Post Municipal Bankruptcy Futures

September 21, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we report on the unsafe conditions of Detroit’s public schools, and dismissal by the Trump administration for self-government in Puerto Rico, and, a year after Hurricane Maria’s devastating strike on Puerto Rico and underwhelming federal response, the U.S. territory’s continued inequitable status.  Unlike in corporate bankruptcies, in municipal bankruptcies, the challenge is not how to walk away from accumulated debts, but rather how to fiscally resolve them.  

Detroit’s Future? In Detroit, where, last week, organizations gathered at the Marygrove College campus to announce a new cradle-to-career educational partnership, including a state-of-the-art early childhood education center, a new K-12 school, and the introduction of an innovative teacher education training modeled after hospital residency programs; Superintendent Nikolai Vitti has announced the closure of thirty-three more schools because of high levels of copper and/or lead, bringing the total number of schools with tainted water to 57 buildings. The Superintendent’s warning noted: “Of the results just received, 33 of 52 schools have one or more water sources with elevated levels of copper and/or lead…This means that 57 of 86 schools where test results have been provided have one or more water sources with elevated levels of copper and/or lead (this does not include the previous 10 Di-Hydro schools where copper and/or lead was detected).” He added the results were incomplete: the district is still awaiting results for 17 schools. He noted: “As you know, drinking water in these schools was discontinued as we await water test results for all schools. Although the kitchen water has only been turned off in schools where levels were determined high, we have been using bottled water to clean food in all schools: As a reminder, we have not used water to cook food in our kitchens for some time and instead have delivered pre-cooked meals to students. We plan to install filters for kitchen sinks to remedy challenges in kitchens.” Last week, the Superintendent, in a state hyper aware of the physical and fiscal threats of contaminated or unsafe water, that a $2 million water station system would address water quality issues, and School Board Member Deborah Hunter-Harvill confirmed, in the wake of the tests: “We completed our community meeting, and we’ve taken down recommendations and suggestions to make certain our kids are safe.” But who will finance the corrections is unclear: School Board member LaMar Lemmons said he supports spending $2 million to fix the water problems, and he continues to blame the state for neglecting school buildings during a decade of state control, which ended in 2017: “Under the $2 billion (spent) for new school construction and renovation, they did a terrible job. There is no excuse for these schools to not have been maintained.” Supt. Vitti said the most practical, long-term, safest solution for water quality problems inside the schools would be water hydration stations in every building, system currently in use in Flint, Royal Oak, Birmingham and in Baltimore, he noted, adding, in an email earlier this week: “Moving forward, we will continue to use water coolers district-wide and are actively working through the bid processes to make a recommendation to the board for the use of hydration stations. This will occur within the next couple of weeks. The hydration stations would be installed in all schools by next school year and replace the need for water coolers.”

The health apprehension came in the wake of, just days before the first day of class at the beginning of this month, the Superintendents’ decision to shut off drinking water inside all 106 school buildings after finding, in an initial check at 6 schools, high levels of copper and/or lead. The checks themselves are costly: they require stations in every school, one per every 100 students, with a resulting tab of $2 million, after taking into account stations in faculty rooms and gymnasiums, according to Supt. Vitti, who stated he intends to provide information to the Detroit School Board to consider next month, noting that, if the funds are approved, the system could be installed in the next school year. The delay comes at a physical and fiscal cost: the school district is spending $200,000 on bottled water and water coolers for the next several months, with Supt. Vitti reporting the cause of the water contamination is likely the result of the aging of the system’s public infrastructure, as well as older plumbing systems, warning that lower usage of water due to smaller enrollment sizes can lead to copper and lead buildup. Because DPS’ schools were built for use by thousands of students, the sharp decline in attendance has adverse effects, and, as the Superintendent noted: “The reality is our schools are vastly different: some are new, some are old. Some have outdated systems, some have outdated sinks and plumbing,” adding he had consulted with the Governor’s office, the Michigan Departments of Environmental Health, as well as Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha, whose critical leadership exposed the Flint lead water crisis, noting: “They have provided lessons on Flint. They gave the recommendation for me to think about piping in general and a long-term solution.”

Despite the tragedy and ongoing Flint related litigation, Michigan has no rules mandating that public school districts test for lead in their water supply. That means, according to the Superintendent, that there are even newer schools built within the last decade which have water-quality issues, noting these problems could be blamed on inadequate piping or non-code compliant piping, adding he had i initiated water testing of DPS’ 106 school buildings last spring, with the testing evaluating all water sources, from sinks to drinking fountains—but learning that the actual source of the contamination remains uncertain—albeit the school system’s widespread infrastructure problems are likely causes: last June, a district report said it would cost $500 million to repair its buildings. The district has said it needs $29.86 million to repair or replace plumbing, according to the facilities report, not related to the current water problems.

Physical & Fiscal Recoveries. Maria was the worst storm to hit Puerto Rico in nearly a century: nearly 3,000 Americans lost their lives, according to a study commissioned by the Puerto Rican government. The storm devastated the economy: thousands of small businesses have been shuttered; some big businesses are leaving, and, in a demographic omen, the exodus of the young, productive population has accelerated. Over the last year, the island’s economy has contracted by 7.6%, according to the latest fiscal plan prepared for PROMESA Board. 

American Inequality. Puerto Rico Gov. Ricardo Rosselló this week asked President Trump to recognize that “Puerto Rico’s territorial status is discriminatory and allows for the unequal treatment of natural-born U.S. citizens.” In his letter to the President, coming one year in the wake of the devastating fiscal and physical impact of Hurricane Maria, the Governor wrote that Puerto Rico’s territorial status had negatively affected post-Maria recovery efforts, noting: “As we revisit all that we have been through in the last year, one thing has not changed and remains the biggest impediment for Puerto Rico’s full and prosperous recovery: the inequalities Puerto Rico faces as the oldest, most populous colony in the world.”

Gov. Rosselló, who campaigned on the promise of promoting statehood for Puerto Rico, added in his letter that FEMA’s bureaucratic processes—processes in which Puerto Rico has no say—had worked to delay disaster recovery, writing: “The ongoing and historic inequalities resulting from Puerto Rico’s territorial status have been exacerbated by a series of decisions by the federal government that have slowed our post-disaster recovery, compared to what has happened in other jurisdictions stateside.” He requested that the President reconsider a State Department request to dismiss a case in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with regard to the U.S.’ international responsibility regarding Puerto Rico’s status—a case in which the Commission is investigating complaints that the United States is violating the human rights of its citizens in Puerto Rico, because they lack the same political rights as other U.S. citizens, including the right to vote for President unless they relocate to one of the states or the District of Columbia, and, because they have no voting representation in the Congress. The Governor added he felt “compelled to respectfully address the most egregious errors in a [State Department] missive,” which sought to dismiss Puerto Rico’s concerns, noting, especially, the Department’s reference to Puerto Rico as a “self-governing territory,” rather than what the Governor believes is really a “territorial colony,” noting that defining Puerto Rico as self-governing “ignores that Congress often uses its plenary powers over the territory to impose a multitude of federal laws without the Commonwealth’s residents having any voting representation in the U.S. Senate and only a single Resident Commissioner in the U.S. House of Representatives, who cannot vote on the floor of that chamber.” He also disputed the State Department’s assertion that Puerto Ricans are not “banned” from voting for President, writing: “[T]he only way for U.S. citizens from Puerto Rico to vote in such an election and be counted is to leave Puerto Rico. If that is not a ban, then what is?” He further wrote that the current governance upholds an “inherently racist logic that deem the people of Puerto Rico as inferior and unable to fully participate in the institutions of democratic governance.”

The letter also touches on two referenda which statehood supporters have won in Puerto Rico, but that have not been deemed official results by the Department of Justice. The most recent, in 2017, was boycotted by local opposition parties, and the ballot never received final DOJ approval.  While that referendum only had a 23% participation rate, the pro statehood vote was an overwhelming 97%.

Gov. Rosselló added his apprehension in the wake of the U.S. Justice Department’s non-approval of Puerto Rico’s 2017 referendum, noting that “after the legislature even amended the format of the vote to meet the recommendations of the U.S. Justice Department,” the Trump administration had nevertheless “failed” to certify the ballot. Thus, he noted that asking an international body to dismiss its complaint was tantamount to asking it to “turn a blind eye to an inconvenient truth, that Puerto Rico remains the unfinished business of American democracy.” Finally, Gov. Rosselló ended his letter with an appeal to President Trump’s leadership, asking him to “work together to abolish this century old territorial-colonialism once and for all: Statehood for Puerto Rico is not only about realizing Puerto Rico’s full potential. It is about America living up to its most noble values by creating a more perfect Union.” (The Trump Administration has advised the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) that if Puerto Ricans want to vote for President, nothing prevents the government of Puerto Rico from calling for a referendum to determine the position of its residents regarding candidates for the U.S. Presidency—a referendum which, however, would be symbolic.)

