Disparate Physical & Fiscal Responses to Municipal Physical & Fiscal Distress

eBlog

January 16, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the ongoing fiscal and physical challenges of restoring power in hurricane devastated Puerto Rico, which the Trump Administration and Congress have opted to treat in a very different manner than other hurricane devastated municipalities and states.

Prospects for Recovery. Notwithstanding the opposition of his own designated coordinator for the restoration of electric power, Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rossello yesterday gave the go-ahead to sign an agreement which will allow Puerto Rico’s muncipios to hire companies and experts to repair the island’s electric distribution lines, with Puerto Rico Secretary of the Interior, William Villafañe, announcing—in the wake of a demonstration by residents of bigger muncipios which remain without electricity since Hurricanes Irma and María passed last September, that the Electric Power Authority (AEE) will sign an agreement with the muncipios to allow them to hire companies to repair power lines. The breakthrough came in the wake of a meeting with the presidents of the Federation and the Association of Mayors, Carlos Molina (Arecibo) and Rolando Ortiz (Cayey), respectively, as well as the Mayor (Alcalde) of Bayamón, Ramón Luis Rivera, and others officials. The agreement, which until yesterday had not been shown to the Mayors, is supposed to have a series of security restrictions; in addition, the agreement is intended to empower the muncipios to offer injury insurance, as well as be eligible for FEMA reimbursement. Secretary Villafañe noted that Governor disagreed with the result of last Monday’s meeting, in which the coordinator designated for the restoration efforts of electric power, Carlos Torres, and the AEE refused to establish an agreement with the municipios out of security concerns.

Thus, among the security conditions the agreement mandates, is that Mayors will be required to establish contracts exclusively with contractors who have specialized equipment and trucks. In a clarification, Secretary Villafañe assured reporters that PREPA retirees may continue to provide services, as is the case of the Pepino Power Authority, an initiative of the Mayor Javier Jiménez of San Sebastian—a muncipio founded in 1752 by Captain Cristóbal González de la Cruz, who among other neighbors, had an interest in converting some cow farms into an agricultural village. The foundation of the town from the religious aspect, was consummated in December 1762 by Mariano Martin, the then Puerto Rico Catholic Bishop: by the beginning, 1700, San Sebastian was a conglomerate of a few cow farms, owned by some residents of the Partido de Aguada. Las Vegas was the former plain site of one of the first cow farms located by the Guatemala riverside at the north; another of those cow farms was Pepinito (today’s downtown), which was a low green mountain with a white calcium carbonate face. From these geographical accidents come the first names of the then new village, albeit one of the oldest municipalities in the United States: Las Vegas del Pepino (Cucumber Fields). Indeed, the permission to found the muncipio was officially given in 1752.

By the beginning of the 19th century, wealthy Spanish families arrived in Pepino, fleeing the revolutions of Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. Subsequently, families from Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain came to Puerto Rico as well as a significant number of isleños (Canary Islanders)—with the isleños taking over the local political power and developing a coffee industry. Much as they did in Nevada, the Basques brought some material progress to the muncipio; in addition, the new resident Basques, in remembrance of their home region and its religious patron, saw the need of upgrading the old traditional Pepino used by the Canary Islanders to the new and “up-dated” San Sebastián—even though, still today, the citizens of San Sebastián are called “pepinianos.” Permission to found the muncipio was officially given in 1752, under the leadership of the founder, Captain Cristóbal González de la Cruz, who sought to convert cattle fincas (ranches/farms) into an agricultural village—with the governmental transformation consummated in December of 1762 by Mariano Martin, the island Catholic bishop at that time. The muncipio grew by the beginning of the 19th century, with the arrival of wealthy Spanish families, fleeing the revolutions of Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. Nearly a century later, several Catalon families from northern Spain and the Canary Islands joined the large number of isleños (Canary Islanders) who had made El Pepino their home—new arrivals who, in the wake of taking over the local political power, developing a coffee industry, and changing the muncipio’s name, in remembrance of their home region and its religious patron, to the new and “up-dated” San Sebastián, notwithstanding that, still today, the citizens of San Sebastián are called “pepinianos.”

For his part, the Mayor Rivera, who had notified the government last September of his interest in collaborating in the restoration of electricity, only learned yesterday that the agreement had been approved; however, the municipal executive of Cayey and President of the Association of Mayors said that as long as they do not see the document, they will not believe it, because, to date, they have neither been allowed to see or sign the document in question: Mayor Ortiz said that during the meeting yesterday, Coordinator Torres again expressed his disagreement with allowing municipalities to collaborate in the restoration of light: “He (Torres) will have control of the materials, will have control of the brigades, control of resources–and that this resource, which is so important in the process of re-energizing the country, says that he does not agree with the Mayors intervening in this process or giving us the agreement to sign…They said that they were going to give us the power to energize the system and work with brigades that we can hire, and that they will give us brigades to work with the municipalities, and they will give us materials, (but) we leave here with nothing in the hand, with a promise of agreement.” Mayor Ortiz explained that in Cayey the muncipio has retirees from PREPA willing to start working, however, absent an agreement, they are not only barred by law from doing so, but also prevented from obtaining protection from the State Insurance Fund Corporation in case of injury to these workers. The Mayor added: “What he (Coordinator Torres) does not know is that in all of our communities and in all of our cities there are people trained with extraordinary resources to work on that system, because they have done it in all the previous events.”  Nevertheless, Mayor Rivera assured that as soon as the document is sent and signed, he has two companies with three brigades ready to work in the Bayamón distribution lines. He estimated that these works can begin today, if the legal division of La Fortaleza advances in the drafting of the agreement with the municipalities.

Unbalanced Politics? The restoration efforts have also been hampered by allegations of partisan discrimination: the number of brigades distributed among the municipalities of the northern region supposedly differed by 480 in the municipalities of the New Progressive Party (PNP) versus 174 in those led by the PPD, according to the President of the Municipal Legislature of Dorado, Carlos Alberto López. However, Secretary Villafañe refuted those data with others: he indicated that among the six municipalities with less than 20% of electric power service restored, five are NPOPs, while among the 35 that already have more than 60% service, 20 are from PPD.

What Would Rod Serling Say? The former host of the Twilight Zone, Rod Serling, who opened each week’s show by saying a “Dimension of sound, a dimension of sight, and dimension of mind: you just crossed over into The Twilight Zone,” seems consistent with Moody’s characteristically moody new report on Puerto Rico’s fiscal plan, writing: “These repeated delays in revising Puerto Rico’s fiscal plan…underscore the economic uncertainties that Puerto Rico faces as a result of post-Maria factors, including surging migration to the U.S. mainland, potentially unsustainable operating conditions for the territory’s manufacturers, and the federal recovery and rebuilding assistance that may fall short of what Puerto Rico needs to prevent lasting and severe damage to its economic base…Together, the growing challenges from these factors may further reduce already low recovery prospects for holders of Puerto Rico’s 17 rated debt types.” The insights, provided by Moody’s senior at least 200,000 Puerto Ricans have left Puerto Rico since Hurricane Maria struck, or about 6% of the pre-Maria population—adding that manufacturing, an important part of Puerto Rico’s economy, has been steadily dropping over the last two decades—and warning that, in the bitter wake of Maria, some manufactures may decide to move to other areas less likely to be hit by future hurricanes. The analysts further warned that the federal government’s new 12.5% excise tax on profits derived from patents and other intangible assets is another negative. Finally, they noted that the amount of federal aid to Puerto Rico in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria will affect Puerto Rico’s trajectory of recovery amid growing doubt and uncertainty whether Gov. Rosselló’s request for $94.4 billion in aid will be honored—especially, with the federal government on the verge of shutting down this week—and its failure, to date—in disbursing any portion of a Congressionally-approved $4.9 billion Community Disaster Loan to Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and some other jurisdictions hit by recent natural disasters. Last week, Reorg Research reported that Puerto Rico’s debt restructuring and arguments between the U.S. Treasury and Puerto Rico over the latter’s control of the funds has delayed the funds’ release.

