Amazonian Recovery

May 18, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we take a fiscal perspective on post-chapter 9 Detroit and its income and property taxes; then we dip south to assess the seemingly interminable governing challenge with regard to whom is in charge of restoring fiscal solvency in Puerto Rico.   

The Challenging Road to Recovery. Last January, Detroit failed to make the Amazon cut to make the finalists: Sandy Baruah, president and CEO of the Detroit Regional Chamber, who was on the fateful call, nevertheless described feedback from Amazon, describing the “creativity, the regional collaboration, the quality of the bid document, the international partnership with Windsor, all of that got incredibly high marks,” adding that: “We were good, but we weren’t good enough on the talent front.” The noted urban writer Richard Florida tweeted that he believed Amazon missed the mark on Detroit, if talent was the disqualifying factor—he, after all, early on, had identified Detroit as a sleeper candidate for HQ2, with a top three of greater Washington, D.C.; Chicago; and Toronto, noting that Detroit has more tech workers than many on the list, including Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, and Columbus—and that the city has access to major public research universities, not to mention its international partnership with Windsor, Ontario, in Canada gave the bid an international quality that only Toronto’s bid could match. Indeed, Mr. Florida had suggested that Detroit’s elimination was due to outdated perceptions of the Motor City’s economy, talent, and overall livability.

Nevertheless, Detroit’s near miss—when added to the city’s exit at the end of last month from state fiscal oversight, is a remarkable testament to Detroit, that, less than five years after filing for the largest municipal bankruptcy in American history, came so close to making the cut, so successfully has it overcome the adverse repercussions of nearly six decades of economic decline, disinvestment, and chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. State officials praised the city for fiscal gains that came quicker than many anticipated after its Chapter 9 exit in December 2014. The city shed $7 billion of its $18 billion in debts during the 18-month bankruptcy. Last year, the city’s income tax take rose by 8%–and assessed property values rose for the first time in nearly two decades.

No doubt the auto industry has played a driving role: in the emerging age of self-driving cars, a recent report by real estate services giant CBRE which evaluated the top 50 U.S. metro areas in the country in terms of tech talent ranked Detroit 21st, ahead of several cities which made the Amazon cut, including Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, Nashville, and Miami. Indeed, remarkably, on a percentage basis, Detroit has as many tech jobs in its metro as Washington, D.C., and Boston. The report also found that Detroit’s millennial population with college degrees grew by just under 10% between 2010 and 2015, more than double the national average of 4.6% and equivalent to rates in the Bay Area (9.5%) and Atlanta (9.3%).

Nevertheless, the Motor City continues to face taxing challenges—including a less than effective record, until recently, of collecting income and property taxes it was owed under existing law—and of improving its school system: a vital step if the city is to draw young families with kids back into the city. Moreover, it still needs to reassess its municipal tax policies: its 2.4% income tax is double that paid by non-residents working in the city. That is not exactly a drawing card to relocate from the suburbs.

The Uncertain Promise of PROMESA. While the PROMESA Oversight Board has requested Puerto Rico to amend its recommended budget, Puerto Rico has responded it would prefer to negotiate, because it understands that resorting to the Court “is not an alternative.” Puerto Rico’s Secretary of Public Affairs, Ramón Rosario Cortés, made clear, moreover, that there would be is no change of position with regard to the Board’s demand for reducing pensions or vacation and sick leave, much less eliminating the Christmas bonus. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth appears to be of the view that its differences with the PROMESA Board are “are minimal,” despite the Board’s rejection, last week, of Governor Ricardo Rosselló’s proposed budget—a rejection upon which the Board suggested that cuts in public pensions and the elimination of the mandatory Christmas bonus had not been incorporated. The Board also noted the omission of funds finance Social Security for police officers. Secretary Rosario Cortés noted: “The Governor called to the Board to sit down and review those points they exposed, as long as they do not interfere with the Governor’s public policy. In the coming days, Gov. Rosselló and his team will be responding to each of the Board’s points and providing information that supports each of the Government’s positions: The Government is open to dialogue in order to reach consensus that does not interfere or contravene those public policy positions that the Governor has already expressed; specifically: no cuts in pensions or eliminating the Christmas bonus and reducing sick leave.”

He acknowledged that the dispute could end up in Court, as PROMESA Board Executive Director, Natalie Jaresko, has warned: “Yes, certainly, they have not only resorted to Court in the past, but they have also said it is a possibility. We understand that it is not an alternative, it would delay the fiscal recovery of Puerto Rico and would require investing resources that are scarce at the moment: They made some observations, and we are willing to look at them,” adding that the work teams of the Governor and the Board are communicating and sharing information: “Dialogue continues and, along the way, we hope to reach a consensus that will avoid setbacks and reaching the courts.”

Who Is Governing? Precisely, Director Jaresko also acknowledged that not amending the budget would delay the renegotiation of Puerto Rico’s debt, warning that if the Rosselló administration does not act, the PROMESA Board will proceed to preempt its governance authority and power as provided by the PROMESA law, which authorizes the Board to amend the U.S. territory’s budget and submit its own version to the Legislature for approval—albeit, it rattles one’s fiscal imagination that Puerto Rican legislators could conceivably want to do so.

Nevertheless, the Board has advised Gov. Rosselló that his recommended budget does not reflect what is established in the fiscal plan: regarding the General Fund, the recommended budget represents about $200 million in expenses on the certified income projection; in addition, the budget information does not include public corporations or similar dependencies—meaning that Director Jaresko is of the view that the draft budget omits some 60% of the public spending. Thus, she has threatened that the Governor has until high noon on Tuesday to correct the ‘deficiencies,’ or risk the Board preempting its governing authority.  

Nevertheless, Puerto Rico’s fiscal position appears to be on the upswing: as of last week, revenues were 7% ahead of its July 2017 forecasts; last month’s revenues came in 18% stronger than projected. Notwithstanding the physical and fiscal impact of Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico’s economy, Puerto Rico’s central bank account, the Treasury Singular Account, held $2.65 billion as of last Friday—some $211 million more than the government had anticipated last July according to information posted on the MSRB’s EMMA.

Advertisements

The Absences of Fiscal Balances

May 4, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we note the deepening road towards insolvency of the Harvey, Illinois; then we turn south to consider the potential adverse municipal fiscal impacts were the State of Georgia to enable the de-annexation of the small city of Stockbridge. Finally, we journey back to Puerto Rico, where House Natural Resources Committee Chair Rob Bishop is headed for a first-hand assessment of the ongoing fiscal and physical challenges and federal emergency assistance still needed. 

An Absence of Fiscal Balance? In the Land of Lincoln, Illinois, where the state’s courts have heard requests for municipal bankruptcy relief; but where chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy is not authorized; relief appears only to have been granted when not challenged. Under 65 Illinois Comp. Statute 5/8-5-1, smaller municipalities may, if not home rule jurisdictions, seek judicial relief. Under the state’s Local Government Financial Planning and Supervision Act (50 Ill. Comp. Stat. 3200) a municipality with a population under 25,000 suffering a “fiscal emergency” may, after securing a two-thirds vote of the governing body, petition the state to establish a financial planning and supervision commission to address such “fiscal emergency.” Ironically, Harvey, with a population of 25,282, just exceeds that level—some 1,052 Illinois municipalities have less than 25,000 residents. Now, with the municipality unable to meet its police and fire pensions, Illinois Comptroller Susana Mendoza is holding up more than $1 million in state funds the town is owed—under Illinois statutes which authorize the state to withhold tax revenues a municipality is slated to receive if it does not make the required payments into its police and firefighter pensions: the funds withheld go right into the pension fund instead of town services—which, in the case of Harvey, amount to about $1.4 million, leading to, as we have previously noted, the town’s announcement that it will lay off nearly half of its police and fire department. Making the fiscal situation more dire, the city’s Mayor, Eric Kellogg, has been banned for life from the municipal bond market for misleading investors; the municipality appears to be in a chronic pattern of underfunding its public safety pension funds, even as its operating budget chronically spends more than the revenues it brings in. Ergo, as we have written, under Illinois’ Public Act 96-1495, the Comptroller may be compelled to withhold state tax revenues, which would traditionally be in order to ensure pension payments are made to a municipality which has failed to make full pension payments for years.

In a situation which risks compromising public health and safety, Harvey has laid off nearly half its police and fire force—even as it has warned it might not be able to make payroll—especially with inadequate municipal fiscal resources now being rerouted to oppose the state actions in court.

It being Illinois—and an election year—Gov. Bruce Rauner has been uncharacteristically silent about the brewing fiscal catastrophe. The godfather of chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, Jim Spiotto, has joined with the exceptional Chicago Civic Federation in drafting legislation, the Local Government Protection Authority, which includes a provision to:

  • establish an oversight board,
  • set up a clear procedure for dealing with a stressed city, and
  • allow filing for Chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. (Legislation which has, to date, gained no traction in the legislature.)

