“This is how government should work.”

May 15, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we fiscally visit the small municipality of Evans, New York, a town of about 41 square miles in upstate New York which was established in 1821—seventeen years after its first settler arrived, and today home to about 14,000—but a municipality so broke after years of fiscal and financial mismanagement that it lost access to the municipal market in the wake of the withdrawal of its credit rating.

Absence of Fiscal Balance? Evans Town Supervisor Mary K. Hosler has reported that the municipality was unable to secure a loan in the wake of the withdrawal of its credit rating. In her 3rd State of the Town Address, where she advised citizens that “much can be accomplished when politics are checked at the door, and a spirit of cooperation is adopted at all levels of our town government;” she added that it was her hope that citizens would leave with “a sense that our Town is mending and moving ahead with strength and momentum,” as she noted: “By way of brief overview, as many of you are aware, the Town has been faced with numerous challenges over the past two years. Unfortunately, a decade of financial mismanagement came to a head during my first year in office, and we were faced with what turned out to be the worst financial crisis in the history of the Town. There were very few options available as the Town was facing the possibility of insolvency or a control board.”

In New York, a municipality—or its emergency financial control board, may file for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy: the Empire State’s §§85.80 to 85.90 authorize the state legislature to create a financial control board—something created in September of 1975 for New York City; however, the New York State Constitution also contains certain fiscal limitations on municipal debt—including a limit of 9 percent of the average full valuation of said municipality’s taxable real estate for municipalities with populations under 125,000.

Supervisor Hosler introduced Evans Finance Director Brittany Gloss to present the municipality’s financial accomplishments and the progress being made in terms of economic development and, “most importantly: where we are headed,” reminding constituents that any loans would have been “costly to our residents: financially, in the loss of services, and the loss of local control,” adding:  “It has been said that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again while expecting different results. Well, we stopped the insanity, which meant we had to identify the problems and take action. Every decision was critical to move the needle in the right direction, and work the Town out of this financial disaster. These decisions were often painstaking and gut‐wrenching, but they were necessary to change the Town’s financial course. They were reviewed from all angles, and made with the taxpayer’s interest and the future of the Town of Evans in the forefront. And these difficult decisions have yielded positive results.” In her introduction, Supervisor Hosler, noting the town’s bond rating had been restored to an A rating, reported: “We’re  definitely on the recovery side of the balance sheet,” with the former bank vice president who played a key role in steering the town toward solvency, telling the audience that the municipality had turned to Erie County for assistance two years ago—or, as Erie County Comptroller Stefan I. Mychajliw recalled, the call came as the town’s payroll and bills were piling up, late at night as he was “on the couch with a horrible flu.” Nevertheless, he stated that he advises every town supervisor to let him know if they ever need anything, adding: “That night I had three or four conference calls with three of my most senior staff.”

Remarkably, by the next morning, he had already helped pull together three possible fiscal plans for the town—with the one which led to the fiscal rescue: an unprecedented $980,000 short-term loan from Erie County.

For her part, Supervisor Hosler knew when she ran for office three years ago that there were financial problems; however, it was not until she took office that she discovered thousands of missing financial transactions, internal audits which had never been completed, and a $2.6 million deficit. The fiscal depths appeared to be the result of the municipality’s debt issued in 2007, when the town had borrowed $12.6 million to install new water lines, hydrants, and a water storage tower. In that transaction, instead of putting those funds into a separate account, as required, the town combined the money with the rest of its municipal funds. Thus, a subsequent New York State audit found that $2 million of those funds were used to cover operating expenses, with the bulk for the municipality’s troubled water operations—putting the municipality on a seemingly unending reliance on tax-anticipation notes to make ends meet—that is, until the ends were at the end—or, as Supervisor Hosler described it: “Not six months into office, I’m thinking ‘Holy Lord, this is a big climb’…We had to keep moving on all fronts.”

A year and a half later, Evans has received an A credit rating from S&P Global Ratings, easing the way for the municipality to issue municipal bonds to finance $5.2 million for a new water tower, with S&P noting: “The stable outlook reflects S&P Global Ratings’ view that Evans has implemented various corrective steps to restore structural balanced operations over the past three audited fiscal years. It also reflects our expectation that the town will likely maintain strong budgetary performance, which will likely support its efforts to eliminate its negative fund balance and rebuild its budgetary flexibility.” Indeed, the town’s current deficit of $320,000 is a shadow of its former $2.6 million—and Supervisor Hosler is hopeful it can be eliminated by the end of the fiscal year—a fiscal accomplishment which could create a fiscal bonus: lower capital borrowing costs on municipal bonds the municipality hopes to issue for its water system.

The $2.6 million deficit is down to $320,000, and now Supervisor Hosler is hopeful it can be erased by the end of this year. In addition, with the credit rating, she is hoping to get a lower rate on water bonds to hopefully lower water rates. As Comptroller Mychajliw put it: “I’m just thrilled for her and the town: This is how government should work.”

Advertisements

Puerto Rico’s Migratory Challenges

January 30, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the migratory challenges to Puerto Rico’s fiscal recovery.