If anything, the federal inability to act has been further clouded by unclear governance: last week, Puerto Rico Sen. Minority Leader Eduardo Bhatia, who, during his tenure as Senate President, had been selected as Chair of the Council of State Governments of the Eastern Regional Conference (CSG-ERC) and later elected as President of the National Hispanic Caucus of State Legislators, thereby becoming the first Senate President and the first Puerto Rican to preside over the organization, as well as serve on the Board of the Council of State Government (CSG), National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) and the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda (NHLA); brought up a different concern about the fiscal plan’s delay: in the new style of Trumpian governance, he tweeted to Gov. Ricardo Rosselló: “This is your great opportunity to regain lost confidence…Make your fiscal plan public today, so that there is no doubt, the people know your proposal and participate in the reconstruction of Puerto Rico,” adding that the people of Puerto Rico deserved a chance to comment prior to the draft’s submission to the PROMESA Oversight Board, tweeting: “In all countries of the world, ideas are discussed before decisions are made, not later…Otherwise, the process is a mockery of the serious people of Puerto Rico who want to contribute to the common good.”

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Governing under Takeovers

December 19, 2017

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s Blog, we consider the fiscal and governing challenges of a city emerging from a quasi-state takeover—and report on continuing, discouraging blocks to Puerto Rico’s fiscal recovery.

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

The Steep Fiscal Road to Recovery.  The Hartford City Council last week forwarded Mayor Luke Bronin’s request for Tier III state monitoring under the new Municipal Accountability Review Board, the state Board established by §367 of Public Act 17-2  as a State Board  for the purpose of providing technical, financial and other assistance and related accountability for municipalities experiencing various levels of fiscal distress. That board, which met for the first time on December 8th, now could be the key for Hartford to avoid filing for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy: the Board, chaired by State Treasurer Denise Nappier and Budget Director Benjamin Barnes, is to oversee the city’s budgeting, contracts, and municipal bond transactions. The Council also passed a bond resolution to permit the city to refund all of its outstanding debt obligations. In addition, the Council approved new labor contracts with the City of Hartford Professional Employees Association and the Hartford Police Union that management projects will save Hartford more than $18 million over five years. According to Mayor Bronin, the police labor contract could save the city nearly $2 million this fiscal year; moreover, it calls for long-term structural changes, or, in the Mayor’s words, the agreement “represents another big step toward our goal of fiscal stability,” adding that the employee contracts and state aid were essential to keeping the 123,000-population city out of Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy—even as Mayor Bronin is also seeking concessions from bondholders. (Insurers Assured Guaranty and Build America Mutual wrap approximately 80% of the city’s outstanding municipal bonds.)

In its new report, “Hartford Weaknesses Not Common,” Fitch Ratings noted that Hartford appears to be fiscally unique in that other Connecticut cities are unlikely to face similar problems, after the company assessed the fiscal outlook of several cities, including Bridgeport, New Haven, and Waterbury—finding that while these municipalities have comparable demographics and fiscal challenges, none is as fiscally in trouble, noting the city’s “rapid run-up” of outstanding debt and unfunded pension liabilities as issues that set it apart from nearby municipalities. Indeed, Hartford Mayor Luke Bronin has threatened the state’s capitol city may file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection—a threat which likely assisted in the city’s receipt of an additional $48 million in aid from Connecticut’s FY2018 budget, as well as two recently settled contracts with two labor unions. In addition, Fitch pointed to Hartford’s fiscal reliance on one-time revenue sources, such as the sale of parking garages and other assets, as well as the city’s inability to obtain “significant” union givebacks as factors that augured fiscal challenges compared to other cities in the state which Fitch noted have “substantial flexibility and sound reserves.” Moreover, despite Mayor Luke Bronin’s pressure for labor concessions, only two of the city’s unions have agreed to new contracts—contracts which include pay freezes and other givebacks, albeit two other unions have agreed to pacts offering significant concessions. These changes have enabled Hartford to draw back from the brink of chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, but still left the city confronting a $65 million deficit this year, and dramatically in debt and facing public pension payment increases—potentially driving Hartford’s annual debt contribution to over $60 million annually—even as it imposes the highest tax rate of any municipality in the state, especially because of its unenviable inability to levy property taxes on more than half the acreage in the city—a city dominated by state office buildings and other tax-exempt properties. These fiscal precipices and challenges have forced the city to prepare to apply for state oversight and begin a restructuring of Hartford’s $600 million in outstanding debt—a stark contrast with the state’s other municipalities, which, as Fitch noted, have achieved greater success in gaining labor concessions, even as they less reliant on state assistance, according to Fitch: “Unlike Hartford, most Connecticut cities have substantial budget flexibility and sound reserves.” In some contrast, Standard & Poor Global Ratings appeared to be in a more generous giving, seasonal spirit: the agency lifted its long-term rating on Hartford’s general obligation bonds to CCC from CC, and removed the ratings from credit watch with negative implications, reflecting its perspective that Hartford’s bond debt is “vulnerable to nonpayment because a default, a distressed exchange, or redemption remains possible without a positive development and potentially favorable business, financial, or economic conditions,” according to S&P analyst Victor Medeiros, who, nevertheless, noted that S&P could either raise or lower its rating on Hartford over the next year, depending on the city’s ability to refinance its outstanding debt, and realize any contract assistance support from the state. Thus, it has been unsurprising that Mayor Bronin has been insisting that bondholder concessions are essential to the city’s recovery.

Fitch made another key observation: many Connecticut local governments lack the same practical revenue constraints as Hartford due to stronger demographics, less reliance on state aid, and lower property tax rates. (Hartford’s mill rate is by far the state’s highest at 74.29.), noting: “In a state with an abundance of high-wealth cities and towns, Hartford continues to be challenged by poverty and blight,” contrasting the city with New Haven, Waterbury, Bridgeport, and New Britain‒all of which Fitch noted had successfully negotiated union concession on healthcare and pension-related costs, so that, as Fitch Director Kevin Dolan noted: “Their ability to raise revenues is not as constrained as Hartford’s and their overall expenditure flexibility is stronger.” said Fitch director Kevin Dolan. (Fitch rates New Haven and New Britain with A-minuses, and A and AA-minus respectively to Bridgeport and Waterbury.) State Senator L. Scott Frantz (R-Greenwich) noted: “I hate to say it, but it’s gotten so desperate in so many cases with the municipalities that they really need to be able to have the power go in there and open up contracts–not maybe not even renegotiate them–and just set the terms for the next three to five years, or longer, to make sure that each one of these cities is back on a sustainable track: The costs are smothering them, and their revenue situation has gotten worse, because people don’t necessary want to live in those cities as they start to deteriorate even further.”

Fiscal & Physical Storm Recovery. Just as on the mainland, municipalities in Puerto Rico assumed the first responder responsibilities in Puerto Rico in reaction to Hurricane Maria; however, the storm revealed the many challenges and obstacles faced—and ongoing—for Mayors (Alcaldes) to meet the needs of their people—including laws or decrees which limit their powers or scope of authority, state economic responsibilities which reduce their economic resources, and legislation which fails to recognize inadequate municipal fiscal resources and capacity. Thus, in the wake of the fiscal and physical devastation, Puerto Rico Senator Thomas Rivera Schatz, the fourteenth and sixteenth President of the Senate of Puerto Rico, is leading efforts to grant some mayors a greater degree of independence to operate and manage the finances of municipalities. He is proposing, effectively, to elevate municipal autonomy to a constitutional rank—a level which he believes should have been granted to City Councils by law, noting that with such a change, municipios “would not have to wait, as they had to wait, for federal and state agencies to handle issues that no one better than they would have handled. They would have the faculty, the responsibility, and the resources to do so…In emergencies, something that cannot be lost is time. Then and before the circumstances that the communications from the capital to the municipalities were practically zero, that shows you that, at a local level, they must have the faculty, the tools, and the resources.”

The Senate President’s proposal arose during exchanges between the Senate and Mayors, conversations which have resulted previously in a series of legislative measures, in what the Senate leader acknowledged to be a complex process, but a track which the Senator stated would, after consultation, be the result of consensus with Mayors of both political parties—providing via the Law of Autonomous Municipalities, “Puerto Rico’s municipalities a scope of action free of interference on the part of the State, even as it reformed a structure of government, to be efficient in collections.” (To date, 12 of Puerto Rico’s 78 municipalities have achieved the highest level of hierarchy granted by the Autonomous Municipalities Law.)