Harvey Town Attorney Bob Fioretti reports: “We are going to find some solution, if possible,” signaling that the municipality was still negotiating with its police and fire pension funds, but warning that, if those discussions falter:  “Layoffs will occur. But the safety of the population is key, and that will continue.”

Mayhap ironically, Illinois adopted its pension law eight years ago as a way to ensure smaller municipalities would stop shorting their pension fund contributions—provisions upheld the week when a judge affirmed that the Illinois comptroller was within the state law to withhold the revenue. Thus, while the Comptroller’s Office issued a statement that it “does not want to see any Harvey employees harmed or any Harvey residents put at risk…the law does not give the Comptroller discretion in this case: The Comptroller’s Office is obligated to follow the law. This dispute is between the retired Harvey police officers’ pension fund and the city of Harvey.”

Nor does Harvey appear to be an isolated case: According to an analysis by Amanda Kass, a researcher at the University of Chicago, there are 74 police or fire pension funds in Illinois municipalities with similar unfunded pension liabilities—leading Chicago Civic Federation President Laurence Msall to note: “If they ignore the law and don’t make the contribution as Harvey has, then yes, those municipalities all around the state have ability to seek an intercept of state revenues that would otherwise come to the municipality.”

The complicating factor for Harvey is, however, not just that it has had years of decline and corruption in government, but also with declining assessed property values and very high property taxes, the municipality has a shrinking set of fiscal options—or, as Mr. Fioretti puts it: “We have an aging population, a declining population, a fixed-income population, and our revenues aren’t even being collected from the real estate taxes. We’re below 50 percent for the year on those collections,” noting that the delinquent real estate tax money is costing the town $12 million this year.”

Uneasy Fiscal Options. While Mr. Msall notes that the State of Illinois helped create the fiscal mess by setting up the pension funds and setting all of the pension levels; now, he notes, Illinois must either dissolve Harvey’s pension into the state fund, or put together an emergency financial team to sort through the wreckage of this and other distressed towns—adding: “Let’s create a board that could be independent with real financial expertise to guide these local governments, not to push them into [municipal] bankruptcy: The best path forward for Harvey is independent oversight that could sort out why they’re not making their financial reports on a regular basis.”

The Cost of Municipal Annexation. Municipalities across Georgia could face higher borrowing costs if the state government enables the “de-annexation” of about half of one small city, that city being Stockbridge, one settled in 1829 when the Concord Methodist Church was organized near present-day Old Stagecoach Road—and, especially, when Stockbridge was granted a post office on April 5, 1847, named for a traveling professor, Levi Stockbridge, who had passed through the area many times before the post office was built. Albeit that heritage remains a matter of some dispute: others contend that the city was named after Thomas Stock, who was State Surveyor and the Georgia State President in the 1820s. The small municipality was incorporated as a town in 1895 and, subsequently, as a city on August 6, 1920. Now, however, more change might be on the way, especially if Georgia Governor Nathan Deal signs into law Senate bills 262 and 263—bills which, if enacted, would de-annex just over half of Stockbridge’s assessable residential and commercial property. Why? Because proposed SB 263, an Act to incorporate the City of Eagles Landing, provide a charter for the City of Eagles Landing; provide for a referendum; provide for transition of powers and duties; provide for community improvement districts; and repeal conflicting laws would effectively have disconcerting fiscal impacts on City Hall in Stockbridge, which was financed with municipal revenue bonds. Neither of the two bills apportions the revenues involved between the to-be two entities—a requirement which, according to some legal experts, is based upon precedent-setting court cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and Georgia when the boundaries of a governmental entity are changed.

Thus, unsurprisingly, during the Georgia Municipal Association’s Georgia Cities Week last week, Stockbridge officials and representatives of the Eagle’s Landing effort held separate meetings with Gov. Deal.  Stockbridge City Attorney Michael Williams described their session as “very productive: The Governor said he would consider the series of points we made…I’m certainly taking him at his word that he will.” Nevertheless, the municipality is hedging its fiscal bets: it has hired three outside law firms to challenge the laws if Gov. Deal approves them.

Should that happen, however, the much reduced City if Stockbridge would still would be obligated to pay off about $13.02 million of privately placed Urban Redevelopment Agency lease-revenue bonds, and $1.5 million of water and sewer notes issued through the Georgia Environmental Facilities Authority—municipal bonds owned by Capitol One Public Funding LLC. Unsurprisingly, the Romulus and Remus of Eagles Landing have expressed no eagerness to help make those payments: sharing only goes so far. The lease-revenue bonds, issued in 2005 and 2006 for projects including funding to purchase land and build city hall, backed by general fund revenues and the city’s taxing power, if needed, even though the city does not currently impose a property tax.

Also unsurprisingly, Jim Spiotto’s firm, Chapman and Cutler LLP, which represents Capital One, wrote to the city a day after the General Assembly ended its session last month, warning it could face potential litigation: “SB 262 and SB 263 infringe Capital One’s constitutional rights under the contracts clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Georgia Constitution by taking away a significant source of the security and source of repayment for the bonds that was contractually bargained for by the bondholders,” Chapman and Cutler partner Laura Appleby wrote to the City Attorney. Unless the bonds are properly apportioned between Stockbridge and Eagle’s Landing, and the [municipal] bondholders have the benefit of the full security that they were originally promised, Ms. Appleby wrote, “We have serious concerns regarding the ability of [Stockbridge] to continue to pay debt service on the bonds because it will have lost a large portion of its ad valorem tax base.”

Jonathan Lewis, Capital One Public Funding’s president, has written to Gov. Deal also requesting a meeting, writing: “The failure of SB 262 and SB 263 to provide for the apportionment of the [municipal] bonds between the City of Stockbridge and, if formed, the City of Eagle’s Landing, is not only an inequitable result for the City of Stockbridge, it is an infringement on Capital One’s constitutional rights under the contracts clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Georgia Constitution, as it removes a significant portion of the security and source of repayment for the bonds…Capital One has come to trust that the State of Georgia will take those actions required to maintain, preserve, and protect the pledges made by its municipalities to their bondholders…Permitting SB 262 and SB 263 to become law would no longer allow us to rely in the State of Georgia [based] on the bedrock public finance principle of non-impairment,” adding that such a “de-annexation” would impair Capital One’s municipal bonds and “create new, unprecedented risks for existing holders and prospective purchasers of State of Georgia local debt.” Mr. Lewis last week also communicated to Georgia Municipal Association Executive Director Larry Hanson, whose organization is made up of 521 municipalities, that if enacted, the de-annexation would require all lenders to Georgia municipalities to “consider, and price in, the potential loss of security from future de-annexations,” because the legislation does not apportion Stockbridge’s outstanding debt: “GMA’s members would bear the burden of this new, Georgia-specific risk in the form of higher interest costs: “The uncertainty created by such a shift sets a dangerous precedent and could produce additional negative unintended consequences as lenders consider municipal financing opportunities within the state.”

Who’s on First? Chairman Rob Bishop (R-Utah) of the House Natural Resources Committee, the committee of jurisdiction for U.S. territories, yesterday confirmed he would got to Puerto Rico to meet with island leaders to assess the recovery in the wake of Hurricane Maria’s devastation, noting: “This trip will allow me to better understand the ongoing challenges and the emergency assistance that is still needed.” He is scheduled to meet with Puerto Rico’s non-voting Member of Congress, Jenniffer Gonzalez, as well as Chairman Jose Carrion of the PROMESA Board as part of an effort the Chairman described as a “first hand look at recovery efforts,” pointing out that, in his view, it would be irresponsible for Governor Rosselló, who apparently the Chairman had not advised of his visit, not to implement the government reforms ordered by the PROMESA oversight board—making clear the fiscal gulf between the two leaders, with the Governor observing that Chairman Bishop, with his demands in favor of a dialogue with creditors, seems to be supporting the causes of the territory’s municipal bondholders over the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico.

Unlike chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, wherein state laws create a process—where permitted—for a municipality; there are many fiscal chefs in the kitchen in Puerto Rico, with growing questions with regard to the limits of their respective legal authority under the PROMESA law. A key issue, the final decision with regard to the implementation of cuts to the pension system and the labor reform may yet take a few months. The fiscal stakes, however, especially on an island where there has been a steady stream of college graduates and young professionals moving to the mainland—leaving behind  disproportionate number of older, retired Puerto Ricans, increasingly creates a greater and greater fiscal imbalance. That is now front and center in the wake of the Board’s proposed 10 percent average reduction in pensions—a proposal Gov. Rosselló has rejected, but, as one commentator noted, it is the Board which holds all the cards. The challenge is in interpreting the PROMESA Board’s authority to use its fiscal plans to provide “adequate funding” to Puerto Rico’s public pension systems: under the proposed fiscal plan, the Board cut in pensions would not begin until FY2020—giving time for the PROMESA Board to submit to U.S. Judge Laura Taylor Swain a quasi-plan of chapter 9 debt plan of debt adjustment by the end of this year.

