Fiscal & Physical Challenges to the Nation’s State & Local Leaders

eBlog

August 17, 2017

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s Blog, we consider the fiscal and physical challenges to municipal and state leaders in the wake of the physical violence this week in Charlottesville, Virginia—and the wavering response from President Donald Trump. Then we return to the City of Flint, where federal court decisions appear to have opened the way for help to assist in access to safe drinking water for the city’s beleaguered residents. Finally, we ask to what degree there might be promise in PROMESA, as the PROMESA Board appears to be seeking independent fiscal analysis in an effort to better address options for fiscal recovery.

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

Fiscal & Physical Municipal Mayhem. Municipal leaders across the nation are suddenly on notice that the federal government cannot be counted upon to help respond to threats of violence and mayhem by alt-right groups in the wake the events last Saturday in Charlottesville, Virginia, as alt-right leaders and white nationalist groups have vowed to stage more rallies in coming days: a group claiming it is advocating free speech has planned a rally for Saturday on the historic Boston Common, with a group advocating racial justice planning its own gathering in opposition. Boston officials have responded by setting strict conditions, including no sticks, weapons, or backpacks—or, as Mayor Marty Walsh stated: “Make no mistake: We do not welcome any hate groups to Boston, and we reject their message.” A similar rally scheduled for the end of this month in San Francisco has prompted House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Ca.)) and several California lawmakers to urge the National Park Service to rescind the permit to gather on federal parkland there. Indeed, the events this week in Charlottesville—and the President’s response, has confronted municipal leaders with hard questions with regard to how to deal with their Confederate monuments, an issue that has suddenly become much more urgent.

In the wake of the violent public clashes, mayors, governors, and other civic leaders are taking steps that even a week ago might not have seemed necessary. Now, however, uncertain of any federal support, city and county leaders will be confronted by costly decisions both with regard to granting permits, but also with regard to what resources to make available to avert injuries to citizens and destruction of local businesses—fearing that the white nationalist movement could attract a larger following, a following perhaps abetted by the remarks yesterday of President Trump. Darrel Stephens, the Executive Director of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, noted that many of the people who came to Charlottesville wore helmets and carried shields: “These guys, the shields that they showed up with. . . you don’t bring that stuff to a demonstration to just express a view…You bring that there prepared for violence. Why else would you have them?”

From time immemorial in our country, demonstrations in cities have been part of the fabric of the nation, so this challenge is not new: there were certain members of Parliament in the mid-1775’s who very much wanted to ban “hate groups” from Colonials in places such as Chesapeake, Williamsburg, Petersburg, Yorktown, that Virginia municipality where a combined French and American army under Alexandria’s George Washington pinned down and besieged a British force under Lord Cornwallis, forcing his surrender on Oct. 19, 1781. The marches and rallies in Virginia, it seemed, were vital to securing independence from Britain. One may well imagine Lord Cornwallis’ response.

We have, in this country, a long and honored tradition of marches and rallies—the writer even spent unmitigated hours negotiating with authorities in the U.S. Embassy in Vienna, the City of Vienna, and Austria to obtain a permit to demonstrate against the killings at Kent State. It is hard to imagine a more important tradition in our young nation than the right to demonstrate: the challenge of governance, however, is how to ensure such demonstrations do not risk life and limb. That is the hard task upon which Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe is now proposing to embark upon, appropriately recognizing the Commonwealth—and its cities and counties—really need to rethink how to protect citizens and their rights—much as former President Kennedy and Johnson had to do in a different era. That responsibility will also require determining how to define “hate groups”?  Was the Confederate Army a hate group? Was George Washington’s army a hate group?

In Like Flint? The United States 6th Circuit Court of Appeals’ reversal on July 28th of a federal court’s decision in two lawsuits filed by Flint, Michigan residents over the contamination of their drinking water, has emboldened lawyers and their plaintiffs, who said residents of the predominately African-American city still are being billed for dirty water they cannot use, clearing the way for tens of thousands of Flint residents to continue their lawsuit against the State of Michigan and local officials—or, as the prevailing attorney noted: “The court’s decision means that the trial court’s dismissal of the case was legally incorrect and the appeals court has sent it back…A lot of our case deals with the fact that residents in Flint have been charged three-times the national rate for water, because the city is trying to balance their budget and these charges and fees come at the exact time that they couldn’t use the water…Not only did they come during the period in which they were getting contaminated water and having their children poisoned, but the water bills kept coming and they were told not to drink the water by an EPA mandate, and they were also told that if they didn’t pay their bill, they’d have a lien placed on their home and face foreclosure. That’s not America.”

In its ruling, the federal appeals court overturned a lower federal court ruling which had dismissed a major class-action lawsuit filed in 2015 on behalf of tens of thousands of Flint residents against Gov. Rick Snyder, the city of Flint, and Flint municipal officials who were involved in deciding to switch to the Flint River as its water source. The decision allows the plaintiffs to seek relief from the State of Michigan in another case in the form of compensation for education, medical monitoring and evaluation services for ongoing harm from Flint’s contaminated water crisis, as well opening the way for cases seeking financial damages against individual state employees, the city of Flint, city employees, and state-appointed emergency managers to proceed. The decision came as Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette and his legal team have pursued criminal and misdemeanor charges against or accepted plea deals with 15 persons, including former Flint employees and former and current state officials, as well as two former Flint emergency managers appointed by Governor Snyder. (The class-action lawsuits involve Flint residents who experienced personal injury and property damage from the Flint River decision, after they were exposed to toxic lead that leached from the city’s pipes into the water supply.) The trial court ruled that the federal Safe Drinking Water Act stopped the plaintiffs from seeking damages, but the appeals panel ruling allows U.S. District Judge Judith Levy to continue weighing the issue.

The appeals court decision came just prior to dismissal, this week, in federal District Court, of a whistleblower lawsuit against Flint Mayor Karen Weaver filed by a former city official who alleged she was fired for raising alarms over possible misuse of water crisis contributions. Former City Administrator Natasha Henderson sued Mayor Weaver and the City of Flint in May of last year, claiming she was wrongfully terminated two days after sending then-city attorney Anthony Chubb an email asking him to look into an “allegation of unethical conduct” by Mayor Weaver; however, U.S. District Court Judge Sean Cox permanently dismissed the three-count complaint, ruling Ms. Henderson failed to prove Mayor Weaver was aware of her complaint prior to firing her, writing: “The Court concludes that Henderson has not produced sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Weaver knew of Ms. Henderson’s complaint to Mr. Chubb before she fired Henderson.”