In a sense, not so different from the state/local strains in the 50 states, one of the greatest complaints by Puerto Rico’s Mayors has been over the economic burdens—or unfunded mandates—Puerto Rico has imposed on the municipios, as well as the decrees which establish contracts with foreign companies and grant them tax benefits, exemptions, and incentives—all state actions taken without municipal consultation—thereby, enabling businesses to avoid the payment of patents and municipal taxes, and undermining municipal collections—or, as the Senate President put it: “The reality of the case is that, for 12 to 16 years, governments have been legislating to nourish the State with economic resources.”  Currently, Puerto Rico’s municipalities contribute $116 million for the redemption of state debt, another $ 160 million for Puerto Rico’s Retirement System, and an additional $ 169 million to subsidize the Government Health Plan. Again, as the Senator noted: “If there are municipal governments that have a structure capable of raising their finances, of providing their services…the State does not have to intervene with them, taxing their resources.” Sen. Schatz noted that his proposal does not include eliminating municipalities; he confirmed that the governing challenge is to realize a “model” of interaction between the municipalities and the state—and that “the citizen has in his municipal environment everything he needs to be able to live happily and have quality of life. The end of the road is that. If it’s called county, province, or whatever you want to call it; the name does not do the thing, it’s the concept.” He asserted he was not proposing to “reward” municipalities, but rather to focus on establishing collaboration agreements through which there could be shared administrative tasks—in a way to not only achieve efficiencies, but also provide greater authority and ability for Puerto Rico’s municipalities to access funds free of intermediaries, noting: “The mayors did an exceptional job (during the emergency), and, practically without resources, had to come to the rescue of their citizens, open access, help sick people, cause the distribution of supplies with logic and speed…the passage of hurricanes rules out the idea of ​​eliminating municipalities.”

Thus, he affirmed that those municipalities which have achieved the maximum hierarchy of autonomy would have total independence, while the other municipalities would remain subject to the actions of the Puerto Rican government until they manage to establish fiscal sustainability—all as part of what he was outlining as a path to greater municipal autonomy, arguing that each of these changes implied the island’s municipalities need to make fiscal and governing adjustments: they have to watch over their finances and make sure they have the resources to meet their payroll, even as he acknowledged that repairing the finances in battered municipalities economically will take time, and said that, for this, the project will include some scales and grace periods to attain that fiscal solvency, noting: “The legislation we can approve, but, to get to the point where we would like to be, it will take years.”

For the president of the Association of Mayors, Rolando Ortiz, who has served as the Mayor of Cayey for a decade, after previously serving as Member of the Puerto Rico House of Representatives from 1993 to 1997, and being reelected in 2012 with 73.29% of the votes–the largest margin of victory for any mayor in that election, the assistance provided by the municipalities to the central government to face the crisis that the country is going through is the best way to see the urgency of empowering the municipalities via this legislation—or, as he put it: “If it were not for the municipalities, I assure you that the crisis would be monumental. We have been patrolling rural roads to ensure there are no trees on the road that impede the mobility of the family.” Mayor Ortiz agreed that the proposal includes hierarchy levels, so that municipal executives comply with minimum responsibilities and mandates which allow them to reach the maximum level: “It can be a strategy to prioritize the process from the perspective of land management, but it cannot take as an only category the element of the organization of the territory, but also the efficiency in public performance, economic capacity, efficiency in the service,” adding he has not heard “any Mayor in opposition to that proposal.” His colleague, Bayamón Mayor Ramón Luis Rivera Cruz, was more reserved when addressing the issue. Although he had no objections to the establishment of the project or to what has been proposed, he indicated that there were other mechanisms to prevent state governments from harming the municipalities that reached the maximum level of hierarchy—as well as other issues which must be addressed, such as the limitation on the collection of patents and the contribution on property. 

Senate President Rivera Schatz indicated the Senate is working on several amendments to the Autonomous Municipalities Law, and that some have already been established or approved, as a preamble to what will be the final project, noting: “We are going to discuss it with all the municipal governments to achieve a consensus project of what the procedure and the route will be.”

In response to a query whether the PROMESA Board could interfere, he noted that every government operation has a fiscal impact, so that he was seeking to create a positive: “It proposes efficiency, capacity to generate more collections, so who could oppose that?” Maybe, the Board. To me, honestly, I do not care in the least what anyone on the Board thinks.” Asked what would happen if the PROMESA Board proposed for the elimination of municipalities, he noted that the Board can say what they want and express what they want, but they will not eliminate municipal governments, they will not achieve it, because in Puerto Rico that would be untenable.

Unreform? Even as Puerto Rico’s state and local leaders are grappling with fiscal governance issues and recovering from the massive hurricane with far less fiscal and physical assistance than the federal government provided to Houston and Florida, there are growing apprehensions about disparities in the final tax “reform” legislation scheduled for a vote as early as today in the U.S. House of Representatives—concerns that the legislation might impose a new tax on Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories, with non-voting Rep. Jennifer González Colón (Puerto Rico) expressing apprehension that bill will impose a 12.5% tax on intangible property imported from foreign countries—and that, under the legislation, Puerto Rico and other U.S. territories would be treated as foreign countries. El Vocero, last Friday, on its news website reported that Rep. González Colón (R-P.R.) said the planned tax bill treated Puerto Rico like a colony: the taxed intangible assets would include items such trademarks and patents generated abroad, tweeting that “The tax reform benefits domestic, not foreign companies…While we are a colony, there will be more legislation like this passed…Unfair taxes show a lack of commitment and consistency from leadership in Congress; showing true hypocrisy.” The Federal Affairs Administration of Puerto Rico last Friday released a statement calling for the tax bill to be changed and for additional aid to recover from Hurricane Maria, noting the conference report could “destroy 75,000 jobs and wipe out a third of [Puerto Rico’s] tax base.” Howard Cure, director of municipal bond research at Evercore, noted that for Puerto Rico, still trying to recover from Hurricane Maria, and with a 10.6% unemployment rate: “Obviously, any tax law change that makes Puerto Rico less competitive for certain industries to expand or remain on the island is a negative for bondholders who really need the economy to stabilize and grow in order to help in their debt recovery.” Similarly, Cumberland Advisors portfolio manager and analyst Shawn Burgess said: “My understanding is that this would impact foreign corporations operating on the island and not necessarily U.S. companies. However, it is a travesty for Congress to treat Puerto Rico as essentially a foreign entity at a time when they need all the assistance they can get. Those are U.S. citizens and deserve to be treated as equals…Leave it to Congress to shoot themselves in the foot: They had voiced their support for helping the commonwealth financially, and they hit them with tax reform terms that could be a detriment to their long-term economic health.” Similarly, Ted Hampton of Moody’s noted: “In view of Puerto Rico’s economic fragility, which was exacerbated by Hurricane Maria, new federal taxes on businesses there would only serve as additional barriers potentially blocking path to recovery. In creating the [PROMESA] oversight board, the federal government declared its intention to restore economic growth in Puerto Rico. New taxes on the island would be at odds with that mission.”

