Planning for a Quasi Plan of Debt Adjustment

eBlog

August 3, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider Gov. Ricardo Rosselló’s ambitious plans for Puerto Rico.  

Governor Ricardo Rossello Nevares believes now is the time to accelerate the pace the pace and demand both programmatic and fiscal results from the U.S. territory’s agency directors to better prepare for a post-recovery quasi plan of debt adjustment. The closing of so many of the island’s schools and the emigration to the mainland of so many health care professionals, and the unhappy state of relations with not just the legislature, but also Puerto Rico municipalities appears to make this a critical point for readjustment. Or, as the Governor put it: “In general, I have always seen the government, particularly in these times, as one which has been in almost continuous transformation—or, to make an analogy with the business sector, as a time to focus on a start-up phase: “Sometimes, you run a lot as if your government was like a Fortune 500 corporation, where things are more or less the same and you keep moving forward. But the reason I aspired was to make some changes…and that requires, in addition to having very specific objectives, to understand, one, that there are changes of roles in that process, as in the start-ups, and two, to know what is the time to execute those changes.”

One area of focus appears to be making his government more open—especially after a year and a half which has seen scandal that touched several of his closest collaborators, the operational and administrative collapse of the Electric Power Authority, the closing of schools, and the flight of health professionals to the mainland. Add to that the ongoing governance challenge imposed by the President and Congress—where the issue of who is steering governance going forward is imbalanced between the Governor, legislature, PROMESA Oversight Board, and. Now, a federal judge—all as Puerto Rico is still not fully recovered from the massive Hurricane Maria—and yet finds itself in the new hurricane season, recognizing it will not receive the same level of FEMA federal assistance in the event of a severe storm as other states or municipalities on the mainland.

Nevertheless, the Governor is focusing on the future—a future beginning to emerge under his “ideas map” which he keeps on his desk: “Puerto Rico: Vision 20/20,” under which he hopes to align his team via setting objectives and what he terms “intangible characteristics” as part of his governing blueprint for the new school year and post-Maria rebuilding.

Thus, in the second half of this year, the Governor intends to focus on reducing some of the bureaucracy of governance, beginning with making the permitting process more practical and less bureaucratically cumbersome—cutting the process in half, and awarding at least three public-private partnerships before the end of the year—or, as he put it: “Accompanying some results with the restructuring of the debt, that would be a great achievement in my assessment,” adding that by November, he hopes his new model of My Health will be implemented, and, by December, new health care legislation will be enacted, followed by a new energy policy for Puerto Rico. Or, as the Governor put it: “My administration has a diversity of people who come from different administrations. My goal is not to select someone because they have gray hair or are very young or certain demographic. The main objective is the commitment to comply with the priorities of this administration and the ability to work as a team.”

A key player on the new team will be Christian Sobrino, who will take the place currently held by Gerardo Portelo, to serve as Puerto Rico’s representative before the PROMESA Oversight Board, while Mr. Portelo will become the main investment officer.

Gov. Rosselló Nevares not only has reconfigured his team of close advisers, but also has transferred to La Fortaleza the tasks to implement the fiscal plan which, until now, has been in the hands of Aafaf—indeed, the Governor has already signed an executive order on the roles of the CFO, but said he could submit legislation on the subject. (The CFO office is one of the reforms in the fiscal plan certified by the Oversight Board which the Governor does not question.)

To address the governing challenges with regard to education, health, and safety, Gov. Rosselló Nevares noted: “We are making sure that students can have a full faculty, that there are challenges and obstacles, of course. If it is a large system, and the transformation, rare as it is soft, is typically a rocky process,” noting his plan to implement educational vouchers and charter schools is still in place. With regard to the vital issue of health care, the Governor noted it is urgent to improve the processes for the response to a disaster, a criterion under which he intends, henceforward, to evaluate all the heads of the respective agencies, adding that he is committed to converting Mi Salud into a model single region with free selection of doctors by indigents. In addition, he has set a goal of reducing crime by 20%, noting that, the havoc created by Hurricane Maria undoubtedly contributed to the significant crime rate increase: “I understand, what happens is that it is not consistent then with what was happening at the beginning of the year. At the beginning of the year, in January, we had a rise particularly in the murders, and it is not after that where one, truth, the capacities to measure all these things improve; they do not get worse, because that’s where the descent happens. Everything is subject to evaluation here, but we have used the same mechanism, the same metrics.”

Restoration of Governing Authority? Asked whether he had given much thought to a post PROMESA Oversight Board governing future, the Governor said: “I have not had that conversation, honestly I have not had it…If there is space to look for something that is optimal for the people of Puerto Rico, I will consider it. But, at this moment, I believe that the Judge must decide…and I cannot predict what her decision will be…after which, we will evaluate that decision, what it entails, and we will take the appropriate actions,” adding that his objective is to present a plan to the President and Congress with regard to Puerto Rico’s reconstruction.

With regard to his relationship with the legislature, he noted: “Our objective, both mine and that of the legislative leaders, I am sure is the welfare of the people of Puerto Rico. I did not start to differences that one can and should calculate that they are going to have on the road; we have a finite time to make some great changes for Puerto Rico. I trust that now, when you see the tax reform, you will act in the best interests of the people of Puerto Rico. I trust that when we see public policy, for example, to mitigate environmental impact, we act in the best interests of the people of Puerto Rico, among other initiatives that we will be presenting. Differences will always be there. I have already established my position: we will be able to work together for the welfare of the people of Puerto Rico.