Post Storm Fiscal & Physical Misery. Puerto Rico’s legislature has passed and sent legislation to Gov. Ricardo Rosselló for his signature to authorize the U.S. territory to lend capital to the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) and the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority to handle imminent cash shortfalls (as of February last year, PREPA had $9 billion of debt and PRASA had $4.6 billion of debt). The intent is to avert any potential financing outage next month—an outage of further apprehension because of the efforts on the mainland to lure Puerto Ricans for employment opportunities on the mainland: the South Carolina Department of Corrections, seeking to fill 650 vacant positions, has erected billboard ads in Puerto Rico offering relocation assistance and salaries as much as $35,000 annually—plus overtime and benefits. Another company, Bayada Home Health Care, has been advertising available positions on Facebook: the company reports the response has been so strong that it had to take down its ads. Given an unemployment rate, according to the U.S. Labor Department, rising over 10 percent at the end of last calendar year in Puerto Rico compared to the mainland, where the unemployment rate was falling below 5 percent, the allure of emigrating is understandable.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s latest American Community Survey—even though outdated in the wake of post-Hurricane Maria migration, approximately 320,000 Puerto Ricans live in central Florida, with a significant percentage arriving recently: the post-Maria migration could mean an outflow of an additional 114,000 to 213,000 each year for the next two years, according to the to the Center for Puerto Rican Studies in New York City, whose researchers from the Climate Impact Lab estimated the impact of Hurricane Maria, using an econometric model of the costs of cyclones over the past 60 years and applied it to the pre-storm economic conditions in Puerto Rico: “Maria could lower Puerto Rican incomes by 21 percent over the next 15 years—a cumulative $180 billion in lost economic output,” concluding that “Maria could be as economically costly as the 1997 Asian financial crisis was to Indonesia and Thailand and more than twice as damaging as the 1994 Peso Crisis was to Mexico—but this time on American soil.”

The allure of emigrating is demonstrated by estimates from the Center for Puerto Rican Studies, which has estimated that in the period from 2017 to next year as many as 470,335 Puerto Ricans will leave for the mainland—the equivalent of approximately 14 percent. More critically, however, those that are living appear, disproportionately, to be those who can afford to: the Center estimates “Maria could lower Puerto Rico incomes by 21 percent over the next 15 years,” an amount the equivalent to $180 billion in foregone economic output—leading the Center to write: “Hurricane Maria has accelerated this propensity to a point where we can refer to the depopulation of Puerto Rico as one of the most significant hurdles for future economic recovery.” The Center’s data makes clear, moreover, that it is the young and employable who are emigrating: overwhelmingly, it is the seniors who are being left behind—raising, unsurprisingly, increasing questions with regard to pension and health care implications as revenues will fall.

Fiscal Economic Dislocation?

January 22, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the ongoing federal and fiscal challenges to fiscal recovery for the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico.

‘Twas in another lifetime, one of toil and blood
When blackness was a virtue the road was full of mud
I came in from the wilderness, a creature void of form
Come in, she said
I’ll give ya shelter from the storm ∞ Bob Dylan

Modern Day Okies. Since Hurricane Maria struck Puerto Rico, nearly 300,000 Puerto Ricans have left their homes and fled to Florida. These Americans have fled to other states too, with New York a key new home. The departures raise a host of fiscal challenges, including: for how much longer will FEMA assistance be available to these U.S. citizens? Are these Americans permanent departees from Puerto Rico? In addition, if so, are they predominantly younger, and higher income?

Under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) program, FEMA has provided hotel or lodging assistance to evacuees; however, the duration of that assistance, which has just been extended until March under the FEMA Transitional Shelter Assistance program (not as form of temporary shelter while rebuilding her damaged home in Puerto Rico, remains uncertain: is it a way to relocate and start a new life on the mainland? In the beginning, most of those leaving were elderly, disabled, or in need of critical medical care. But that appears to have changed: today young Puerto Ricans appear to be the primary departees, threatening to compound what we have previously noted to be an historic, migratory wave in the wake of the U.S. territory’s physical and fiscal crisis: mayhap as many as 25 percent of the population will have departed by the end of the decade.

Ironically, especially given President Trump’s attitude towards Puerto Rico, including the disparate response to Puerto Rico compared to Houston and Florida, the disproportionately younger Puerto Ricans coming to the mainland have been sought after—often recruited. Last November, the agency offered to airlift victims of Hurricane Maria to the U.S. mainland to reach temporary housing–a first of its kind for the agency: under the program, the Transitional Shelter Assistance (TSA) program, displaced residents and families who are still living in shelters on Puerto Rico can opt to relocate to housing in Florida and New York. Mike Byrne, a federal coordinating officer for FEMA, said the program is the first time the agency has attempted what it calls an “air bridge,” or a relief operation requiring the transportation of individuals from a disaster area. In most disasters, FEMA pays displaced residents to stay in hotels under the TSA program. In Puerto Rico, the hotels are filled to capacity, so FEMA is turning to the mainland and working with states to find accommodations.