  • 936. More than a decade ago, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) reached an agreement with former President Bill Clinton to allow the phasing out of section 936, the tax provision with permitted U.S. corporations to pay reduced corporate income taxes on income derived from Puerto Rico—a provision allowed to expire in 2006—after which the U.S. territory’s economy has contracted in all but one year—a tax extinguishment at which m any economists describe as the trigger for the subsequent fiscal and economic decline of Puerto Rico. Thus, as part of the new PROMESA statute, §409, in establishing an eight Congressional-member Congressional Task Force on Economic Growth in Puerto Rico, laid the foundation for the report released one year ago, in which the section addressing the federal tax treatment of Puerto Rico, noted: “The task force believes that Puerto Rico is too often relegated to an afterthought in Congressional deliberations over federal business tax reform legislation. The Task Force recommends that Congress make Puerto Rico integral to any future deliberations over tax reform legislation….The Task Force recommends that Congress continue to be mindful of the fact that Puerto Rico and the other territories are U.S. jurisdictions, home to U.S. citizens or nationals, and that jobs in Puerto Rico and the other territories are American jobs.” Third, the task force said it was open to Congress providing companies that invest in Puerto Rico “more competitive tax treatment.” Thus it was last week that Governor Ricardo Rosselló tweeted that people should read the Congressional leadership’s “OWN guidelines on the task force report. Three main points, did not follow a single one.” The tweet recognizes there are no provisions in the legislation awaiting the President’s signature this week to soften the impact of the new modified territorial tax system—a system which will treat Puerto Rico as a foreign country, rather than an integral part of the United States, a change which Rep. Jose Serrano (D-N.Y.) this week predicted would act as a “a devastating blow to Puerto Rico’s economic recovery…Thousands more businesses will have to leave the island, forcing thousands Puerto Ricans to lose their jobs and leave the island.” Indeed, adding fiscal insult to injury, House Ways and Means Committee Chair Kevin Brady (R-Tx.) admitted that the “opportunity zone” provision in the House version of tax reform authored by Resident Commissioner Jenniffer Gonzalez, Puerto Rico’s nonvoting member of the House of Representatives, to make Puerto Rico eligible for designation as a new “opportunity zone” that would receive favorable tax treatment, was stripped out because it would have violated the Senate’s Byrd Rule, the parliamentary rule barring consideration of non-germane provisions from qualifying for passage by a simple majority vote instead of a 60-vote super-majority. Adding still further fiscal insult to injury, the latest installment of emergency funding for recovery from hurricanes which hammered Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Florida, and Houston had been expected this month; however, those fiscal measures have been deferred to next year in the rush to complete the tax/deficit legislation and reach an agreement to avoid a federal government shutdown this week. (The Opportunity Zone proposal was included in the Senate version of tax reform, adopted from a bipartisan proposal by Senators Tim Scott (R-S.C.) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.) which would defer federal capital gains taxes on investments in qualifying low-income communities—under which all of Puerto Rico could, theoretically, have qualified as one of a limited number of jurisdictions. As the ever insightful Tracy Gordon of the Tax Policy Center had noted: part of the motivation for the opportunity zone designation had been to stem the migration of residents, which has accelerated since Hurricane Maria areas getting the designation throughout the United States. To qualify, the area must have “mutually reinforcing state, local, or private economic development initiatives to attract investment and foster startup activity,” and must “have demonstrated success in geographically targeted development programs such as promise zones, the new markets tax credit, empowerment zones, and renewal communities; and have recently experienced significant layoffs due to business closures or relocations.” Thus, Ms. Gordon notes: “There’s a concern you are basically taking away an incentive to be in Puerto Rico which is this foreign corporation status.” The tax conference report simply ignores the recommendation last year by the bipartisan Congressional Task Force on Economic Growth in Puerto Rico to “make Puerto Rico integral to any future deliberations over tax reform,” not acting on the recommendation for a permanent extension of a rum cover-over payment to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands the revenues of which have been used by the territories to pay for local government operations; last year’s Congressional report had warned that “Failure to extend the provision will cause harm to Puerto Rico’s (and the U.S. Virgin Islands’) fiscal condition at a time when it is already in peril.’’ Similarly, the conference report includes no provisions addressing the task force’s recommendation that the federal child tax credit include the first and second children of families living in Puerto Rico, not just the third as specified under current law.

Getting Schooled on Disaster

December 15, 2017

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s Blog, we consider the fiscal and governing challenges of a city emerging from a quasi-state takeover—and report on continuing, discouraging blocks to Puerto Rico’s fiscal recovery.

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

The Steep Fiscal Road to Recovery. Detroit’s Cerveny – Grandmont neighborhood, where median household income has declined by 5 percent since 2000 and average household incomes are under $38,000—and median home sale prices are just over $51,000, this week was one of 10 areas in the Motor City yesterday was cited in a report, “Reset, Rethink, Rebuild: A Shared Vision of Performing Schools in Quality Buildings for Every Child in Detroit”  a study about neighborhoods, educational opportunity, and the conditions of public school buildings, as one of ten neighborhoods wherein it is nearly impossible to find a quality school. Indeed, the report determined that the problem is deeper than just those 10 neighborhoods: Only 20 percent of the children enrolled in a public school in the city, whether charter or traditional public, are attending a quality school: a discouraging, failing grade with implications for both assessed property values and Detroit’s budget. Chris Uhl, the Executive Director of the eastern region for IFF, which published the study, noted: “The fact that four out of five kids in this city” are not attending a quality school “is pretty horrifying to me…that…should catalyze action.” The report notes that nearly half of the space in school buildings in the city is underutilized. A key recommendation of the report was that greater coordination is needed between leaders of the Detroit Public School System and the authorizers of charter schools—presumably including the current U.S. Secretary of Education. (Currently, only Grand Valley State University and Central Michigan University are authorized to open new charters in the city, but there are a number of other authorizers with schools in the city.)  IFF’s recommendations are similar last week’s report by the Coalition for the Future of Detroit Schoolchildren.

In its report, the IFF identified quality schools using Michigan’s less than clear, but outdated quality schools color-coded accountability system–a system due to be replaced next year: a part of that old system provided for the assignment of five colors, based on how well students achieved academic goals. Of the city’s 178 general education public schools, just 2.4% received the equivalent of an A.  The report makes clear that the steep road back from the nation’s largest municipal bankruptcy requires a greater focus on the next generation’s future: schools good enough to attract families back into the city—attracted by a good school to enroll their children. Today, too few of them exist—or, as the report notes: Detroit needs nearly 70,000 more seats available in quality schools to ensure that every child has access to such a school. Tonya Allen, President and CEO of the Skillman Foundation, which funded the research, noted: “We’re not meeting the demand, which leaves us vulnerable to leakages: for students to leave the city to go to school in the suburbs.”

A Taxing Recovery? Just as Puerto Ricans were treated unequally by the federal response to hurricane devastation compared to Houston and Florida, so too there is apprehension that the tax “reform” legislation nearing completion in Congress—especially as there is growing apprehension that Congress could move towards adopting a territorial tax system for businesses—that is a new tax system which would treat Puerto Rico as a foreign country with respect to the numerous foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations which operate there. Puerto Rico Secretary of Economic Development and Commerce Manuel Laboy Rivera is apprehensive that subsidiaries of U.S. corporations which receive favorable treatment under current federal law could find the emerging federal tax reform would impose a new 20 percent federal excise tax on all pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and other products shipped to the mainland—that is a new, discriminatory tax—which would be in addition to the Jones Act provisions which render Puerto Rico unable to compete fairly vis-à-vis other Caribbean competitor nations—even as Puerto Rico is subject to the federal minimum wage and other federal regulations involving workplace safety and environmental protection. Indeed, last December, a bipartisan congressional task force had recommended changes in the tax treatment of the U.S. territory with the Congressional Task Force on Economic Growth writing: “Puerto Rico is too often relegated to an afterthought in Congressional deliberations over federal business tax reform legislation. The task force recommends that Congress make Puerto Rico integral to any future deliberations over tax reform.” Among the recommendations: a modification of the federal child tax credit to include the first and second children of families living in Puerto Rico, not just the third as specified under current law; the report also recommended making permanent the so-called rum cover-over payments to the governments of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The task force, however, was divided with regard to whether to fully expand the eligibility of Puerto Rican families for the Earned Income Tax Credit. The report recommended that a domestic business production credit known as Section 199 that has covered Puerto Rico since 2006 should be maintained as long as Section 199 continues. Now, however, that credit has been targeted for elimination in the pending tax reform negotiations as they enter their final hours. Under the discriminatory treatment, for federal tax purposes, Puerto Rico is considered outside the U.S. tax code, even though for virtually all other issues the island is treated as a domestic part of the U.S. For the purposes of federal tax reform, however, Senate Finance Committee Chair Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) said during the Finance Committee’s deliberations that Puerto Rico’s tax issues would be handled in separate legislation. So, it seems that for Hurricane Maria ravaged Puerto Rico, where 20% to 40% of all businesses are at risk of being shuttered in the wake of the hurricane and its ensuing devastation for the economy because of challenges ranging from the lack of electricity to loss of inventory, physical damage to their facilities, business interruption, and lack of capital; the message from Congress is to wait for next year.