Ms. Henderson had emailed Mr. Chubb one day after a purported conversation with Mayor Weaver’s administrative assistant, Maxine Murray. Ms. Murray “fearfully” told Ms. Henderson that the Mayor had asked her and a volunteer to direct water crisis contributions into the Mayor’s political fund, Karen about Flint, according to the suit. Mr. Chubb was serving as interim chief legal officer during Ms. Henderson’s suit, and said he was seeking the permanent appointment. Ms. Henderson speculated he gave the Mayor a “preview of information about her accused malfeasance” in order to “curry favor,” a speculation with which Mr. Chubb took exception. Judge Cox, in his opinion, noted: “Henderson seeks to prove Weaver’s knowledge by circumstantial evidence,” as he also dismissed a First Amendment claim by Ms. Henderson, ruling that her speech was not constitutionally protected, because she was operating in an official government capacity, not as a private citizen. At the same time, he was entitled to “absolute immunity” against defamation claims by Ms. Henderson, who alleged the Mayor had made false statements about her after her firing, writing: “Weaver is entitled to immunity, because her alleged statements were made in the scope of her executive authority.”

Is There Promise in PROMESA? The PROMESA Board has issued an RFP in an effort to secure an independent research team to conduct an investigation into Puerto Rico’s debt and its connection with the U.S. territory’s fiscal crisis, defining the scope to include:

  • a review of the factors contributing to the fiscal crisis in Puerto Rico, including changes in the economy, expansion of spending commitments and benefit programs, changes in the federal financing it receives and its dependence on debt to finance a structural budget deficit,
  • a review of Puerto Rico’s debt, the general use of the proceeds of borrowing, the relationship between debt and the structural budget deficit of Puerto Rico, the extent of its debt instruments and how Puerto Rico’s debt practices compare with the debt practices of large municipal states and jurisdictions, and
  • a review of debt issuance, disclosure and sale practices of Puerto Rico, including its interpretation of Puerto Rico’s constitutional debt limit.

It was also stated that proposers will be evaluated and selected based on their professional qualifications, the competitiveness of their economic proposal, the integrity and quality of their response to the RFP, their relevant experience in conducting research, their knowledge and experience in federal securities law, knowledge and experience in the municipal bond market, government budget and fiscal management, and the ability to commence work immediately—albeit failure to meet all the above areas will not necessarily disqualify a proposal.

The independent investigative team will report to the Special Investigation Committee of the Supervisory Board, composed of members Ana Matosantos, David Skeel, and Arthur González.

A Hole in Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Safety Net: Should Congress Amend Chapter 9 Municipal Bankruptcy?

eBlog

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the growing physical and fiscal breakdown in the U.S. Territory of Puerto Rico as it seeks, along with the oversight PROMESA Board, an alternative to municipal bankruptcy—but we especially focus on the fiscal plight of the territory’s many, many municipalities—or muncipios, which, because Puerto Rico is not a state, do not have access to chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy .   

Tropical Fiscal Typhoon. When former President Ronald Reagan signed Public Law 100-597, legislation authorizing municipal into law 29 years ago, no one was contemplating a U.S. territory, such as Puerto Rico—so that the federal statute, in coherence and compliance with the concepts of dual sovereignty, which served as the unique foundation of the nation, provided that a city, county, or other municipality could only file for chapter 9 if authorized by state law—something a majority of states have not authorized. Unsurprisingly, none of us contemplated or thought about U.S. territories, such as Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.: Puerto Rico is to be considered a state for purposes of the bankruptcy code, except that, unlike a state, it may not authorize its municipalities (and by extension, its utilities) to resolve debts under Chapter 9 of the code. Ergo, no municipio in Puerto Rico has access to a U.S. bankruptcy court, even as 36 of the island’s 78 muncipios have negative budget balances; 46% are experiencing fiscal distress. Their combined total debt is $3.8 billion. In total, the combined debt borne by Puerto Rico’s municipalities is about 5.5% of Puerto Rico’s outstanding debt.  

The fiscal plight of Puerto Rico’s municipalities has also been affected by the territory’s dismal fiscal condition: From 2000 to 2010, the population of Puerto Rico decreased, the first such decrease in census history for Puerto Rico, declining by 2.2%; but that seemingly small percentage obscures a harsher reality: it is the young and talented who are emigrating to Miami, New York City, and other parts on the mainland, leaving behind a declining and aging population—e.g. a population less able to pay taxes, but far more dependent on governmental assistance. At the same time, Puerto Rico’s investment in its human infrastructure has contributed to the economy’s decline: especially the disinvestment in its human infrastructure: a public teacher’s base salary starts at $24,000—even as the salary for a legislative advisor for Puerto Rico starts at $74,000. That is, if Puerto Rico’s youngest generation is to be its foundation for its future—and if its leaders are critical to local fiscal and governing leadership in a quasi-state where 36 of the island’s 78 municipalities, or just under half, are in fiscal distress—but, combined, have outstanding debt of about $3.8 billion; something will have to give. These municipalities, moreover, unlike Detroit, or San Bernardino, or Central Falls, have no recourse to municipal bankruptcy: they are in a fiscal Twilight Zone. (Puerto Rico has a negative real growth rate; per capita income in 2010 was estimated at $16,300; 46.1% of the territory’s population is in poverty, according to the most recent 2106 estimate; but that poverty is harsher outside of San Juan.) A declining and aging population adversely affects economic output—indeed, as former Detroit Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr who steered the city out of the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history recognized, the key to its plan of debt adjustment was restoring its economic viability.

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, who is of Puerto Rican descent, has indicated there should be a more favorable interpretation of the law to make the system fairer to Puerto Rico: to allow the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to create its own emergency municipal bankruptcy measures—something, however, which only Congress and the Trump administration could facilitate. It seems clear that Justice Sotomayor does believe Puerto Rico ought to be considered the equivalent of a state, i.e. empowered to create its own bankruptcy laws. However, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted, Puerto Rico is barred from enacting its own bankruptcy laws: it is treated as a state—in a country of dual federalism wherein the federal government, consequently, has no authority to authorize state access to bankruptcy protection.