At the same time, because of anticipated labor shortages because of the White House anti-immigration policies, many domestic employers are eager to hire bilingual workers for whom the minimum wage of a U.S. state represents a significant boost in income compared to grim options on Puerto Rico. Likewise, both the federal and Puerto Rican governments have facilitated departures: that is, in the ongoing absence of an equitable or comprehensive recovery plan for Puerto Rico, migration has become a substitute for federal disaster relief and recovery: for the first time ever, FEMA created an “air bridge” and chartered cruise ships to evacuate residents. In the beginning, new arrivals were forced to seek shelter with family members or in homeless shelters; subsequently, such families are being offered hotel stays for up to three months. (Traditionally, FEMA offers temporary shelter to homeowners who have been adversely affected by a disaster while they carry out the arduous task of rebuilding; however, in the case of Hurricane Maria, the process of recovery has been severely undercut by the lack of electricity and running water, and the inability of the federal government to supply even the most basic materials.

The increasing challenge is that, as we have noted before, those Puerto Ricans fleeing destroyed homes, devastated public infrastructure, and a shattered economy, are, disproportionately, those who can afford to leave—and those whose jobs and livelihoods have been washed away. After all, some nearly four months after the hurricanes, many restaurants, stores and offices remain closed: how can one be competitive with operating on generators, operating with reduced personnel serving only FEMA workers, and with massive layoffs? Just last week, Walmart, Puerto Rico’s largest private employer, announced it was closing three of its Sam’s Club stores; pharmaceutical companies, which, today, account for nearly 50% of Puerto Rico’s manufacturing jobs, are rethinking their location in the wake of the implementation of the new federal tax reform law—a law which treats Puerto Rico as a foreign jurisdiction. The new tax law imposes a 12.5% tax on profits derived from intellectual property held in foreign jurisdictions. (The U.S. territory of Puerto Rico is a domestic jurisdiction in U.S. law—except for federal tax purposes.) The pre-existing tax law exempted Puerto Rico residents from paying federal income taxes, a provision which sought to attract investment in manufacturing, something which, prior to the hurricane, accounted for 47% of Puerto Rico’s gross domestic product—more than $48 billion, with the bulk of the incentives encouraging pharmaceuticals and medical devices that generate revenue from patented drugs and technologies.

However, the new federal tax changes were enacted to render offshore operations less profitable, thereby rewarding corporations which opt to relocate back to the U.S. mainland—because, the IRS considers Puerto Rico to be foreign, and because many of the most significant manufacturers on the island are foreign-owned.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the economic dislocation in Puerto Rico has led to mainland employers recognizing a diamond in the rough—meaning that they have been recruiting Puerto Rican workers to places such as Florida, North Carolina, Georgia, and Kansas: in Texas and Florida, developers hope that Puerto Rican labor will alleviate an expected shortage of construction workers as their own hurricane recovery gets underway. The efforts, piggy-backing on a trend that has accelerated over the last decade, has been focused on teachers, doctors, police officers, nurses, and engineers—exactly the positions most critical for Puerto Rico’s physical and fiscal recovery. But how to compete against Houston—a city where approximately one-third of schoolchildren are native Spanish speakers—and a city which received disproportionately greater federal hurricane assistance? The city’s school districts have already conducting multiple recruitment trips to Puerto Rico. Similarly, the police departments of Dallas, Charlotte, Baltimore, and even the nation’s capitol, Washington, D.C., have all turned to Puerto Rico as they have sought to diversify their departments with more Latino officers. In these instances, the recruiters lure workers with what appear to be high salaries when compared with the depressed incomes of a U.S. territory in physical and fiscal crisis.

Some have noted, moreover, that with the U.S. federal government closed, in no small part due to opposition to extending the DACA or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, it may be coincidental that the influx of Puerto Ricans to the mainland who were displaced by the storm coincides with the expiration of and, most recently, the end of temporary protected status for Central American and Caribbean migrants who had also fled natural disasters. That is, the combination furloughs, wage cuts, and higher prices for Puerto Rico’s working poor, combined with the massive damage to the island’s public infrastructure and disparate federal response, appears to have contributed to fueling a mass exodus—an exodus, however, of the young and qualified.

Stormy Governance & Federalism Challenges in the Wake of a Storm

eBlog

November 14, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s eBlog, we consider the governance and federalism challenges in the wake of the devastating Hurricane Maria impact on the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, where questions in a federal courtroom about the balance between Puerto Rico’s government and the federally appointed oversight board for Puerto Rico consider not just the Puerto Rican government’s authority—but also that of the Congress.  

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain has denied the PROMESA Oversight Board’s request to deny the request to appoint Noel Zamot as the Transformation Officer (CTO), noting that the powers granted to the special panel by Congress are insufficiently broad to limit the actions of the government of Puerto Rico, holding that the Puerto Rico Oversight Board lacked authority to replace the leader of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA). The Board had requested the Judge to confirm its appointment of Noel Zamot as PREPA’s Chief Transformation Office—a position comparable to CEO. Instead, Judge Swain called on the Board and Gov. Ricardo Rosselló to work collaboratively to address the U.S. territory’s problems—a call, in response to which, Gov. Rosselló responded by noting: “We are very pleased with the decision issued today by Judge Laura Taylor Swain, since it reiterates our position regarding the limit of power of the Financial Oversight and Management Board.…It is clear that the Financial Oversight and Management Board does not have the power to take full control of the government or its instrumentalities…We recognize that the reconstruction and recovery of the island requires a union of wills; therefore, we welcome any collaboration or technical support that the Board wishes to offer to the government elected by Puerto Ricans to ensure the best interests of the people of Puerto Rico.” Judge Swain noted that Congress could have eased the governance role of the oversight board if it had given the Board direct authority over Puerto Rico’s government and public entities; however, as she noted: it had not—instead it deliberately split power between the federally appointed oversight board and the government, adding: “I urge you to work together,” in regard to the PROMESA Board and the Rosselló administration, noting that every moment spent on complicated and expensive litigation was time lost for the Puerto Rico people. Judge Swain noted that the Board has multiple mechanisms to discharge its functions without requiring its direct intervention after the Congressionally created public corporation, its governing board and its executive director, Ricardo Ramos, were unable to articulate and effectively implement a plan to restore the electricity grid after its collapse in the wake of Hurricane Maria. Nevertheless, Judge Swain also called on the government of Puerto Rico to address the situation of the island, noting that millions of American citizens remain in the dark and in a dangerous situation, while every controversy aired in court is “a minute lost” for the future of Puerto Rico.