The apparent position of the Trump Administration reflects its views that Puerto Ricans, in addition to being able to participate in Presidential primary elections, they may also, according to Kevin Sullivan, the U.S. Deputy Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS), organize and vote in presidential elections. Thus the U.S. representative asked the inter-American tribunal to dismiss the independent complaints filed by lawyer Gregorio Igartua and former governor Pedro Rossello alleging that the lack of participation of Puerto Rico’s residents in Presidential and Congressional elections represents a violation of their human and civil rights. Secretary Sullivan, who asserted that the government of Puerto Rico maintains a “broad” self-government, in a recently disclosed communication from the end of last June, maintained that within the colonial relationship with the U.S. territory, there are some electoral processes related to the federal government. Within this group of electoral processes, he thus sought to highlight as significant the ability for Puerto Ricans to vote in those for presidential primaries, as well as for its non-voting delegate in the U.S. House of Representatives.  Nevertheless, Secretary Sullivan recognized Puerto Ricans’ first vote in favor of statehood via the June 2017 plebiscite, describing that vote as having launched a process of requesting statehood before Congress, which outcome the “United States cannot predict.”

Puerto Rico Resident Commissioner Jenniffer Gonzalez, Puerto Rico’s non-voting Member of Congress, said she would have preferred the recognition of the undemocratic nature of the territorial status, and that statehood remains as “the only viable political status with a relationship with the United States, not territorial and not colonial.”

Puerto Rico Progressive Party representative Jose Aponte noted that it seemed unfortunate “at this point” that the federal government intends to develop some theory with regard to Puerto Rico’s self-government, especially in the wake of enacting the PROMESA law, thereby imposing the PROMESA Board, likening it to colonialism, and emphasizing what he views as Secretary Sullivan’s specious claim in which he advises Puerto Rican leaders that Puerto Ricans, “if they wish…are also free to move to any state,” noting: “It is hypocritical to hide the fact that they have a regime in which we cannot govern with the faculties and minimum rights that any human being deserves.”

Promising Good Gnus? Even if perceived by many Puerto Ricans as colonial overseers, the PROMESA Board, acting in a quasi-Emergency Manager role, such as Kevyn Orr did in putting together and managing the plan of debt adjustment for Detroit, is offering some hope for fiscal promise, as the Board is poised to lift its fiscal forecast and predicting a budget surplus in the wake of the recovery from the devastating Hurricane Maria, predicting a cumulative surplus, prior to debt payments, of in excess of $20 billion through 2058, or 500% greater than its quasi plan of debt adjustment certified by the PROMESA Board last June. PROMESA Board Executive Director has indicated that plan will be certified “in the coming weeks,” adding: “The changes in the fiscal plan will come from new data in actual FY18 revenue and expense figures, budget to actuals, and disaster spending.” Earlier last summer, the PROMESA Board, in certifying the most recent fiscal plan, had estimated that Puerto Rico would have a cumulative surplus of about $4 billion over the next four decades; the new projection, incorporating higher than expected disaster aid and tax receipts, would lift that projection to more than $20 billion.

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The Fiscal Challenges of Inequity

May 15, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we return to the small municipality of Harvey, Illinois—a city fiscally transfixed between its pension and operating budget constraints in a state which does not provide authority for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy; then we turn east to assess Connecticut’s fiscal road to adjournment and what it might mean for its capital city of Hartford; before heading south to Puerto Rico where there might be too many fiscal cooks in the kitchen, both exacerbating the costs of restoring fiscal solvency, and exacerbating the outflow of higher income Americans from Puerto Rico to the mainland.

Absence of Fiscal Balance? After, nearly a decade ago, the Land of Lincoln—the State of Illinois—adopted its pension law as a means to ensure smaller municipalities would stop underfunding their public pension contributions—provisions which, as we noted in the case of the small municipality of Harvey, were upheld when a judge affirmed that the Illinois Comptroller was within the state law to withhold revenues due to the city—with the Comptroller’s office noting that whilst it did not “want to see any Harvey employees harmed or any Harvey residents put at risk…the law does not give the Comptroller discretion in this case: The Comptroller’s Office is obligated to follow the law. This dispute is between the retired Harvey police officers’ pension fund and the City of Harvey.” But in one of the nation’s largest metro regions—one derived from the 233 settlements there in 1900, the fiscal interdependency and role of the state may have grave fiscal consequences. As we previously noted, U. of Chicago researcher Amanda Kass found there are 74 police or fire pension funds in Illinois municipalities with unfunded pension liabilities similar to that of Harvey. Unsurprisingly, poverty is not equally distributed: so fiscal disparities within the metro region have consequences not just for municipal operating budgets, but also for meeting state constitutionally mandated public pension obligations.

Now, as fiscal disparities in the region grow, there is increasing pressure for the state to step in—it is, after all, one of the majority of states in the nation which does not authorize a municipality to file for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy: ergo, the fiscal and human challenge in the wake of the state’s enactment of its new statute which permits public pension funds to intercept local revenues to meet pension obligations; the state faces the governance and fiscal challenge of whether to provide for a state takeover—a governing action taken in the case of neighboring Michigan, where the state takeover had perilous health and fiscal consequences in Flint, but appeared to be the key for the remarkable fiscal turnaround in Detroit from the largest municipal chapter 9 bankruptcy in American history. Absent action by the Governor and state legislature, it would seem Illinois will need to adopt an early fiscal warning system of severe municipal fiscal distress—replete with a fiscal process for some means of state assistance or intervention. In Harvey, where Mayor Eric Kellogg has been banned for life from any role in the issuance of municipal debt because of the misleading of investors, the challenge for a city which has so under-budgeted for its public pension obligations, has defaulted on its municipal bond obligations, and provided virtually no fiscal disclosure; Illinois’ new state law (PL 96-1495), which permits public pension funds to compel Illinois’ Comptroller to withhold state tax revenue which would normally go to the city, which went into effect at the beginning of this calendar year, meant the city reasons did not take effect until January 2018. Now, in the wake of the city’s opting to lay off nearly half its police and fire force, the small municipality with the 7th highest violent crime rate in the state is in a fiscal Twilight Zone—and a zone transfixed in the midst of a hotly contested gubernatorial campaign in which neither candidate has yet to offer a meaningful fiscal option.  

Under Illinois’ Financial Distressed City Law ((65 ILCS 5/) Illinois Municipal Code) there are narrow criteria, including requirements that the municipality rank in the highest 5% of all cities in terms of the aggregate of the property tax levy paid while simultaneously in the lowest percentage of municipalities in terms of the tax collected. Under the provisions, the Illinois General Assembly would then need to pass a resolution declaring the city as fiscally distressed—a law used only once before in the state’s history—thirty-eight years ago for the City of East St. Louis. The statute, as we have previously noted, contains an additional quirk—disqualifying in this case: Illinois’ Local Government Financial Planning and Supervision Act mandates an entity must have a population of less than 25,000—putting Harvey, with its waning population measured at 24,947 as of 2016 somewhere with Rod Serling in the Twilight Zone. Absent state action, Harvey could be the first of a number of smaller Illinois municipalities unable to meet its public pension obligations—in response to which, the state would reduce revenues via intercepting local or municipal revenues—aggravating and accelerating municipal fiscal distress.

Capital for the Capitol. In a rare Saturday session, the Connecticut Senate passed legislation to enable the state to claw back emergency debt assistance for its capital city, Hartford, through aid cuts beginning in mid-2022, with a bipartisan 28-6 vote—forwarding the bill to the House and Gov. Dannel Malloy—as legislators raced to overwhelmingly approve a new state budget shortly before their midnight deadline Wednesday which would:  restore aid for towns; reverse health care cuts for the elderly, poor, and disabled; and defer a transportation crisis. The $20.86 billion package, which now moves to Gov. Dannel P. Malloy’s desk, does not increase taxes; it does raise the maximum tax rate cities and towns can levy on motor vehicles. In addition, the bill would spend rather than save more than $300 million from this April’s $1 billion surge in state income tax revenues. The final fiscal compromise does not include several major changes sought by Republicans to collective bargaining rules affecting state and municipal employees. And, even as the state’s fiscal finances are projected to face multi-billion-dollar deficits after the next election tied in part to legacy debt costs amassed over the last 80 years, the new budget would leave Connecticut with $1.1 billion in its emergency reserves: it will boost General Fund spending about 1.6 percent over the adopted budget for the current fiscal year, and is 1.1 percent higher than the preliminary 2018-19 budget lawmakers adopted last October. The budget also includes provisions intended to protect Connecticut households and businesses which might be confronted with higher federal tax obligations under the new federal tax law changes. Indeed, in the end, the action was remarkably bipartisan: the Senate passed the budget 36-0 after a mere 17 minutes of debate; the House debated only 20 minutes before voting 142-8 for adoption.

In addition to reacting to the new federal tax laws, the final fiscal actions also dealt with the sharp, negative reaction from voters in the wake of tightening  Medicare eligibility requirements for the Medicare Savings Program, which uses Medicaid funds to help low-income elderly and disabled patients cover premiums and medication costs—acting to postpone cutbacks to July 1st, even though it worsened a deficit in the current fiscal year, after learning an estimated 113,000 seniors and disabled residents would lose some or all assistance. As adopted, the new budget reverses all cutbacks, at a cost of approximately $130 million. Legislators also acted to restore some $12 million to reverse new restrictions on the Medicaid-funded health insurance program for poor adults, with advocates claiming this funding would enable approximately 13,500 adults from households earning between 155 and 138 percent of the federal poverty level to retain state-sponsored coverage.