Getting Schooled in Demography. With Puerto Rico’s new school year set to start Monday, it remains uncertain how many students and teachers will be present. Secretary of Education Julia Keleher yesterday reported that 20,000 regular teachers have already been relocated, out of which only 550 have reported “difficulties” with the changes—only 18,000 students out of the island’s 305,000 have yet to confirm which school they will attend. A declining school population has created jitters with regard to which schools to close—and how to involve parents—or not to—in this Solomon-like process. Nevertheless, as one mother bitterly complained: “Parents were not involved in anything, ever.” Indeed, many parents and teachers believe that the closure was improvised. For instance, a newspaper delivery vehicle (El Nuevo Día) which had stopped opposite a school was hailed by a driver of a truck with the Education logo: its driver asked if the school was open. When they told him it was not, the man said he was to deliver food for the school cafeteria. It seems the decision to keep Jacinto López Martínez School open was taken after the Secretary of Education, along with Mayor Carlos López of Dorado, visited the school at the end of the semester—or, as Principal Lois Santiago described it: “There has been a crazy (student) relocation. The majority appears (enrolled) in the Jacinto López Martínez School, but there are first former students who‒we do not know how‒appear in the Escuela Libre de Música…There is a student listed in the Luisa Valderrama School, which is an hour away.”

Dorado Physical Education Teacher Miguel Rubildo said that, last week, he went to the Arecibo educational region to request some of the available positions, but the options he was given were in the municipalities of Quebradillas and Florida, while the principals of the schools Jacinto López Martínez and Esperanza González confirmed that, a little more than a week before the beginning of the semester, they did not know the number of teachers who would be relocated in their schools, much less whether there would even be classrooms available for them.

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Contrasting Responses to Fiscal and Physical Storms

July 10, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the superb update on the fiscal impact of Hurricanes Irma and Maria on the U.S. Virgin Islands by Jason Bram and Lauren Thomas of the New York Federal Reserve.

Much more dependent on tourism than Puerto Rico, the authors noted that there has been far less attention to the fiscal ravages of the two storms despite the fact that St. Thomas, St. Croix, St. John, and a number of smaller islands suffered comparable devastation. No doubt, they point out, this is in part due to their much smaller population: the U.S. Virgin Islands is home to about 105,000 Americans—1/30th Puerto Rico’s population. It is home to Claude O. Markoe Elementary School in Christiansted, where, long, long ago, this author taught school as part of training for the Peace Corps to teach in Bush Gbaepo Grebo Konweaken, in Grand Gedah County, Liberia.

The Fed authors reminded us that the Virgin Islands had already been fiscally weakened prior to the hurricanes in the wake of a shutdown of a major refinery on St. Croix in 2012—a shutdown which dramatically increased the dependence on tourism: employment dropped by about 15 percent between 2011 and 2014; it has changed little since. Then, last September 20th, Hurricane Maria smote St. Croix where, as they described it, the “magnitude of the damage and disruption for the territory as a whole was unprecedented in recent history.” Adding to the physical and fiscal misery, the Virgin Islands could not count on any assistance from Puerto Rico—and, as we have noted based upon the devastating lack of help from the federal government, the U.S. Virgin Islands were mostly left to fend for themselves.

The economic, physical, and fiscal damage, according to the latest available data, meant that total employment in the U.S. Virgin Islands dropped by an estimated 12% between August 2017—right before Hurricanes Irma and Maria—and November of that year; but by May of this year, the authors found that only a fraction of those job losses, about 600, had been reversed. Indeed, it appears that the fiscal and economic effects of Irma and Maria were “substantially more severe in the Virgin Islands than in Puerto Rico, where employment fell by about 6 percent right after Maria.”

Such a disparate outcome would, they wrote, seem unexpected, especially when considering not only the widespread power outages and pathetic FEMA responses which affected so much of Puerto Rico for so very long—and began to drain the U.S. territory of those most fiscally and physically able to leave for the mainland, especially when compared to the Virgin Islands, where “literally everyone lives within a few miles of the coastline,” unlike Puerto Rico where the steep mountains vastly complicated the task of restoring power to hospitals and police and emergency response centers, leading the Fed authors to pose the question: “With this greater disruption of everyday life occurring in Puerto Rico, why would the economic effect appear considerably more severe in the Virgin Islands?”

The authors note that a critical distinction relates to the Virgin Islands’ high dependence on tourism—a reliance which can be especially pernicious in the wake of a major natural disaster. Thus, they wrote, because tourism tends to be particularly sensitive to the aftermath of natural disasters, “the Virgin Islands’ dependence on this industry largely explains the relatively severe economic hit,” contrasting that with Puerto Rico’s much more diversified economy, illustrating the difference by noting that Puerto Rico’s hotel/accommodation industry, which represents just over 2% of private-sector jobs in Puerto Rico, accounts for about 13% of jobs in the U.S. Virgin Islands. Thus, one fiscal outcome of the storm was the hotel/tourist industry in the U.S. Virgin Islands experienced an especially steep slump after the storm: as of last December, employment in that industry had fallen by 1,300 jobs, or 35%; employment in the broader leisure and hospitality sector—which also includes restaurants and bars but largely caters to visitors—fell by just under 30%. Nearby in Puerto Rico, in comparison, tourism and hospitality job losses accounted for only about 25% of the total job loss. 

The Fed writers also examined the contrasting capacities of the two U.S. territories to accommodate tourists, writing that the damage wrought to hotels in the Virgin Islands after the two hurricanes significantly impacted the capacity for fiscal recovery: by the middle of last May, nearly 90% of Puerto Rico’s 149 hotels had reopened. In contrast, only 60% of the Virgin Islands’ had—adding that, in the Virgin Islands, relief workers were being housed in many of the available rooms, reducing the capacity for tourists or business travelers—and noting: “Remarkably, there has been virtually no new hotel construction in the Virgin Islands for more than two decades.” With the latter, they note, adding to the fiscal challenges to the U.S. Virgin Islands, because of the related sharp decline in restaurant business—finding that local economies had contracted far more sharply in the Virgin Islands than in Puerto Rico, where the surge of rescue workers, including from FEMA and army personnel, utility crews, and construction workers, helped offset the loss of tourists.

Now, they note, the key challenge for the U.S. Virgin Islands’ economy is to restart its vital tourism, noting that the critical steps “appear to be twofold: restoring its capacity to accommodate overnight guests, and encouraging visitors to come,” but, critically, also noting that, in the long-term, the Virgin Islands confront a dilemma: “Is it best to focus resources and policy on a key industry like tourism, which brings in money from outside, or should policy place more of an emphasis on diversifying into other industries, which may be less vulnerable to the periodic hurricane?”