Unsurprisingly, Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares responded he was pleased with Judge Swain’s decision, noting in written statements that the decision issued today by Judge Swain “reiterates our position on the power limit of the JSF: We have been clear from day one about the powers the [PROMESA] Board has, and those it does not have. It is clear that the (Board) does not have the power to take control of the government as a whole or its instrumentalities,” adding: “Our position is validated and it is recognized that the administration and public management of Puerto Rico remains with the democratically elected government…As Governor of Puerto Rico, I will defend the democratic rights of my people over any challenge and in any forum. We recognize that the reconstruction and recovery of the Island requires a union of wills, therefore, we welcome any collaboration or technical support that the Board wishes to offer to the Government elected by the Puerto Ricans to ensure the best interests of the People of Puerto Rico.”

The U.S. government yesterday filed notice it would defend the court supervised restructuring of Puerto Rico’s debt against a constitutional challenge by an investor—with the filing coming in response to the Title III bankruptcy case related to Puerto Rico’s government debt to an adversary proceeding filed last August by the Aurelius Capital hedge fund. (Aurelius owned $473 million of Puerto Rico municipal bonds as of July.) The government argued that the Title III bankruptcy petition should be dismissed, because its filing had not been authorized by a validly constituted oversight board, whilst the fund asserted that the appointments clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, which empowers the President to appoint certain public officials with the “advice and consent” of the U.S. Senate was breached in appointing the board’s members: the Board was appointed under the Puerto Rico Oversight Management and Economic Stability Act to oversee fiscal and economic management in the territory and the restructuring of more than $70 billion of debt that the Puerto Rico government said could not be repaid under current economic conditions.

Aurelius claimed that the PROMESA Board is “unconstitutional,” and, because it is, its actions are “are void,” pressing Judge Swain to dismiss the case. In response, the Justice Department notified the court it would file a memorandum supporting PROMESA’s constitutionality on or before December 6th. Part of the dispute will relate to the process itself: the Board, as we noted initially, was named by the U.S. House and Senate Majority and Minority leaders, the Speaker and House Minority Leader, and former President Obama: neither U.S. Senate committees nor the Senate as a whole voted on the confirmations. Last Friday, the government of Puerto Rico, the COFINA Seniors Bondholders Coalition, the Unsecured Creditors Committee, and the Official Committee of Retired Employees of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico submitted memoranda against the Aurelius position, with the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico pressing the federal court to lift the stay on litigation outside of the bankruptcy process, arguing that Aurelius is seeking actions against the debtor and the Oversight Board outside the Title III process—something it asserts is barred by the PROMESA statute. In contrast, the COFINA Seniors argue that the Oversight Board’s membership is constitutional, because Congress’s power over the territories is plenary and not subject to the structural limitations of the United States Constitution, while the Unsecured Creditors argued that the “U.S. Constitution gives Congress virtually unlimited authority to govern unincorporated territories directly, or to delegate that power to such agencies as it” deems fit. This group said that there is precedent for the Board members’ appointment procedures, asserting the Board members are territorial officials and not U.S. government officials, as Aurelius claims.

Power to Puerto Rico. On a separate front, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico notched a significant win in court yesterday when Judge Swain rejected the appointment of a former military officer to oversee the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), after the PROMESA Board had sought to appoint retired Air Force Col. Noel Zamot to supervise the reconstruction and operations of PREPA in the wake of Hurricane Maria’s devastation of the U.S. territory’s utility and the subsequent territory-wide blackout on September 20th—an inability to restore service since has led to accusations of mismanagement, especially as, PREPA, two months after the hurricane, is generating only 48 percent of its normal output. Thus it was that Judge Swain ruled that the PROMESA Board may not unilaterally seize control of the U.S. territory’s government agencies—a signal legal victory for the administration of Gov. Ricardo Rosselló and others who have argued that no independent official should oversee a local government agency—or, as the Governor noted: “Our position has been validated and it has been recognized that the administration and public management of Puerto Rico remains with the democratically elected government.” PREPA is $9 billion in debt and continues to face scrutiny after signing a $300 million contract with Montana-based Whitefish Energy Holdings—a contract cancelled at the end of last month at the Governor’s request, but which is now undergoing federal and local audits. Both Gov. Rosselló and PREPA Director Ricardo Ramos are scheduled to testify this morning in Washington, D.C. before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee.

