challenges

February 8, 2016. Share on Twitter

“Progress is our most important product.” As former California Governor and President Ronald Reagan used to say in ads he did for General Electric, progress matters—especially for San Bernardino, the city in municipal bankruptcy longer than any other in U.S. history. San Bernardino, in its latest filing in U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California, has reported progress: the bankrupt city has reached a tentative settlement agreement with pension bondholders in its Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, having reached a tentative agreement with the creditor holding its pension obligation bonds with regard to how the debt would be treated in the city’s plan of debt adjustment, reporting the agreement was reached last month and that it was working on document terms, which remain confidential for now. As in the Detroit bankruptcy, the role of a judicial mediator is proving invaluable. In this instance, Nevada Bankruptcy Judge Gregg W. Zive, appears to be playing a critical role in confidential mediation with the city, bond insurer, and bondholder—mediation which has been ongoing for nearly a year, according to the filing. San Bernardino had been planning to pay $655,000 plus interest on nearly $50 million in pension obligation bonds held by a Luxembourg-based bank (Erste Europaische Pfandbrief-und Kommunalkreditbank AG—EEPK), which had been at the forefront of opposing the city’s proposal to adjust more than $150 million in claims.

When San Bernardino first filed its plan of debt adjustment and its disclosure statement last May 29th, after nearly three years in bankruptcy, the plan had drawn objections from both Ambac Assurance Corp. and EEPK—with Ambac the bond insurer on the pension obligation bonds held by EEPK. Under the previous terms of San Bernardino’s plan of debt adjustment, holders of the $50 million of unsecured pension obligation bonds (POB) claims would have received payments of $655,000 plus interest over time, and holders of general unsecured claims between $130 million and $150 million would have received a pro rata share of $1.3 million after the plan became effective. But last December, in a filing with the U.S. bankruptcy court, Ambac Attorney Paul Kreller had questioned how the city was able to decide on what he termed its “draconian” plan of only paying 1 percent owed on the pension obligation bonds and general unsecured claims when its financial disclosures were what he termed so “murky.”

The disclosure of the agreement followed a unanimous vote by the new City Council to approve a settlement ending disputes involving more than $40 million in claims with the city’s firefighters, a move the city said it expected would advance its proposed plan of debt adjustment to exit municipal bankruptcy. As adopted, the settlement resolves nine years’ of claims against San Bernardino. It includes paying the firefighters $2.7 million to resolve claims over changes to the city’s pension policy and to settle lawsuits the firefighters pressed against the city after it filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection. The agreement also provides for the firefighters’ union to be treated as an unsecured creditor which would receive $140,000, or 1 percent, on a $14 million claim in the city’s plan of debt adjustment. Amended disclosures documents are now due March 30, rather than Feb. 10, with opposition filings due April 13. The status hearing was postponed from Feb. 10 to April 27 at 1:30 p.m.

Puerto Rico in the Twilight Zone. While Puerto’s Rico’s Governor and other state and local elected leaders await U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan’s (R-Wisc.) anticipated deadline of April 1st with regard to what authority or plan the House will settle upon with regard to the U.S. Territory, Representatives for Puerto Rico report the Territory intends to pursue its recently proposed debt exchange with holders of tax-supported debt. In the category of, when it rains it pours, moreover, Puerto Rico Gov. Alejandro García Padilla last Friday announced the declaration of a public health emergency over the mosquito-borne Zika virus, with 22 confirmed cases to date, including a pregnant woman. The virus, which has been particularly linked to microcephaly on newborns, or abnormal brain development, poses a threat not just for Puerto Rico residents, but also on its operating budget. In issuing his executive order, Gav. Padilla noted: “Our main objective is to ensure the security of Puerto Ricans, inform about the necessary prevention measures, following the recommendations of health experts.” The Health Department will hold an event today at the Puerto Rico Convention Center to provide local health professionals with more information not only on Zika, but also dengue and chikungunya, which are also carried by the same mosquito linked to Zika — the aedes aegypti. The Consumers Affairs Department has also ordered a temporary price freeze on products that help in preventing and fighting the disease. From the territory’s fiscal perspective, the public emergency constitutes a double fiscal whammy: it will impose significant, unbudgeted costs—even as it risks discouraging tourists from visiting the islands. The Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC) recently issued a Zika-related travel alert on the Caribbean region, warning pregnant women and those planning to become pregnant against travel to the affected areas, including Puerto Rico. The government’s service line, 3-1-1, will be taking calls to provide information about the virus and log complaints about mosquito breeding sites.