Ending a State’s Fiscal Emergency Manager Preemption, & Who’s on First in Puerto Rico’s Governance?

July 2, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider what might be the end of the State of Michigan’s much maligned emergency manager program, before returning to assess the question with regard to whether a governor and legislature or a quasi U.S. bankruptcy court are in charge in Puerto Rico.

Exiting from Municipal Bankruptcy. For the first time in nearly two decades, a state-appointed Emergency Manager governs no municipality or school district in Michigan, after the state released Wayne County’s Highland Park School District in Wayne County from receivership under Michigan’s Local Financial Stability and Choice Act of 2012. Indeed, Michigan Treasurer Nick Khouri reports that Michigan municipalities have worked hard to become financially sound, noting: “Today’s achievement is really about the hard work our communities have accomplished to become financially sound…I commend the efforts of our local units to identify problems and bring together the resources needed to help problem-solve challenging financial conditions.” Under the terms of the release, Highland Park School District’s locally elected school board will oversee the contract for Highland Park Public School Academy and the cooperative agreement with the Detroit Public Schools Community District for the continuing education of students. In addition, the board will manage the repayment of long-term debt obligations. The Highland School District has a quasi-chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment in place to address its $7.5 million general fund deficit, with revenues from property taxes imposed on non-homestead property dedicated to finance outstanding debt, as well as an approved two-year budget. According to financial statements, as of the end of last year’s fiscal year, the District had $2.4 million in general obligation bonds outstanding.

The agreement means the school district, which had been under emergency management since January of 2012, and for which the state-appointed emergency manager had established Highland Park Public School Academy to provide educational services to district students while the school district paid off long-term debt obligations—for which, since 2015, said public school academy has been educating students from pre-kindergarten through eighth grades, and for the scholastic years through high school via a cooperative agreement with the Detroit Public Schools Community District, which has been providing educational services to students from ninth through 12th grades.

Nevertheless, the State of Michigan continues to maintain an oversight role in a limited number of Michigan communities: public school districts in Benton Harbor and Pontiac are operating under a consent agreement with the state, and the Muskegon Heights school district is overseen by a receivership-transition advisory board. The critical fiscal recoveries were marked by April’s exit from state oversight by the City of Flint, after seven years, and then, the following month: Detroit.

Conflicted Fiscal Governance. With the beginning of the new fiscal year, Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares still assessing fiscal options, as well as his authority to address the $8.7 billion operating budget imposed yesterday by the PROMESA Oversight Board on the U.S. territory–or, as he put it: “We are evaluating the budget certified by the Fiscal Oversight Board on the U.S. territory. Certainly, the impact on the budget of the three branches of government and municipalities will require additional adjustments that will limit our ability to provide services.” Ramon Rosario, Puerto Rico’s Secretary of Public Affairs, noted:  “The Governor and his cabinet continue to analyze all possible alternatives to the scenario.”

There was no public reaction to the imposed fiscal preemption of elected authority by House President Carlos Johnny Mendez, nor Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz, respectively, to the budget imposed by the JSF. The Governor indicated, however, that some of the biggest concerns of the Executive are public employees and the payment of the Christmas bonus, as well as the elimination of funds for economic development.

The Board’s proposed budget, interestingly, is greater than that approved by the Legislature; however, it imposes additional cuts of up to $345 million. It does not repeal Law 80-1976, the Law Against Unjustified Dismissal. It does preserve the Christmas bonus for public employees and establish two funds, one of $ 25 million for the University of Puerto Rico, and another of $ 50 million for municipio recovery. PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión, in a written statement, noted: “The course has been drawn, and although it will be a challenge, we cannot afford to deviate. We must all work together.”

Working together would be a challenge—and a question now for Puerto Rico is whether to comply or go to court to preserve, ironically, an approved fiscal budget smaller than that to be imposed by the PROMESA Board: that is, what if the Governor and Legislature were to opt not to implement the unelected PROMESA Board’s proposed budget? One attorney noted: “There would be a confrontation that would generate a controversy in the court, because, then, the Board would have to go to the court and ask it to force the officials to comply with the budget.” Under such a scenario, the unelected fiscal oversight Board would issue a certification of non-compliance, which, were it not to compel the elected government of Puerto Rico to comply, could entail the Board availing itself of the mechanisms in the PROMESA statute preempting Puerto Rico’s governing authority. Independence Party’s Denis Márquez remarked that his “exhortation is not to obey the Fiscal Control Board, but they always tell you that you have to be against the Board, but at the end of the day you look for a reasonable accommodation that always ends up hurting the country.” However, unlike a chapter 9 governance situation, where a federal bankruptcy court assesses a municipality’s plan of debt adjustment, PROMESA allows the Board to establish the budget at its sole discretion. It appears to be virtually a form of colonialism.

As the oversight board had advanced during its approval of the fiscal plan last Friday, the public expenditure scheme contemplates reductions greater than those set in the first version of the document approved by the Legislature: the budgets of some agencies seem to have an increase compared to the current fiscal year, but this is due to the fact that, for the first time, each one was assigned an authorization corresponding to the payment of their employees’ pensions (pay as you go). A spokesperson for the Popular Democratic Party in the House noted: “The vision of the Board is the republican vision, a small government with less participation.” Indeed, the version to be imposed by the Oversight Board contemplates major cuts for the Department of Education, which ended with an allocation for this fiscal year of $2.479 billion, about a 5% cut for what the Legislature had approved, with the deepest cuts coming in payroll and operating expenses, even as the Board added nearly $30 million to “cover services related to the provision of therapies and other services for special education children, and $ 23.8 million for the payment of salary increases to teachers—leading Puerto Rico Senate Education Chair Abel Nazario to note that the PROMESA Board “itself recognizes that these measures must be maintained in the coming years is an achievement that we recognize and appreciate.”