Getting into and out of Municipal Bankruptcy

07/10/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the exceptional fiscal challenge to post-chapter 9 Detroit between building and razing the city; then we head East to Hartford, where the Governor and Legislature unhappily contemplate the Capital City’s fiscal future—and whether it will seek chapter 9 bankruptcy, before finally returning the key Civil War battlefield of Petersburg, Virginia—where a newly brought on Police Chief mayhap signals a turnaround in the city’s fiscal future.  

Raising or Razing a Municipality? Detroit, founded on July 24th in 1701 by Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac, the French explorer and adventurer, went on to become one of the country’s most vital music and industrial centers by the early 20th century; indeed, by the 1940’s, the Motor City had become the nation’s fourth-largest city. But that period might have been its apogee: the combination of riots and industrial restructuring led to the loss of jobs in the automobile industry, and signal white flight to the suburbs; since reaching a peak of 1.8 million in the 1950 census, Detroit’s population has declined precipitously: more than 60%.  Nevertheless, it is, today, the nation’s largest city on the U.S.—Canada border, and, with the imminent completion of the Gordie Howe Bridge to Canada, the city—already the anchor of the second-largest region in the Midwest, and the central city of a metro region of some 4.3 million Americans at the U.S. end of the busiest international crossing in North America; the question with regard to how to measure its fiscal comeback has been somewhat unique: it has been—at least up until currently, by the number of razed homes. Indeed, one of former Mayor Dave Bing’s key and touted programs was his pledge to raze 10,000 homes—a goal actually attained last year under Mayor Mike Duggan—under whose leadership some 11,500 homes have been razed. Mayor Duggan reports his current goal is to raze another 2,000 to 4,000 annually—so that, today, the city is host to the country’s largest blight-removal program—a critical component of Detroit’s future in a municipality which has experienced the loss of over one million residents over the last six decades—and where assessed property values of blighted and burned homes can be devastating to a municipality’s budget—and to its public schools. Worse, from a municipal governing perspective, is the challenge: how do the cities’ leaders balance helping its citizens to find affordable housing versus expenditures to raze housing—especially in a city where so many homeowners owed more than their homes were worth after the 2008 housing collapse?

Mayor Duggan’s response, moreover, has attracted the focus of multiple investigations, including federal subpoenas into bidding practices and the costs of demolitions—even as a separate grand jury has been reported to have subpoenaed as many as 30 contractors and Detroit municipal agencies, and Michigan officials have sought fines, because contractors mishandled asbestos from razed homes. Mayhap even more challenging: a recent blight survey by Loveland Technologies, a private company which maps the city, questions whether demolition is even keeping pace with blight in Detroit: the report indicates that vacancies in neighborhoods targeted for demolition have actually increased 64% over the last four years.

Hard Fiscal Challenges in Hartford: Is there a Role for the State? The Restructuring of Municipal Debt. Connecticut Gov. Daniel Malloy stated that the state would be willing to help the City of Hartford avoid chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy—but only if the city gets its own financial house in order, with his comments coming in the wake of the decision by Mayor Luke Bronin to hire an international law firm with expertise in municipal bankruptcies—with the Mayor making clear the city is also exploring other fiscal alternatives. Gov. Malloy has proposed offering millions more in state aid to the capital city in his budget proposal, to date, the state legislature, already enmired in its own, ongoing budget stalemate—has not reacted. Thus, the Governor noted: “I don’t know whether we can be all things to all people, but I think Hartford has to, first and foremost, help itself…But we should play a role. I think we need to do that not just in Hartford, but in Bridgeport and New Haven, and other urban environments and Waterbury. There’s a role for us to play.” The stakes are significant: Hartford is trying to close a $65 million fiscal gap—a gap which, should it not be able to bridge, would mean the city would have to seek express, prior written consent of the Governor to file a municipal bankruptcy petition (Conn. Gen. Stat.§7-566)—consent not yet sought by the city—or, as the Governor put it on Friday: “There’s no request for that…I don’t think they’re in a position to say definitively what they are going to do. I’m certainly not going to prejudge anything. That should be viewed as a last resort, not as a first.”

House Speaker Joe Aresimowicz (D-Berlin and Southington) and a former Member of the Berlin Council, reports the legislature could vote as early as a week from tomorrow on a two-year, $40 billion state budget, albeit some officials question whether a comprehensive agreement could be reached by that date, after the legislature has missed a series of deadlines, including the end of the legislative session on June 7th, not to mention the fiscal year of June 30th.  Meanwhile, the city awaits its fiscal fate: it has approved a budget of nearly $613 million, counting on nearly half the funds to come from the state; meanwhile, the city has hired the law firm of Greenberg Traurig to begin exploration of the option of filing for bankruptcy—or, as Mayor Bronin noted: “One important element of any municipal restructuring is the restructuring of debt…They will be beginning the process of reaching out to bond holders to initiate discussion about potential debt restructuring.”