On the Brink of Governmental Bankruptcy

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the unique federalism and fiscal challenges confronting Puerto Rico—a U.S. territory in the Rod Serling Twilight Zone between a state and a municipality. 

Mayday. With a May Day midnight deadline looming under the PROMESA law, the PROMESA Oversight Board, meeting in New York City, officially put on the table the possibility of using the PROMESA Title III judicial bankruptcy mechanism as a chapter 9-like mechanism to initiate the use of judicial proceedings to allow the U.S. territory access to the use of quasi-judicial proceedings to allow Puerto Rico to escape from some $70 billion of debt, adopting a resolution permitting such a fateful decision today in an executive meeting, without the need for a public meeting, using the mechanism contemplated under Title III of PROMESA. At its New York City session, the PROMESA Board resolution adopted this weekend, provides that “[B]etween the closing of this session and the opening of the next public meeting, the Board may consider in executive session any matters that it is authorized to consider under PROMESA,” in the wake of the adoption of the fiscal plans of four Puerto Rican public corporations, three of them with important amendments aimed at revising rates and examining models of privatization. Now, in order to bring the Board’s debt restructuring proposal before a judge, who must be appointed by the presiding Justice of the US Supreme Court, five of the seven Board members have to vote in favor of a restructuring.

At a press conference, PROMESA board Chairman José Carrión III stated: “We reserve the right to deal with any presentation of a resource or certification in an executive session;” however, he avoided commenting on what would happen if May 2nd arrives and the Government of Puerto Rico has not reached an agreement with its creditors—with a critical focus on the U.S. territory’s main investment funds via general obligation bonds, those which have preference under Puerto Rico’s Constitution, and the Corporation of the Appealing Interest Fund (Cofina). Thus, while the Government of Puerto Rico has been hoping to achieve an extrajudicial agreement with its main creditors which would have allowed it to continue debt discussions after today, that option appears to have died. For his part, Chair Carrión, meanwhile, hoped that any decision to go to federal court to ask for the creation of a territorial bankruptcy court. He said he hoped that any restructuring of Puerto Rico’s general obligation debt would gain the support of Gov. Ricardo Rosselló’s administration: “We want to be aligned with the government, and I think they have been able to see that the work has been done together. The government has raised its fiscal plans, we have contemplated changes, made suggestions and the government has welcomed them.”

The Mayday deadline marks the expiration of a moratorium on the judicial litigation for collection of the debt of the Government of Puerto Rico, which has served as a shield for the U.S. territory’s authorities since last June 30th, thus, as in a chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, serving to prevent claims from jeopardizing essential public services. Unsurprisingly, neither the members of the PROMESA Oversight Board, nor the government of Governor Ricardo Rosselló has wanted to declare how ready they are to bring debt restructuring cases to the courts. Under a unique mechanism, the members of the PROMESA Board will be able to vote today by e-mail, as the authorizing resolution reads: “Between the adjournment of this meeting and the opening of the next public meeting, the Board may consider in an executive meeting any matters that it is authorized to consider under PROMESA,” referencing the resolution, which was the first agreement ratified at this weekend’s PROMESA Board meeting in New York, where the Board adopted the tax plans of four public corporations, three of them with major amendments focused on revising rates and examining privatization models. In order to bring the debt restructuring proposal before a judge, per the unique process described above, five of the seven members of the Board must vote in favor thereof. PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión III noted the Board reserves “the right to deal with any appeal or certification, at an executive meeting.”  At the very least, the Government of Puerto Rico hopes to reach an extra-judicial settlement with its major creditors that enables continuation of talks after today–without being sued—notwithstanding how difficult it would be to adopt any agreement which would prevent judicial actions by other holders of Puerto Rico’s municipal bonds. (Note: the key focus has been with regard to the U.S. territory’s main investment funds which hold general obligation bonds, which have a preferred status according to Puerto Rico’s Constitution, and the Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA)).

For his part, Chair Carrión has hoped that any decision to resort to the federal court to request the creation of a territorial federal bankruptcy court would have the support of Gov. Rosselló’s administration, noting: “We’re trying to do our best and trying to do the right thing by all the stakeholders and the people of Puerto Rico.” The Chairman told reporters after the meeting. “It’s a very difficult situation. These folks have lent Puerto Rico money, and we are where we are, and it’s not a situation where we don’t understand…We want to be aligned with the government, and I believe you have seen that these efforts have been made jointly.  The government has proposed its fiscal plans; we have contemplated changes, made suggestions; and the government has accepted them.” The extraordinary federalism here led Elías Sánchez, Gov. Rosselló’s representative before the PROMESA Board, to assert that the PROMESA Board should act on the basis of a debt adjustment requested by the head of a dependency. That is, the PROMESA statute, unsurprisingly, did not specifically specify whether the PROMESA Board is obligated to have Puerto Rico’s support. Chair Carrión, over the weekend, said that the U.S. Treasury Department had discarded the idea that Congress may be entertaining any amendment to postpone the possibility of using the judicial bankruptcy mechanism contemplated in PROMESA—with the statement coming as some conservatives in Congress have been distributing a potential amendment to the next omnibus bill set to be considered before the end of this week, which would allow blocking the territorial bankruptcy mechanism—apparently backed by groups of creditors of the Government of Puerto Rico.

Legal Deadline. The decision comes with tonight’s expiration of a legal stay which has sheltered Puerto Rico from lawsuits filed by its municipal bondholders after a series of escalating defaults, and in the wake of making little meaningful headway in negotiations with creditors, leading, seemingly intractably to the courts—as was the case in Detroit, Stockton, Jefferson County, Central Falls, and San Bernardino—and marks the end of a last gap effort by some of the U.S territory’s general obligation bondholders to achieve a “consensual solution that is based on a credible financial forecast and that avoids the free fall Title III that the Oversight Board seems intent on imposing.” Indeed, as late as Saturday, Gerardo Portela Franco, the Executive Director of Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority, said Puerto Rico was committed to reaching a consensual resolution with its creditors, noting the territory’s proposal was “intended to maximize returns to its creditors in a manner consistent with Puerto Rico’s goals for economic growth equitably,” and adding: “The government anticipates the discussions to continue over the coming weeks.” He was discussing an offer to repay general-obligation bondholders as much as $10.25 billion of the $13.2 billion they are owed, according to the proposal, and that sales tax bondholders would receive as much as $10.2 billion of $17.6 billion of sales tax bonds. Under said proposal, investors would exchange their existing municipal securities for two different types of debt: tax-exempt senior bonds with a constitutional priority maturing in 30 years, and cash-flow bonds that would be repaid after the senior securities, depending on the commonwealth’s liquidity. That proposal would have meant providing g.o. bondholders a recovery range of as little as 52%. Nonetheless, Puerto Rico bondholders had rejected Governor Rossello’s debt-restructuring proposal days before today’s deadline—effectively triggering the PROMESA provision.  