The Board imposed a number of deep cuts, such as the Bureau of the Fire Department, where the Board cut operating expenses of $576,000, as proposed by the Legislature, to $148,000; it slashed just over $1 million for firefighter protection equipment, and cut the police department payroll by $587.1 million, as stipulated in the Legislature’s version, to $ 570.2 million, but the Board retained the proposed $18.8 million for increased police salaries.

Imbalanced Governance? The Board cut funding for the Governor’s office in excess of 10 percent, and funds for the Puerto Rico Legislature by nearly 20 percent; it cut funding for the Puerto Rico Health Department by just under 10 percent.

Can there be Shelter from the Storm? Meanwhile, in a different courtroom, U.S. District Judge Leo T. Sorokin of Massachusetts has ordered that FEMA cannot end its Transitional Sheltering Assistance program until at least midnight tomorrow, granting Puerto Ricans who fled Hurricane Maria’s devastation and have been living in temporary housing on the mainland a very brief reprieve. Christiaan Perez, manager of advocacy and digital strategy for the civil-rights group, LatinoJustice, the national civil-rights group which filed a lawsuit Saturday seeking the restraining order told the court the end of the FEMA assistance would lead to Puerto Rican evacuees being evicted. The temporary restraining order is projected to offer some protection for about 1,744 Puerto Ricans for whom the FEMA transitional assistance was to end Saturday. Judge Sorokin has scheduled a telephone hearing for today.

The outcome will impact many of the families who left Puerto Rico in the wake of the storm for the mainland who have been living in hotels in New York and Florida and those who have been unable to secure affordable housing and are now worried about what happens as FEMA assistance expires—or, as Cynthia Beard, one of the 600 Puerto Rican hurricane survivors living in New York, told NBC News this week: “I don’t know what’s going to happen. The city called me and said there’s a shelter, but there’s no guarantee; they didn’t say everything is going to be OK.” According to Mayor De Blasio’s office, New York City has a program in place to direct transportation from the hotels to the shelters. Once there, families have to find out if they are deemed eligible to register into the city’s shelter system: if accepted, families are assigned to case management and housing assistance services to help them find permanent homes. 

But FEMA has also offered displaced Puerto Ricans the option to return to Puerto Rico, asserting the agency has called more than 1,500 displaced Puerto Ricans to offer to pay for their plane tickets to return to Puerto Rico by yesterday or recommend them ways to look into their respective state’s shelter system. As of June 27, only 145 families had either booked their plane tickets or already returned to Puerto Rico. It appears the majority of displaced Puerto Rican families have opted to remain stateside, even though many do not have a permanent home. The offer came in the wake of four different deadline extensions, during which, under FEMA’s TSA program has housed Puerto Rican hurricane survivors for nearly 9 months. During other disasters, survivors participating in that program were given up to a year and a half—even though officials have said that the program normally lasts 30 days. Nevertheless, FEMA warned it was ending Transitional Sheltering Assistance for survivors of hurricanes Maria, Irma, and Harvey on Saturday, asserting it has spent more than $432 million on survivor lodging as part of the program, and that it has provided rental assistance to more than 25,000 TSA participant families to help them find permanent housing.

Who Is in Fiscal Command?

June 29, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing challenge of governance in the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico: is it a federal judge, a duly elected Governor and legislature, or a board imposed by Congress and the Administration?

Who Is In Fiscal Charge? With the new fiscal year beginning Sunday, the Puerto Rico Legislature is set to approve a budget less than that which was presented to the PROMESA Board. The initial version, approved by the House of Representatives of $8.782 billion provided for an increase of $33.2 million over the amount approved by the PROMESA Board. The Legislative Assembly is, today, expected to approve an FY2019 budget of $8.7 billion. Senator Migdalia Padilla Alvelo of Maraquitas, a small town founded in 1803, who has served in the Senate for nearly two decades, and is the current Finance Commission Chair, yesterday announced that, as part of the legislative discussion, they have managed to identify several items which will adjust the budget without touching the allocations included by the House of Representatives to meet the reductions imposed by the PROMESA Board to the umbrella of the Department of Public Security and tax agencies, such as the Office of Government Ethics and the Office of the Comptroller. Those modifications cleared the path to revert some $50 million for the operation of the Government Central Accounting System (Prifas). Concurrently, the budget was modified to adjust reserves down from $75 to $35 million, with the Senator explaining: “was reduced from $ 75 million to $ 35 million: We reduced the $8,749 billion which the Board had set for expenses to $8.709 billion: “we are below what the PROMESA Board originally set.” House Finance Committee Chair Antonio Soto also confirmed there would be approval of the budget today, explaining that the negotiations with the Senate team had been aimed at reducing the budget to the level proposed by the Board without touching the expense items that had been added, noting: “We understand that we are going to be able to maintain it…in the same level that they established, but including the expense items that are necessary.”

Meanwhile, in a press release, Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz reported that a Conference Committee had been formed to address the amendments introduced on his side, adding: “We had planned to approve the budget today. In the House, the discussion of the measure has been delayed a little, but the House President Carlos Méndez Núñez yesterday told me that that body will approve it today.”

With the action, the PROMESA Oversight Board cancelled its scheduled public meeting set for today—where it had intended to act on the Puerto Rico budget, to await today’s actions by the legislature, and then act tomorrow to approve the U.S. territory’s budget, as well as those of several authorities, with the Board noting the delay would provide more time to “complete required technical and macroeconomic changes to the Commonwealth Fiscal Plan with updated information.” The board still expects to approve a budget by the end of the fiscal year—with the PROMESA Board apparently primed to preempt Puerto Rico’s authority and impose its own fiscal dictates, including a repeal of Law 80 and the establishment of at-will employment, per its preemption demand to Gov. Ricardo Rosselló last month—a demand the Puerto Rico Senate declined to act upon.