Municipal Physical & Fiscal Safety. The fiscally challenged municipality of Petersburg, Virginia has brought on a new Chief of Police, “Kenny” Miller, a former Marine with 36 years of law enforcement experience.  Chief Miller views his new home as an “opportune place to give back” after a “blessed” career with one of Virginia’s largest police agencies—in the wake of serving 34 of his 36 years as an officer with the Virginia Beach Police Department. Chief Miller, who was sworn in last Friday afternoon, in the wake of a national search, noted: “You got to get out there and engage people…If people see that you care, they know you care. You can’t police inside of a building,” adding: “Engagement means working with the community…Solving problems together. People that live in the communities know the problems better than I do just passing through…We need to break down some barriers and get some trust going.” Chief Miller commences in his new role as the historic city seeks to turn around a fiscal and leadership crisis—one which left some parts of city government in dysfunction. The police department has had its own woes—including the Police Department, where, a year and a half ago, former Petersburg Chief John I. Dixon III acknowledged, after weeks of silence, that an audit of the department’s evidence and property room turned up $13,356 in missing cash related to three criminal cases—a finding which led former Petersburg Commonwealth’s Attorney Cassandra Conover to ask Virginia State Police to investigate “any issues involving” the police department that had come to her attention through “conversations and media reports” of alleged police misconduct or corruption—an investigation which remains ongoing. But the new Chief will face a different kind of fiscal challenge in the wake of the resignations of 28 sworn officers who have resigned in the last nine months after the city’s leaders imposed an across-the-board 10 percent pay cut for the city’s nearly 600 full-time workforce a year ago—and dropped 12 civilians from emergency communications positions. Nevertheless, Chief Miller said he was attracted to Petersburg because “the job was tailor-made for me. It’s a city on the rise, and I wanted to be part of something good…I don’t do it for the money. I’ve been blessed. I want to give back, (and) Petersburg is the opportune place to give back…The community members and the city leadership team are all working together to bring Petersburg to a beginning of a new horizon: “So why not be a part of that great opportunity?”

Chief Miller enters the job as Petersburg is straining to overcome a fiscal and leadership crisis that left some parts of city government in dysfunction; moreover, the police department has had its own woes. Seventeen months ago, former Petersburg police Chief John I. Dixon III acknowledged after weeks of silence that an audit of the department’s evidence and property room turned up $13,356 in missing cash related to three criminal cases. That led former Petersburg Commonwealth’s Attorney Cassandra Conover to ask the Virginia State Police to investigate “any issues involving” the police department which had come to her attention through “conversations and media reports” of alleged police misconduct or corruption. Nevertheless, Chief Miller reports he was “intrigued” by those officers who stayed with the force in spite of the pay cut “and showed virtue with respect to policing: Policing isn’t something that you do, it’s what you are: There are men and women there who really care about the city, and (those) people stayed.” He adds, he was attracted to Petersburg, because “the job was tailor-made for me. It’s a city on the rise, and I wanted to be part of something good…I’m now in my 36th year in law enforcement…And I don’t do it for the money. I’ve been blessed. I want to give back, (and) Petersburg is the opportune place to give back. The community members and the city leadership team are all working together to bring Petersburg to a beginning of a new horizon: So why not be a part of that great opportunity?” According to an announcement of his appointment as Petersburg’s Chief on Virginia Beach’s Facebook page: “[H]is connection with multiple civic leaders and groups throughout the city have forged and strengthened deep bonds between the Virginia Beach community and the police department.”

Are There non-Judicial Avenues to Solvency?

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the increasing threat to Hartford, Connecticut’s capitol, of insolvency; then we look at the nearing referendum in Puerto Rico to address the U.S. Territory’s legal status.

Can Chapter 9 Be Avoided? As the Connecticut legislature nears ending its session, House Majority Leader Matthew Ritter (D-Hartford) has been taking the lead in efforts to commit tens of millions of state dollars to rescue the city—but, as the Leader noted: “There are going to be strings;” the price to the municipality will be greater state control—however, what that control will be and how implemented remains unclear. One key issue will be the city’s looming pension challenge: the city’s current $33 million in annual obligations is projected to increase to $52.6 million by FY2023—ergo, one option for the state would be to utilize an oversight board to re-negotiate union contracts, a move used before by the state for Waterbury—and a step Mayor Luke Bronin had proposed last year—only to see it rejected. His efforts to seek a commitment for $15 million in givebacks by the unions this year succeeded in getting only one tenth that amount, $1.5 million—and came as the local AFSCME Council recently rejected a contract which could have saved the city $4 million.

The inability to agree upon voluntary steps to address the nearing insolvency has pushed state leaders, increasingly, to discuss the creation of a state financial control board as a linchpin to any state bailout of the city—with leaders discussing a board composed evenly of state, local, and union representatives. Connecticut’s law (§7-566) requires the express prior written consent of the Governor—obligating him to submit a report to the Treasurer and General Assembly—actions taken twice before in the cases of Bridgeport (1991) and the Westport Transit District; however, each case was resolved without going through the legal process and submission of a plan off debt adjustment. Indeed, there is, as yet, little consensus in the state legislature with regard to what oversight governance would include: one option under consideration would impose a spending cap, while another would provide for state preemption of the city’s authority to negotiate with its unions: the Majority Leader notes: “I think that if we could get these concessions agreed to and reach the savings that have been targeted…it would go a long way to limiting the amount of oversight in the city of Hartford.” Whatever route to restoring solvency, tempus fugit as the Romans used to say: time is fleeing: the city’s deficit is just under $50 million, even as the departure of one of its biggest employers, Aetna, looms—and, as we had reported in Providence, the city has a disproportionate hole in its property tax base: state and local government agencies, hospitals, and universities occupy 50% of the city’s property. Add to that, the city’s current authority to levy property tax limits such collections to an assessed value of 70 percent.