House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady (R-Tx.) has informed reporters that he and other lawmakers are considering several options for Puerto Rico—especially in the wake of meeting with Resident Commissioner Jenniffer Gonzalez, Puerto Rico’s non-voting Representative in Congress, to discuss her request to consider making Puerto Rico an economic opportunity zone or empowerment zone—provisions adopted by Congress to abet economic recovery in hard-hit cities and counties. Thus, a change would be to treat Puerto Rico similarly—as if it were, gasp, a part of the United States for federal tax purposes and eligible for the same treatment. Likewise, tax reform could have been a vehicle for Congress to eliminate or reduce the discriminatory 20% excise tax on goods from Puerto Rico—a tax which undercuts Puerto Rico’s ability to compete with Cuba, and other countries in the region.

Even as the tax reform-deficit/debt increase legislation has swiftly moved towards the President’s desk, in New York, U.S. Judge Laura Taylor Swain, presiding over Puerto Rico’s quasi-chapter 9 case, heard from attorneys for the Employees Retirement System and the Puerto Rico Oversight Board—with the critical issue what claims of Puerto Rico’s bondholders are valid. PROMESA Oversight Board attorney Steven Weise said the 2008 Financing Statements governing Puerto Rico’s municipal bonds did not provide bondholders any collateral, arguing that the bondholders’ written arguments quoted from legal rulings about “security agreements,” but that what is allowed in these agreements are not allowed in Financing Statements—adding that the system’s legal name changed in the last several years, but that bondholders had failed to properly follow-up on this development—a failure which meant, at least as he argued, that the system should not be legally obligated to pay interest on the municipal bonds—even as Bruce Bennett, representing bondholders, told Judge Swain the bondholders had a lien on employer contributions, based on multiple commitments, arguing that the 2008 Financing Statements gave the bondholders the lien. He said errors in the document were not of such gravity to merit undercutting to undercut the bondholders’ claims—and adding that the Spanish name of the system had not changed, and that the change in the English name was just a translation change—a change without legal significance. Moreover, he noted, that along with the Financing Statements, a parallel “security agreement” had been created in 2008 and this perfected the lien; further, he argued, the 2015 and 2016 Financing Statements also assured the bondholders’ lien on the employer contributions.

Where Are the Lights? U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Lieutenant General Todd Semonite, the commanding General and Chief Engineer for the Corps reports that Puerto Rico’s electrical grid is unlikely to be fully restored until the end of May, a far more pessimistic timeline that suggested by Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rossello, who Wednesday stated he expects Puerto Rico’s electric grid to reach 75 percent of customers by the end of January—and 95 percent by the end of February—and 100 percent by the end of May. Adding to the dissonance, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority last month pledged service would reach 95 percent of customers by the end of this month—even though, as of Wednesday, just 61 percent of electricity had been restored.  

What Municipal Fiscal Items Might Be Found in Stockings?

December 11, 2017

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s Blog, we consider the ongoing and renewed fiscal challenges confronting Connecticut–albeit with some hints that Santa might have paid an early visit and filled some stockings in Hartford; then we observe the still unmet, post-hurricane fiscal and physical storms which have slammed the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico–but where the federal response has been less than anemic.

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

Coal in the Fiscal Stocking? Barely weeks after Connecticut Gov. Dannel Malloy signed the state’s FY2018 budget, Connecticut has a new round of fiscal crises—meaning the Governor will have to go back to the fiscal drawing board to come up with a new fiscal plan to address a state deficit of at least $207 million, even as he is confronted by a hurtling insolvency for the state’s special transportation fund: Connecticut statutes mandate the Governor to submit a mitigation plan within 30 days when a shortfall exceeds 1% of the general fund. Ergo, Gov. Malloy alerted bond rating municipal bond rating agencies that the fund, key to back stopping critical transportation projects, could be in the red by the beginning of next summer, noting to reporters: “It’s the same things I’ve been telling you guys for years, that we’ve got do something about the transportation fund: “Revenue is coming in, and was predicted to come in slower in large part because people are buying less gas and gas is cheaper.” His remarks follow by just under three years is then announcement of a 30-year, $100 billion transportation infrastructure program—a program which, however, has scarcely commenced. Now, as the Governor anticipates the state’s budget deficit to rise, given delays in implementing reductions in medical benefits which had been projected to play a key fiscal role in the state’s $41 billion biennial spending plan, the Gov. added: “Unless they’re selling new hats that deliver rabbits, a mitigation plan means there only two things you can do—cut spending, raise revenue, or do a combination of both,” with his comments coming a day after huddling with legislative leaders about the hemorrhaging deficit—just two months after the Governor had signed—four months’ late—and now as Congress is on the precipice of sending the White House a tax cut bill that will signally increase the federal debt and deficit—and impose Medicaid cuts and discombobulate Connecticut’s budget—even if the federal government does not shut down. With the Constitution State on the market to sell $400 million of taxable general obligation bonds and $350 million of GO bond anticipation notes, S&P has been less than optimistic, with analyst David Hitchcock indicating a 33% chance the agency could lower Connecticut’s rating within two years, writing: “The outlook reflects what we believe to be increasing constraints on achieving long-term structural balance, highlighted by Connecticut’s delay in enacting a fiscal 2018-2019 biennial budget.” The rating agency is apprehensive about the state’s above-average debt, high unfunded public pension liabilities, as well as OPEB unfunded post-employment benefit liabilities—all coming at a time of population declines, economic stagnation, and weak reserves. Likewise, Fitch warned Connecticut was a state to flag in the new year: “The state has struggled in recent years with revenues failing far short of projections,” while Municipal Market Analytics indicated it anticipates the new state deficit to trigger aid cuts, cuts which will adversely impact the state’s municipalities, writing: “There is a significant medium-term downside scenario developing for the paper of middle-class and poorer Connecticut towns.” Thus, Gov. Malloy said he expects the General Assembly to reconvene for a special session prior to Christmas, especially due to the potential fiscal impact of the announced CVS takeover of Aetna—the state’s largest employer, based in Hartford, and Stanley Black & Decker’s announcement that it will open a 23,000-square-foot advanced manufacturing center in downtown Hartford—kind of a pre-Christmas good gnus/bad gnus combination. , giving the global tools maker its first presence in the Capital City. Almost as if Santa had left an early fiscal stocking present, the twin developments indicate that Hartford, notwithstanding its fiscal and financial struggles and economic decline, is resilient: a city now at a crossroads, with the addition of more than 1,000 new housing units, the opening of the University of Connecticut’s new campus at the old Hartford Times building.

Build Back Mejor! Puerto Rico Gov. Ricardo Rosselló flew to New York yesterday for fiscal and physical reconstruction meetings, after meetings with Puerto Rico Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz and House Leader Carlos Méndez, as he sought to reach consensus on a unified strategy and position with Congress and the Trump administration—hoping that President Trump will agree to some special dispensations for the U.S. territory—especially with regard to manufacturing. His voyage comes as the Justice Department has filed a constitutional defense of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, arguing the law gives the federal government flexibility in making appointments to address Puerto Rico’s debt crisis—with the trip coming as the federal government, last week, responded to an August 7th filing by hedge fund Aurelius Capital in the Title III bankruptcy case: PROMESA Oversight Board Executive Director Natalie Jaresko said the board supported the U.S. filing in defense of PROMESA’s constitutionality, noting: “We welcome the United States Solicitor General’s legal arguments in support of PROMESA and the board’s constitutionality…The devastation of Hurricanes Irma and Maria make it even more important to have in place an orderly process for restoring the island’s finances, providing oversight and increasing confidence among residents and businesses while upholding equitable treatment for creditors.” Potentially at stake are the fates of $74 billion in outstanding public sector debt, $49 billion in pensions, and the control not only of Puerto Rico’s government, but also its public corporations: in the complaint, Aurelius said the Title III bankruptcy petition should be dismissed, because its filing was not validly authorized by the validly constituted oversight board: in particular, Aurelius charged that the appointments clause of the U.S. Constitution was breached in appointing the PROMESA board’s members, arguing that, according to the Constitution, all “principal officers” of the United States must be appointed by the President of the United States, and approved by the U.S. Senate. In its August complaint, Aurelius had argued that the board members are “principal officers” of the U.S. In a responding federal brief, the federal government wrote that the PROMESA appointments scheme “is not subject to the Appointments Clause, because the Oversight Board is a component of the territorial government,” noting that Congress enacted PROMESA under the Territory Clause of Article IV of the Constitution, which gives Congress “‘broad latitude to develop innovative approaches to territorial governance,’ Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle (2016),” with the U.S. attorneys writing: “The Appointments Clause does not govern the appointment of territorial officers, including members of the Oversight Board, because Congress may legislate for the territories ‘in a manner…that would exceed its powers or at least would be very unusual, in the context of national legislation enacted under other powers delegated to it.’ Palmore v. United States (1973).” The attorneys added that historical practice shows that the “Appointments Clause is inapplicable to the appointment of territorial officers.” (In 1900, Congress passed the Foraker Act, which said that a locally-elected house of representatives should work alongside a governor and 11-member elected council nominated by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. In 1947, the U.S. government gave Puerto Rico the power to also elect a governor.) Ergo, the federal lawyers argued that these local elections are not in conformity with the Appointments Clause, but rather have historically been practiced without challenge. Not dissimilarly, Aurelius Capital had also argued that PROMESA’s appointment mechanism for the Oversight Board also encroached on the U.S. President’s executive authority in violation of the Constitution’s separation of powers: while the statute encouraged the President to pick six of the seven board members from those nominated by Congress, according to the act: “he could have requested the recommendatory lists to be supplemented with additional candidates or nominated his own candidates for Senate confirmation under PROMESA’s appointments structure.”