The Board preemption yesterday came in the wake of, earlier this week, of its issuance of notices of violation with regard to government-proposed budgets for the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority and University of Puerto Rico—with, in each instance, the unelected Board notifying the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority that the Board required “substantial revisions and additional information” before it could approve the budgets. Some believe the PROMESA Board’s actions could signal a likely rejection of Puerto Rico’s budget tomorrow. PROMESA Board Director Natalie Jaresko said that if Puerto Rico’s elected leaders did not repeal Law 80, the Board would eliminate several accommodations it made to the Governor, including the retention of Christmas bonuses for government employees and a multiyear $345 million economic development and reform implementation initiatives fund.

It appears that, irrespective of the final actions taken by the Legislature, Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares recognizes the authority under the PROMESA statute granted to the Board. Thus, with the clear expectation that Law 80 (the Law Against Unjustified Dismissal) will be repealed,  the Governor appears to seeking to ensure he will play a key role in the process of restructuring the debt in federal court, and that he will be a player in constructing the quasi chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment which is anticipated to be settled by next week.

Another key issue pending relates to Chamber 1662, on Puerto Rico public pensions, which the Gov. yesterday endorsed—likely to arm himself to oppose the Oversight Board’s proposed average 10% cut in Puerto Rico pension benefits—cuts the Board wishes to trigger in the new fiscal year.

In response to a press question yesterday with regard to whether the Governor would go to court if, as expected, the PROMESA Board preempts Puerto Rico’s law and eliminates the Christmas bonus and current provisions for sick leave and vacations of public employees, the Governor was clear he would, noting:Yes, I’ve always said it. The unfortunate thing is that we will be spending $20 to $25 million a month in litigation processes that we are not sure of how we are going to finish. Second,  the process of restructuring the debt is not started and, instead of having a visibility to finish this in a year and a half, two years, we are talking about years. Possibly eight years, a decade in which this can be resolved, because the Oversight Board is the only entity authorized to submit a plan of debt adjustment. We have been working with them, with certain differences on that adjustment plan. But this is very clear, if you have an agreement, the only difference is pensions where we can sit or go to court for a single component…The content of this adjustment plan will depend not only on the restructuring of the debt, but also on whether the island will continue to be protected against appropriations of its government funds.”

Hurricane Recovery. On the critical issue of recovery from Hurricane Maria, where Puerto Rico received thrown paper towels compared to Houston, estimates are that recovery costs could be as high as $94 billion—Puerto Rico has, to date, received about $6 billion. Nevertheless, Gov. Rosselló appears optimistic, noting the island is in its recovery phase: “I think we’re on the way. Certainly FEMA’s disbursement has been slow, but now a new phase is entering that is important for people to know, which is includes HUD housing and CDBG funds—funds from which Puerto Rico has already begun drawing down: he added: “We hope that by the beginning of January or the end of December we can already have access to the bank of the $18.5 billion.”  

The Tides of Immgration: Are there Fiscal Consequences?

June 25, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the tides of emigration as they fiscally challenge the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico.

Today, more than one million Puerto Ricans live in New York City, just under one-third of Puerto Ricans who reside in Puerto Rico, with the likelihood of emigrating from Puerto Rico to Gotham increasing for single Puerto Ricans between the ages of 25 and 29 who have never married, do not own property, and whose income is limited, albeit not to the point of being below the federal poverty level. The majority are men, and the destinations of preference seem to be cities in Florida, New York, or Texas. In theory, about a fifth of those who left will return, judging by the rate of return reported on the immigration side to Puerto Rico. According to the most recent census data, in 2016, some 89,000 left Puerto Rico, a number which appears to indicate a rising trend, albeit, there is some evidence that the pattern might be changing—with that pattern affected by not only destination, but also by the level of academic achievement of those leaving Puerto Rico.

While we await, in December, 2017 emigration data, early indications based upon passenger counts at airports, appear to represent very high migration trends, finding, for instance, that last year, more than 281,000 Puerto Ricans left Puerto Rico than arrived there—an indication of the demographic impact of Hurricane Maria. Demographer Judith Rodríguez wrote in the 2016 Migrant Profile (published last week) that “The recent wave of migration in the last decade exceeds the Great Exodus of 1950-60, which has great impact on the social and economic level.” More recent data, however, indicates this demographic tide may finally be ebbing: during this year’s first month, January, 58,202 more arrived on the island than left, with the patter continuing the next month when there was a net positive inflow of 10, 698—a number which ebbed by March to 1,510—a change estimated to be temporary.

After New York, Florida appears to be the emigration state of choice: currently, around 30% of Puerto Rican emigrants choose a city in Florida, mainly in the central zone. At the same time, Texas is rising as a demographic state of choice. It appears more likely than not that New York City will continue to be a focal point of Puerto Rican emigration, due to cultural and family ties with Puerto Ricans since the migrations of the early twentieth century in the wake of the enactment of the Jones-Shafroth Act. According to the most recently updated Census figures, New York City is in the top three exodus destinations for emigrating Puerto Ricans.

But this is not all one-way traffic: many Puerto Ricans appear to be going home, with the largest such numbers coming from the states of Florida and New York; however, the number returning from the states of Massachusetts, Louisiana, and Washington make up more than half the total.

While it is more difficult to assess who is leaving and who is staying, Census data indicates that 48% of Puerto Ricans living in the D.C. metropolitan area have at least a bachelor’s degree, and, overall, 78% of Puerto Ricans living on the mainland have at least some level of university education, nearly three times the percentage of Puerto Ricans who have moved to Miami. Income wise, Washington, D.C. is the location, which appears to have drawn Puerto Ricans with both the greatest levels of scholastic achievement and the most income: the median household income for Puerto Ricans in the nation’s capital is $87,713. Next, after Washington DC, mainland cities with the highest median income for the Puerto Ricans are Miami ($50,945), Chicago ($47,232) and New Haven ($43,165). The disparity in annual income perhaps demonstrates the lure of emigrating from Puerto Rico, where the median income of a household is around $ 19,977, according to the Census data.