Mayor Bronin, recognizing that state help is critical, notes his “goal and hope is that legislators from around the state of Connecticut will recognize that Hartford cannot responsibly solve a crisis of this magnitude at the local level alone.” State aid will be critical for an additional reason: absent such assistance, the city’s credit rating is almost certain to deteriorate, thereby driving up its costs for capital borrowing.  Adding to the urgency of fiscal action is the pending departure of Aetna from the city: even though city leaders believe the giant health care corporation will keep many of its 6,000 employees in Connecticut, notwithstanding its negotiations with several states to relocate its corporate headquarters from Hartford, Aetna has stated it remains committed to its Connecticut employees and its Hartford campus. (Aetna and Hartford’s other four biggest taxpayers contribute nearly 20% of the city’s $280 million of property-tax revenues which make up nearly half the city’s general fund revenues.) The companies have imposed a fiscal price, however: Aetna, together with Hartford Financial Services and Travelers have offered to contribute a voluntary payment of $10 million annually over the next five years to help the city avoid chapter 9 municipal avoid bankruptcy, but only on the condition there are comprehensive governing and fiscal changes. But the companies have said they want to see comprehensive changes in how Hartford is run—including vastly reducing reliance on the property tax—a tax rate which the city has raised seven times in the past decade and a half to rates 50% greater than they were in 1998. Thus, with time fleeing, the city confronts coming up with the fiscal resources to finance nearly $180 million in debt service, health care, pensions, and other fixed costs for its upcoming fiscal budget—an amount equal to more than half of the city’s budget, excluding education; that is, the city’s options are increasingly limited—and the Mayor has made clear that he will not reduce essential public safety. As the Majority Leader describes it, it is in the state’s best interest to make sure the city has a sustainable future, noting that a municipal bankruptcy would not “just affect Hartford: It would affect neighboring communities, it would affect the state, it would probably affect our credit ratings.”

Eliminating local power? Hartford City Council President Thomas Clark is apprehensive with regard to state preemption of local authority, noting hisconcern has always been if this bill is passed–in whatever form it gets passed–what does that do to the elected leadership at the local level?…And I think until we see what that actually includes, we’re just going to be uncomfortable with this concept.” From the Mayor’s perspective, he notes: “Understandably, Connecticut residents do not want their hard-earned tax dollars being used wastefully, or simply funding an increase in the cost of city government…I don’t mind anybody looking over my shoulder…and I don’t mind having the books open. I’m confident in the decisions that we’ve made.” That contrasts with his colleagues on the City Council—and the city’s unions, who have previously charged: “The Governor and this mayor are clutching at their last chance at unconditional and overreaching power.” The unions have claimed there are measures which could be taken without resorting to negating collective bargaining rights and municipal bankruptcy; yet, as we have seen in Detroit, San Bernardino, etc., those efforts were ineffective compared to the pressure of a U.S. bankruptcy judge.

Chartering a Post Insolvency Future? Voters and taxpayers in the U.S. Territory of Puerto Rice go to the polls this Sunday to vote on a referendum on Puerto Rico’s political status—the fifth such referendum since it became an unincorporated territory of the United States. Although, originally, this referendum would only have the options of statehood versus independence, a letter from the Trump administration had recommended adding “Commonwealth,” the current status, in the plebiscite; however, that recommendation was scotched in response to the results of the plebiscite in 2012 which asked whether to remain in the current status—which the voters rejected. Subsequently, the administration cited changes in demographics during the past 5 years as a reason to add the option once again, leading to amendments incorporating ballot wording changes requested by the Department of Justice, as well as adding a “current territorial status” as provided under the original Jones-Shafroth Act as an option. Notwithstanding what the voters decide, however, it remains uncertain what might happen—much less how a Trump Administration or how Congress would react. The referendum was approved last January by the Puerto Rico Senate—and then by the House, and signed by Gov. Rossello last February.

How Does A City Turn Around Its Fiscal Future?

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider a state’s response to a municipal fiscal insolvency, before turning to the challenge the Windy City is facing in the virtually politically insolvent State of Illinois, before finally turning to the uncertain political, governing, and fiscal future of East Cleveland, Ohio.  

Addressing Disparate Municipal Fiscal Distress. More than a century ago, Petersburg, Virginia, was a highly industrialized city of 18,000 people—and the hub and supply center for the Confederacy: supplies arrived from all over the South via one of the five railroads or the various plank roads; it was also the last outpost. Today, it is one of the last fiscal outposts, but, mayhap, because of its fiscal distress, set to be a model for the nation and federalism with regard to how the Commonwealth of Virginia—unlike, for instance, Ohio, is responding. More than 53 percent of Virginia’s counties and cities have reported above-average or high fiscal stress, according to a report by the Commission on Local Government. Petersburg, a city grappling with a severe financial crisis, placed third on the state fiscal stress index behind the cities of Emporia and Buena Vista. Del. Lashrecse Aird (D-Petersburg) noted: “Petersburg does have some financial challenges, but they’re actually not unique. There are a lot of counties and localities within the commonwealth right now that are facing similar fiscal distressers.”  