State Aid to Connecticut Cities & Towns. Legislators also took a different approach with this budget regarding aid to cities and towns. After clashing with Gov. Malloy last November, when Gov. Malloy had been mandated by the legislature to achieve unprecedented savings after the budget was in force, including the reduction of $91 million from statutory grants to cities and towns; the new budget gives communities $70.5 million more in 2018-19 than they received this year—and bars the Governor from cutting town grants to achieve savings targets. As adopted, the fiscal package means that some municipalities in the state, cities and towns with the highest local tax rates, could be adversely impacted: the legislation raises the statewide cap on municipal property taxes from a maximum rate of 39 mills to 45 mills. On the other hand, the final legislation provides additional education and other funding for communities with large numbers of evacuees from Puerto Rico—dipping into a portion of last month’s $1.3 billion surge in state income tax receipts tied chiefly to capital gains and other investment income—and notwithstanding the state’s new revenue “volatility” cap which was established last fall to force Connecticut to save such funds. As adopted, the new state budget “carries forward” $299 million in resources earmarked for payments to hospitals this fiscal year—a fiscal action which means the state has an extra $299 million to spend in the next budget while simultaneously enlarging the outgoing fiscal year’s deficit by the same amount. (The new deficit for the outgoing fiscal year would be $686 million, which would be closed entirely with the dollars in the budget reserve—which is filled primarily with this spring’s income tax receipts.) The budget reserve is now projected to have between $700 million and $800 million on hand when the state completes its current fiscal year. That could be a fiscal issue, as it would leave Connecticut with a fiscal cushion of just under 6 percent of annual operating costs, a cushion which, while the state’s largest reserve since 2009, would still be far below the 15 percent level recommended by Comptroller Kevin P. Lembo—and, mayhap of greater fiscal concern, smaller than the projected deficits in the first two fiscal years after the November elections: according to Connecticut’s nonpartisan Office of Fiscal Analysis, the newly adopted budget, absent adjustment, would run $2 billion in deficit in FY2019-20—a deficit that office projects would increase by more than 25 percent by FY2020-21, with the bulk of those deficits attributable both to surging retirement benefit costs stemming from decades of inadequate state savings, as well as the Connecticut economy’s sluggish recovery from the last recession.

As adopted, Connecticut’s new budget also retains and scales back a controversial plan to reinforce new state caps on spending and borrowing and other mechanisms designed to encourage better savings habits; it includes a new provision to transfer an extra $29 million in sales tax receipts next fiscal year to the Special Transportation Fund—designed in an effort to avert planned rail and transit fare increases—ergo, it does not establish tolls on state highways.

Reacting to Federal Tax Changes. The legislature approved a series of tax changes in response to new federal tax laws capping deductions for state and local taxes at $10,000: one provision would establish a new Pass-Through Entity Tax aimed at certain small businesses, such as limited liability corporations; a second provision allows municipalities to provide a property tax credit to taxpayers who make voluntary donations to a “community-supporting organization” approved by the municipality: under this provision, as an example, a household owing $7,000 in state income taxes and $6,000 in local property taxes could, in lieu of paying the property taxes, make a $6,000 contribution to a municipality’s charitable organization.

Impacts on Connecticut’s Municipalities. The bill would enable the state to reduce non-education aid to its capital city of Hartford by an amount equal to the debt deal. It would authorize the legislature to pare non-education grants to Hartford if the city’s deficit exceeds 2% of annual operating costs in a fiscal year, or a 1% gap for two straight year—albeit the legislature would be free to restore other funds—or, as Mayor Luke Bronin put it: “I fully understand respect legislators’ desire to revisit the agreement after five years.” Under the so-called contract assistance agreement, which Gov. Malloy, Connecticut State Treasurer Denise Nappier, and Mayor Luke Bronin signed in late March, the state would pay off the principal on the City of Hartford’s roughly $540 million of general obligation debt over 20 to 30 years. With Connecticut’s new Municipal Accountability Review Board, not dissimilar to the Michigan fiscal review Board for Detroit, having just approved Mayor Bronin’s five-year plan. In the wake of the legislative action, Mayor Bronin had warned that significant fiscal cuts in the out years could imperil the city at that time, albeit adding: “That said, I fully understand and respect legislators’ desire to revisit the agreement after five years, and my commitment is that we will continue to work hard to earn the confidence our the legislature and the state as a whole as we move our capital city in the right direction.”

Dying to Leave. While we have previously explored the departure of many young, college-educated Puerto Ricans to the mainland, depleting both municipio and the Puerto Rico treasuries of vital tax revenues, the Departamento of Salud (Health Department) reports that even though Puerto Rico’s population has declined by nearly 17% over the decade, the U.S. territory’s suicide rate has increased significantly, especially in the months immediately following Hurricane Maria, particularly among older adults, with social workers reporting that elderly people are especially vulnerable when their daily routines are disrupted for long periods. Part of the upsurge is demographically related: As those going have left for New York City, Florida, and other sites on the East Coast, it is older Americans left behind—many who went as long as six months without electricity, who appear to be at risk. Adrian Gonzalez, the COO (Chief Operating Officer at Castañer General Hospital in Castañer, a small town in the central mountains) noted: “We have elderly people who live alone, with no power, no water and very little food.” Dr. Angel Munoz, a clinical psychologist in Ponce, said people who care for older adults need to be trained to identify the warning signs of suicide: “Many of these elderly people either live alone or are being taken care of by neighbors.”

A Hot Potato of Municipal Debt. Under Puerto Rico Gov. Ricardo Rosselló’s proposed FY2019 General Fund budget, the Governor included no request to meet Puerto Rico’s debt, adding he intended not to follow the PROMESA Board’s directives in several parts of his budget—those debt obligations for Puerto Rico and its entities are in excess of $2.5 billion: last month’s projections by the Board certified a much higher amount of $3.84 billion. Matt Fabian of Municipal Market Analytics described it this way: “Bondholders have to wait until the Commonwealth makes a secured or otherwise legally protected provision to pay debt service before they can begin to (dis)count their chickens: The alternative, which is where we are today, is an assumption that debt service will be paid out of surplus funds. ‘Surplus funds’ haven’t happened in a decade and the storm has only made things worse: a better base case assumption is the Commonwealth spending every dollar of cash and credit at its disposal, regardless of what the budget says: That doesn’t leave much room for the payment of debt service and is good reason for bondholders to continue to litigate.” Under the PROMESA Board’s approved fiscal plan, Puerto Rico should have $1.13 billion in surplus funds available for debt service in FY2023—with the Board silent with regard to what percent the Gov. would be expected to dedicate to debt service. The Gov.’s budget request does seek nearly a 10% reduction for the general fund, with a statement from his office noting the proposal for operational expenditures of $7 billion is 6% less than that for the current fiscal year and 22% less than the final budget of former Gov. Alejandro García Padilla. The Governor proposed no reductions in pension benefits—indeed, it goes so far as to explicitly include that his budget does not follow the demands of the PROMESA Oversight Board for the proposed pension cuts, to enact new labor reforms, or to eliminate a long-standing Christmas bonus for government workers.

Nevertheless, PROMESA Board Executive Director Natalie Jaresko, appears optimistic that Gov. Ricardo Rosselló Nevares’s government will correct the “deficiencies” in the recommended budget without having to resort to litigation: while explaining the Board’s reasoning for rejecting the Governor’s proposed budget last week, Director Jaresko stressed that correcting the expenses and collections program, as well as implementing all the reforms contained in the fiscal plan, is necessary to channel the island’s economy and to promote transparency and accountability in the use of public funds, adding that approving a budget in accordance with the new certified fiscal plan is critical to achieve the renegotiation of Puerto Rico’s debt—adding that, should the Rosselló administration not do its part, the Board would proceed with what PROMESA establishes: “The fiscal plan is not a menu you can choose from.”

Unequal and/or Inequitable Fiscal & Physical Responses

January 29, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the seemingly unending physical and fiscal challenges to Puerto Rico’s fiscal and   physical recovery.

Post Storm Fiscal & Physical Misery. Puerto Rico Gov. Ricardo Rosselló’s proposed privatization of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority faces opposition from local political leaders; thus, it may prove to be a tough sell to potential investors: the proposal, which the Governor has presented to privatize PREPA, the public utility burdened with some $8.2 billion of municipal bond debt—and the utility which the PROMESA Oversight Board has put into a Title III bankruptcy process, creating potential hurdles for any plan to alter its ownership, notwithstanding that Board members have expressed support for the idea. For his part, Puerto Rico House Minority Leader Rafael Hernández Montañez said he thought Governor Rosselló was seeking to distract people from his problems with his PREPA privatization proposal: “It’s a way of taking off the heat, on the re-energization of the houses and stores.” That is to write that the Gov. understands that neither the Puerto Rico House nor Senate will approve his proposal—so, Minority Leader Montañez asserts he is just posturing for public support, he said. Members of Gov. Rosselló’s own party in the legislature; moreover, appear to be opposed. Nevertheless, as part of the Title III PROMESA quasi-chapter 9 bankruptcy, parts of the utility appear certain candidates for sale–albeit, this would be a decision made by Judge Laura Taylor Swain—not Governor Rosselló.  

Moreover, there is apprehension that the Governor’s governance proposal would be unlikely to generate any support from investors, either: Tom Sanzillo, Director of Finance at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, noted: “We fail to see how any investor would put money into Puerto Rico with a regulatory system like that proposed by Gov. Rosselló: “He appoints and can fire board members at will. Under the current system, board members have staggered, fixed terms, and can only be fired for cause…This means the whim of every new Governor sets rules and contracts. This makes energy investing highly risky, contracts uncertain, and a politicized investment environment.” Indeed, Tomás Torres, Project Director at the Institute for Competitiveness and Sustainable Economy, believes the Puerto Rico Energy Commission’s oversight should be strengthened, and it should implement any transformation of PREPA.

