Municipal Challenges from State Control & Preemption of Local Authority

 

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eBlog, 1/0917

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider more outcomes from the Flint drinking water crisis—outcomes which raise issues with regard to the State of Michigan’s Emergency Manager law—and accountability, before taking a run to Atlantic City, a municipality in the midst of a state takeover, and, now, apparently caught between state-mandates to reduce police capacity amid an apparent dramatic surge in public safety concerns. Finally, we note a challenge to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s so-called pay-to-play rules, under which municipal advisors and broker-dealer firms would be mandated to wait two years before doing business with municipal entities to which they have made political contributions.

Out Like Flint. Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder Friday signed into law new state legislation mandating municipalities in the state to warn residents of dangerous lead levels in drinking water within three days’ notification by the state of contamination, marking the enactment of the first piece of legislation stemming from the Flint water crisis. Gov. Snyder described it as an “important step…This is not the last piece of legislation we should see on this. This is a good start of getting faster notification to the public when there is a water issue.” The bill, sponsored by state Rep. Sheldon Neeley (D-Flint), a former Flint council member, is aimed at strengthening water quality control in Michigan to ensure a water crisis such as Flint’s will not happen in a Michigan municipality again, or, as Rep. Neeley put it: “The water crisis in Flint has left the community and its allies reeling with a sense of urgency, and rightfully so…During this difficult time, I have valued the governor’s partnership in helping to steward legislation that will have a positive impact on the residents of Flint.” Previously, owners or operators of municipal water plants were legally required to notify customers of any noncompliance with state drinking water standards, within 30 days, according to the representative; now, under the new law, operators must issue a public advisory within three business days of notification from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. Such alerts may be disseminated via radio or television, notices delivered to customers or advisories posted in conspicuous areas throughout the community. The bill had been adopted unanimously in both the Michigan House and Senate. The new state law comes in the wake of criminal charges filed against more than a dozen government officials related to the Flint water crisis. Last month, the Michigan Attorney General’s Office filed criminal charges against former Flint emergency manager Darnell Earley, former emergency manager Gerald Ambrose, and two former city public works employees. Mr. Earley had served as Flint’s emergency manager from 2013-15, before going on to be named by Gov. Snyder as Emergency Manager for the Detroit Public Schools, where he resigned nearly a year ago in the face of severe criticism. Mr. Earley, who had refused to testify about his role and responsibility with regard to the Flint drinking water crisis, was subsequently charged with false pretenses, conspiracy to commit false pretenses, misconduct in office, and willful neglect of duty while in office–charges which carry up to 20 years in prison.

Recent testing of Flint water suggests lead levels have dropped, but residents in the city of roughly 100,000 residents continue to rely on bottled and filtered water for their daily needs.

A City’s Fiscal and Physical Safety. According to a review of crime data by The Press of Atlantic City, the two-decade long decline in crime in Atlantic city has not only halted, but reversed itself in 2015, according to the Press’s review of New Jersey state crime data, reporting that in 2015, crime increased in nearly every major category, including homicides, rapes, and aggravated assaults—with the homicide increase extending into last year. The city’s violent crime rate is more than 500 percent higher than the statewide average—the murder rate a thousand percent—posing a stark governing challenge as, last week, New Jersey’s Local Finance Board, which is managing the city, alerted the city’s police and fire unions that it would press drastic cuts, including reduced staffing and imposing longer shifts. The Board has the authority to hire and fire employees, authorize raises and promotions, renegotiate service and labor contracts, restructure or pay off debt, approve the municipal budget, and make changes with regard to the delivery of municipal services. The state is seeking to force a restructuring of the city’s police department, including salary reductions, higher health care benefit contributions, moving to 12-hour shifts, and a more aggressive police response to nuisance issues in neighborhoods. Nevertheless, Anthony Marino, a retired executive with the South Jersey Transportation Authority, who has studied Atlantic City’s crime figures, reports that crime statistics have been on the wane since a high in 1989 and that the trend shows Atlantic City is, for the most part, a reasonably safe city, noting that in 1977, before the city had casinos, its crime index, or the total number of the seven categories tracked by State Police, was 4,391. In 1989, it peaked at over 16,000 before declining almost annually. Nevertheless, the apparent turnaround—in addition to the state-mandated changes in the city’s police department could not only limit the city’s capacity to address the seeming turnaround, but also adversely affect tourism and assessed property values.