In a separate but related action, the PROMESA Board approved winding down Puerto Rico’s government development bank, which financed public works on the island until it defaulted during the crisis. Elias Sanchez, Governor Ricardo Rossello’s PROMESA representative stated: This will provide a viable path for an orderly process for the Government Development Bank with the least impact for stakeholders involved.”

Meanwhile in the Nation’s Capital. With Congress in OT after failing to act by last Friday, Congressional negotiations over including healthcare funding for Puerto Rico may have been stymied in the pending Continuing Resolution (CR) in the wake of President Trump’s tweet denouncing the idea; nevertheless, there appear still to be efforts in Washington to negotiate health care assistance in return for Puerto Rico’s agreement to a temporary hold on any use of bankruptcy-like provisions available under PROMESA. In the negotiations, Democrats in the House and Senate had been pushing to get Medicaid funding for Puerto Rico included in the CR, with some indications that Republican leaders have agreed that some type of Medicaid funding is needed for the Commonwealth—which is expected to exhaust its Medicaid funding under the Affordable Care Act by the end of the year, putting a huge strain on its ability to provide healthcare to its citizens—deemed a “Medicaid cliff” by Gov. Ricardo Rosselló, who, over the weekend noted: “This is not a bailout…This is what was allotted to Puerto Rico in the first place and is what is needed for us to have a runway in the next year so we can execute certain changes to our health industry.”

However, in a pair of tweets, President Trump blasted the possibility of Medicaid funding for Puerto Rico in a continuing resolution; he also took the opposite view in a pair of tweets late Wednesday and early Thursday last week which linked Democrats’ calls for funding help in Puerto Rico with insurer subsidies under Obamacare, writing: “Democrats are trying to bail out insurance companies from disastrous #ObamaCare, and Puerto Rico with your tax dollars. Sad!” The next day he tweeted: “The Democrats want to shut government if we don’t bail out Puerto Rico and give billions to their insurance companies for OCare failure. NO!” Thus, with Congress in overtime this week, the extra time could provide Congress more time to debate a potential agreement which would delay the Commonwealth’s ability to seek in-court restructuring of its debts in exchange for the Medicaid funding—albeit, the clock, as noted above, expires today.  

Governing Challenges of Federalism & Severe Fiscal Distress

eBlog, 1/20/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the deteriorating municipal fiscal conditions in Connecticut’s central cities, a new twist in New Jersey’s usurpation of municipal governance in Atlantic City, and the ongoing challenges in Puerto Rico where the PROMESA Board has provided new Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares additional time to submit a new fiscal plan—albeit a plan potentially complicated by a court ruling, as well as uncertainty with regard to potential changes in direction from Washington where, later this morning, a new Trump Administration takes the reins of power in Washington, D.C.  

Can Connecticut Help to Avert Municipal Bankruptcies? Gov. Daniel Malloy, in his State of the State address this month, stated he wanted to “ensure that no Connecticut city or town will need to explore the avoidable path of [municipal] bankruptcy,” indicating he would be working on an initiative involving statewide restructuring of local aid, especially for schools. His remarks seemed to parallel a new report, “Connecticut’s Broken Cities,” by Stephen Eide of the Manhattan Institute, in which he wrote: “State government is almost certainly going to have to get involved in the case of Hartford…Hartford may need a bailout to restore solvency.” However, the new report also examined the fiscal challenge of three other of the state’s central cities: Bridgeport, New Haven, and Waterbury—cities confronted by nearly $5 billion in OPEB and public pension obligations, estimating their combined annual OPEB liabilities at $120 million, and their unfunded pension liability to be $2.7 billion. The report paints a fiscal picture of municipalities which have the highest property taxes in the state—and the highest per capita municipal debt. Indeed, the rating agencies awarded Hartford two four-notch downgrades last year: Moody’s reduced the city’s rating to junk-level, putting it in the lowest one percent credit rating of all municipalities—even as it cited the city as at risk of further downgrades “over the medium term,” with its analysts noting that: “For the time being, Waterbury, and Bridgeport, and most likely also New Haven, can continue to muddle through without the need for extraordinary support from the state…[but] the same cannot be said for Hartford.” Hartford faces a $48 million gap on a $270 million budget, notwithstanding the steep budget cuts and layoffs the city undertook last year. The city appears to be on the wrong fiscal end of a teeter-totter: its reserves sagged 34% from FY2006 to FY2015; while its debt per capita escalated 78% over the same period, according to the report. Or, as Mayor Luke Bronin describes it: “The city used every trick up its sleeve to try to keep the lights on…I think all of those were mistakes, but in a big sense they’re a symptom of the problem, not the problem itself.” Gov. Malloy attributes the city’s property tax as the key fiscal contributor, whilst Mayor Bronin, the Governor’s former Chief Counsel, has pressed, as we have previously noted, for a regional solution—one that might, for instance, mirror some of the innovative fiscal, regional efforts in the St. Paul-Minneapolis and Denver metro areas. Mayor Bronin believes that a municipal fiscal partnership could include shared services or revising state formulas for education and health funding—a proposal that in some ways fits Connecticut Superior Court Judge Thomas Moukawsher’s order last fall directing the state to revise its state aid to education formula to better serve students in low-income municipalities—an order which Connecticut Attorney General George Jepsen is currently appealing. For his part, Gov. Malloy said a fairer distribution of Connecticut’s state aid to local governments could provide an important lifeline to avert chapter 9 bankruptcies—but that any such aid would mean the state would “play a more active role in helping less-affluent communities – in helping higher-taxed communities – part of that role will be holding local political leadership and stakeholders to substantially higher standards and greater accountability than they’ve been held to in the past: We should do it so that increased aid doesn’t simply mean more spending on local government.”