It is not that the Governor believes pension should be off the table—after all, he had recommended a 6% reduction last year; thus, there remains some chance that the government and the Board could reach an agreement and avoid the heavy costs of fighting the fiscal issues out before Judge Swain. Indeed, as we saw in San Bernardino, those back door negotiations between the government and creditors can save an awful lot in lawyers’ fees—or, as former U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Gerardo Carlo-Altier put it: “The ideal thing would be for the Board, the government, and the groups of creditors to reach an agreement in advance and go together to court.”

A key sticking point appears to be the Board’s insistence of labor reforms: under its proposed plan, the Puerto Rico Legislature should approve the labor reform by the end of this month, so that the seven-day reduction for vacation and sick leave would take effect immediately. The elimination of the protections against unjustified dismissal, the mandatory Christmas bonus, and work requirements for the Nutrition Assistance Program (NAP) are proposed for next January—with the PROMESA Board estimating that, absent the enactment of such labor reforms, including: such as employment at will, reductions in sick and vacation leaves, and non-mandatory Christmas bonus; the government of Puerto Rico would stop receiving $330 million within the next five years. They estimate another $ 185 million to cuts in pensions—all of which has led the PROMESA Board to project that, absent the adoption of the reforms proposed in the five-year fiscal plan, Puerto Rico’s economic growth and capacity to finance its public debt service would fail.

Who Will Govern? Are there too many fiscal cooks in the kitchen? In Central Falls, Rhode Island: there was one individual in charge of steering the small city, aka Chocolateville, out of bankruptcy. Similarly, in Detroit, Governor Snyder named Kevyn Orr as Emergency Manager—effectively suspending the governance authority of the Mayor and Council during the pendency of the city’s chapter 9 proceedings until U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes approved Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment. Yet, in Puerto Rico—a territory which is neither a state, nor a municipality; there are a multiplicity of actors—including, now, Chairman Bishop, the Governor, the Legislature, and the PROMESA Board—a Board which Constitutionalist Professor Carlos Ramos González of the Inter-American University Law School believes, even given the power conferred upon it by Congress over Puerto Rico’s elected government, is uncertain with regard to its own authority to implement the structural reforms it favors—or, as he has noted: “Nobody wants to be blamed for cutting pensions: in all the chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy cases, there were pension reductions,” adding that, as we saw especially in the case of Detroit, the issue of equity is challenging: how to make those cuts without plunging many retirees into poverty—a problem of even greater resonance on an island experiencing an outflow of its young professionals, so that the demography already risks insufficient revenues to meet a clearly growing demand.  

Then there is a second challenge: while PROMESA appears clear in its grant of authority to the Board to certify the fiscal plan, it appears to lack any authority to implement it on its own. Unlike Central Falls, Detroit, San Bernardino, or other chapter 9 plans of debt adjustment approved by U.S. Bankruptcy Courts; the current PROMESA statute does not authorize a federal court to control Puerto Rico’s legislative process: there is a separation of powers issue.  Nevertheless, in the wake of the approval of the fiscal plan, the PROMESA Board is trying: it has submitted a preliminary labor reform draft to the Puerto Rico Legislature, where Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz has invited PROMESA President José Carrión III to defend the proposed changes and cuts—an invitation, however, which has not been accepted.  

Former Governor Aníbal Acevedo Vilá, who lectures for a Separation of Powers class at the Law School of the University of Puerto Rico, finds it self-evident that the Legislature will not give way to the Boards proposed labor reforms, noting: “I think the Board has a very weak case in terms of imposing the labor reform. It has a better case in other measures, because they are directly tied to Puerto Rico’s fiscal crisis.” Similarly, Governor Rosselló usually quotes §205 of the PROMESA Act, which refers to the fact that the Board can make “recommendations to the Governor or the Legislature on actions the territorial government may take to ensure compliance with the Fiscal Plan, or to otherwise promote the financial stability, economic growth, management responsibility, and service delivery efficiency of the territorial government.” While Carlo Altieri adds to the debate §108, which, regarding the general powers of the Board, warns that: “Neither the Governor nor the Legislature may— (1) exercise any control, supervision, oversight, or review over the Oversight Board or its activities; or (2) enact, implement, or enforce any statute, resolution, policy, or rule that would impair or defeat the purposes of this Act, as determined by the Oversight Board.”

Indeed, an attorney for the Governor, Richard Cooper of Cleary Gottlieb, noted: “Congress did not grant the Board the power to pass laws or appoint or replace government officials…it left the government of Puerto Rico the capacity and responsibility to make the law (as long as it is consistent with the adopted fiscal plan and adjustment fiscal plan) and manage the government, with all that it entails.” Indeed, in an earlier ‘who’s in charge dispute,’ when the PROMESA Board tried to appoint a trustee to monitor the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), alleging that PROMESA recognizes it as representative of the “debtor,” Judge Swain stated that no section of the PROMESA law granted the Board power with regard to the “the implementation of those (fiscal) plans and budgets,” instead comparing the statute Congress adopted in the 1990’s creating a fiscal control board over Washington, D.C. with PROMESA. She concluded that the Board has the task of establishing the “rails” for the “territorial government” to move “towards credibility and fiscal responsibility.” Indeed, the Congressional Record appears to make no reference to the power of the Board to impose structural governmental reforms—just as Congress lacks any authority to impose such on a state—especially in a nation where it was the states which created the nation, rather than vice versa. Rather, the Congressional debate on Puerto Rico reflected an emphasis on the power of the PROMESA Board to restructure the debt, which is the main burden of Puerto Rico—and, in Congress, Republicans and Democrats have expressed no interest in amending the act, either to strengthen or soften the powers of the Board.

For his part, Chairman Bishop believes that the act allows the Board to implement structural reforms and that it would be an irresponsible attitude of the Puerto Rican government to block them. That indicates there could well be intriguing fiscal and governmental discussions this weekend—albeit it seems most certain that, as Gov. Rosselló has made clear: “We are not going to allow an imposed Board to dictate the public policy of Puerto Rico.”

Notwithstanding their differences over the extent of the powers of the PROMESA Board, Gov. Rosselló and the Board are not at complete odds: they appear to have made common cause before regarding the case of Aurelius investment group and the Electrical Industry and Irrigation Workers Union, the main union of PREPA, to defend the constitutionality of the appointment of the Board members, because six of the seven were proposed by the Congressional leadership; rather, Gov. Rosselló’s administration has limited itself to challenging actions of the Board, not its existence—even as one of his predecessors, former Governor Acevedo Vilá, noting that, even under the colonial situation and the doctrine of Insular Cases decided a century ago by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has repeatedly validated the so-called “plenary powers” of Congress in Puerto Rico, the government of Puerto Rico must challenge the existence of the Board as a violation of the U.S. Constitution under the theory that “to the extent that Board has executive and legislative powers, even under the Insular Cases, it is unconstitutional,” adding that: “Even when organizing the territories, Congress has to guarantee a minimum system of separation of powers.”

The Puerto Rico Debt Tango. While the PROMESA Oversight Board and Gov. Rosselló are engaged in a complicated dance over future debt payments and policy, their complicated dance steps are not dissimilar: In successive versions of a fiscal plan that the Governor submitted to the Board in January, February, March, and last month; the Governor said the amount of debt Puerto Rico should carry should be determined through a comparison with debt medians in the 50 mainland states—quite similar to the Board’s certified plan.  Like the Governor’s proposed fiscal plans, the board certified plan has a comparison to the medians for the 50 states and to the 10 states with the highest levels of four measures of debt. The Board certified plan stated: “The implied debt capacity and expected growth in debt capacity in debt capacity must be sufficient to cover both the payments due on the restructured debt, and all payments due on future new money borrowings.” Accordingly, the aggregate debt service due on all fixed payment debt issued in the restructuring of the government’s existing tax-supported debt should be capped at a maximum annual debt service level: “The cap would be derived from the U.S. state rating metrics, and specifically what Moody’s [Investors Service] calls the ‘Debt Service Ratio.’” (The debt service ratio is defined as ratio of total debt payments due in a year divided by a state-government’s own source revenues.)

Under such a construct, it would appear that Puerto Rico could pay about $19 billion of the roughly $45 billion that the central government and its closely related lending entities owe, according to the plan’s exhibit 26. In the same exhibit, the PROMESA Board alternately suggests that one should use an average of a set of four measures of debt capacity and not just own-source revenues. Using this composite measure would mean that Puerto Rico should pay back about $10.7 billion in outstanding debt. But the Board plan notes this would be optimistic for a promised level of payments, rather, it reports, the fixed amount committed to should be cut by 10% to 30% to allow for “implementation risk.” It suggest that 20% should be used and the coupon be adjusted to 5%. These would lead to Puerto Rico committing to pay 19% of its debt—adding: “Any additional cash flow above the maximum annual debt service cap applied to the restructured fixed payment debt that is generated over the long-term from successful implementation of the new fiscal plan could be dedicated to a combination of contingent ‘growth bond’ payments to legacy bond creditors, debt service due on future new money borrowings needed to fund Puerto Rico’s infrastructure investments, and additional ‘PayGo’ capital investment to reduce the government’s historically out-size reliance on borrowing to fund its needs, among other purposes.”