Jose Rossi Coughlin, Chairman of the Institute for Competitiveness and Sustainable Economy has expressed apprehension about any interruption of key regulatory processes, much less permitting each new Governor to select all commission members when she or he assumes elected office—noting that is not only contrary to widely prevailing mainland U.S. practice, but also likely legally incompatible with Title V of PROMESA. For his part, Mr. Torres notes that with the Governor’s submission, last week, of a bill to eliminate the Energy Commission and substitute in its place a Public Service Commission (which would merge Telecom, Transportation & Public Services, and the Energy Commission), the “The three commissions/boards that are to be merged in this new body add to 15 commissioners, but the new boards will only be of three members…“The recently proposed Energy Commission reorganization and consolidation with other public service regulation would be a huge step backward.”

Moody’s Investor Service was not quite as pessimistic, writing: “The [proposed] privatization itself is positive, because it is another source of capital to help solve PREPA’s fiscal problems; however, there are still challenges; including negotiating a price in an environment of declining Puerto Rico population, investing in rebuilding aging infrastructure, and how PREPA’s pension liability will be handled. The 18-month timeline appears quite aggressive.” For its part, the PREPA Bondholders Group said they would support a “private operator” to “immediately” take over operations, subject to the Puerto Rico Energy Commission oversight. Indeed, in statement sent out by Gov. Rosselló’s office, some representatives of Puerto Rico’s business community indicated their support for the proposal, with Nelson Ramírez of the United Center of Retailers, noting: “The announced changes will allow Puerto Rico to become a competitive jurisdiction, ending a monopoly that discourages investment and the creation of jobs,” albeit, as Puerto Rico Senate Minority Leader Eduardo Bhatia Gautier said, the proposal was a step in the right direction but that “the devil is in the details.”  Leader Bhatia-Gautier, a co-founder and former editor of the Stanford Journal of Law and Policy, with previous service as a law clerk at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Boston, as well as Chief of Staff for the resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico in the U.S. Congress, is the 15th president of the Senate of Puerto Rico, where he has focused on the U.S. Territory’s fiscal system and authored a comprehensive energy reform law. Now, he asserts that Puerto Rico’s electrical system should be decentralized into 20 to 25 micro grids, and believes that, with federal assistance, Puerto Rico should try for widespread installation of solar panels on rooftops. Nevertheless, as he notes: even though the Governor and the Puerto Rico legislature will privatize PREPA, the reality is that Judge Swain will have to be involved.

Power to the Muncipio? Jayuya Mayor Jorge L. González Otero, a muncipio founded in 1911, at a time it featured a population of around 9,000, was certain that power would be restored to close to 10,000 residents of his northwest coast municipality of around 88,000, on Saturday. Some 35% of residents in Arecibo do not currently have electricity, he reported, albeit, he said he had received word from PREPA that one of the region’s substations, Charco Hondo, would receive a generator from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to power a temporary micro grid while repairs on the substation continue. The muncipio, which, at its founding, was separated from the larger cities of the coasts with little to no communication: it was the site of the Jayuya uprising in 1950, in which the Nationalists commenced a revolt against the U.S. Government, when a social worker, Doris Torresola, and her cousins led the group into the town square and gave a speech, declaring Puerto Rico an independent republic. Subsequently, the police station was attacked, telephone lines cut, and the post office burned to the ground. The Nationalists held the town for three days, until it was bombed by U.S. planes, which were supporting a ground attack by the Puerto Rican National Guard. Even though an extensive part of the town was destroyed, however, news of the bombing was not reported outside of Puerto Rico. Today, unsurprisingly, the Mayor notes: “Four months is way too much time for people in Puerto Rico to not have energy. All of us, the representatives, the mayors, the people, the senators, have to raise our voices to get things done.”

In fact, last month, he had reached an agreement with PREPA to temporarily restore power by means of the micro grid: last Saturday, the Mayor planned to tour the substation with PREPA’s interim director, Justo González, as the generator was being installed. However, in another example of the dysfunction which has plagued Puerto Rico’s recovery, there was no sign of the generator, nor even PREPA’s interim director at the Charco Hondo substation—meaning thousands of Arecibo’s residents remained in darkness, just like nearly one-third of all Puerto Ricans: more than one million U.S. citizens—darkness wherein there is no remote contemplation of when power might be restored: a spokesperson for PREPA told BuzzFeed News that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was overseeing the project and providing the generator. A Corps spokesperson indicated that after a second inspection of the site, the Corps had determined there was too much damage to the nearby power lines to allow the generator to be safely switched on as planned; rather, he said contractors will “begin installing” the generator over the weekend, but that it will not become operational, albeit the Corps is unable to provide “definitive time” when it will.

Renogiaciones. The Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority reports that Puerto Rico’s decision to renegotiate its public debt will cost at least $ 800 million over five years, with FAFAA, relying on an expensive cadre of attorneys, consultants, and financial advisors who have been recruited as part of an effort to cobble together a quasi-plan of debt adjustment which would reduce more than $ 70 billion owed to  Puerto Rico’s bondholders—now the cadre has to translate its fiscal algorithms before Judge Swain’s courtroom. The document, however, fails to specify whether the plan incorporates the budget for either FAFAA or the PROMESA Oversight Board, much less the vast array of advisors and lawyers who have participated in voluntary negotiations, as in the case of the Government Development Bank (GDB)—not exactly as propitious beginning as, for the first time, there is to be an assessment of the actual costs of reducing or cancelling bondholders’ debts, albeit, already, some early estimates are that such costs could exceed $1 billion—the portion of which would redound to U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico, where, in comparison to the different mainland states, Puerto Rico falls far below the poorest mainland state, with 45% of its population living below the poverty line, would be most limited. Nevertheless, despite the seemingly endless process, and despite the PROMESA oversight, or quasi-chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment, there has been as yet, no agreement with any key creditor. Rather, in what many in Puerto Rico would deem noticias falsas, President Trump, last November, reported Puerto Rico was “doing well” and “it’s healing, and it’s getting better, and we’re getting them power, and all of the things that they have to have.” That was in sharp contrast with reality—or, as District Representative José “Memo” González Mercado, of Arecibo put it: “The reality is that we are U.S. citizens, but Donald Trump treats us as second-class citizens.”

Post Municipal Bankruptcy Leadership

08/07/17

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Good Morning! In this a.m.’s blog, we consider the fiscal challenge as election season is upon the Motor City: what kind of a race can we expect? Then we observe the changing of the guard in San Bernardino—as the city’s first post-chapter 9 City Manager settles in as she assumes a critical fiscal leadership role in the city emerging from municipal bankruptcy. Third, we consider the changing of the fiscal guard in Atlantic City, as outgoing (not a pun) Gov. Chris Christie begins the process of restoring municipal authority. Then we turn to what might be a fiscal turnaround underway in Puerto Rico, before, fourth, considering the special fiscal challenge to Puerto Rico’s municipios—or municipalities.

Post Municipal Bankruptcy Leadership. Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan, the city’s first post-chapter 9 mayor, has been sharing his goals for a second term, and speaking about some of his city’s proudest moments as he seeks a high turnout at tomorrow’s primary election mayoral primary election‒the first since the city exited municipal bankruptcy three years ago, noting he is: “very proud of the fact the unemployment rate in Detroit is the lowest it has been in 17 years: today he notes there are 20,000 more Detroiters working than 4 years ago. In January 2014, there were 40,000 vacant houses in the city, and today 25,000. We knocked down 12,000 and 3,000 had families who moved in and fixed them up,” adding: “For most Detroiters, that means the streetlights are on, grass is cut in the parks, busses are running on time, police and ambulances showing up in a timely basis and trash picked up and streets swept.” Notwithstanding those accomplishments, however, he confronts seven contenders—with perhaps the signal challenge coming from Michigan State Senator Coleman Young, Jr., whose father, Coleman Young, served as Detroit’s first African-American Mayor from 1974 to 1994. Mr. Young claims he is the voice for the people who have been forgotten in Detroit’s neighborhoods, noting: “I want to put people to work and reduce poverty of 48% in Detroit. I think that’s atrocious. I also want mass transit that goes more than 3 miles,” adding he is seeking ‘real change,’ charging that today in Detroit: “We’re doing more for the people who left the city of Detroit, than the people who stayed. That’s going to stop in a Young administration.” Remembering his father, he adds: “I don’t think there will ever be another Coleman Young, but I am the closest thing to him that’s on this planet that’s living.” (Other candidates in tomorrow’s non-partisan primary include Articia Bomer, Dean Edward, Curtis Greene, Donna Marie Pitts, and Danetta Simpson.)  

According to an analysis by the Detroit News, voters will have some interesting alternatives: half of the eight candidates have been convicted of felony crimes involving drugs, assault, or weapons—with three charged with gun crimes and two for assault with intent to commit murder, albeit, some of the offenses date back as far as 1977. (Under Michigan election law, convicted felons can vote and run for office, just as long as they are neither incarcerated nor guilty of crimes breaching public trust.