Paying to Play. Tennessee and Georgia Republican groups are challenging the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s (MSRB) so-called pay-to-play rules under which municipal advisors and broker-dealer firms would be mandated to wait two years before doing business with municipal entities to which they have made political contributions (the pay-to-play rule also prohibits an investment adviser from soliciting contributions for a government official or the official’s political party at the same time the adviser is providing services to the government entity for which the official works.). The two political organizations have filed the suits charging that the rules violate their First Amendment rights; in addition, they claim that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and MSRB exceeded their authority and have not demonstrated a sufficient legal interest in restricting political contributions. In response, the Campaign Legal Center, in its brief to the 6th U.S. Court of Appeals, argues the rules are important to prevent municipal advisors from engaging in pay-to-play practices—and the rules are needed to address the potential for corruption in the municipal market. The amicus brief opposes attempts by the Tennessee Republican Party, Georgia Republican Party, and New York Republican State Committee seeking to have the court vacate the SEC’s approval of the rule changes.

Last summer, the SEC issued notice that it intends to approve the rules proposed by the MSRB and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, noting it would issue orders finding that the self-regulatory organizations’ rules impose “substantially equivalent or more stringent restrictions” on municipal advisors and broker-dealers than its own pay-to-play rule. The Center’s brief notes: “Substantial campaign contributions from a municipal advisor to officeholders with control over awards of municipal advisory business are likely to give rise to quid pro quo exchanges, or at a minimum, the appearance of such exchanges…That is the premise not only of the challenged amendments, but also the underlying rule, which was upheld by the D.C. Circuit.” Under the proposed changes to the rule, municipal advisors, like dealers, are barred from engaging in municipal advisory business with a municipal issuer for two years if the firm, one of its professionals, or a political action committee controlled by either the firm or an associated professional, makes significant contributions to an issuer official who can influence the award of municipal advisory business. As proposed, the modified rule contains a de minimis provision, which allows a municipal finance professional associated with a dealer or a municipal advisor professional to make a contribution of up to $250 per election to any candidate for whom she or he can vote without triggering the two-year ban. This is not a first: there was a previous challenge to an earlier version of Rule G-37 by an Alabama bond dealer in Blount v. SEC after it was first approved for dealers in 1994—a challenge which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected, noting, in its opinion, the rule had been “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”

The Daunting Road to Recovery from the Nation’s Longest Ever Municipal Bankruptcy

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eBlog, 12/09/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we look back on the long and rocky road from the nation’s longest municipal bankruptcy back to solvency taken by the City of San Bernardino, a city in a Dillon Rule state, which we described in our original study as the former gateway from the East to Midwest of the L.A. basin and former home to Norton Air Force Base, Kaiser Steel, and the Santa Fe Railroad, but which in the 1990’s, with the departure of those industries and employees, fell into hard times. By the advent of the Great Recession, 46% of its residents were on some form of public assistance—and nearly one-third below the poverty line. By FY2012, the city faced a $45 million deficit; its fund balance and reserves were exhausted—leading the city to file for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy (note California codes §§53760, 53760.1, 53760.3, 53760.5, and 53760.7—and where, effective on the first day of this year, new statutory state language specifically created a first lien priority for general obligation debt issued by cities, counties, schools, and special districts, so long as the debt was secured by a levy of ad valorum taxes pursuant to California’s Constitution.) As we have noted, in the 18 states which authorize chapter 9 filings, states have proscribed strikingly different legal mechanisms relating to the state role—varying from a state takeover, such as we have described in the case of the nation’s largest municipal bankruptcy in Detroit, but to a very different regime in Jefferson County and San Bernardino—where the elected municipal officials not only remained in office, but here the respective states—if anything—contributed to the severity of the fiscal challenges. Then we turn to what might be Congress’ last day in town this year—and whether funding to help the City of Flint might be enacted: Will Congress pass and send to the President a bill to provide emergency assistance to Flint?

Back to a City’s Viable Future. San Bernardino leaders this week issued a detailed statement on the arduous road to recovery they have travelled and what they intend for the road ahead, albeit noting the city is already well along its own blueprint for its recovery, as it awaits formal approval from U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury from its chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy early next year. In its statement, San Bernardino reported it had implemented about 70 percent of its recovery plan. That’s turned once-dire projections for the future upside down—a virtual u-turn from when the city’s fiscal analysts three years ago projected that in FY2023, the city would have a deficit of $360 million if dramatic changes were not achieved. But today, the city instead projects an unallocated cash balance for FY2023 of $9.5 million, or, as the statement reads: “Now, the city is on the cusp of emerging from bankruptcy as a changed city with a brighter future.” The municipal statement is primarily focused on the governance and fiscal changes made to create a virtual u-turn in the city’s fiscal ship of state since entering what became the nation’s longest municipal bankruptcy—a change in fiscal course without either state aid or state imposition of an emergency manager or a state takeover. The statement notes: “Given the emergency nature of its filing, it took the city several months to assess its financial condition—until April 2013, at which time the city adopted a final budget for fiscal years 2012-13 and 2013-14…The city’s initial financial assessment, however, only reflected further concern over its financial future. In September 2013, Mayor [Pat] Morris announced that absent fundamental modernization and change the city faced a 10-year deficit of a staggering $360 million. The future of San Bernardino looked bleak.”