The Uneven Challenges to Chapter 9 Recovery from Municipal Bankruptcy

Mayday, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we note the uneven recovery in Detroit from the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in American history.

An Absence of Fiscal Balance? In a new report by 24/7 Wall Street about the nation’s poorest urban regions, Detroit is ranked 5th, raising, the publication notes, the question why so many communities in such good times have been left fiscally behind. . The report — from 24/7 Wall St., a New York-based financial news organization — ranks the Detroit area at No. 5 in a list of impoverished communities. It also raises the question: During such good economic times, why are so many being left behind? While the report notes the seeming good times for the U.S. economy, it also reports that the share of Americans living below the federal poverty level ($25,100 for a family of four) has increased by nearly 10 percent since 2010. But of greater concern for state and local leaders, the concentration of poverty has also risen—or, as the report noted: “This increased concentration of poverty is far more pronounced in certain metropolitan areas: The share of poor residents living in extremely poor neighborhoods—defined as those with a poverty rate of at least 40%—climbed by more than 3.5% in 20 metro areas in the last six years.” That is, in a post-Richard Nixon era where the federal government no longer appears to believe it has a role in providing some fiscal equity, the report writes that the Detroit metro area has “long been the poster child for economic decline in postindustrial America.”

It appears we are in a state of fiscal disequilibrium, where no major municipality is any longer in chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, and Detroit, emerging from the largest ever municipal bankruptcy and now a center of innovation again for the auto industry, with the city’s poverty rates having declined by more than 10% from 2015 to 2016—to its lowest rate in a decade. Nevertheless, with a poverty rate of 35.7% in 2016, the report found that an increasing share of residents in the metro region are, today, below the federal poverty level: 16.2%, putting the Motor City behind Bakersfield, Fresno, Springfield (Mass.), and Albuquerque, N.M. The report noted: “The share of poor residents living in extremely poor neighborhoods—defined as those with a poverty rate of at least 40%—climbed by more than 3.5% in 20 metro areas in the last six years: Such high-poverty neighborhoods are often characterized by high crime rates, low educational attainment rates, and high unemployment. Partially as a result, those living in these extremely poor neighborhoods are at a greatly reduced likelihood of success and upward economic mobility.”

The 24/7 Wall Street bears out Brooking’s 2016 report which defined the Detroit metro region (including Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Livingston, St. Clair, and Lapeer) to have the highest rate of concentrated poverty among the most populous metro areas in the U.S. That is, in a nationally growing economy, one can, mayhap, better appreciate some of the appeal of President Trump, as there remains, in a growing economy, a large segment of the population unable to take advantage of the growing economy.

Part of it, of course, is that the issue of fiscal disparities is neither on the agenda of the President nor Congress.

Nevertheless, as our colleagues at Municipal Market Analytics note, Detroit’s exit from state oversight this week after shedding about $7 billion of its fiscal liabilities  “seems a bit fast, given the depths of the city’s challenges, and suggests that the state continues to value a narrative of quick rebound versus evidence that such can be sustained.” While MMA noted Detroit’s relatively conservative budgeting, small resulting surpluses, planning for the upcoming spike in pension payments, and decision to redeem $52M in recovery bonds; it noted the “the rising pension payments are a significant concern (even with funds set aside to temporarily smooth incremental costs) particularly when considered in conjunction with the city’s limited flexibility to address other potential events outside of its control such as reductions in federal or state aid, changes in federal policies that impact the economy in the state and/or nationally, and probably most concerning, an economic recession.”

Interestingly, MMA noted that were the Motor City’s recovery to stumble, the “potential for additional state intervention or aid is remote. Going forward, the city is likely on its own,” adding that, notwithstanding that the city has become an epicenter of the self-driving car industry; nevertheless,  this represents just a portion of the city and: “The rising living costs in these areas risks pushing existing residents out to more challenged neighborhoods, creating a greater income divide and worsening inequality. Notwithstanding the burgeoning economy in some pockets of Detroit, significant challenges remain across the vast city including horribly high poverty, crime, and poor educational outcomes. Detroit’s poverty rate is 39.4%, and only 13.8% have attained at least a bachelor’s degree.”

Phoenix Rises in Detroit!

April 30, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we recognize and celebrate Detroit’s emergence from the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history.

More than three years since the Motor City emerged from the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history, the Michigan Financial Review Commission is widely expected to act early this afternoon to vote on a waiver, after its Executive Director, Kevin Kubacki, had, last December, notified Gov. Rick Snyder of the city’s fiscal successes in holding open vacancies and reporting “revenues trending above the city’s adopted budget.” The city’s exit, if approved as expected, would restore local control and end state oversight of the City of Detroit. The expected outcome arrives in the wake of three consecutive municipal budget surpluses—something unanticipated for the federal government any year in the forseeable future. In the case of the Commission, Detroit’s fiscal accomplishment met a crucial threshold required to exit oversight: the Motor City completed FY2017 with a $53.8 million general fund operating surplus and revenues exceeding expenditures by $108.6 million—after recording an FY2016 $63 million surplus, and $71 million for FY2015. Michigan’s statute still requires the Review Commission to meet each year to grant Detroit a waiver to continue local control until the completion of 10 consecutive years.

In acknowledging the historic fiscal recovery, Mayor Mike Duggan noted that the restoration is akin to a suspension, as the oversight commission will not be active—but will remain in a so-called “dormancy period” under which, he said, referring to the Commission: “They do continue to review our finances, and, if we, in the future, run a deficit, they come back to life; and it takes another three years before we can move them out.”

On the morning Detroit went into chapter 9 bankruptcy—a morning I was warned it was too dangerous to walk the less than a mile from my downtown hotel to the Governor’s Detroit offices to meet with Kevyn Orr as he accepted Gov. Snyder’s request that he serve as Emergency Manager; Mr. Orr told me he had ordered every employee to report to work on time—and that the highest priority would be to ensure that all traffic and street lights were operating—and no 9-1-1 call was ignored. We sometimes forget—to our peril—that while the federal government can shut down, that is not an option for a city or county.  From the critical—to the vital everyday services, crews in Detroit have started cleaning 2,000 miles of residential streets, with Mayor Duggan’s office reporting that the first of three city-wide street sweeping operations is underway: each will take 10 weeks to complete.

The state oversight has, unsurprisingly, been prickly, at times: it has added levels of frustration to governance. For example, under the state oversight, all major city and labor contracts are delayed 30 days in order to await approval from the state. Nevertheless, with Detroit a vital component of Michigan’s economy, Detroit Chief Financial Officer John Hill had likened this oversight as a “real constructive process where the city has excelled.” Indeed, under the city’s plan of chapter 9 debt adjustment, Detroit had committed to shed some $7 billion in debt, while at the same time investing some $1.7 billion into restructuring and municipal city service improvements over a decade. In addition, the city had accepted the state fiscal oversight of its municipal finances, including budgets, contracts, and collective bargaining agreements with municipal employees. In return, the carrot, as it were, was that the state would assist by defraying cuts to Detroit retiree pensions and shield the Detroit Institute of Arts collection from bankruptcy creditors. The plan of debt adjustment also provided for relief of most public pension obligations to Detroit’s two pension funds through FY2023—after which Detroit will have to start funding a substantial portion of the pension obligations from its general fund for the General Retirement System and Police and Fire Retirement System.

Follow the Yellow Brick Road? While the Review Commission’s vote of fiscal and governing confidence for Detroit is a recognition of fiscal responsibility and accountability…and pride, the road of bankruptcy is steeper than for other municipalities—and the road is not unencumbered. Detroit is, in many ways, fiscally unique: more than 20 percent of its revenues are derived from a municipal income tax versus 17 percent from property taxes. That means the Motor City cannot fiscally rest: as in Chicago, city leaders need to continue to work with the state and the city’s School Board to improve the city’s public schools in order to attract families to move back into the city—a challenge made more difficult at a time when the current Congress and Administration have demonstrated little interest in addressing fiscal disparities: so Detroit is not competing on a level playing field.