Taking the Reins.  San Bernardino has named its first post-chapter 9 bankruptcy city manager, selecting assistant City Manager and former interim city manager, Andrea Miller, to the position—albeit with some questions with regard to the $253,080 salary in a post-chapter 9 recovering municipality where the average household income is less than $36,000 and where officials assert the city’s budget is insufficient to fully address basic public services, such as street maintenance or a fully funded police department. Nevertheless, Mayor Cary Davis and the City Council voted unanimously, commenting on Ms. Miller’s experience, vision, and commitment to stay long-term, or, as Councilman Fred Shorett told his colleagues: “As the senior councilmember—I’ve been sitting in this dais longer than anybody else—I think we’ve had, if we count you twice, eight city managers in a total of 9 years: We have not had continuity.”  However, apprehension about continuity as the city addresses and implements its plan of debt adjustment remains—or, as Councilmember John Valdivia insisted, there needs to be a “solemn commitment to the people of San Bernardino” by Ms. Miller to serve at least five years, as he told his colleagues: “During Mayor (Carey) Davis’ four years in office, the Council is now voting on the third city manager: San Bernardino cannot expect a successful recovery with this type of rampant leadership turnover at City Hall…Ms. Miller is certainly qualified, but I am concerned that she has already deserted our community once before.” Ms. Miller was the city’s assistant city manager in 2012, when then-City Manager Charles McNeely abruptly resigned, leaving Ms. Miller as interim city manager to discover that the city would have to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy—a responsibility she addressed with aplomb: she led San Bernardino through the first six months of its municipal bankruptcy, before leaving without removing “interim” from her title, instead assuming the position of executive director of the San Gabriel Valley Council of Governments.

Ms. Miller noted: “I would remind the Council that I was here as your interim city manager previously, and I did not accept the permanent appointment, because I felt like I could not make that commitment given some of the dynamics…(Since then) this Council and this community have implemented a new city charter, the Council came together in a really remarkable way and had a discussion with me that we had not been able to have previously: You committed to some regular discussion about what your expectations are, you committed to strategic planning. And so, with all those things and a strategic plan that involves all of us in a stronger, better San Bernardino, yes I can make that commitment.” Interestingly, the new contract mandates at least two strategic planning sessions per year—and, she told the Council additional sessions would probably be wise. The contract the city’s new manager signed is longer than the city’s most recent ones—mayhap leavened by experience: the length and the pay are higher than the $248,076 per year the previous manager received. Although Ms. Miller is not a San Bernardino resident, she told the Mayor and Council she is committed to the city and said the city should strive to recruit other employees who do live in the city.

Not Gaming Atlantic City’s Future. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s administration last week announced it had settled all the remaining tax appeals filed by Atlantic City casinos, ending a remarkable fiscal drain which has contributed to the city’s fiscal woes and state takeover. Indeed, it appears to—through removal of fiscal uncertainty and risk‒open the door to the Mayor and Council to reduce its tax rate over the long-term as the costs of the appeal are known and able to be paid out of the bonds sold earlier this year—effectively spinning the dial towards greater fiscal stability and sustainability. Here, the agreements were reached with: Bally’s, Caesars, Harrah’s, the Golden Nugget, Tropicana, and the shuttered Trump Plaza and Trump Taj Mahal: it comes about half a year in the wake of the state’s tax appeal settlement with Borgata, under which the city agreed to pay $72 million of the $165 million the casino was owed. While the Christie administration did not announce dollar amounts for any of the seven settlements announced last week, it did clarify that an $80 million bond ordinance adopted by the city will cover all the payments—effectively clearing the fiscal path for Atlantic City to act to reduce its tax rate over the long term as the costs of the appeal are known and can be paid out of the municipal bonds sold earlier this year.  

In these tax appeals, the property owners have claimed they paid more in taxes than they should have—effectively burdening the fiscally besieged municipality with hundreds of millions in debt over the last few years as officials sought to avoid going into chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Unsurprisingly, Gov. Christie has credited the state takeover of Atlantic City for fostering the settlements, asserting his actions were the “the culmination of my administration’s successful efforts to address one of the most significant and vexing challenges that had been facing the city…Because of the agreements announced today, casino property tax appeals no longer threaten the city’s financial future.” The Governor went on to add that his appointment of Jeffrey Chiesa, the former U.S. Senator and New Jersey Attorney General to usurp all municipal fiscal authority in Atlantic City when, in his words, Atlantic City was “overwhelmed by millions of dollars of crushing casino tax appeal debt that they hadn’t unraveled,” have now, in the wake of the state takeover, resulted in the city having a “plan in place to finance this debt that responsibly fits within its budget.” The lame duck Governor added in the wake of the state takeover, the city will see an 11.4% drop in residents’ overall 2017 property tax rate. For his part, Atlantic City Mayor Don Guardian described the fiscal turnaround as “more good news for Atlantic City taxpayers that we have been working towards since 2014: When everyone finally works together for the best interest of Atlantic City’s taxpayers and residents, great things can happen.”

Puerto Rican Debt. The Fiscal Supervision Board in the U.S. territory wants to initiate a discussion into Puerto Rico’s debt—and how that debt has weighed on the island’s fiscal crisis—making clear in issuing a statement that its investigation will include an analysis of the fiscal crisis and its taxpayers, and a review of Puerto Rico’s debt and issuance, including disclosure and sales practices, vowing to carry out its investigation consistent with the authority granted under PROMESA. It is unclear, however, how that report will mesh with the provision of PROMESA, §411, which already provides for such an investigation, directing the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to provide a report on the debt of Puerto Rico no later than one year after the approval of PROMESA (a deadline already passed: GAO notes the report is expected by the end of this year.). The fiscal kerfuffle comes as the PROMESA Oversight Board meets today to discuss—and mayhap render a decision with regard to furloughs and an elimination of the Christmas bonus as part of a fiscal oversight effort to address an expected cash shortfall this Fall, after Gov. Ricardo Rosselló, at the end of last month, vowed he would go to court to block any efforts by the PROMESA Board to force furloughs, apprehensive such an action would fiscally backfire by causing a half a billion dollar contraction in Puerto Rico’s economy.

Thus, we might be at an OK Corral showdown: PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión III has warned that if the Board were to mandate furloughs and the governor were to object, the board would sue. As proposed by the PROMESA Board, Puerto Rican government workers are to be furloughed four days a month, unless they work in an excepted class of employees: for instance, teachers and frontline personnel who worked for 24-hour staffed institutions would only be furloughed two days a month, law enforcement personnel not at all—all part of the Board’s fiscal blueprint to save the government $35 million to $40 million monthly.  However, as the ever insightful Municipal Market Advisors managing partner Matt Fabian warns, it appears “inevitable” that furloughs and layoffs would hurt the economy in the medium term—or, as he wrote: “To the extent employee reductions create a protest environment on the island, it may make the Board’s work more difficult going forward, but this is the challenge of downsizing an over-large, mismanaged government.” At the same time, Joseph Rosenblum, the Director of municipal credit research at AllianceBernstein, added: “It would be easier to comment about the situation in Puerto Rico if potential investors had more details on their cash position on a regular basis…And it would also be helpful if the Oversight Board was more transparent about how it arrived at its spending estimates in the fiscal plan.”

Pensiones. The PROMESA Board and Puerto Rico’s muncipios appear to have achieved some progress on the public pension front: PROMESA Board member Andrew Biggs asserts that the fiscal plan called for 10% cuts to pension spending in future fiscal years, while Sobrino Vega said Gov. Ricardo Rosselló has promised to make full pension payments. Natalie Ann Jaresko, the former Ukraine Minister of Finance whom former President Obama appointed to serve as Executive Director of PROMESA Fiscal Control Board, described the reduction as part of the fiscal plan that the Governor had promised to observe: the fiscal plan assumed that the Puerto Rican government would cut $880 million in spending in the current fiscal year. Indeed, in the wake of analyzing the government’s implementation plans, the PROMESA Board appeared comfortable that the cuts would save $662 million—with the Board ordering furloughs to make up the remaining $218 million. The fiscal action came as PROMESA Board member Carlos García said that the board last Spring presented the 10 year fiscal plan guiding government actions with certain conditions, Gov. Rosselló agreed to them, so that the Board approved the plan with said conditions, providing that the government achieve a certain level of liquidity by the end of June and submit valid implementation plans for spending cuts. Indeed, Puerto Rico had $1.8 billion in liquidity at the end of June, well over the $291 million that had been projected, albeit PROMESA Board member Ana Matosantos asserted the $1.8 billion denoted just a single data point. Ms. Jaresko, however, advised that this year’s government cuts were just the beginning: the Board fiscal plan calls for the budget cuts to more than double from $880 million in this year, to $1.7 billion in FY 2019, to $2.1 billion in FY2020.  No Puerto Rican government representative was allowed to make a presentation to the board on the issue of furloughs.

Not surprisingly, in Puerto Rico, where the unemployment rate is nearly triple the current U.S. rate, the issue of furloughs has raised governance issues: Sobrino Vega, the Governor’s chief economic advisor non-voting representative on the PROMESA Oversight Board, said there was only one government of Puerto Rico and that was Gov. Rosselló’s, adding that under §205 of PROMESA, the board only had the powers to recommend on issues such as furloughs, noting: “We can’t take lightly the impact of the furloughs on the economy,” adding the government will meet its fiscal goals, but it will do it according its own choices, but that the Puerto Rican government will cooperate with the Board on other matters besides furloughs. His statement came in the wake of PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión III’s statement in June that if Puerto Rico did not comply with a board order for furloughs, the Board would sue.