A Bridge to Local Experience. The New Jersey Department of Community Affairs has hired Atlantic City business administrator Jason Holt to assist in its state takeover of the distressed city, in this case adding a key individual who has worked under Mayor Donald Guardian for the last two years: Mr. Holt is charged with assisting the Department’s Division of Local Government Services in taking on the virtually insolvent city’s fiscal. He seems very well equipped, having served previously as Mayor Guardian’s solicitor, before serving as the city’s business administrator. Indeed, Mayor Guardian yesterday noted: “Over the past three years, Jason Holt has been an integral part of my team…When I originally selected him as my solicitor and then as my business administrator, I did so because of his extreme intellect and professionalism. Obviously, the State sees the same thing in Mr. Holt.” The transition is likely enhanced, because Mr. Holt has worked closely over the last two months with Local Government Services Director Tim Cunningham and Jeffrey Chiesa, the state’s designee in charge of Atlantic City financial matters. Department of Community Affairs spokesperson Lisa Ryan noted: “Mr. Holt’s hire by DLGS formalizes the work he has been doing in practice for the last two months…Mr. Holt will leave the City’s business administrator position, although the work he will do for DLGS will largely be the same as what he is doing now.” She added that Mr. Holt will continue working out of City Hall with his official first day with the DLGS set for next Monday. The state decision, however, has not been met with uniform approval: Assemblyman Chris Brown (R-Atlantic), who has been critical of the state for not producing its own fiscal recovery plan after rejecting the city’s, noted the lack of state transparency: “Without a transparent plan, even if they laid all the state’s experts end to end, they’d still never reach a solution.” In contrast, Mayor Don Guardian, who, in a statement said Mr. Holt has been an integral part of his team, added: “When I originally selected him as my solicitor, and then again as my business administrator, I did so because of his extreme intellect and professionalism. Obviously, the state sees the same thing in Mr. Holt…I look forward to working with him in his new capacity.” Indeed, Mr. Holt brings considerable experience, having previously served as corporation counsel for East Orange, Essex County, where, he provided legal counsel to both the Mayor and City Council, oversaw the complete spectrum of that city’s legal affairs, and played a key role in revamping its public-safety initiatives.

Is There Promise in PROMESA? Just as Puerto Rico enters its 12th year of economic depression, the PROMESA Oversight Board has informed new Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares that the Board is willing to grant additional time for the submission of a new fiscal plan—provided the Governor is willing to lay off public employees, reduce the pensions of thousands of retirees, make budget cuts for the University of Puerto Rico and Mi Salud, and extract an additional $1.5 billion from the pockets of corporations and individuals. In addition, the Board indicated it would be willing to extend the stay on litigation provided by PROMESA until May 1st, if Gov. Rosselló Nevares’s administration presents a plan to renegotiate Puerto Rico’ public debt. According to the calculations provided by the Board, this could mean an adjustment of $3 billion to the debt service, with the proposals gleaned from a 14-page letter, which appeared to be a warning to the new Governor that he must balance the budget in the next two fiscal years, and that the proposals for adjustments in public expenditures are “prerequisites” for the Board to certify any plan submitted. In response, Puerto Rico’s representative to the Board, Elías Sánchez Sifonte, immediately stated that Gov. Rosselló Nevares’s administration will seek to meet the Board’s conditions. He also assured that there are other mechanisms to balance the budget and close the fiscal gap—a gap the Oversight Board estimates at nearly $7.6 billion. In its letter, the Board advised the new Governor that his team could submit a new fiscal plan by the end of February, and that the document should be approved by March 15th—all subject to the Governor agreeing to balance the budget with a “one and done” approach, with “no discussion or consideration of short-term liquidity loans or near-term financings,” despite the contention by Gov. Rosselló Nevares and his team that such financing are a prerequisite in order to avoid a government shutdown. The stiff challenges, which the new Governor’s administration agreed were not so different from its own preliminary forecasts, were, nevertheless, perceived as “dramatic,” albeit key to avoid “the total collapse” of the government, blaming the previous Gov. Alejandro García Padilla’s administration’s “unwillingness to cooperate, [and] wasting time in presenting a fiscal plan that did not meet the requirements.”

The Board’s orders will affect not only Puerto Rico’s public employees, government pensioners, and foreign corporations and their tax liabilities, but also holders of Puerto Rican municipal bonds: those bondholders, in every state, could realize a reduction of as much as 80% of the annual payments that Puerto Rico must make—through different issuers—over the next two years. Sacrifices, it appears, will be widespread: the Board also proposed that Gov. Rosselló cut 23% in payroll expenses (about $900 million), which would imply a reduction in the number of public sector employees, an indicator that is already at a historical low; reduced public pensions by 10 percent—in a “progressive manner,” eliminated 100 percent of the subsidies to municipalities (about $400 million), which would be offset by a revision to property taxes, and higher payments by beneficiaries of Puerto Rico’s healthcare plan, all as part of Board recommendations that could, if implemented, save the U.S. territory as much as $1 billion. The Board added it believed the University of Puerto Rico could cut $300 million (27%) from its budget if it hiked tuitions. if it increased the amount of services among students and faculty members, raised the tuition to those who could afford it, and promoted the arrival of international and continental students to take courses in the institution.

The Board noted that to close Puerto Rico’s budget gap, Gov. Rosselló Nevares’s administration would have to meet with Puerto Rico’s municipal bondholders to make voluntary debt renegotiations through Title VI of PROMESA; albeit negotiations with the creditors would not necessarily take place in good terms: according to the numbers the Board released yesterday, the series of cutbacks and changes in the government would, on their own, be insufficient; ergo bondholders—including thousands of Puerto Rican individuals—will have to accept a cut in the debt service, which could amount to $3 billion.