In Michigan, however, the federal disinterest is partially offset by Michigan’s Revenue Sharing program, which, for the current fiscal year, provides that each eligible local unit is eligible to receive 100% of its eligible payment, according to Section 952 of 2016 PA 268. Therefore, if a city’s, village’s, or township’s FY 2010 statutory payment was greater than $4,500, the local unit will be eligible to receive a “Percent Payment” equal to 78.51044% of the local unit’s FY 2010 statutory payment. If a city’s, village’s, or township’s population is greater than 7,500, the local unit will be eligible to receive a “Population Payment” equal to the local unit’s population multiplied by $2.64659. Cities, villages, or townships that had a FY 2010 statutory payment greater than $4,500 and have a population greater than 7,500 will receive the greater of the “Percent Payment” or “Population Payment.

Unfortunately, since the Great Recession, local units of government have been hit with three major blows, all of which involve the state government. The first is the major decline in revenue sharing as the state struggled to balance its budget during the recession of 2007-2009. (Statutory revenue sharing declined from a peak of $684 million in FY 2001 to $210 million in FY 2012 and only recovered to $249 million by FY 2016. Total revenue sharing which fell from a peak of $1.326 billion in FY 2001 had only recovered to $998 million in FY 2016.)

Nevertheless, and, against seemingly all odds, it appears the civic pride created in this extraordinary challenge to recover from the largest chapter 9 in American history has given the Governor, legislature, and Detroit’s leaders—and citizens—a resolute determination to succeed.

The Fiscal Challenges of Exiting from Fiscal Oversight

April 23, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we return to Michigan to assess the unbalanced state of its municipal public pension and post-retirement health care obligations, before turning to the state’s largest city, Detroit, which appears to be on the brink of earning freedom from state oversight—marking the remarkable fiscal exodus from the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in American history. Then we return to Puerto Rico, a territory plunged once again into darkness and an exorbitant and costly set of fiscal overseers. 

Imbalanced Fiscal Stress. In the Michigan Treasury Department’s first round of assessments under a new state law, the Treasury reported that 110 of 490 local units of government across the state are underfunded for retiree health care benefits, pension obligations‒or both. That number is expected to increase. Nineteen municipalities in Wayne County, including Allen Park, Dearborn and two of the five Grosse Pointes (Farms and Woods), are behind on their retiree health care funding, the state says, as well as six Wayne County jurisdictions, including Redford Township, Trenton, Wayne and Westland are underfunded on both, as are Hazel Park, Oak Park, and Madison Heights in Oakland County. The state fiscal oversight effort to highlight the expanding obligations competing for scarce taxpayer dollars in the state which is home to the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in American history, the result of the state’s “Protecting Local Government Retirement and Benefits Act,” Act 202, which was enacted last December, marks a pioneering effort to put tighter local data to detect and assess the likelihood of severe fiscal distress—kind of a municipal fiscal radar—or, as Michigan Deputy Treasurer Eric Scorsone, who is the designated head of the State and Local Finance Group,  describes it: “By working together, we can help ensure the benefits promised by communities are delivered to their retirees and help ensure that the fiscal health of communities allows them to be vibrant now and into the future,” Eric Scorsone, deputy state treasurer and head of Treasury’s State and Local Finance Group, put it: “This is just a start. One of the common denominators of the financial crisis has been legacy costs. We know this is a big liability out there”—and it continues to grow for current and retired public employees, as well as their counterparts in public schools, whose districts are not covered by the new state law. In an era featuring longer lifespans, the unfunded liability of the Michigan Public School Employees Retirement System totaled $29.1 billion, or 40.3 percent, at the end of FY2015-16—an aggregate number, the likes of which have not been previously available at the municipal level. Now, under the new statute, a municipality’s post-retirement health care plan is deemed underfunded if its assets are “less than 40 percent” of its obligations, or require annual contributions “greater than 12 percent” of a jurisdiction’s annual operating revenues. A pension plan is deemed underfunded if it is “less than 60 percent funded,” or its annual contributions are “greater than 10 percent” of annual operating revenues. The new state mandates require the state’s panoply of cities, villages, townships, counties, and county commissions to report pension and retiree health care finances by the end of January. (Municipalities whose books close later could be included in future lists.) The aim is to underline the fiscal need to local elected leaders to do something the federal government simply does not do: reconcile reconciling long-term obligations with current contributions and recurring revenue—that is, not only adopt annual balanced budgets, but also longer term. The new state law, an outgrowth of the Responsible Retiree Reform for Local Government Task Force, is intended to enhance transparency and community awareness of local government finance, as well as to emphasize that failure to account for such obligations could negatively impact municipal bond ratings—effectively raising the costs of capital infrastructure. Indeed, as East Lansing City Manager George Lahanas stated last week, “The city’s pension plan was 80 percent funded in 2003 and is 50 percent funded today…The city has implemented numerous cost-controlling measures over the years to address the legacy cost challenges…City officials have identified that more aggressive payments need to be made moving forward to further address the challenges.”

Nevertheless, in one of the very few states which still try to address municipal fiscal disparities, the Michigan Senate General Government subcommittee met last week and reported (Senate Bill 855) its budget recommendations, including for revenue sharing, the subcommittee matched the Governor’s recommendation, which eliminate the 2.5% increase cities, villages, and townships received this year—a cut, ergo, of some $6.2 million for FY2019; the Senate version retained the counties current year 1% increase (which the Governor had also recommended removing) and added another 1% to the county revenue sharing line item—with the accompanying report language noting the increase was intended to ensure “fairness and stability” across local unit types, since counties do not receive Constitutional revenue sharing payments.  Estimates for sales tax growth related to Constitutional payments anticipate an additional 3.1% next year for cities, villages, and townships, distributed on a per capita basis. 

Moving into the Passing Lane? The Legislature’s actions came as the Detroit Financial Review Commission has approved the Motor City’s Four-Year Financial Plan, setting the stage for the city’s exit from direct state supervision as early as this month, enabling the city with the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history to glimpse the possibility of exiting state oversight—or, as Detroit CFO John Hill put it:  “Today’s FRC approval of the City’s 2019 budget and plan for fiscal years 2020-2022, is another key milestone in the city’s financial recovery: It demonstrates the continued commitment of city leaders to prepare and enact budgets that are realistic and balanced now and into the future. It also demonstrates continued progress toward the waiver of active State oversight, which we expect will occur later this month.” The Commission is scheduled to meet at the end of this month for a vote to end state fiscal oversight, albeit the Commission would remain in existence, so that it could be jump started in the event of any reversal in the city’s fiscal comeback. Thus, Mr. Hill said there would likely be a memorandum of understanding between Detroit and the Commission to lay out the kinds of information the city would need to provide to the Commission for review, as he noted: “They still can at any time decide to change the waiver, although we hope and will make sure that doesn’t happen.” Mr. Hill noted that the now approved financial plan includes Mayor Mike Duggan’s budget for FY2019, as well as fiscal years 2020-2022—and that the Motor City now projects ending the current fiscal year with an operating surplus of $33 million: that would mark Detroit’s fourth consecutive municipal budget surplus since exiting from the nation’s largest ever chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. He also noted that, as provided for under the city’s plan of debt adjustment, Detroit continues to put aside funds to address the city’s higher-than-expected pension payments, payments starting in 2024, when annual payments of at least $143 million begin. Payments of $20 million run through 2019 with no payments then due through 2023.

Unbalanced Budgets & Power–& Justice. Although they are still evaluating the impact that a new reduction of their budget would have, Puerto Rico’s Judicial Branch has expressed apprehension with regard to the PROMESA Board’s imposed cuts, with Sigfredo Steidel Figueroa, Puerto Rico’s Director of the Office of Court Administration, expressing apprehension: “At the moment, we are evaluating the impact that the proposals of the Fiscal Oversight Board, contained in the fiscal plan published yesterday, could have on the Judicial Branch,” referring to the Board certified plan of staggered cuts for the Judiciary—cuts of $31.9 million, rising to a cut of $161.9 million by 2023. He noted: “In the light of the measures already taken, any proposal for additional reduction to our budget is a matter of concern. Therefore, we will remain vigilant to ensure that the Judicial Branch has the resources it needs to ensure its efficiency and that any budgetary measures taken do not affect the quality of judicial services and the access to justice that corresponds to all the citizens and residents of Puerto Rico,” as he stressed that, “At present, even with the budgetary limitations of recent years, the Judicial Branch has managed to draw and execute the work plan defined by the presiding judge, Maite D. Oronoz Rodríguez, for an increasingly more judicial administration—one of efficiency, transparency, and accessibility.” He added:An independent and robust judiciary is essential to guarantee the legal security necessary for the stability and economic development of Puerto Rico.”

PROMESA Board Chair Jose Carrion, at the end of last week, issued a warning: “We hope the government and the legislature will comply. We don’t want to sue the government, but we have to fulfill the duties that we understand the law gives us.” That is to write that in this fiscal governance Rod Serling Twilight Zone, somewhere between chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy and hegemony; there is an ongoing question with regard to sovereignty, autonomy, and, as they would say in Puerto Rico, al fin (in the end): who is ultimately responsible for making decisions in Puerto Rico? We have a federal, quasi U.S. bankruptcy judge, a federal oversight board, a Governor, and a legislature—with only the latter two representing the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico.