However, for Puerto Ricans leaving for the mainland, nirvana is not guaranteed: in the cities of Springfield and Boston, as well as in Hartford, there are high poverty levels are high for Puerto Ricans: in Springfield, more than one-third of the more than 100,000 Puerto Ricans live below the federal poverty level—a level comparable to the 31% below that level in the Boston metro region, and 26.5% in the Springfield metropolitan area have incomes that place them below the poverty level.  In addition, age is a discriminating factor: in Springfield, almost 50% of Puerto Ricans under the age of 18 live below the poverty line—a figure that compares unfavorably to the 46% of Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico who fall below the federal poverty line of $12,060 for an individual.

The Prospects and Draws for Emigration. Demographic data with regard to those leaving Puerto Rico finds that the bulk of emigrants worked in 2016 as administrative office staff (6,822), followed by operators of production lines (5,445), vendors (4,870), and food preparers (3,264). According to the date, some 382 desperately needed doctors left—while some 1,376 nursing professionals left the island. Stateside, 82% of the 2.2 million Puerto Ricans who are working on the mainland are employed in the private sector; 4% have their own business. 14% of the jobs occupied by Puerto Ricans are in the government. In Puerto Rico, that figure rises to 22%, according to data from the Census Bureau. On the other hand, most of those who immigrated or returned to Puerto Rico were vendors (1,383) or educators (1,101).

Quien Es Encargado? (Who is in charge?) The Puerto Rico Senate has killed a an agreement between Puerto Rico Gov. Ricardo Rosselló and the PROMESA Oversight Board, potentially escalating the governance conflict with regard to Puerto Rico’s operating budget and the restructuring of the central government’s $51 billion of debt. Last Friday, Puerto Rico Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz threatened a lawsuit against the Board if it continues to attempt to preempt Puerto Rico’s government in order to impose budget cuts or the repeal of worker protection measures. In a compromise with the Governor, the Board had agreed to maintain Puerto Rico’s mandatory Christmas bonus, vacation and sick day policies in exchange for Gov. Rosselló’s agreement to introduce at-will employment for all employers by repealing a 1976 law, Law 80. The House, at the end of last month, had approved the measure, before the Senate amended it to introduce at-will employment only for employees entering the workforce. Indeed, as we had previously noted, last Thursday, the Senate President had declared the Law 80 repeal to be dead, after speaking with other members of the majority New Progressive Party caucus in the Senate. Moreover, according to a video posted on the El Nuevo Día website, the Senate leader said he had consulted lawyers and was ready to fight in court, if the PROMESA Board seeks to preempt the island’s elected leaders. The power struggle came as the Puerto Rico House has added funding to a budget bill—spending which Puerto Rico House President Carlos Méndez and Treasury Committee President Antonio Soto said they expected the PROMESA Board would reject—relying on the Congressional PROMESA Act granting the Board the right to create and approve its own version of Puerto Rico’s budget—as is, for instance, the current budget. Puerto Rico’s new fiscal budget year begins this Sunday—a date by which, on normal years, like most states, but unlike the federal government, its fiscal year operating budget would normally have been adopted—but, where, last Thursday, PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión, in New York City, stated that if the government opted not to repeal Law 80, the currently certified fiscal plan would operate—a plan which would mandate at-will employment to be introduced by January 1, 2019—a plan which, unsurprisingly, Senate President Rivera Schatz is set to challenge, especially after, on May 9th, Sergio Marxuach, the New Economy Policy Director, testified before the Puerto Rico Senate Committee on Federal, Political, and Economic Relations that repealing Law 80 would be a bad idea, noting that a 2016 International Monetary Fund study showed that in times of economic weakness, eliminating job protections would have had a negative economic impact in the short and medium term, noting: “By triggering a wave of layoffs, reforming employment protections further weakens aggregate demand and delays economic recovery.” Similarly, a 2017 report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development said that in Portugal from 2006 to 2014 “reforms increasing the flexibility of the labor market negatively affect firms’ productivity both in the short- and long-run. A possible explanation is that higher job turnover reduces firms’ incentives to invest in job-specific training and reduce the scope for workers’ specialization.”

In response, Governor Rosselló released a statement: “Puerto Rico has just seen how politics is done and not how a future government should be made in challenging and difficult times, with this regrettable decision by the President of the Senate, Thomas Rivera Schatz.”

Now Senate Finance Committee President Migdalia Padilla is scheduled to meet with the Governor’s fiscal team to discuss the changes which have been included in the joint resolutions that make up the budget for the next fiscal year; he will also  meet with Financial Advisory Authority and Fiscal Agency (Aafaf) Executive Director Raul Maldonado and the Secretary of Finance, Gerardo Portelo—with the Chairman noting: “They are going to have meetings with me so that we can all harmonize what we have observed, what the Board says, and what the Executive establishes.” Chairman Padilla added that he trusts that today will be constituted the conference committee to discuss the House amendments, especially after, at the end of last week, House approval of an FY2019 budget $33.2 million higher than the one presented by PROMESA Board—followed, the next day, by Senate approval, albeit with amendments intended to force a conference committee to settle the differences.

In addition to the perception of preemption, one of the legislature’s greatest reservations with regard to the PROMESA Board’s version of the budget their perception that that version underestimates the revenue estimate is $7,000 million, according to the President of the Finance Commission of the Chamber, Antonio Soto, who noted that the government will close the year with revenues of more than $9,172 million, but the fiscal entity estimates $8,400 million for the next fiscal year, despite the fact that it proposes a growth in the economy of 6.3%.