The Commonwealth has repeatedly asked Congress to provide it or its authorities with restructuring capabilities, such as Detroit, Jefferson County, and San Bernardino have under Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy; however, there has been little progress to date. Under the restructuring plan Puerto Rico announced last week, creditors holding $49.2 billion of tax-supported debt would be asked to exchange it for $26.5 billion of new, mandatorily payable so-called “Base Bonds” and $22.7 billion of Growth Bonds. There would be no interest payments on the Base Bonds until fiscal year 2018 and no principal payments until fiscal year 2021. In addition, the so-called Growth Bonds would only be payable if Puerto Rico were to surpass conservative revenue growth projections through real economic growth: the first payments on the Growth Bonds, if possible, would commence a decade after the close of the exchange offer. If Puerto Rico were to experience growth consistent with the U.S.’s projected growth over the next three decades, the creditors would be able to recover the full amount of their principal investments. Annual payments on the Growth Bonds would be capped at 15% of the commonwealth’s revenue. If it all worked, Puerto Rico’s debt service-to-revenue ratio on tax-supported debt would fall by more than 50 percent from its current 36% level.

Ms. Acosta Febo, President of the Puerto Rico Government Development Bank, said she and other commonwealth officials have had more conversations with creditors in the wake of last week’s meeting when the idea, which lays out a broad allocation of how much each class of creditor would receive, was proposed. At the same time, Puerto Rican leaders have also been trying to finalize a separate agreement with creditors for about $9 billion of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority debt: a previously missed deadline for Puerto Rico’s lawmakers to pass legislation required under the potential agreement has been extended to next Tuesday. The negotiations have led Moody’s to be unmoody in noting that the extension of negotiations “suggest a consensual debt restructuring is still possible.” ‘Possible’ is increasingly the key term, as Puerto Rico officials have said that without solutions from those negotiations or Congressional action, the territory will default on its next major round of municipal bond payments due July 1st.

It Ain’t Over Until It’s Over. Jefferson County, prior to Detroit, the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history, is finding that exiting municipal bankruptcy can take longer and be more trying (a pun) than getting into bankruptcy. Now the county will have to, some more than two years after its exit from municipal bankruptcy, appear before the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to argue, once again, the soundness of its plan of debt adjustment – and why that plan should remain in force to protect bondholders. Jefferson County had asked to appear before the panel to appeal U.S. District Judge Sharon Blackburn’s ruling in September 2014, a ruling in which Judge Blackburn denied the county’s motion to strike down an appeal by a group of local ratepayers of the Jefferson County’s sewer system—ratepayers who have challenged Jefferson County’s plan of debt adjustment. The county had argued unsuccessfully that the ratepayers’ appeal was moot, because the bankruptcy plan was largely consummated in December 2013, when $1.8 billion of sewer system refunding warrants were sold to write down $3.2 billion of outstanding debt. Jefferson County’s attorneys believe an oral argument could be of assistance for the federal appellate judges, noting: “The constitutional, statutory, and equitable principles involved in this appeal are particularly important to governmental entities that may consider Chapter 9 relief now or in the future, as well as to the municipal debt market.” The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals has accepted numerous documents and court cases, including friend of the court briefs from municipal market organizations and Chapter 9 bankruptcy appeal rulings in Detroit and Stockton, California.

The challenge here is constitutional—and goes to the core of federalism. The Jeffco ratepayers are alleging the Jefferson County’s plan of debt adjustment violates the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, under which powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people. Thus, they contend, a provision in Jefferson County’s court-approved plan of debt adjustment could allow the federal bankruptcy court to set sewer system rates to service Jefferson County’s debt—a key provision in the city’s approved plan of debt adjustment because it guaranteed protection for the county’s municipal bondholders who participated in the 2013 refunding agreement—and allows the federal bankruptcy court in Alabama to maintain jurisdiction over Jefferson County’s plan of debt adjustment as long as the debt remains outstanding. Judge Blackburn, however, was troubled by the provision when she denied Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss the ratepayers’ appeal. Although Judge Blackburn said some parts of the county’s bankruptcy confirmation order “may be impossible to reverse,” she said the portion which cedes the county’s future authority to set sewer rates to the bankruptcy court is not one of those. Jefferson County has argued that the bankruptcy court is only a forum for bondholders to enforce the plan and related contracts, and not to set sewer rates.