And now, in the midst of a 21st century exodus of the young and educated to Florida and New York, it appears that banks are joining this exodus—threating, potentially, to further not only isolate Puerto Rico’s financial system—a system in which the number of consumer banks has dropped by half over the past decade, and in which two of the largest, Bank of Nova Scotia and Bank of Santander SA, have been quietly shrinking—the challenge of governance and fiscal recovery as Puerto Rico seeks to emerge from recession and rebuild after last year’s Hurricane Maria, a small number of financial institutions could end up in charge of deposits and lending for its 3 million citizens. Poplar, Inc., First Bancorp/Puerto Rico, and OFG Bancorp, are cash rich and have many branches, but these financial institutions appear to have limited ability to facilitate trade beyond the Caribbean and Florida—and, as economist Antonio Fernos of the Interamerican University of Puerto Rico notes: “What would really be negative is if we lose access to the network of international banks.” The U.S. territory, once was an attractive place for banks to invest, with pharmaceutical manufacturing driving growth, meant that financial institutions entered and opened what had been scarce financing for everything from homes and cars to consumer electronics. However, as Congress changed the rules which had incentivized pharmaceutical companies to locate there—and as Congress moved to make it more attractive to provide shipping to other Caribbean nations, rather than the U.S. territory, many drug companies departed. Today, in the wake of a decade-long recession, Puerto Rico’s economy is 14% smaller, and the emigration of college graduates to the mainland appears to have accelerated—leaving behind the elderly and those who could not afford to leave—increasing a crushing public pension burden, while imposing greater fiscal burdens to serve an increasingly elderly and poor population left behind—and left with over $120 billion in debt and pension liabilities, and now, in then wake of Maria’s devastation, a spike in mortgage delinquency.

Human, Fiscal, & Physical Challenges

April 20, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we return to Flint, Michigan to assess its human and fiscal challenges in the wake of its exit from state receivership; then we return to Puerto Rico, a territory plunged once again into darkness and an exorbitant and costly set of fiscal overseers. 

Out Like Flint. Serious fiscal challenges remain for Flint, Michigan, after its exit from state financial receivership. Those challenges include employee retirement funding and the aging, corroded pipes that caused its drinking water crisis, according to Mary Schulz, associate director for Michigan State University’s Extension Center for Local Government Finance and Policy. In the public pension challenge, Michigan’s statute enacted last year mandates that the state’s municipalities report underfunded retirement benefits. That meant, in the wake of Flint’s reporting that it had only funded its pension at 37%–with nothing set aside for its other OPEB benefits, combined with the estimated $600 million to finance the infrastructure repair of its aging water infrastructure, Director Schulz added the small city is also confronted by a serious problem with its public schools—describing the city’s fiscal ills as “Michigan’s Puerto Rico,” adding it would “remain Michigan’s Puerto Rico until the state decides Flint is part of Michigan.”

Michigan Municipal League Director Dan Gilmartin notes that Flint is making better decisions financially, but still suffers from state funding cuts. He observed that Flint’s leaders are making better decisions fiscally—that they have put together a more realistic budget than before its elected leaders were preempted by state imposed emergency managers, noting: “The biggest problem Flint faces now is what all cities in Michigan face, and that is the state’s system of municipal financing, which simply doesn’t work.”

Perhaps in recognition of that, Michigan State Treasurer Nick Khouri, on April 10th announced the end of state-imposed receivership under Michigan’s Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, and he dissolved the Flint Receivership Transition Advisory Board. Treasurer Khouri also signed a resolution repealing all remaining emergency manager orders, noting: “Removing all emergency manager orders gives the City of Flint a fresh start without any lingering restrictions.” Concurrently, Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, in an email, wrote: “Under the state’s emergency manager law, emergency managers were put in place in a number of cities facing financial emergencies to ensure residents were protected and their local governments’ fiscal problems were addressed: This process has worked well for the state’s struggling cities, helping to restore financial stability and put them on a path toward long-term success. Flint’s recent exit from receivership marks the end of emergency management for cities in Michigan and a new chapter in the state’s continued comeback.” Indeed, the state action means that Detroit is the only Michigan municipality city still under a form of state oversight, albeit Benton Harbor Area Schools, Pontiac Public Schools, Highland Park School District, and the Muskegon Heights school district remain under state oversight.

The nation’s preeminent chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy expert Jim Spiotto notes that a financial emergency manager is supposed to get a struggling municipality back to a balanced budget, to find a means to increase revenue, to cut unnecessary expenses, and to keep essential services at an acceptable level:  “To the degree that they achieve that, then you want to continue with best practices: If they don’t accomplish that, then even if you return the city back to Mayor and City Council, then they have to do it: Someone has to come up with viable sustainable recovery plan, not just treading water.”

From his perspective, Director Gilmartin notes: “Flint has more realistic numbers in place, especially when it comes to revenues. I think that is the most important thing the city has accomplished from a nuts and bolts standpoint…The negative side of it is the system in which they are working under just doesn’t work for them or any communities in the state. In some cases making all the right decisions at the local level still doesn’t get to where you need to get to, and it will require a change in the state law.” Referencing last year’s Michigan Municipal League report which estimated the state’s municipalities had been shortchanged to the tune of $8 billion since 2002, Director Gilmartin noted: “A lot of the fiscal pressures that Flint and other cities in Michigan find themselves in are there by state actions.” No doubt, he was referencing the nearly $55 million in reduced state aid to Flint by 2014—as the state moved to pare revenue sharing—the state’s fiscal assistance program to provide assistance based upon population and fiscal need—funds which, had they been provided, would have sufficed to not only balance the city’s budget, but also cut sharply into its capital debts—enhancing its credit quality. Indeed, it was the state’s Emergency Manager program that voters repealed six years ago after devastating decisions had plunged Flint into not just dire fiscal straits, but also the fateful decision to change its public drinking water source—a decision poisoning children, and the city’s fisc by decimating its assessed property values. During those desperate human and fiscal times, local elected leaders were preempted—even as two of the gubernatorially named Emergency Managers were charged with criminal wrongdoing in relation to the city’s lead contamination crisis and ensuing Legionnaire’s disease outbreak which claimed 12 lives in the wake of the fateful decision to  change Flint’s water source to the Flint River in April of 2014. Now, as Director Schulz notes: “Until we come up with other solutions that aren’t really punitive in nature and leave communities like Flint vulnerable as repeat customer for emergency management law, these communities will remain in financial and service delivery purgatory indefinitely.”

Director Schulz notes a more profound threat to municipal fiscal equity: she has identified at least 93 Michigan municipalities with a taxable value per capita under $20,000, describing that as a “good indicator” for which municipalities in the state are prime candidates for finding themselves under a gubernatorially imposed Emergency Manager, in addition to 32 other municipalities in the state which  are either deemed service insolvent or on the verge of service insolvency. Flint’s taxable value per capita of $7575 comes in as the second lowest behind St. Louis, Michigan, which has a taxable value of $6733. Ms. Schulz defines such insolvency as the level below which a municipality is likely unable to fiscally provide “a basic level of services a city need to provide to its residents.” Indeed, a report released by Treasurer Khouri’s office has identified nearly 25% of the state’s local units of government as having an underfunded pension plan, retirement health care plan, or both—an issue which, as we have noted in the eGnus, comes after the State, last December enacted legislation creating thresholds on pensions and OPEB which all municipalities must meet in order to be considered funded at a viable level, meaning OPEB liabilities must be at least 40% funded, and pensions 60% funded. While the Treasurer may grant waivers, such granting is premised on plans approved to remedy the underfunding—failure to do so could trigger oversight by a three-member Michigan Stability Board appointed by the Governor. As Director Schulz notes: “The winds here are blowing such that the municipality stability board is going to be up and running soon, and there will be an effort to give that board emergency manager powers…That means they can break contacts, they can sell assets…whatever it needs to put money in the OPEB.” But in the face of such preemption—preemption which, after all, had caused such human and fiscal damage to Detroit, Detroit’s public schools, and to the City of Flint; Director Gilmartin notes: “Getting the community back to zero is the easy part and is just a function of budgeting, but having it function and provide services is harder: I would say that a lot of the support for emergency management by the state has dwindled based on the experience over the last several years.”

A Storm of Leaders. If the human health and safety, and fiscal challenges created by state oversight in Michigan give one pause; the multiplicity—and cost—of the many overseers of Puerto Rico and its future by the inequitable storm response by Congress and the Trump Administration—and by the costly “who’s on first…” sets of conflicting fiscal overseers could experience at least some level of greater clarity today, as the PROMESA Board releases its proposed fiscal plans it intends to certify, including the maintenance of its mandate to the federal court for an average public pension cut of 10 percent—after having kept under advisement the concerns of Governor Ricardo Rosselló the inclusion in the revised fiscal, quasi chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment immediate reductions in sick and vacation leave.