Senate President Padilla explained that one of the changes that will be introduced to the House version is aimed at addressing the $164,000 reduction for the Independent Special Prosecutor’s Panel Office (OPFEI), advising that he would be subtracting that $164,000 from the additional $2 million that the Chamber allocated in the budget to the Alliance for Alternative Education program. In its version, the Chamber dealt with the cuts contemplated in the PROMESA Board’s proposal for the oversight agencies, such as the Office of Government Ethics, the Office of the Comptroller and the Office of the Citizen Procurator, but left out the Special Prosecutor, noting: “I am not increasing the spending budget; I am simply moving part of an allocation of $2 million,” adding that it is inconsistent with the amendments submitted by the Chamber aimed at ensuring the functioning of the agencies under the Department of Public Safety, such as the Bureau of Emergency Management and Disaster Management, the Emergency Medical Bureau, the Bureau of the Corps of Firemen, and the Bureau of Forensic Sciences—all agencies with regard to which there is heightened concern in the wake of Puerto Rico’s devastating hurricanes and inequitable FEMA responses.  Indeed, Miguel Romero the vice president of the Senate Finance Committee, agreed on the need to assign the necessary funds to the Department of Public Security to ensure its operation: “There is a deficiency of over $40 million that we have to address.” In addition, Senator Padilla indicated the Senate would take a close look at the Board’s proposed $7 million cut to Court Administration, noting: “There is a need for appointment of judges and to maintain diversion programs with the correctional population.” Moreover, Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz also indicated that the controversy centers on inconsistencies between the budget and the fiscal plan, both presented by the PROMESA Board, explaining, in the wake of discussions, that it had been “established that there is a gap between the approved budget and the fiscal plan: basically, regarding the collections we will have available to cover the budget.” With the session scheduled to end on Saturday, that date falls three days after the limit established by the PROMESA Board to approve the budget, with the Board anticipating that, if Puerto Rico does not comply with the agreement reached with the Governor to repeal the Law Against Unjustified Dismissal (Law 80-1976), it will revert the fiscal plan to the approved one.

Municipal Finance Transparency

June 13, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider efforts in a  Puerto Rican municipality to focus on municipal finance transparency.

Toa Baja, a municipio of just under 90,000 in Puerto Rico, was first settled around 1511—long, long before Lexington and Concord. It was officially organized as a town in 1745, when it was dedicated to Nuestra Señora de la Concepción. By the dawn of U.S. independence in 1776, it was a town of some six cattle ranches and 12 sugar cane estates, but a town at risk of flooding because of the confluence of surrounding rivers. In 1902, in the wake of the U.S. invasion, the town became part of a consolidated region when the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico approved the consolidation of a number of municipalities—before a 1905 statute annulled the statute and Toa Baja regained its status as an independent town. This municipio of around 90,000 divided into seven barrios or neighborhoods has not been a stranger to floods: nine years ago, former Governor Luis G. Fortuño ordered a shut off essential services, such as water and electricity, to Villas del Sol, a village within the municipality of Toa Baja, and FEMA actually purchased homes in the municipality from the Puerto Rican Government in order to ensure public safety.  What had been a farming-based economy, mostly sugar, turned increasingly to fishing, cattle, and then, by the 1950’s, manufacturing began to replace replacing agriculture, so that, today, it is a center for the manufacture of metal, plastic, concrete, textile, electrical, electronic machinery, and rum. The city’s leader, Mayor Anibel Vega Borges, was first elected in 2004; he has since been re-elected twice (2008 and 2012)—and by wide margins.

Now the city or ciudad is set to be a leader in fiscal transparency: it will be the first Puerto Rico municipality to publish its accounts, in the wake of signing an agreement with the Statistics Institute after Institute President Mario Marazzi urged all public agencies, including municipalities and public corporations, to make use of the Institute’s transparencyfinanciera.pr platform. Ergo, Alcalde or Mayor Bernardo “Betito” Márquez García will disclose, beginning with the fiscal year next month, all its transactions, evaluations of income, costs and benefits in order to ensure the public has access to inspect all its fiscal and financial actions—or, as Mayor Garcia put it:I understand that it is the right step. I think that the responsibility to administer the municipalities is shared with the people, and the people have to have the information to be an oversight of what is done with their resources.”

President Marazzi noted that his offer, made available in 2015, had, so far, only attracted two previous takers: the Institute of Statistics, and the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, noting: “(Toa Baja) is the first municipality to take the step forward to provide extremely detailed information on their finances…Toa Baja is truly opening its books, here it is going to be done because the platform demands it: The platform requires a level of disclosure that definitely has to be someone with courage, who has nothing to hide,” as he urged all Puerto Rican agencies, public corporations, and municipalities to make use of the platform, stressing that, in times of fiscal crisis, the tool becomes even more useful to record how public funds are being used at the central and municipal levels, and also to recover the credibility of Puerto Rico before the financial markets, and—as he described it: “Give it a good goodbye to the [PROMESA] Board of Fiscal Supervision: All we need is that in our country, we have the political will to implement what already exists technologically.”

His initiative comes even as the Legislature is set to debate Senate Bill 236, the “Open Data Law of the Government of Puerto Rico.”

Mr. Marazzi described his effort by noting that “Lack of transparency is the best breeding ground for corruption, and sunlight–or transparency–is the best disinfectant,” adding that his Institute will also train municipal personnel in the use of the electronic platform, and in the handling and sending of the necessary information, at the same time that it will offer assistance, advice, and collaboration in the preparation of a work plan for the implementation of the project, Open Government, in Toa Baja, noting: “Governments do not have the resources to audit all the information. This will allow external auditors to help us find flaws in our data, (to identify) corruption.” Audit reports (from the Office of the Comptroller), he noted, take so much time that by the time they are made available, the proverbial cow is often already outside the barn.  

In turn, the Fundación Agenda Ciudadana will join the effort to educate the Tobajeña citizenship with the necessary skills to control the available information and use it in the democratic exercise. Mayor Márquez García emphasized this educational process, and indicated that a second phase of the project would be the search for participatory budgeting: “In my personal character, I think we had to work on this type of initiative for a long time … This will allow Mayors to be forced to render collective accounts … Here there must be active citizen participation. The responsibility is shared.”

A Physical & Fiscal Storm of the Ages

May 30, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we worry that, based upon a New England Journal of Medicine study, Hurricane Maria caused far greater human and property devastation than official FEMA and other federal reports reported.