The statement itemized what appeared to be the key steps to recovery, including achieving labor agreements—agreements which resulted in savings in excess of $100 million, and involved the termination of virtually all health insurance subsidies coverage for employees and retirees, writing that the city calculated the resulting savings to amount to about $44 million for retirees and $51 million for current employees. The statement notes some $56 million in other OPEB changes. A key—and hard-fought change—was achieved by contracting out for essential public services, with one of the most hard fought such changes coming from the annexation agreement with the San Bernardino County Fire Protection District: an agreement under which the county assumed responsibility for fire and emergency medical response—a change projected to save San Bernardino’s budget nearly $66 million over the next two decades just in public pension savings, but also as much as $5 to $6 million in its annual operating budget—and that is before adding in the parcel tax revenues which were incorporated in that agreement. San Bernardino also switched to contracting out for its trash and recycling—an action with a one-time franchise payment of $5 million, but increased estimated annual revenues of approximately $5 million to $7.6 million. The switch led to significant alterations or contracting out for an increasing number of municipal services. Or, as the paper the city released notes: “Modern cities deliver many services via contracts with third-party providers, using competition to get the best terms and price for services…The city has entered into a number of such contracts under the Recovery Plan.”

Governance. The city paper writes that the voters’ approval of a new city charter will allow San Bernardino to eliminate ambiguous lines of authority which had created a lack of authority, or, as U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury put it earlier this week: “(City officials) successfully amended their charter, which will give them modern-day, real-life flexibility in making decisions that need to be made…There was too much political power and not enough management under their charter, to be frank, compared to most cities in California.”

Rechartering San Bernardino’s Public Security. San Bernardino’s Plan of Debt Adjustment calls for increasing investment into the Police Department through a five-year Police Plan—a key step, as a study commissioned to consider the city’s public safety found the city to be California’s most dangerous municipality based on crime, police presence, and other “community factors.” The study used FBI data and looked at crime rates, police presence, and investment in police departments as well as community factors including poverty, education, unemployment, and climate: The report found a high correlation between crime rates and poverty—with San Bernardino’s poverty rate topping 30.6 percent. Thus, in the city’s Police Plan portion of its plan of adjustment, the report notes:  “The Mayor, Common Council, and San Bernardino’s residents agree that crime is the most important issue the city faces,” the city says in the Police Plan, submitted to the federal bankruptcy court as part of its plan. The plan calls for $56 million over five years to add more police, update technology, and replace many of the Police Department’s aging vehicles.

The Cost of Fiscal Inattention. Unsurprisingly, the fiscal costs of bankruptcy for a city or county are staggering. The city estimates that the services of attorneys and consultants will cost at least $25 million by the time of the city’s projected formal emergence from chapter 9 next March—albeit those daunting costs are a fraction of the $350 million in savings achieved under the city’s pending plan of debt adjustment—savings created by the court’s approval of its plan to pay its creditors far less than they would have otherwise been entitled: as little as 1 cent on the dollar owed, in many instances. Or, as the city’s statement wryly notes: “In addition, the city’s bankruptcy has allowed the city a reprieve during which it was able to shore up its finances, find greater cost and organizational efficiencies and improve its governance functions…Thus, all told, while the city’s exit from bankruptcy will have been a hard-fought victory, it was one that was critical and necessary to the city’s continued viability for the future.”

Out Like Flint. The House of Representatives on what it hopes to be its penultimate day yesterday approved two bills which, together, would authorize and fund $170 million for emergency aid to Flint and other communities endangered by contaminated drinking water. The emergency assistance came by way of a stopgap spending bill to keep the federal government operating next April in a bipartisan 326-96 vote and, separately, a water infrastructure bill which directs how the $170 million package should be spent by a 360-61 vote. Nevertheless, the aid for the city is not certain in the U.S. Senate: some have vowed to stop it, at least in part because the bill includes a controversial drought provision which would boost water deliveries to the San Joaquin Valley and Southern California.