Thus, it appears U.S. Judge Laura Taylor Swain will consider a proposed adjustment plan to reduce public pensions later this year which would total savings of as much as nearly $1.45 billion over the next five years—a level below the PROMESA Board’s proposed $1.58 million—but massive when put in the context that the current average public pension on the island is roughly $1,100 a month, but more than 38,000 retired government employees receive only $500, because of the type of job they had and the number of years worked.

Thus, there are fiscal and human dilemmas—and governance challenges: even though the PROMESA law authorizes the restructuring of retirement systems, it is unclear whether the Congressionally-created Board has the authority to impose such a significant, unfunded federal mandate on the government of Puerto Rico, including labor reforms, and restrictions of vacation and sick leaves. Last year, Governor Rosselló agreed to a reduction in pensions for government retirees, but then his aim was to propose cuts of 6 percent.

At the moment, he is against it. A few weeks ago, after negotiations with the Board, Governor Rosselló proposed a labor reform similar to the one he negotiated with members of the Board, with differences on how to balance it with an increase in the minimum wage and when to put it in into effect—a proposal he subsequently withdrew after the PROMESA Board mandated that the labor reform be in full force in January 2019, instead of phasing it in over next three years, and conditioning the increase from $7.25 to $8.25 per hour in the minimum wage to the increase in labor participation rates—proposals which, in any event, made clear the “too many leaders” governance challenges—as these were proposals with little chance of approval by the Puerto Rican House. That is, for the Governor, there is not only a federal judge, and a PROMESA Board, but also his own legislature elected by Puerto Ricans—not appointed by non-Puerto Ricans. (Under the PROMESA Law, which also created the territorial judicial system to restructure the public debt of Puerto Rico, the PROMESA Board also has power over the local government until four consecutive balanced budgets and medium and long-term access to the financial markets are achieved. Thus, as the ever insightful Gregory Makoff of the Center for International Governance Innovation—and former U.S. Treasury Advisor put it: “While the lack of cooperation with the Board may be good in political terms in the short-term, it simply delays the return of confidence and extends the time it will take for the Oversight Board to leave the island.” Thus, he has recommended the Board and Gov. Rosselló propose to Judge Swain a cut from $45 billion to $6 billion of the public debt backed by taxes, with a payment of only 13.6 cents per each dollar owed, with the aim of equating it with the average that the states have. All of this has been complicated this week by the blackout Wednesday, before the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, PREPA, yesterday announced it had restored power to some 870,000 customers.

As in  Central Falls, Rhode Island, and in Detroit, in their respective chapter 9 bankruptcies, the issue and debate on pensions appears to be a matter which will be settled or resolved by the court—not the parties or Board. While the Board has the power to propose a reform in the retirement systems, it appears to lack the administrative or legislative mechanisms to implement a labor reform. The marvelous Puerto Rican daily newspaper, El Nuevo Día asked one of the PROMESA Board sources if it were possible for the Board to go to Court and demand the implementation of a labor reform in case the Governor does not propose such legislation—the response to which was such a probability was “low.” Concurrently, an advisor to House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Rob Bishop (R-Utah) with regard to proposing legislation to address the issue receive a doubtful response, albeit an official in the Chairman’s office said recently that if the Rosselló administration does not implement the labor reforms proposed by the PROMESA Board, the option for the Board would be to further reduce the expenses of the government of Puerto Rico. Put another way, Carlos Ramos González, Professor of Constitutional Law at the Interamerican University of Puerto Rico, is of the view that, notwithstanding the impasse, “in one way or another, the Board will end up imposing its criteria. How it will do it remains to be seen.”

Physical, Not Fiscal—But Fiscal Storms.  Amid the governance and fiscal storm, a physical storm in the form of am island-wide blackout hit Puerto Rico Wednesday after an excavator accidentally downed a transmission line, contributing to the ongoing physical and fiscal challenge to repair an increasingly unstable power grid nearly seven months after Hurricane Maria. More than 1.4 million homes and businesses lost power, marking the second major outage in less than a week, with the previous one affecting some 840,000 customers. PREPA estimated it would take 24 to 36 hours to restore power to all customers—it is focusing first on re-establishing service for hospitals, water pumping systems, the main airport in San Juan and other critical facilities. The physical blackout came as the PROMESA Board has placed PREPA, a public monopoly with $9 billion of debt, in the equivalent of its own quasi chapter 9 bankruptcy, in an effort to help advance plans to modernize the utility and transform it into a regulated private utility—after, last January, Gov. Ricardo Rosselló announced plans to put the utility up for sale.

Several large power outages have hit Puerto Rico in recent months, but Wednesday was the first time since Hurricane Maria that the U.S. territory has experienced a full island-wide blackout. Officials said restoring power to hospitals, airports, banking centers and water pumping systems was their priority. Following that would be businesses and then homes. By late that day, power had returned to several hospitals and at least five of the island’s 78 municipalities. Federal officials who testified before Congress last week said they expect to have a plan by June on how to strengthen and stabilize Puerto Rico’s power grid, noting that up to 75% of distribution lines were damaged by high winds and flooding. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is overseeing the federal power restoration efforts, said it hopes to have the entire island fully restored by next month: some 40,000 power customers still remain without normal electrical service as a result of the hurricane. The new blackout occurred as Puerto Rico legislators debate a bill that would privatize the island’s power company, which is $14 billion in debt and relies on infrastructure nearly three times older than the industry average.

 

The Once & Future Puerto Rico?

April 17, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we try to assess the fiscal and future governance options for Puerto Rico: will it become a second class state? A nation? Or, at long last, an integral part of the nation? And governance: who is in charge of its governance?

Before Hurricane Maria wracked its terrible human, fiscal, and physical toll; more than 50% of Americans knew not that Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens. Still, today, some six months after the disaster, more than 50,000 have no electricity. The fiscal and physical toll on low-income Americans on the island has been especially harsh: of the nearly 1.2 million applications to FEMA for assistance to help fix damaged homes, nearly 60% have been rejected: FEMA provided no assistance, citing the lack of lack of title deeds or because the edifices in need were constructed on stolen land or in contravention of building codes. That is to write that this exceptionally powerful storm took a grievous toll not just on life and limb, but especially on the local and state economy, destroying an estimated 80% of Puerto Rico’s agricultural crop, including coffee and banana plantations—where regrowing is projected to take years. The super storm devastated 20% of businesses—today an estimated 10,000 firms remain closed. Discouragingly, the government forecasts output will shrink by another 11% in the year to June 2018.

It might be, ojala que si (one hopes) that a burst of growth will ensue, with estimates of as much as 8% next year, in no small part thanks to federal recovery assistance and as much as $20 billion in private-insurance payments—as well as Puerto Ricans dipping into their own savings to make repairs to their own homes and businesses. Yet, even those positive signs can appear to pale against the scope of the physical misery: by one estimate, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands will lose nearly $48 billion in output—and employment equivalent to 332,000 people working for a year. Of perhaps longer term fiscal concern are the estimated thousands of Puerto Ricans who left the island for Florida and other points on the mainland—disproportionately those better educated and with greater fiscal resources—leaving behind older and poorer Americans, and a greater physical and fiscal burden for Puerto Rico’s government.

The massive storm—and disparate treatment by the Trump administration and Congress—have encumbered Puerto Rico with massive debts, both to its central government and municipalities, but also to its businesses. Encumbered with massive debts—including $70 billion to its municipal bondholders and another $50 billion in public pension liabilities; Governor Ricardo Rosselló’s administration is making deep cuts: prior to the massive storm, the government had been committed to slashing funding to its local governments by $175 million, closing 184 schools, and cutting public pensions—pensions which, at just over $1,000 are not especially generous. Now, that task will be eased, provided the PROMESA oversight Board approves, to moderate the proposed cuts in services in order to do less harm the reviving economy.

Assisted by federal tax incentives, Puerto Rico’s economic model was for decades based on manufacturing, especially of pharmaceuticals. However, what Congress can bestow; it can take away. Thus it was that over the last decade, Congress steadily eroded economic incentives—Congressional actions which contributed to the territory’s massive debt crisis, and contributing to the World Bank dropping Puerto Rico 58 places in its ranking compared to the mainland with regard to the ease of doing business.

The havoc wreaked by Maria could be especially creative for the island’s private sector, which represents a chronically missed opportunity. Puerto Rico, for all its problems, is a beautiful tropical island, with white-sanded beaches, rainforest, fascinating history, lovely colonial buildings and a vibrant mix of Latin-American and European culture. Yet, with 3.5 million visitors a year, its tourism industry is less than half the size of Hawaii’s. It has an excellent climate for growing coffee and other highly marketable products, yet its agriculture sector is inefficient and tiny. The island has a well-educated, bilingual middle-class, including a surfeit of engineers, trained at the well-regarded University of Puerto Rico for the manufacturing industry, and cheap to hire. But in the wake of the departing multinationals, they are also leaving. Isabel Rullán, a 20-something former migrant, who has returned to the island from Washington to try to improve linkages to the diaspora, estimates that half her university classmates are on the mainland.