Will There Ever Be Shelter from the Storm? More than two months after Hurricane Maria devastated Puerto Rico, the U.S. territory, unlike Houston or Florida, has yet to receive any of the $4.9 billion of short-term loans promised in the storm aid package Congress passed at the end of October. Gov. Christian Sobrino, Gov. Rosselló representative on the PROMESA oversight board, confirmed last Friday that no Puerto Rican entity has received any portion of the funds, which were requested for basic functions—with the inexplicable delay raising fear after the Puerto Rican government told the oversight board that the island utility, PREPA, and water utility, PRASA, would run out of money this month—as discussions with the U.S. Treasury and Department of Homeland Security remain unsettled. Puerto Rico has requested $94 billion in federal aid, only a portion of which has been granted, as Members of Congress have raised concerns over how the island’s government will steward billions in federal money—an ironic concern given the current Congressional tax cut proposals projected to add $1.4 trillion to the federal debt, raising questions with regard to not just discrimination, but also a double standard. Puerto Rico Rep. Rafael “Tatito” Hernandez, of Puerto Rico’s House of Representatives, last Wednesday wrote to U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin with regard to the status of the loan package—an epistle to which, at least as of last Friday, he has received no response. Rep. Hernandez noted that Members of Congress still need reassurance that the funds will be well spent, adding that: “A lot of them have some issues.” Whether their issues in any way are comparable to the scale of as much as $100 billion of damage to Puerto Rico, however, or to the challenge to the PROMESA Board as it seeks to unwind the equivalent of the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history is another question. Now Puerto Rico warns it will have to redraw plans for economic reforms. As fabulous Matt Fabian of Municipal Market Analytics noted: “There is a risk that Puerto Rico will use the operating loans and rebuilding dollars as short-term financing to avoid making hard choices in terms of making economic reforms.” As of last Friday, Puerto Rico’s utility, PREPA, was generating only 68% of the power needed and 7% of customers still lacked access to clean water. 

Recovering after a Quasi-State Takeover

December 8, 2017

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s Blog, we consider the fiscal and governing challenges of a city emerging from a quasi-state takeover—and report that last night, House Republicans voted 235-193 to pass and send to the Senate a stopgap bill to keep the federal government open for another two weeks, freeing up space to finish both the federal budget for the year that began last October 1st—and to try to craft a conference report on federal tax reform. The House vote now awaits Senate action, where leaders plan to act swiftly to put the bill on President Trump’s desk and avoid a shutdown on Saturday.

.Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

A Founding Municipality. Petersburg, Virginia—where archaeological excavations have found evidence of a prehistoric Native American settlement dated to 6500 BC, was, when the English first began to settle America, arriving in Virginia in 1607, in a region then occupied by Algonquin speaking early Americans—was founded at a strategic point along the Appomattox River. Nearly four decades later, the Virginia Colony established Fort Henry along the banks of the Appomattox River. The colony established Fort Henry—from which Colonel Abraham Wood sent several famous expeditions in subsequent years to explore points to the west; by 1675, his son-in-law, Peter Jones, who commanded Fort Henry opened the aptly named Peter’s Point trading post. In 1733, the founder of Virginia’s capitol of Richmond, Col. William Boyd, settled on plans for a municipality there—to be called Petersburgh—an appellation the Virginia General Assembly formally incorporated as Petersburg on December 17, 1748.

By the 20th century, the upward growth in one of the nation’s oldest cities peaked—at just over 41,000 residents: by 2010, the population had declined more than 20 percent—and the municipality had a poverty rate of 27.5%, double the statewide average, and nearly 33% greater than in 1999. The city’s largest employer, Brown & Williamson, departed in the mid-1980s. By last year, 100% of Petersburg School District students were eligible for free or reduced price lunch—even as the district lagged behind state graduation rates; the  and the rate of students receiving advanced diplomas. Last year, the city’s violent crime rate was just under twice the U.S. average. By 2014, Petersburg’s violent crime rate of 581 per 100,000 residents was nearly 30% higher than the violent crime rate in Danville—even though, unlike Danville, Petersburg is in the thriving Richmond metropolitan area—and has potential partners in higher education (Virginia State University and Richard Bland College) and philanthropy (Cameron Foundation), as well as a unique concentration of affordable, historic housing. Yet the city’s unassigned General Fund reverses grew from $20.4 million in FY2005 to $35.0 million by FY2014, or 55% of operating expenditures; it has very strong liquidity, with total government available cash equal to 11.5% of total governmental fund expenditures and more than ten times greater than annual debt service payments. Nevertheless, as we have previously noted, a state technical assistance team’s review last year determined that the City had exhausted most of its unrestricted reserves—also noting that in FY 2015, the City’s final budget called for General Fund revenue of $81.4 million and spending of $81.1 million, even as the municipality’s CAFR reported that actual revenue was $77 million, while spending was $82.9 million—leading to a conclusion that, based on General Ledger reports, all funds expenditures exceeded all funds revenue by at least $5.3 million.

Moreover, notwithstanding its string of operating deficits, Petersburg undertook a series of costly, low return economic development investments—purchasing a hotel, supporting a local baseball team, and building a new library—all investments beyond the city’s means. Nevertheless, after a state intervention, after nearly a decade of near insolvency, the city’s most recent Comprehensive Annual Finance Report demonstrates Petersburg is emerging from its fiscal bog—closing FY2017 having collected $73,069,843 in revenues, while spending $65,861,125 in expenditures: meaning the positive $7,208,718 difference nearly eclipsed the $7.7 million deficit which had been carried over from FY2016—unsurprisingly leading Blake Rane, the city’s Finance Director, to note: “We’re really excited about the changes that occurred in 2017: As the new administration, we are super excited that the road we have to go on is starting at a better position than where we thought it would be.” Similarly, Mayor Samuel Parham, at a news conference, noted: “We’re showing outside development that Petersburg is a safe investment…There was a time when people thought we were going to fall into the Appomattox.”

Much of the fiscal recovery credit, as we have previously noted, may be credited in part to strict expenditure practices instituted by the Robert Bobb Group, the turnaround team headed by the former City of Richmond Manager, which ran the city administration from October 2016 until September—where the team found Petersburg had always overestimated revenues, according to former Finance Director Nelsie Birch, so that the fiscal challenge was to get a “handle on spending,” a challenge met via the adoption of a very conservative FY2017 budget with a strong focus on improving Petersburg’s collection practices—including enforcement:  For the first time in several years, the city put delinquent properties up for tax sale—or, as City Manager Aretha Ferrell Benavides put it: “The new billing and collecting office is moving on collecting now: People are realizing that we’re not going to sit and wait.”  The results are significant: Petersburg’s fund balance is nearly at zero after dropping to a negative $7.7 million. Today that balance is a shadow of its former level at negative $143,933, and Manager Benavides notes: “We’re working on building up [the fund balance], because we’ve been very dependent on short-term loans through Revenue Anticipation Notes.”