But Here Come da Judge. Yet even as the PROMESA Board and the new Governor were seeking to come to terms with steps critical to fiscal recovery, the third branch of government stepped into the fiscal fray when U.S. District Judge Francisco Besosa handed a victory to holders of Puerto Rico Employment Retirement System (ERS) bonds, marking one of municipal bondholders’ first legal victories since Puerto Rico began defaulting on municipal bond interest payments about a year ago. Judge Besosa has ordered ERS to shift incoming employers’ contributions from its operating account to a segregated account at Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, directing that such funds remain in the segregated account until all parties agree on a different approach or the court orders the money to be moved out of the account. ERS had $3.1 billion in municipal bond debt outstanding as of July 2, 2016, according to the Puerto Rico government—none of it insured; all of it taxable. Normally, Puerto Rico government employers make employer contributions to support the payment of senior pension funding bonds; last year, as part of Puerto Rico’s emergency order 2016-31 in which it declared the ERS was in an emergency, the obligation of the ERS to transfer employer contributions to the bond trustee was suspended. Last November, Judge Besosa ruled against the plaintiffs in the case concerning the ERS bonds. Simultaneously, he had ruled against several other bondholder plaintiffs in other cases—leading some of the municipal bondholders to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit—which, last week, generally concurred with Judge Besosa’s opinion (see Peaje Investments, LLC v. Alejandro Garcia-Padilla et al, 4th U.S. Court of Appeals, #16-2431, January 11, 2017), affirming the continued stay on bondholder litigation stemming from the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act in several cases, albeit ordering Judge Besosa to hold a hearing for the arguments of the lead plaintiff, Altair Global Credit Opportunities Fund, and its co-plaintiffs, with the court writing: “We note that the Altair movants’ request for adequate protection here appears to be quite modest. They ask only that the employer contributions collected during the PROMESA stay be placed ‘in an account established for the benefit of movants.’ In light of ERS’s representation that it is not currently spending the funds, but instead simply holding them in an operating account, this solution seems to be a sensible one.” Thus, this week, Judge Besosa ordered such a segregated account to be set up and that all funds not transferred since the start of the PROMESA litigation stay be deposited in the account within five business days; Judge Besosa also ordered that in the future the ERS should transfer the employer contributions to the segregated account no later than the end of each month, noting that the segregated account will be “for the benefit of the holders of the ERS bonds,” adding, moreover, that said funds will simply sit in the account until a court orders otherwise, although he noted it would not preclude the ERS from transferring the employer contributions to the bond trustee for payment of the bonds, as would normally be the case.

Emerging from Municipal Bankruptcy: a Rough Ride

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eBlog, 1/04/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing challenges for the U.S. city emerging from the nation’s largest ever municipal bankruptcy, Detroit; then we veer into the warm Caribbean waters to observe the first days of the new administration of Gov. Ricardo Rosselló in Puerto Rico—where his new administration must adjust to coming to terms with its own PROMESA oversight board.

A New Detroit? The city emerging from the largest ever municipal bankruptcy is witnessing a string of major construction projects, from a massive hockey arena and street car line downtown to the resurrection of the Wayne County jail project: changes which will reshape the Motor City’s downtown in 2017—a level of activity and investment which seemed most improbable as the city shrunk and then dissolved into chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Today, the construction detours and closed sidewalks seem to offer a welcome sign of a new era for many who live and work near downtown. According to recent statistics, office vacancies in the downtown area are at their lowest point in a decade, and now the addition of the city’s new rail line could open demand in the New Center area, as well as increase demand for office space in neighborhoods near downtown such as Corktown and Eastern Market. Notwithstanding, the Detroit Financial Review Board, created as part of Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment to secure the U.S. bankruptcy court’s approval to exit bankruptcy, in its most recent oversight report, noted that the city continues to confront an unexpected gap in its public pension obligations and the absence of a long-term economic plan, reporting in its fourth annual report that could leave the city vulnerable to further fiscal challenges.(The next certification is due by October 1, 2017: under the plan of debt adjustment stipulations, the review board is charged with reviewing and approving annual four-year financial plans.) Both previous such plans have been approved. The most recent plan, submitted at the end of November, projects a general fund surplus of at least $41 million for FY2016, based on budget projections; Detroit expects to finish the current fiscal year with a general fund surplus of about $30 million. Nevertheless, the city faces a double-barreled fiscal challenge: its public pension liabilities and high costs of borrowing. Because its junk territory credit ratings from Moody’s and S&P, Detroit is forced it to pay disproportionately higher interest rates on its bonds.

With regard to its pension liabilities, where Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment approved by now retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes left intact public safety monthly checks, but imposed a 4.5% cut on general employees—and reduced or eliminated post-retirement (OPEB) benefits, as part of a mechanism to address some $1.8 billion in post-retirement obligations, the approved plan nevertheless suspended the COLa’s only until 2024—so a longer term liability of what was originally projected to be $111 million pends. (Indeed, the city’s pension agreement withstood a challenge last Fall when a federal appeals court ruled in favor of Detroit in a lawsuit by city retirees whose pensions were cut as part of the city’s approved plan of debt adjustment, after some retirees had sued, claiming they deserved the pension which was promised before the city filed for bankruptcy in 2013, with U.S. Judge Alice Batchelder of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals noting it was “not a close call.”)

But, as Shakespeare would put it: ‘There’s the rub.” Detroit’s actuaries, in their 2015 actuarial valuation reports, projected the liability in FY2024 and beyond to be nearly $200 million, based upon a thirty year amortization, with level principal payments and declining interest payments; however, as we have previously noted, those estimates were based upon optimistic estimates of assumed rates of return of 6.75 percent. In response, Detroit set aside $20 million from this year’s FY2016 fund balance, $10 million from its FY2016 budgeted contingency fund, and added an additional $10 million for each of the next three fiscal years—or, as Detroit Finance Director John Naglick told the Bond Buyer: “The city has six fiscal years to make an impact and close the gap on the [pension] underfunding. We don’t want to create such a cliff in 2024 where there is a big budget shock…The reality is to find those kind of monies over the next six fiscal years will cause some tradeoff in services.” Director Naglick added that last month Detroit completed an updated decade-long plan to update its approved plan of debt adjustment, adding: “The 10-year model will show the FRC that this incremental funding can be folded into the budget, but we aren’t naïve, it will also create some disruption in services to accommodate that…Think of it as a master plan on how we are going to make this stable.” Nevertheless, Mr. Naglick’s challenge will be hard: Moody’s last summer warned that the city’s “very weak economic profile” makes it susceptible to future downturns and population loss—threatening its ability “to meet its requirement to resume pension funding obligations in fiscal 2024.” Detroit’s next deadline looms: The City must submit its FY18-FY21 Four-Year Financial Plan to the Financial Review Commission by the statutory deadline of March 23rd.