Cambio?  Puerto Rico Commonwealth Treasury Secretary Raul Maldonado has reported that Puerto Rico’s tax revenue collections last month were was ahead of projections, marking a positive start to the new fiscal year for an island struggling with municipal bankruptcy and a 45% poverty rate. Secretary Maldonado reported the positive cambio (in Spanish, “cambio” translates to change—and may be used both to describe cash as well as change, just as in English.): “I think we are going to be $20 to $30 million over the forecast: For July, we started the fiscal year already in positive territory, because we are over the forecast. We have to close the books on the final adjustment but we feel we are over the budget.” His office had reported the revenue collection forecast for July, the start of Puerto Rico’s 2017-2018 fiscal year, was $600.8 million: in the previous fiscal year, Puerto Rico’s tax collections exceeded forecasts by $234.9 million, or 2.6%, to $9.33 million, with the key drivers coming from the foreign corporations excise tax, the sales and use tax, and the motor vehicle excise tax. Sec. Maldonado, who is also Puerto Rico’s CFO, reported that each government department is required to freeze its spending and purchase orders at 95% of the monthly budget, noting: “I want to make sure that they don’t overspend. By freezing 5%, I am creating a cushion so if there is any variance on a monthly basis we can address that. It is a hardline budget approach but it is a special time here.” Sec. Maldonado also said he was launching a centralized tax collection pilot program, with guidance from the U.S. Treasury—one under which three large and three small municipalities have enrolled in an effort to assess which might best increase tax collection efficiency while cutting bureaucracy in Puerto Rico’s 78 municipalities, noting: “We are going to submit the tax reform during August, and we will include that option as an alternative to the municipalities.”

Addressing Municipal Fiscal Distress at the White House and State House

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07/31/17

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Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider whether President Trump’s appointment of new White House Communications Director of Communications might have fiscal implications for Puerto Rico’s fiscal future; then we turn to leadership efforts in the Virginia General Assembly to refine what a state’s role in oversight of municipal fiscal distress might be. 

Might There Be a Change in White House Direction vis-à-vis Puerto Rico? Prior to his new appointment as White House Director of Communications, Anthony Scaramucci, more than a year ago, questioned whether the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico should be granted authority more akin to a sovereign nation than a state—power which would, were it granted, authorize Puerto Rico to authorize its muncipios the authority to file for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, writing in an op-ed, “The shame of leaving Puerto Rico in limbo,” in Medium a year ago last May, just as the U.S. House Natural Resources Committee was seeking to report the PROMESA legislation. Mr. Scaramucci then indicated that creditors wanted to file with regard to the actions taken by the Puerto Rican government as if they were “equal to the intransigence of the Kirchner government in Argentina, but in reality the situations (of both countries) are completely different.” He explained: Not only does Puerto Rico not have the same public policy options as Argentina, but its economy and ability to pay its debts are worse off: Not only does Puerto Rico not have the same public policy options as Argentina, but its economy and ability to pay its debts are worse off.” He further noted that House Speaker Paul Ryan (R.-Wis.) was in a difficult situation to deal with the situation in Puerto Rico, amid what he described as a “civil war” within the Republican Party—a war he described as “induced by Donald Trump.”

Now, of course, Mr. Scaramucci is in a starkly different position—one where he might be able to influence White House policy. Having written, previously, that the “tax code of the Commonwealth must be revised to be more friendly to economic development…Social assistance programs should be drastically reduced and labor laws softened,” Mr. Scaramucci has also called for public-private partnerships to make “essential” government services more efficient, such as the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority—noting: “Ultimately…we must also allow Puerto Rico to operate as a sovereign country or grant them legal protections more similar to those of the states (which is the preference of the Puerto Rican people).” He argued that the case of Puerto Rico represents a “failure on multiple levels: the insatiable desire of US investment funds for Puerto Rico triple exemption bonds; U.S. Congressmen of the status of the Congressionally-created territory, and misappropriation of funds by the Puerto Rican government: “We must now face our failures and take pragmatic measures to create a better future:  The tax code of the Commonwealth must be revised to be more friendly to economic development; social assistance programs should be drastically reduced, and labor laws softened.” He noted that public-private partnerships could be vital in rendering “essential” government services more efficient, such as the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, noting: “Ultimately, we must also allow Puerto Rico to operate as a sovereign country or grant them legal protections more similar to those of the states (which is the preference of the Puerto Rican people).” Referencing that, as in the Great Recession of 2008, he noted the case of Puerto Rico represents a “failure on multiple levels: the insatiable desire of US investment funds for Puerto Rico triple exemption bonds; U.S. Congressmen of the status of ELA (Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico), and misappropriation of funds by the Puerto Rican government…But as we did after 2008, we must now face our failures and take pragmatic measures to create a better future.”

Mr. Scaramucci’s comments came as the City or Pueblo of San Juan has filed a legal challenge to the PROMESA Oversight Board’s approval of the Government Development Bank (GDB) for Puerto Rico debt restructuring agreement: San Juan is seeking a declaratory judgement and injunctive relief against the PROMESA Oversight Board, the GDB, and the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority before U.S. Judge Laura Swain Taylor in the U.S. District Court for Puerto Rico—a judge by now immersed in multiple bankruptcy filings, after the Bastille Day PROMESA Board’s approval of a restructuring agreement for the GDB’s $4.8 billion in debt—an approval for which the Board asserted it had authority under PROMESA’s Title VI.

San Juan’s filing claims the GDB holds more than $152 million in San Juan deposits—deposits which the city asserts are the property of San Juan, and thereby ineligible for Title VI restructuring, which explicitly addresses only municipal bonds, loans, and other similar securities. San Juan then claims the GDB deposits are “secured,” unlike the funds which the GDB owes to municipal bondholders—even as the PROMESA Board’s approved Restructuring Support Agreement provides for the municipalities to vote in the same class as all the other GDB creditors, asserting that such a voting practice would be contrary to PROMESA. The suit also notes that, under Puerto Rico statutes, municipal depositors are allowed to set-off their deposits against their GDB loan balances; however, the Restructuring Support Agreement (RSA) is grossly inaccurate in accounting for these deposits against the loans and, thus, the agreement is breaching the law—asserting:

“The ultimate effect of the RSA would be to provide a windfall to the GDB’s bondholders by using the resources of San Juan and other municipalities for the payment of bondholder claims while imposing enormous losses on those same municipal depositors through the confiscation of their excess [special tax deposit] and their statutorily guaranteed right to setoff deposits at the GDB against their loans from the GDB.” The suit further charged that the PROMESA Board convened illegal executive private sessions concerning the creation of the RSA—sessions which included representatives of the GDB and FAFAA. (The federal statute only allows executive sessions with board members and its staff present, according to the suit.)  Thus, in its complaint , the city is requesting that Judge Swain find the board’s approval of the agreement invalid, and that Judge Swain further find that PROMESA and Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution preempt Puerto Rican laws and executive order that have stopped the municipalities from withdrawing their funds from the GDB for over a year.

Not Petering Out. In the Virginia Legislature, Del. Lashrecse Aird (D-Petersburg), the youngest woman ever elected to the House of Delegates, recently noted: “In this session, I’m carrying a very light load, just four or five bills, that are locality bill requests: As a lawmaker overall, you will always see me supporting those initiatives and those policy issues that reference those three priorities: jobs, education, and healthcare. I think that if I can execute on those priorities, that will definitely improve the quality of life for the citizens, the families and kids, not just for Petersburg but the entire district.” Del. Air noted that last year, the City of  Petersburg’s financial situation made headlines throughout the Commonwealth, and led to serious conversations about the financial health of Virginia’s cities and counties: “What we saw in Petersburg, in addition to a declining economy nationwide, was longstanding financial mismanagement, negligence, and declining cash balances dating back to 2009. And, what we saw in localities like Emporia, Martinsville, Lynchburg, Buena Vista—all classified as having significant fiscal stress—is that these historic cities were displaying similar indicators, and they were largely going unaddressed.” Thus, she played a key role in creating a work group which has examined local fiscal distress—and which has produced an action plan, a plan from which components have been incorporated into the state’s new budget: including:

  • improving how the Commonwealth of Virginia monitors fiscal activity and increases the level of oversight by the auditor of public accounts;
  • establishing a mechanism which is responsive to situations of local fiscal distress; and
  • providing readily available resources should intervention become necessary.

As a start, she noted that Virginia House has adopted a budget which allocates up to $500,000 to conduct intervention and remediation efforts in situations of local fiscal distress that have been previously documented by the Office of the State Secretary of Finance prior to January 1st, 2017. As part of a longer-term approach, the effort incorporates additional language establishing a Joint Subcommittee on Local Government Fiscal Stress, with the new subcommittee charged to review:

  • savings opportunities for increased regional cooperation and consolidation of services;
  • local responsibilities for service delivery of state-mandated or high-priority programs;
  • causes of fiscal stress; potential financial incentives and other governmental reforms for regional cooperation; and
  • the different taxing authorities of cities and counties.

Or, she she put it:

“An integral part of the approach we take towards addressing fiscal distress must also include conversations about electing capable local leadership and providing training in areas most critical to effective governance and financial management. Where there are gaps in knowledge and understanding, elected officials must be willing to educate themselves in every area necessary for good governance.”

Is There a “Right” Structure to Resolve Fiscal Insolvency?