Other key steps on the city’s road to recovery included selling excess water from the city’s water system, selling pieces of city-owned property, and even selling the city’s water system, or, as Mr. Bobb put it: “Moving forward, the city still needs that liquidity event (that was not intended to be a pun), because a major snowstorm, or a major water line break, sinkhole, etc., those things would be a significant drain on the city, unless it has a major fund balance.” As part of its fiscal diet, Manager Benavides notes Petersburg is still examining options to sell as many as 320 pieces of city-owned property, with the City Council already having approved the disposition of some of these properties over the past several months. The fiscal road, like the city’s history and geography, has been steep, but the fiscal exertions appear to be paying off, as it were.

Fiscal Challenges Under Federal or State Takeovers

December 6, 2017

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s Blog, we consider the fiscal and governing challenges of a city still under a state takeover, before heading south to assess the governing and fiscal challenges in a dissimilar, quasi-takeover of the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico.  

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

Fiscal, Intergovernmental, & Branches of Government Challenges under a State Takeover. Atlantic City’s Fire Department, which, like the City, remains under the control, as part of the ongoing state takeover, of the state Department of Community Affairs, faces another round of salary cuts as the state continues to cut spending in the municipality: the firefighters are anticipated to realize an 11.3 percent reduction in their salaries effective this Sunday, according to union officials, with the cuts coming just two months after Superior Court Judge Julio Mendez ruled the state had the authority to cut the Department by 15 members, to 180, after next February 15th. Moreover, in the wake of the state’s fiscal action, the state warned further salary cuts were possible, because Atlantic City only had sufficient fiscal resources to fund the department through November 30: Lisa Ryan, a spokesperson for the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, noted: “While we have made considerable progress in stabilizing Atlantic City, significant work remains in restraining the city’s unsustainable finances…Judge Mendez’s decision requiring 180 firefighters instead of the 148 the state and city believe is sufficient to maintain public safety in Atlantic City resulted in $3.8 million in additional costs.” Over the past couple of years, the size of the city’s Fire Department has continued to shrink: in January, the department had 225 members; currently there are 195. Indeed, over the last seven years, the department has been reduced by 82 members—leading Fire Chief Scott Evans to note that in what would have to be an understatement, the year has been tough on the department, or, as he put it, the cuts and ongoing litigation have been a “distraction” to the firefighters: “It’s tough to keep the focus on your job…What the guys have faced all year have been the toughest challenges.” Ms. Ryan noted: “The state and city refuse to have taxpayers and other city stakeholders shoulder the burden of these costs caused by the fire union, thereby resulting in the salary reduction of firefighters, who are still highly compensated when compared to other city employees…Notably, the police have chosen to mediate and find compromise, and we encourage firefighters to do the same.”

Siguiendo en Disarollo. Puerto Rico currently expects its central government revenues to come in 25% short of budget in this fiscal year. Geraldo Portelo Franco, the Executive Director of the Puerto Rico Fiscal Advisory and Financial Information Authority, advised the PROMESA Oversight Board yesterday, meaning Gov. Ricardo Rosselló and the PROMESA Board will have to address the shortfall as the island government struggles to address not just recovery from the devastation from Hurricane Maria, devastation which received far less of a U.S. response than Houston or Florida, but also left the island with a substantial loss of those who could afford to leave—and who may not return. Now Mr. Portelo Franco is warning that public corporations will be without cash this month, while the General Fund will see a 25 percent drop in revenues this fiscal year: while he did not specify how the central government would help PREPA and PRASA if the disaster loan under FEMA, a loan the final terms of which are still undefined—even as the full restoration of electricity and water services is urgent; Puerto Rico’s two main public corporations on the island, those which provide essential public services, appear to be without fiscal resources with which to cover their operations this month, according to Mr. Portela, when he spoke at the eleventh public meeting of the PROMESA Oversight Board in New York City. He noted that in the case of PREPA (the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority), which has not yet restored electricity service to most of its customers, the corporation will deplete what is left in its coffers by the end of the week of December 22nd; he anticipates PREPA will finish the calendar year with a cash deficit of $ 224 million. Meanwhile, the Puerto Rico Aqueducts and Sewers Authority (PRASA) is anticipated to end this month with a cash overdraft of about $ 1 million. The twin fiscal perils could, according to Mr. Portela, push Puerto Rico’s general fund into negative territory, because there might be no choice but to assist PREPA and PRASA if Washington does not allocate fiscal resources to Puerto Rico as soon as possible: in total, according to PAFAA, PREPA, and PRASA need $ 883 million of liquidity. Thus, Mr. Portela noted: “Our efforts are focus on obtaining liquidity for PREPA and PRASA through the CDL (Community Disaster Loan).”

If anything, the governance and fiscal challenge has been exacerbated, because the FEMA disaster loan, which was authorized about a month ago, but for which terms have yet to be negotiated, has yet to arrive. While Puerto Rico, as part of governing for contingencies, maintains reserves in case it needs to give liquidity to these quasi-public corporations, or, as he put it: “They (PREPA) have tried to preserve cash by managing the time of payment to suppliers,” in responding to PROMESA Board executive Arthur González, the liquidity crisis in PREPA and PRASA has complicated the governance and fiscal options facing the PROMESA Board as it confronts the challenge of approving a new fiscal plan which, among other things, seeks profound reforms of Puerto Rico’s economic framework and, in turn, will be key to the renegotiation of the debt through the cases of Title III of PROMESA. For one, if Puerto Rico uses General Fund resources, it would likely face further court challenges by Puerto Rico’s creditors—similar to a challenge already underway in the case of the bondholders of the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (Cofina). (Recently, the insurer Ambac Assurance Corporation and several investment funds have asked U.S. Judge Laura Taylor Swain to investigate how Puerto Rico’s decisions to suspend the collection of the Sales and Use Tax (IVU) will affect that debt. But, with some $700 million owed to its suppliers, Puerto Rico’s central government has no cash options. Notwithstanding the gloomy fiscal portents, Mr. Portela reported better collections in items such as the 4 percent tax, FEMA assistance, and a less severe migration than had been feared; notwithstanding, however, he noted that if the predicted drop of 25 percent in revenues materializes, the General Fund would fall short in this fiscal year by about $ 2.4 billion—ensnaring the government in delaying payments to its suppliers and contractors, as he admitted that, apart from the estimate of accounts payable already recorded (around $ 500 million), there could be up to $ 250 million in additional payments to suppliers which are pending, noting that because “certain systems were inoperative in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, there was a delay in payments and processing.”

Catch 22. With the PROMESA Board, the most likely bridge to gaining any additional fiscal help from the White House and Congress, thus a critical potential ally to Puerto Rico; the evident frustration by members of the PROMESA Board, combined with the speed with which Congress is moving on federal tax reform—but with virtually no analysis of the potential fiscal impact on Puerto Rico, albeit with a debt dwarfing Puerto Rico’s, the Board appears increasingly caught between a rock and hard place—a place Director Ana Matosantos described as “unacceptable,” adding that, for at least four times, PROMESA Board executives have asked for information on what is owed to government suppliers and contractors, stating: “This issue of not having clear things about accounts payable and the ongoing issue of late payments, at the same time that we are trying to look at what is happening economically in Puerto Rico while you have outstanding balances, is frustrating.” PRMOMESA Executive Andrew Biggs noted: “I have mostly dealt with governments at the state and federal level, but I’ve never seen a government that is so dependent on external consultants.”

The fiscal challenges, indeed, go both ways: as the exchange between the Board and officials of Gov. Ricardo Rosselló Nevares’ administration, the officials sought information and analysis of the potential fiscal impacts on Puerto Rico of the rapidly moving federal tax reform legislation in Congress—legislation, after all, which Congress’ Joint Committee on Taxation has warned will add close to $1.4 trillion to the federal debt.

Federal Tax Reform in a Post-Chapter 9 Era

December 4, 2017

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s Blog, we consider the fiscal and governing challenges that the pending federal tax “reform” legislation might have for the nation’s city emerging from the largest municipal bankruptcy in American history, before returning to the governance challenges in Puerto Rico.  