The Journal study reported that at least 4,645 people died as a result of Hurricane Maria, a storm which wreaked some $90 billion in damage and its physical and human devastation across Puerto Rico last year—an estimate which far exceeds the federal government’s official death toll of 64—and makes clear that the brief Presidential visit to throw paper towels marked an embarrassing demonstration—one now in even starker contrast to the White House response to Houston. The study found that health-care disruption for the elderly and the loss of basic utility services for the chronically ill had significant impacts across the U.S. territory, leaving disparate and devastating chaos not just to human lives, but also to Puerto Rico’s electrical grid and public infrastructure—meaning some communities or muncipios were completely isolated for weeks amid road closures and communications failures.

Scientists from the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health and Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center Researchers calculated the number of deaths by surveying nearly 3,300 randomly chosen households across Puerto Rico, comparing the estimated post-hurricane death rate to the mortality rate for previous year: their surveys indicated that the mortality rate was 14.3 deaths per 1,000 residents from Sept. 20 through Dec. 31, 2017, a 62% increase in the mortality rate compared to 2016, or what they termed 4,645 “excess deaths,” writing: “Our results indicate that the official death count of 64 is a substantial underestimate of the true burden of mortality after Hurricane Maria.”

The study criticized Puerto Rico’s methods for counting the dead, as well as the lack of transparency in sharing information, noting it would detract from planning for future natural disasters. The authors called for patients, communities, and doctors to develop contingency plans for natural disasters. Today, more than eight months after the powerful hurricane’s physical and human devastation, Puerto Rico’s slow recovery has been marked by a persistent lack of water, a faltering power grid, and a shortage of essential services. These failures, moreover, on the cusp of the new hurricane season, have exacerbated Puerto Rico’s fiscal challenges.

The study also found that Puerto Rico’s recovery was hindered by numerous systemic failures, as well as what the scientists determined assessed as a complex method for certifying the deaths in San Juan: they noted that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that deaths can be directly attributed to storms like Maria if they are caused by forces related to the event, from flying debris to loss of medical services; however, in Puerto Rico, such deaths continued for months.

The government of Puerto Rico, notwithstanding the inadequate FEMA response compared to Houston, nevertheless was sharply criticized for its response , especially after initially reporting that only 16 Puerto Ricans had died as a result of the storm—a number which more than doubled by the time of the President’s very brief visit to assess the damage last September: a number which continued to escalate until early last December, at which time authorities 64 had died, an official death toll, which counted those who suffered injuries, were swept away in floodwaters, or were unable to reach hospitals while facing severe medical conditions. The Journal study, however, concludes there were likely thousands more Americans who died in the weeks and months that followed, but who were not counted—raising questions with regard to both the role of FEMA, as well as the manner and integrity of the Puerto Rico government’s protocols for certifying hurricane-related deaths: Gov. Ricardo Rosselló’s administration did not release mortality data immediately after the storm, nor did his administration’s officials provide much information publicly about the process officials were using to enumerate the dead.

However, in the wake of pressure by Congress, as well as statistical analyses from news organizations assessing a much higher death toll, Gov. Rosselló enlisted the assistance of George Washington University experts to review the government’s death certification process, vowing that “regardless of what the death certificate says,” each death would be inspected closely to ensure a correct tally, stating: “This is about more than numbers. These are lives: real people, leaving behind loved ones and families.”

Dean Lynn Goldman of the George Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health anticipates the university will release an initial report as early as next month: GW’s findings will include the first government-sponsored attempt by researchers and epidemiologists to quantify Hurricane Maria’s deadliness, as experts are assessing statistical mortality data, intending to examine medical records and to interview family members of those who died—with Dean Goldman making clear that death certificates bearing the phrase “natural causes” will require further investigation.

Simultaneously, the Center for Investigative Journalism in Puerto Rico has gone to court in an effort to seek Puerto Rico’s Department of Health and Demographic Registry’s mortality data for the months since last November, the last month for which such information was available. The Puerto Rico Institute of Statistics has also announced it intends to provide an independent death count and use subpoena powers to retrieve the data.

The Chan School researchers reported there are several reasons the death toll in Puerto Rico has been so drastically underestimated, noting that, for every disaster-related death, such passing must be confirmed by the government’s Forensic Sciences Institute, which requires that bodies be sent to San Juan or that a medical examiner travel to the local municipio; consequently, it can be difficult to track indirect deaths from a worsening of chronic conditions due to the storm; moreover, the researchers reported that the government of Puerto Rico stopped sharing mortality data with the public last December, leading them to write: “As the United States prepares for its next hurricane season, it will be critical to review how disaster-related deaths will be counted, in order to mobilize an appropriate response operation and account for the fate of those affected.”

Many families here are awaiting clarity on what happened to their loved ones when “natural causes” became the only explanation. That is what was written on Leon’s death certificate the morning a local law enforcement official brought the document to the family home. The Puerto Rico Department of Justice’s Yamil Juarbe said in a statement it is customary for local officials in these cases to review bodies for any signs of trauma and talk to relatives to learn about the deceased’s medical history. That information is collected and sent to the central office of the Institute of Forensic Sciences.

Meanwhile, even as FEMA is accelerating community disaster loans to help municipios mitigate the loss of income due to natural disasters, the Government of Puerto Rico reaffirmed that, for the time being, it does not anticipate needing the $4.9 loan: last Friday, FEMA announced that the approval of another $39 million in loans from the CDL program for the municipalities of Aguadilla, Cabo Rojo, Canóvanas, Carolina, Manatí, Mayagüez, Peñuelas, and Orocovis—after, last month, approving $53.7 million in CDL loans for 12 other municipalities, including Bayamón, Caguas, Humacao, Juncos, Ponce, Toa Baja, and Trujillo Alto. Thus, to date, FEMA has allocated at least $ 92.8 million for municipios in the U.S. territory, and $371 million for the U.S. Virgin Islands; the $4.9 billion loan passed by Congress to help local municipios mitigate the loss of income has not been available to Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares—something due in part, as Puerto Rico Treasury Secretary Raúl Maldonado noted, because the “Rosselló administration Government has consistently had more than $ 2 billion available…The administration has been very successful in lowering operational costs and achieving an increase in collections.” Nevertheless, access to the loan will remain open through March of 2020—access which could prove invaluable in the event of another disaster or a drop in the income of public corporations.