Quien Es Encargado? (Who is in charge?) Unlike a normal chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy proceeding, the process created by Congress under the PROMESA law created a distinct governance model—one which does create a quasi emergency manager, but here in the form of a board, the PROMESA Board, which, today, will submit its proposed fiscal plan, or quasi plan of debt adjustment to U.S. Judge Laura Swain Taylor; it will maintain its requirement to propose the reduction of the public pensions of Puerto Ricans by an average of 10 percent. Until last weekend, the PROMESA Board had kept under review the complaints to Governor Ricardo Rosselló with regard to the inclusion in its revised fiscal plan of the central government the base of a labor reform which, among other proposals, calls for the immediate reduction in vacation and sick leaves from 15 to 7 days for workers of private companies, according to two sources close to the Board. Under the fiscal plan proposed by the Governor Rosselló, the cuts would reach $1.45 billion in five years. The PROMESA Board has requested that they total $1.58 million by June of 2023. The proposal, unsurprisingly, has raised questions with regard to whether the Congress has the authority to impose on the government of Puerto Rico a reform of its labor laws—any more than its inability under our form of federalism to dictate changes in any state’s retirement systems—contracts which are inherent in state constitutions.

Pension reductions in chapter 9 cases, because they involve contracts, are difficult, as contracts are protected under state constitutions—moreover, as we saw in Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment approved by now retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes, the court wanted to ensure that any such reductions would not subject the retiree to income below the federal poverty level—a level which, Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rossello told Reuters, in an interview this past week, “many retirees are already under,” as he warned  that any further pension cuts could “cast them out and challenge their livelihood.” That is, in the U.S. territory struggling with a 45 percent poverty rate and unemployment more than double the U.S. national average, the fiscal challenge of how to restructure nearly $70 billion in debt, where public pensions, which owe $45 billion in benefits, are also virtually insolvent, makes the challenges which had confronted Judge Rhodes pale in comparison.  Moreover, with the current pensions already virtually insolvent, paying pension benefits out of Puerto Rico’s general fund, on a pay-as-you-go basis, could cost the virtually bankrupt Puerto Rico $1.5 billion a year. The PROMESA Board has recommended that Gov. Rossello reduce pensions by 10 percent.  

For their part, the island’s pensioners have formed a negotiating committee, advised by Robert Gordon, an attorney who advised retirees in Detroit’s chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, as well as Hector Mayol, the former administrator of Puerto Rico’s public pensions. The fiscal challenge in Puerto Rico, however, promises to be more stiff than Detroit—or, as Moody’s put it: Puerto Rico’s “unusual circumstances mean that it will not conform exactly” to recent public bankruptcies, in which “judges reduced creditor claims far more than amounts owed to pensioners.” Moreover, the scope or size of Puerto Rico’s public pension chasm is exacerbated by the ongoing emigration of young professionals from Puerto Rico to the mainland—making it almost like an increasingly unbalanced teeter totter.  The U.S. territory’s largest public pension, the Employee Retirement System (ERS), which covers nearly 100,000 retirees, is projected to run out of cash this year: it is confronted by a double fiscal whammy: in addition to paying retiree benefits, ERS owes some $3.1 billion to repay debts on municipal bonds it issued in 2008—bonds issued to finance Puerto Rico’s public pension obligations. Last year, Governor Rosselló had agreed to a reduction in pensions for government retirees, indicating a willingness to seek as much as a 6% reduction. That appears not, however, to be something he currently supports.

A few weeks ago, in the wake of negotiations with the PROMESA Board, Governor Rosselló proposed a labor reform similar to the one he negotiated with members of the Board, with differences with regard to how to balance it with an increase in the minimum wage and when to implement such changes. The Governor, however, withdrew the proposal when the Board required that the labor reform be in full force by next January, instead of applying it gradually over the next three years, and conditioned the increase from $ 7.25 to $ 8.25 per hour in the minimum wage to the increase in labor participation rates. It seems the PROMESA Board is intent upon labor reform as an essential element for future economic growth.

The Challenge of “Shared” Governance. Unlike in Central Falls, San Bernardino, Detroit, Jefferson County, or other chapter 9 cases where state enacted chapter 9 statutes prescribed governance through the process, the PROMESA statute created a territorial judicial system to restructure Puerto Rico’s public debt, creating a Board empowered to reign until four consecutive balanced budgets and medium and long-term access to the financial markets are achieved—or, as our colleague and expert, Gregory Makoff, of the Center for International Governance Innovation, who worked for a year as an advisor to the Department of Treasury in the Puerto Rican case, put it: “While the lack of cooperation with the Board may be good in political terms in the short-term, it simply delays the return of confidence and extends the time it will take for the Oversight Board to leave the island.” Mr. Makoff has recommended the Board and Gov. Rosselló propose to Judge Swain a cut of from $45 down to $6 billion of the public debt backed by taxes, with a payment of only 13.6 cents per each dollar owed, with the intent of equating it with the average that the states have. His suggestion comes as the Board aims to disclose its plans as early as this evening in advance of its scheduled sessions at the end of the week at the San Juan Convention Center, where, Thursday, the Board wants to certify Puerto Rico’s and PREPA’s proposed plans, and then, Friday, vote on the plans of the other public corporations: the Aqueducts and Sewers Authority (PRASA), the Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA), the Government Development Bank, the University of Puerto Rico (UPR) and the Cooperatives Supervision & Insurance Corporation (COSSEC).

Fiscal Balancing. The PROMESA law authorizes the Board the power to impose a fiscal plan and propose to Judge Swain a quasi plan of debt adjustment, as under chapter 9, on behalf of the government, much as in a chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment‒albeit the PROMESA statute does not grant the Board the power to enact laws or appoint or replace government officials. The Congressional act retained for the government of Puerto Rico the capacity and responsibility to enact laws consistent with the fiscal plan and the fiscal adjustment plan, as well as, obviously, to operate the government.

The Promise & Unpromise of PROMESA: Who Is Encargado II? Unlike in a, dare one write “traditional” chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, where state enacted legislation defines governing authority in the interim before a municipality receives approval of its plan of debt adjustment to exit municipal bankruptcy, the Congressional PROMESA statute has left blurred the balance—or really imbalance—of authority between the power of the Board to approve a budget and fiscal plans, with its possible lack of authority to implement reforms, such as changes to federal regulations it promotes. An adviser to House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Rob Bishop ((R-Utah) recently noted that if the Rosselló administration does not implement the labor reform proposed by the PROMESA Board, the option for the Board would be to further reduce the expenses of the government of Puerto Rico—or, as Constitutional Law Professor Carlos Ramos González, at the Interamerican University of Puerto Rico, describes it, notwithstanding the impasse, “in one way or another, the Board will end up imposing its criteria. How it will do it remains to be seen.” An adviser to Chair Bishop said recently that if Gov. Rosselló’s administration does not implement the labor reform proposed by the Board, the option for the PROMESA Board would be to further reduce the expenses of the government of Puerto Rico—or, as Professor González put it: “In one way or another, the Board will end up imposing its criteria. How it will do it remains to be seen.”

The Uncertain State of the State. An ongoing challenge to full recovery for Puerto Rico is its uncertain status—a challenge that has marked it from its beginning: in February of 1917, during debate on the Senate floor of HR 9533 to provide for a civil government for Puerto Rico, when Sen. James Wadsworth (R-N.Y) inquired of Senate sponsor John F. Shafroth of Colorado whether it would “provide woman suffrage in Puerto Rico?” Sen. Shafroth made clear his intent that the eligibility of voters in Puerto Rico—as in other states—“may be prescribed by the Legislature of Puerto Rico.” That debate, more than a century ago, lingers as what some have described as “the albatross hanging around the island’s neck: the uncertainty over its status.” Is it a state? A country? Or some lesser form of government?  Even though thousands of Puerto Ricans have fought and died serving their country in World Wars I and II, in Vietnam and Afghanistan, Puerto Rico has never been treated as a state—and its own citizens have been unable to decide themselves whether they wish to support statehood.

Some believe Puerto Rico will become a state eventually. But to get there, especially without risking a violent nationalist repulse, Puerto Rico needs to understand what the federal requirements and barriers will be—and what the promise of PROMESA really will mean. And, as they used to say in Rome: tempus fugit. Time is running out: for, absent economic and fiscal recovery soon, the flood of emigration of young Americans from Puerto Rico will become a brain-drain boding a demographic death-spiral, leaving the island with too few taxpayers to cover its more rapidly growing health care costs for an aged population.