Puerto Rico: A New Chapter? The new Governor of Puerto Rico, Ricardo Rosselló, yesterday, in the wake of his swearing in, acted straightaway on his first day in office to cut government spending and revenues, amid greater urgency to take steps to avoid a massive out-migration and end ten years of economic recession, and increase efforts to stem vital population losses which in 2013 alone witnessed some 74,000 Puerto Ricans leave the island. The new governor has already signed five executive orders, cutting annual agency spending by 20 percent, encouraging asset privatization, and proposing a zero based budgeting standard. Efforts like these, if actually implemented (a crippling risk in the context of historical Puerto Rico governance), could represent strides towards achieving fiscal solvency and help lay the groundwork for economic recovery. Governor Rosselló directed his agency heads to implement zero-based budgeting, under which agency heads start with a $0 and only adds to it when they can provide a justification for particular programs. Gov. Rosselló also created a Federal Opportunity Center attached to the governor’s office. The center will provide technical and compliance assistance to the office to make programs eligible for federal funds. For the new Governor, the three keys to recovery appear to be: how to revive the economy, fix the territory’s fiscal situation, and address the public debt.

The key, many believe, would be to opt for Title VI of the new PROMESA law, the voluntary restructuring portion. A growing concern is to create job opportunities—with one leader noting: “Many will leave if they cannot find jobs to search off the island for a better quality of life: our cities have to be habitable and safe…it has to be a place where the world wants to come to live…” Governor Rosselló also signed six executive orders, directing his department heads to cut 10 percent in spending from the current budget and to reduce the allocations for professional services by a similar amount—with even deeper cuts in other hiring; he imposed a freeze on new hires, noting: “We do not come to merely administer an archaic and ineffective scaffolding: Ours will be a transformational government.” Nevertheless, his task could be frustrated by the Puerto Rico House, where, yesterday, El Vocero reported that Puerto Rico House of Representatives President Carlos Méndez Núñez had told the newspaper last weekend that the legislature would cut Puerto Rico’s sales and use tax rate and the oil tax rate, reversing steps by the prior governor and legislature over the last four years. Governor Rosselló also pledged to work with the PROMESA Oversight Board in a collaborative way, as he departed the island to meet with members of the new Congress in Washington, D.C., where he planned to lobby for statehood for the U.S. territory.

With new administrations in San Juan and Washington, Gov. Rosselló will also have to work out a relationship with the PROMESA board, as the absence of cash to pay debt service, combined with the current payment moratoriums and federal stay on bondholder litigation appear destined to be extended deep into the year, albeit some anticipate that under the incoming Trump administration, one which will have much closer ties to creditor groups than the outgoing Obama administration, could lead to efforts to restart formal bondholder negotiations—negotiations which could become a vehicle by means of which creditors would increase their investment in Puerto Rico risks, by means of new loans and/or partial restructuring of liabilities in ex-change for a settlement which would be intended to improve long term municipal bond-holder recoveries and, most critically, work to enhance the price evaluations of Puerto Rico’s general obligation municipal bonds. Nevertheless, the territory’s structural, long-term budget deficit of nearly $70 billion over the next decade risks crowding out any medium-term payment of debt service absent serious spending reform as well as public pension reform—especially because of the ongoing outflow of young persons seeking better economic opportunities on the mainland.

Leaving Municipal Bankruptcy: Such Sweet Sorrow

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eBlog, 1/03/17

Good Morning! Happy New Year! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the next—and final—steps for the City of San Bernardino to exit the nation’s longest in U.S. history municipal bankruptcy, then we consider the underlying fiscal strengths that could be critical to Atlantic City’s emergence from state control and back to solvency. Finally, we try to assess whether one of President Obama’s final laws—expanding Petersburg’s national park—might help the fiscally ailing municipality, before finally comparing and contrasting the fiscal dilemmas of two U.S. territories: Puerto Rico and Guam.

Leaving Chapter 9. In just over three weeks, San Bernardino could receive its exit clearance from U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury from the longest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history. That will reduce court-related costs and burdens to the city; the real issue will be with regard to how it implements its plan of debt adjustment, with Mayor Carey Davis noting: “The city is poised and setting the stage for quite a bit of continued growth and improvements for 2017.” But, in the wake of the long bankruptcy, the new city which emerges will be different: it will have a new charter as soon as California Secretary of State Alex Padilla confirms the city’s election results, clearing the path for the city to begin implementing a new charter much more similar to those of other, successful cities—changes such as moving to a system where the City Council votes with the Mayor to set policy which is then implemented by the city manager. That change will take effect immediately; other changes will need to be implemented by the City Council approving changes to the municipal code. For her part, Judge Jury noted the city’s plan of debt resolution did not hinge on the charter approval; nevertheless, she praised the outcome: “(City officials) successfully amended their charter, which will give them modern-day, real-life flexibility in making decisions that need to be made…There was too much political power and not enough management under their charter, to be frank, compared to most cities in California.”

There were other critical steps to this longest-ever plan to exit municipal bankruptcy, including: catching up on audits for the first time since 2010, the city caught up on its audits, perhaps allowing it to operate in 2017 under less suspicion and with eligibility for more state and federal grants; significant outsourcing, especially with the transfer of the 137-year old Fire Department to county control; redevelopment at the Carousel Mall, and attempts to alleviate homelessness; albeit Mayor Carey Davis notes: “As you can see, there’s a full plate ahead of us in 2017…I’m sure there will be some unexpected needs that will be in place with a stronger city hall, a city hall that is doing a much better job with our financial reporting, but I think that with the changes of 2016 we’ll have a strong front to show investors.”