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

Harming Post Chapter 9 Recovery? As the House and Senate race, this week, to conference on federal tax legislation, the potential fiscal impact on post chapter 9 Detroit provides grim tidings. The proposed changes would eliminate federal tax credits vital to Detroit’s emergency from chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy; the elimination of low-income housing tax credits would reduce financing options for the city: the combination, because it would adversely affect business investment and development, could undercut the pace of the city’s recovery. Most at risk are historic rehabilitation and low income housing tax credits: the House version of the tax “reform” legislation proposes to eliminate historic tax credits—the Senate version would reduce them by 50%; both versions propose the elimination of new market tax credits. The greatest threat is the potential elimination of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LITC), proposed by the House, potentially undercutting as much as 40% of the current financing for low income housing in the Motor City. While both the House and Senate versions retain a 9% low income housing tax credit, the credit, as proposed, would limit how much the Michigan State Housing Development Agency may award on an annual basis—putting as much as $280 million at risk. According to the National Housing Conference, the production of low income housing could decline by as much as 50%. The combined impact could leave owners and developers of low income housing with fewer options for rehabilitation—an impact potentially with disproportionate omens for post-chapter 9 municipalities such as Detroit.   

Is There Promise or Democracy in PROMESA? Since the imposition by Congress of the PROMESA, quasi-chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy legislation, under which a board named by former President Obama appointed seven voting members, with Gov. Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rosselló serving as an ex officio member, but with no voting rights—there have been singular disparities, including between the harsh fiscal measures imposed on the U.S. territory, measures imposing austerity for Puerto Rico, even as the PROMESA Executive Director receives an annual salary of $625,000—an amount 500% greater than the executive director of Detroit’s chapter 9 bankruptcy oversight board, and some $225,000 more than the President of the United States—with Puerto Rico’s taxpayers footing the tab for what is perceived as an unelected board acting as an autocratic body which threatens to undermine the autonomy of Puerto Rico’s government. Unsurprisingly, the Congressional statute includes few incentives for transparency, much less accountability to the citizens and taxpayers of Puerto Rico. Indeed, when the Center for Investigative Journalism and the Legal Clinic of the Interamerican University Law School, attorneys Judith Berkan, Steven Lausell, Luis José Torres, and Annette Martínez—both in one case before the San Juan Superior Court and in another before federal Judge Jay A. García-Gregory, as well as the Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press submitted an amicus brief seeking clarification with regard to the legal standards of transparency and accountability which should be applied to the board, the PROMESA Board asserted that the right of access to information does not apply to it. 

Governance in Insolvency. As we have followed the different and unique models of chapter 9 and insolvencies from Central Falls, Rhode Island, through San Bernardino, Stockton, Detroit, Jefferson County, etc., it has been respective state laws—or the absence thereof—which have determined the critical role of governance—whether it be guided via a federal bankruptcy court, a state oversight board, in large part determined by the original authority under the U.S. system of governance whereby the states—because they created the federal government—individually determine the eligibility of municipalities to file for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. In Puerto Rico, sort of a hybrid, being neither a state, nor a municipality, the issue of governing oversight is paving new ground. Thus, in Puerto Rico, it has opened the question with regard to whether the Governor or Congress ought to have the authority to name an oversight board—a body—whether overseeing the District of Colombia, New York City, Detroit, Central Falls, Atlantic City, etc.—to exercise oversight in the wake of insolvency. Such boards, after all, can protect a jurisdiction from pressures by partisan and outside actors. Moreover, the appointment of experts with both experience and expertise not subject to voters’ understandable angst can empower such appointed—and presumably expert officials, to take on complex fiscal and financial questions, including debt restructuring, access to the municipal markets, and credit.  Moreover, because appointed board members are not affected by elections, they are in a sometimes better position to impose austerity measures—measures which would likely rarely be supported by a majority of voters—or, as former D.C. Mayor Marion Barry said the District of Columbia oversight Board, it “was able to do some things that needed to be done that, politically, I would not do, would not do, would not do,” such as firing 2,000 human-service workers. 

In Puerto Rico—which, after all, is neither a municipality nor a state, the bad gnus is that these governance disparities are certain to continue: indeed, despite the PROMESA Board’s November 27th recommendations, Gov. Rosselló announced he would spend close to $113 million on government employees’ Christmas bonuses-an announcement the PROMESA Board responded to by stating that its members expect “to be consulted during the formulation and prior to the announcement of policies such as this to ensure the Government is upholding the principles of fiscal responsibility.” (Note: it would have to be a challenge for PROMESA Board members to observe the current federal tax bills in the U.S. House and Senate as measured by Congress’ Joint Committee on Taxation and the Congressional Budget Office and believe that Congress is actually exercising “fiscal responsibility.”)

Nevertheless, there might be some help at hand for the U.S. territory: House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Kevin Brady (R-Tx.), in trying to mold in conference with the Senate the pending tax reform legislation, is considering options to avert what top Puerto Rican officials fear could be still another devastating blow to its already tottering economy: both versions would end Puerto Rico’s status as an offshore tax haven for U.S. companies—a devastating potential blow, especially given the current federal Jones Act which imposes such disproportionate shipping costs on Puerto Rico compared to other, competitive Caribbean nations. Now, the Governor, as well as Puerto Rico’s Resident Commissioner Jenniffer Gonzalez, Puerto Rico’s sole nonvoting member of Congress, are warning that Puerto Rico’s slow recovery from Hurricane Maria could suffer an irreparable setback if manufacturers decide to close their factories. Commissioner Gonzalez said 40% of Puerto Rico’s economy relies on manufacturing, with much of that related to pharmaceuticals; ergo, she is worried that any drop in the $2 billion of annual revenue these businesses provide would undercut the economic recovery plan instituted by the PROMESA Board. The Commissioner notes: “Forty percent of the island is living in poverty,” even though the federal child tax credit only applies to a third child for residents of Puerto Rico.

Thus, many eyes in Puerto Rico—and, presumably in the PROMESA Board—are laser focused on the House-Senate tax conference this week, where the House version would extend, for five years, the so-called rum cover which provides an excise tax rebate to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands on locally produced rum—a provision which Republican leaders appear unlikely to retain, albeit, they appear to be amenable to changes which could help reboot the island’s economy. (Puerto Rico produces 77% of the rum consumed in the U.S., according to the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Agency.) In a sense, part of the challenge is that for Puerto Rico, the issue has become whether to focus its lobbying on retaining its quasi-tax haven status. Gov. Rosselló worries that if that status were altered, “companies with a strong presence on the island would be forced to shutter those operations and decamp for the mainland or, worse, a lower-tax country…This would put tens of thousands of U.S. citizens in Puerto Rico out of work and demolish our tax base right as we are trying to rebound from historic storms.” Chairman Brady, after meeting with Commissioner Gonzalez at the end of last week, told reporters the meeting was with regard to “ideas on how best to help Puerto Rico…I know the Senate too has some ideas as well…“Yeah, we’re going to keep working on that.” In conference, the House bill imposes a 20% excise tax on payments by a U.S. company to a foreign subsidiary; the Senate bill proposes a tax ranging from 12.5% to 15.625% on the income of foreign corporations with intangible assets in the U.S. Unsurprisingly, Puerto Rico officials and U.S. businesses operating there describe both the House and Senate versions as putting Puerto Rico at a disadvantage—or, as one official noted: “The companies are asking from exemptions from all of this if Puerto Rico is involved…They want to be exempted from the taxes going forward that would prevent companies from accumulating untaxed profits abroad.” Foreign earnings, which includes revenues earned by corporations operating in Puerto Rico, could be repatriated at a 14% rate if the funds were held in cash and 7% if its illiquid assets under the House bill; the Senate version would tax cash at 10% and illiquid assets at 5%. Companies operating in Puerto Rico would be taxed at the same rate on the mainland of the U.S. and in foreign countries. In addition, the average manufacturing wage is three times lower in Puerto Rico than on the mainland and companies operating there can claim an 80% tax credit for taxes paid to the territorial government, according to officials. Senate Finance Committee Chair Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) noted he wishes to “help Puerto Rico, but not in this tax bill.”