06/19/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing challenges to restoring fiscal solvency in the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, so that chapter 9 does not apply—nor does that process provide a mechanism to address the territory’s municipalities, much less the existing federal discrimination against Puerto Rico vis-à-vis other Caribbean nations The challenge, if anything, has been heightened by the absence of mixed messages from Congress-where the PROMESA Oversight Board has sent a letter to Puerto Rico’s leaders warning of what the Board described as a waning resolve to deal with a dire financial situation.

Trying to Shock? House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Rob Bishop R-Utah) has notified PROMESA’s oversight board that its failure to approve the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority’s restructuring support agreement is seen as “very problematic” by some federal legislators: “It appears there is no consensus from the oversight board in favor of certifying the PREPA [RSA] under…PROMESA…This is troubling, as the decision to implement the RSA had already been made by Congress with the passage of PROMESA. The oversight board’s dilatory tactics run counter to the plain language of PROMESA.” At the same time, PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión III stated that Puerto Rico needs to create implementation plans to reduce government spending and ensure adequate liquidity—writing last  Friday at a key time as the Puerto Rico legislature worked to try to reach consensus on a balanced FY2018 budget, in compliance with a board-approved 10-year fiscal plan. Chairman Carrión wrote: “I write to you out of a concern that some of the progress we appeared to have made in the past few weeks as a result of the close and positive collaboration between the board and the administration–and their respective teams of advisors–may be receding and that the necessary resolve to attain the goals set forth in the certified fiscal plan may be waning…It is equally of concern that some of the narrative taking hold in the public discourse fails to characterize adequately the truly dire fiscal situation the Commonwealth is facing.”  Chairman Carrión, in his epistle to Gov. Ricardo Rosselló, Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz, and House of Representatives Speaker Carlos Méndez Núñez, noted it was an incorrect “narrative” for Puerto Rico’s government to say that if the government generates $200 million in additional cash reserves by June 30th, the PROMESA Board would not mandate a government furlough program and reduction or elimination of the Christmas bonus; rather, to avoid these measures, the Board is mandating a spending-reduction implementation plan in addition to the cash reserve intended to ensure ongoing liquidity—with Chairman Carrión warning that if the plan is inadequate or poorly executed, “Puerto Rico is all but certain to run out of money to fund the central government’s payroll come November or December of this year.” The PROMESA Board also called on Governor Rosselló to explain which public services are essential.

The stern warning—to a government where some of the most essential services are lacking—produced a response from Governor Rosselló’s non-voting representative to the PROMESA Board, Elías Sánchez Sifonte: “This administration has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to face this inherited crisis with the seriousness it deserves,” adding that: “We have also been demonstrating implementation plans to ensure we provide resources to cover essential services as required by PROMESA and in accordance with our Certified Tax Plan,” including progress in the Puerto Rico legislature on the budget proposed by the Governor based upon consultation with the PROMESA Board—a budget the Puerto Rican Senate expects to consider later this week.

The discussions came as U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain, who is overseeing Puerto Rico’s Title III municipal bankruptcy process, taking a page from Detroit’s chapter 9 bankruptcy, named U. S. District Court Judges, including the remarkable Judge Christopher Klein, who presided over Stockton’s municipal bankruptcy trial, to help address critical issues. She also named Judge Barbara Houser of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of Texas, designating her to lead the mediation team; Judge Thomas Ambro, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit; U.S. District Court Judge Nancy Atlas of U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas; and Judge Victor Marrero of U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Judge Swain made clear that participation in any mediation will be voluntary and confidential—and that she will not participate in mediation sessions, and mediators will not disclose information about the parties’ positions or the substance of the mediation process to her—with this process—as was the case in Stockton and Detroit’s chapter 9 cases—ongoing concurrently with trial in her courtroom. Judge Swain added that she plans to make final appointments prior to the June 28th Title III hearing in San Juan, where she will further explain the mediation process.

Who’s in Charge? The PROMESA Oversight Board has warned Puerto Rico’s leaders that the Board is apprehensive of a waning resolve to address the U.S. territory’s dire fiscal situation, with Chairman José Carrión III warning that Puerto Rico needs to create implementation plans for reducing government spending and assuring adequate liquidity at all times. The letter—coming between the emerging quasi-bankruptcy proceedings under Judge Taylor and as the Puerto Rico legislature is attempting to put together a balanced FY2018 budget, in compliance with a board-approved 10-year fiscal plan—came as PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión III urged greater resolve, writing: “I write to you out of a concern that some of the progress we appeared to have made in the past few weeks as a result of the close and positive collaboration between the Board and the administration–and their respective teams of advisors–may be receding and that the necessary resolve to attain the goals set forth in the certified fiscal plan may be waning…It is equally of concern that some of the narrative taking hold in the public discourse fails to characterize adequately the truly dire fiscal situation the Commonwealth is facing.” Chairman Carrión, in his epistle to Gov. Ricardo Rosselló, Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz, and House of Representatives Speaker Carlos Méndez Núñez, added that there is an incorrect “narrative” that says that if the Puerto Rican government generates $200 million in additional cash reserves by the end of this month, the PROMESA Board would not mandate a government furlough program, nor a cut or elimination of the Christmas bonus. To avoid such a mandate, he added that the PROMESA Board is mandating a spending-reduction implementation plan in addition to a cash reserve plan intended to assure government liquidity, with the Chairman adding that if the plan is inadequate or poorly executed, “Puerto Rico is all but certain to run out of money to fund the central government’s payroll come November or December of this year.” Noting that: “Now we are at a critical juncture that requires that we collectively strengthen…,” the Board demanded that Gov. Rosselló explain which public services are essential.

Does Accountability Work Both Ways? Unlike chapter 9 bankruptcy cases in Detroit, San Bernardino, Central Falls, Jefferson County, and Stockton—Puerto Rico is unique in that the issue here does not involve municipalities, but rather a quasi-state. There have been no public hearings. PROMESA Chair José B. Carrion has not testified before the legislature. Now Puerto Rico Rep. Luis Raúl Torres has asked the Puerto Rico Finance Committee to invite Chair Carrión to appear to explain to Puerto Rico’s elected leaders the demands the PROMESA Board is seeking to mandate—and to justify the $60 million that the Fiscal Supervision Board is scheduled to receive as part of the resolution of special assignments. That Board, headed by Natalie Jaresko, the former Finance Minister of the Ukraine, is, according to PROMESA Chair Jose Carrión, to be in charge of the implementation of the plan, or, failing that, to achieve the fiscal balance of Puerto Rico and its return to the capital markets. (Ms. Jaresko has agreed to work for a four-year term: she is expected to earn an annual salary of $ 625,000 without additional compensation or bonuses, except for reimbursement of travel and accommodation expenses related to the position he will hold, according to PROMESA Board Chair Carrión, who has previously noted: “I know it’s going to be a controversial issue…We have a world-class problem, and we have a world-class person. This is what the rooms cost.”)

What Lessons Can State & Local Leaders Learn from Unique Fiscal Challenges?

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eBlog, 04/25/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the unique fiscal challenges in Michigan and how the upswing in the state’s economy is—or, in this case, maybe—is not helping the fiscal recovery of the state’s municipalities. Then we remain in Michigan—but straddle to Virginia, to consider state leadership efforts in each state to rethink state roles in dealing with severe fiscal municipal distress. Finally, we zoom to Chicago to glean what wisdom we can from the Godfather of modern municipal bankruptcy, Jim Spiotto: What lessons might be valuable to the nation’s state and local leaders?  

Fiscal & Physical Municipal Balancing I. Nearly a decade after the upswing in Michigan’s economic recovery, the state’s fiscal outlook appears insufficient to help the state’s municipalities weather the next such recession. Notwithstanding continued job growth and record auto sales, Michigan’s per-capita personal income lags the national average; assessed property values are below peak levels in 85% of the state’s municipalities; and state aid is only 80% of what it was 15 years ago.  Thus, interestingly, state business leaders, represented by the Business Leaders for Michigan, a group composed of executives of Michigan’s largest corporations universities, is pressing the Michigan Legislature to assume greater responsibility to address growing public pension liabilities—an issue which municipal leaders in the state fear extend well beyond legacy costs, but also where fiscal stability has been hampered by cuts in state revenue sharing and tax limitations. Michigan’s $10 billion general fund is roughly comparable to what it was nearly two decades ago—notwithstanding the state’s experience in the Great Recession—much less the nation’s largest ever municipal bankruptcy in Detroit, or the ongoing issues in Flint. Moreover, with personal income growth between 2000 and 2013 growing less than half the national average (in the state, the gain was only 31.1%, compared to 66.1% nationally), and now, with public pension obligations outstripping growth in personal income and property values, Michigan’s taxpayers and corporations—and the state’s municipalities—confront hard choices with regard to “legacy costs” for municipal pensions and post-retirement health care obligations—debts which today are consuming nearly 20 percent of some city, township, and school budgets—even as the state’s revenue sharing program has dropped nearly 25 percent for fiscally-stressed municipalities such as Saginaw, Flint, and Detroit just since 2007—rendering the state the only state to realize negative growth rates (8.5%) in municipal revenue in the 2002-2012 decade, according to numbers compiled by the Michigan Municipal League—a decade in which revenue for the state’s cities and towns from state sources realized the sharpest decline of any state in the nation: 56%, a drop so steep that, as the Michigan Municipal League’s COO Tony Minghine put it: “Our system is just broken…We’re not equipped to deal with another recession. If we were to go into another recession right now, we’d see widespread communities failing.” Unsurprisingly, one of the biggest fears is that another wave of chapter 9 filings could trigger the appointment of the state’s ill-fated emergency manager appointments. From the Michigan Municipal League’s perspective, any fiscal resolution would require the state to address what appears to be a faltering revenue base: Michigan’s taxable property is appreciating too slowly to support the cost of government (between 2007 and 2013, the taxable value of property declined by 8 percent in Grand Rapids, 12% in Detroit, 25% in Livonia, 32% in Warren, 22% in Wayne County values, and 24% in Oakland County.) The fiscal threat, as the former U.S. Comptroller General of the General Accounting Office warned: “Most of these numbers will get worse with the mere passage of time.”