Spinning the Wheel of Misfortune. A key challenge for Atlantic City—and the State of New Jersey, which has assumed control over the city, relates to casinos: how to emerge from over reliance on gambling, which produces some 67 percent of the city’s revenues. Despite losing half its value in Atlantic City over the past decade, the gaming industry appears to remain a critical component of Atlantic City’s future. Notwithstanding the multiple bankruptcies of former casino owner and now President-elect Donald Trump in the fabled city, the industry still represents a more than $3.7 billion economy: in 2015, the casino industry totaled revenues of $3.7 billion, $2.4 billion of which was from gambling, according to New Jersey state figures. Through the first nine months of last year, there was $2.8 billion in total revenue. Ironically, the impact of Trump Taj Mahal Casino Resort’s closing in October remains to be determined. Still, as seemingly mouth-watering as such revenues would appear to be, they contrast with the more than double $5.2 billion in casino revenues from a decade ago—since then competition from outside the market has contributed to the closing of five casinos since 2014. So it seems to be a positive sign that over the past couple of years, Atlantic City properties increased their non-gaming attractions, with the increase in non-gaming attractions demonstrating a steady growth in non-gaming revenue. Indeed, between 2012 and last year, non-gaming revenue nearly quadrupled from $252 million to more than $998 million, according to state records.

A Fiscal Battlefield. President Obama has signed into law new federal legislation for a major expansion of Petersburg National Battlefield: the battlefield commemorates the Civil War’s longest battlefield conflict, marked by bursts of bloody trench warfare spanning some 10 months from 1864 to 1865. The new law, however, does not pay for the addition of more than 7,000 acres to the existing 2,700 acres of rolling hills, earthworks, and siege lines already under protection at Petersburg. Supporters of the new law say the larger boundary would not only protect historic sites from commercial development, but also give park visitors a more comprehensive understanding of the Petersburg campaign, which left tens of thousands of men dead. According to National Park Service figures, the park draws approximately 200,000 visitors a year, far fewer than such higher-profile sites as Gettysburg in Pennsylvania, with more than 1 million tourists annually. Nevertheless, the park has proved key to the area economy, bringing in some $10 million a year. Officials hope expanding the battlefield’s protected footprint would bring in even more visitors. However, the newly enacted legislation does not include any new funding.

The land changes come as the City of Petersburg, trying to unwind nearly $19 million in unpaid obligations, having reduced its employees’ pay and experienced the repossession of its firefighting equipment, is trying to determine how the federal changes might affect its fiscal distress. Today, according to National Park Service figures, the park draws about 200,000 visitors a year. Notwithstanding, the Petersburg park plays a key role in the regional economy, bringing in some $10 million a year. Thus, officials hope expanding the battlefield’s protected footprint would bring in even more visitors—visitors who might help enhance the city’s tax base. That might happen, as the Park Service’s first priority is expected to focus on the acquisition of still more private property and most vulnerable to commercial development. While that would risk creating a fiscal issue due to foregone property tax revenues, it might have the counter impact of raising the assessed values of property within the city limits—and create a means to help the city grapple with nearly $19 million in unpaid obligations.

Are Fiscal Crises Contagious? A question has arisen whether the promise of the newly enacted PROMESA law to provide a quasi-municipal bankruptcy mechanism for the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico to address its fiscal meltdown might be contagious for the territory’s U.S. counterpart Guam, where Fitch Ratings has cut Guam’s business-tax revenue bonds to junk, noting that PROMESA “fundamentally” alters the premise used to rate debt issued by U.S. territorial governments. Even though Guam is nearly 10,000 miles away from Puerto Rico, analysts claim the new Congressional law has set a precedent which could let other U.S. territories escape from obligations to their municipal bondholders. In contrast, S&P Global Ratings analyst Paul Dyson maintains an A rating for Guam—a rating which he notes reflects the territory’s ability to pay investors, adding that the new federal PROMESA law “currently applies only to Puerto Rico.” Indeed, Mr. Dyson points out that: “We have no indication that Guam is going to do something similar to PROMESA.” S&P reports that Guam’s economic outlook is stable: the territory is host to U.S. Air Force and Navy bases, and its economy likely to benefit from U.S. plans to expand its military operations on the island, which is the closest U.S. territory to potential hot spots in Asia. In contrast, however, Guam has not adopted a balanced budget; it has rising pension liabilities, and growing debt—debt of some $3.2 billion in obligations for a population of about 165,700, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Double Transitions & The Challenges of Fiscal Governance

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eBlog, 12/14/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the dual transition periods for the U.S. and Puerto Rican governments as they change administrations in the midst of Puerto Rico’s insolvency. President-elect Trump has devoted little focus on the U.S. territory’s fiscal and health care crisis—and governance on the island is about to change too in the wake of the election last month of Governor-elect Ricky Rossello, who won with 41% of the vote in a four-way race.

Puerto Rico Governor Alejandro García Padilla, who has 18 days left in office, yesterday affirmed that it will require creativity to pull Puerto Rico out of its fiscal and political crisis—and that it would also mean the territory must file for restructuring as soon as possible. He added that the federal government would have to be a critical partner if the commonwealth is to resolve its fiscal crisis. He noted that even though the new PROMESA law offered the island a legal structure to restructure its public debt, he noted that the new federal statute “interfiere con la Constitución de Puerto Rico al extremo de que permite una junta no electa imponer un plan fiscal y controlar los presupuestos bajo ese plan”—that is that the PROMESA law provided for an unelected group to impose its authority, adding that even though the U.S. Supreme Court had recognized the “political reality and the changed law” in the territory, he  noted that for many in Puerto Ricans, PROMESA has created an unconstitutional intrusion. Thus, he urged that “no crisis should go to waste,” so that an important part of any fiscal solution will hinge on the commonwealth filing for restructuring “now;” because, he warned: “The chaos of costly, protracted litigation that would ensue if the commonwealth does not seek restructuring can easily be avoided with swift, decisive action within the next two months,” referring to the expiration of the stay on litigation” imposed by PROMESA until Feb. 15th, at which point, he added: the “commonwealth will face a cash deficit of over $3 billion that would likely force a government shutdown…There should be no excuse to force Puerto Rico to depression economics.”

He insisted on the importance of Congress and the Administration’s commitment of economic assistance—including equal treatment of Puerto Ricans with regard to Medicare and Medicaid. The Governor’s remarks came as a double transition is underway—both in Washington, D.C. and in Puerto Rico—and where the incoming Trump Administration has, so far, been silent with regard to PROMESA’s implementation and next steps—and as the current PROMSEA oversight board is currently reviewing Puerto Rico’s fiscal plan in order to determine whether and how to file debt restructuring petitions on behalf of the territory and its entities in federal district court if voluntary negotiations with the islands creditors fail.