Fiscal & Physical Municipal Balancing II. Mayhap Michigan and Virginia state and local leaders need to talk:  Thinking fiscally about a state’s municipal fiscal challenges—and lessons learned—might be underway in Virginia, where, after the state did not move ahead on such an initiative last year, the new state budget has revived the focus on fiscal stress in Virginia cities and counties, with the revived fiscal focus appearing to have been triggered by the ongoing fiscal collapse of one of the state’s oldest cities, Petersburg. Thus, Sen. Emmett Hanger (R-Augusta County), a former Commissioner of the Revenue and member of the state’s House of Delegates, who, today, serves as Senate Finance Co-Chair, and Chair of the Health and Human Services Finance subcommittee, has filed a bill, SJ 278, to study the fiscal stress of local governments: his proposal would create a joint subcommittee to review local and state tax systems, as well as reforms to promote economic assistance and cooperation between regions. Although the legislation was rejected in the Virginia House Finance Committee, where members deferred consideration of tax reform for next year’s longer session, the state’s adopted budget does include two fiscal stress preventive measures originally incorporated in Senator Hanger’s proposed legislation—or, as co-sponsor Sen. Rosalyn Dance (D-Petersburg), noted: “Currently, there is no statutory authority for the Commission on Local Government to intervene in a fiscally stressed locality, and the state does not currently have any authority to assist a locality financially.” To enhance the state’s authority to intervene fiscally, the budget has set guidelines for state officials to identify and help alleviate signs of financial stress to prevent a more severe crisis. Thus, a workgroup, established by the auditor of public accounts, would determine an appropriate fiscal early warning system to identify fiscal stress: the proposed system would consider such criteria as a local government’s expenditure reports and budget information. Local governments which demonstrate fiscal distress would thence be notified and could request a comprehensive review of their finances by the state. After a fiscal review, the commonwealth would then be charged with drafting an “action plan,” which would provide the purpose, duration, and anticipated resources required for such state intervention. The bill would also give the Governor the option to channel up to $500,000 from the general fund toward relief efforts for the fiscally stressed local government.

Virginia’s new budget also provides for the creation of a Joint Subcommittee on Local Government Fiscal Stress, with members drawn from the Senate Finance Committee, the House Appropriations, and the House Finance committees—with the newly created subcommittee charged to study local and state financial practices, such as: regional cooperation and service consolidation, taxing authority, local responsibilities in state programs, and root causes of fiscal stress. Committee member Del. Lashrecse Aird (D-Petersburg) notes: “It is important to have someone who can speak to first-hand experience dealing with issues of local government fiscal stress…This insight will be essential in forming effective solutions that will be sustainable long-term…Prior to now, Virginia had no mechanism to track, measure, or address fiscal stress in localities…Petersburg’s situation is not unique, and it is encouraging that proactive measures are now being taken to guard against future issues. This is essential to ensuring that Virginia’s economy remains strong and that all communities can share in our Commonwealth’s success.”

Municipal Bankruptcy—or Opportunity? The Chicago Civic Federation last week co-hosted a conference, “Chicago’s Fiscal Future: Growth or Insolvency?” with the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, where experts, practitioners, and academics from around the nation met to consider best and worst case scenarios for the Windy City’s fiscal future, including lessons learned from recent chapter 9 municipal bankruptcies. Chicago Fed Vice President William Testa opened up by presenting an alternative method of assessing whether a municipality city is currently insolvent or might become so in the future: he proposed that considering real property in a city might offer both an indicator of the resources available to its governments and how property owners view the prospects of the city, adding that, in addition to traditional financial indicators, property values can be used as a powerful—but not perfect—indicators to reflect a municipality’s current situation and the likelihood for insolvency in the future. He noted that there is considerable evidence that fiscal liabilities of a municipality are capitalized into the value of its properties, and that, if a municipality has high liabilities, those are reflected in an adjustment down in the value of its real estate. Based upon examination, he noted using the examples of Chicago, Milwaukee, and Detroit; Detroit’s property market collapse coincided with its political and economic crises: between 2006 and 2009-2010, the selling price of single family homes in Detroit fell by four-fold; during those years and up to the present, the majority of transactions were done with cash, rather than traditional mortgages, indicating, he said, that the property market is severely distressed. In contrast, he noted, property values in Chicago have seen rebounds in both residential and commercial properties; in Milwaukee, he noted there is less property value, but higher municipal bond ratings, due, he noted, to the state’s reputation for fiscal conservatism and very low unfunded public pension liabilities—on a per capita basis, Chicago’s real estate value compares favorably to other big cities: it lags Los Angeles and New York City, but is ahead of Houston (unsurprisingly given that oil city’s severe pension fiscal crisis) and Phoenix. Nevertheless, he concluded, he believes comparisons between Chicago and Detroit are overblown; the property value indicator shows that property owners in Chicago see value despite the city’s fiscal instability. Therefore, adding the property value indicator could provide additional context to otherwise misleading rankings and ratings that underestimate Chicago’s economic strength.

Lessons Learned from Recent Municipal Bankruptcies. The Chicago Fed conference than convened a session featuring our former State & Local Leader of the Week, Jim Spiotto, a veteran of our more than decade-long efforts to gain former President Ronald Reagan’s signature on PL 100-597 to reform the nation’s municipal bankruptcy laws, who discussed finding from his new, prodigious primer on chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Mr. Spiotto advised that chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy is expensive, uncertain, and exceptionally rare—adding it is restrictive in that only debt can be adjusted in the process, because U.S. bankruptcy courts do not have the jurisdiction to alter services. Noting that only a minority of states even authorize local governments to file for federal bankruptcy protection, he noted there is no involuntary process whereby a municipality can be pushed into bankruptcy by its creditors—making it profoundly distinct from Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy, adding that municipal bankruptcy is solely voluntary on the part of the government. Moreover, he said that, in his prodigious labor over decades, he has found that the large municipal governments which have filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy, each has its own fiscal tale, but, as a rule, these filings have generally involved service level insolvency, revenue insolvency, or economic insolvency—adding that if a school system, county, or city does not have these extraordinary fiscal challenges, municipal bankruptcy is probably not the right option. In contrast, he noted, however, if a municipality elects to file for bankruptcy, it would be wise to develop a comprehensive, long-term recovery plan as part of its plan of debt adjustment.

He was followed by Professor Eric Scorsone, Senior Deputy State Treasurer in the Michigan Department of Treasury, who spoke of the fall and rise of Detroit, focusing on the Motor City’s recovery—who noted that by the time Gov. Rick Snyder appointed Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr, Detroit was arguably insolvent by all of the measures Mr. Spiotto had described, noting that it took the chapter 9 bankruptcy process and mediation to bring all of the city’s communities together to develop the “Grand Bargain” involving a federal judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes, the Kellogg Foundation, and the Detroit Institute of Arts (a bargain outlined on the napkin of a U.S. District Court Judge, no less) which allowed Detroit to complete and approved plan of debt adjustment and exit municipal bankruptcy. He added that said plan, thus, mandated the philanthropic community, the State of Michigan, and the City of Detroit to put up funding to offset significant proposed public pension cuts. The outcome of this plan of adjustment and its requisite flexibility and comprehensive nature, have proven durable: Prof. Scorsone said the City of Detroit’s finances have significantly improved, and the city is on track to have its oversight board, the Financial Review Commission (FRC) become dormant in 2018—adding that Detroit’s economic recovery since chapter 9 bankruptcy has been extraordinary: much better than could have been imagined five years ago. The city sports a budget surplus, basic services are being provided again, and people and businesses are returning to Detroit.

Harrison J. Goldin, the founder of Goldin Associates, focused his remarks on the near-bankruptcy of New York City in the 1970s, which he said is a unique case, but one with good lessons for other municipal and state leaders (Mr. Goldin was CFO of New York City when it teetered on the edge of bankruptcy). He described Gotham’s disarray in managing and tracking its finances and expenditures prior to his appointment as CFO, noting that the fiscal and financial crisis forced New York City to live within its means and become more transparent in its budgeting. At the same time, he noted, the fiscal crisis also forced difficult cuts to services: the city had to close municipal hospitals, reduce pensions, and close firehouses—even as it increased fees, such as requiring tuition at the previously free City University of New York system and raising bus and subway fares. Nevertheless, he noted: there was an upside: a stable financial environment paved the way for the city to prosper. Thus, he advised, the lesson of all of the municipal bankruptcies and near-bankruptcies he has consulted on is that a coalition of public officials, unions, and civic leaders must come together to implement the four steps necessary for financial recovery: “first, documenting definitively the magnitude of the problem; second, developing a credible multi-year remediation plan; third, formulating credible independent mechanisms for monitoring compliance; and finally, establishing service priorities around which consensus can coalesce.”