The Virginia Legislature has dropped a proposed study of local government finances in its just completed legislative session, a legislative initiative which co-sponsor Rosalyn Dance (D-Petersburg) had described to her colleagues as necessary, because:  “Currently, there is no statutory authority for the Commission on Local Government to intervene in a fiscally stressed locality, and the state does not currently have any authority to assist a locality financially;” nevertheless, Virginia’s new fiscal year state budget did revive a focus on fiscal stress in Virginia cities and counties. Motivated by the City of Petersburg’s financial crisis, Sen. Emmett Hanger (R-Augusta County), who co-Chairs the Virginia Senate Finance Committee, had filed a bill (SJ 278) to study the fiscal stress of local governments: his bill proposed the creation of a joint subcommittee to review local and state tax systems, as well as reforms to promote economic assistance and cooperation between regions. Under SJ 278, a 15-member joint subcommittee would have reviewed local government and state tax systems, local responsibilities for delivery of state programs, and causes of fiscal stress among local governments. In addition, the study would have been focused on creating financial incentives and reforms to promote increased cooperation among Virginia’s regions. We will have to, however, await developments, as his proposal was rejected in the House Finance Committee, as members deferred consideration of tax reform for next year’s longer session; however, the adopted state budget did incorporate two fiscal stress preventive measures originally introduced in Sen. Hanger’s bill.

Del. Aird had identified the study as a top priority for this session, identifying: “what we as a Commonwealth need to do to put protections into place and allow localities to have tools and resources to prevent this type of challenge from occurring into the future,” noting: “I believe that this legislation will help address fiscal issues that localities are experiencing: ‘Currently, there is no statutory authority for the Commission on Local Government to intervene in a fiscally stressed locality, and the state does not currently have any authority to assist a locality financially.’” In the case of Petersburg, the city received technical assistance from state officials, including cataloging liabilities and obligations, researching problems, and reviewing city funds; however, state intervention could only be triggered by a request from the municipality: the state’s statutes forbid the Commonwealth from imposing reactive measures to an insolvent municipality.

To modify the conditions to enhance the ability of the state to intervene, the proposal set guidelines for state officials to identify and help alleviate signs of financial stress to prevent a more severe fiscal crisis, proposing the creation of a workgroup established by the Auditor of Public Accounts, who would have been responsible to create an early warning system for identifying fiscal stress, taking into consideration such criteria as a local government’s expenditure reports and budget information. In the event such distress was determined, such a local government would be notified and entitled to request a comprehensive review of its finances by the state. After such a review, the state would be responsible to draft an ‘action plan’ detailing: purpose, duration, and the requisite state resources for such intervention; in addition, the governor would be offered the option to channel up to $500,000 from the general fund toward relief efforts for the local government in need. As Del. Aird noted: “It is important to have someone who can speak to first-hand experience dealing with issues of local government fiscal stress: This insight will be essential in forming effective solutions that will be sustainable long-term, adding: “Prior to now, Virginia had no mechanism to track, measure, or address fiscal stress in localities…Petersburg’s situation is not unique, and it is encouraging that proactive measures are now being taken to guard against future issues. This is essential to ensuring that Virginia’s economy remains strong and that all communities can share in our commonwealth’s success.”

What Might Be a City’s Weakest Link? The state initiative comes as the city intends to write off $9 million in uncollected internal debt Petersburg has accumulated over the past 17 years: debt representing loans from Petersburg’s general fund to other city enterprises since 2000 which its leaders now concede they will never collect—or, as former Richmond City Manager—and now consultant for the city Robert Bobb notes: “This is something that the leadership should have addressed between 2000 and last year, but the issue was not being addressed.” As a result, when Petersburg officials receive the city’s financial audit for FY2017, it will show a negative fund balance that will make it even harder to secure financing for capital projects, albeit, it is expected to clear the uncollected debt from the books for the current fiscal year and the upcoming fiscal year—or, as Virginia Finance Director Ric Brown notes: “They’re taking it on the chin in FY2016 by clearing it all out of the books: To me, the most important thing is not how bad ‘16 is—it’s going forward whether FY2017 and FY2018 improve.” With its bond rating downgraded last year to BB with a negative outlook, Petersburg already faces a stiff fiscal challenge in raising capital—the municipality recently experienced an inability to raise capital to purchase police cars and fire equipment—making manifest the connection between public safety and assessed property values.

Nevertheless, Mr. Bobb has promised that this fiscal year will end without an operating deficit and the next one will begin with the first structurally balanced budget in nearly a decade—to which Secretary Brown notes: “It’s going to take some time, but I believe the sense of everyone is he’s making progress.” The Secretary noted that when the Commonwealth acted to come to Petersburg’s assistance last summer, he discovered the municipality had ended the fiscal year with $18.8 million in unpaid bills and $12 million over its operating budget; ergo, he testified the bottom line was “not going to be good” in the city’s FY2016 CAFR; however, Petersburg has worked in phases to pay its bills, reduce its costs, and rebuild its underpersonned, overwhelmed bureaucracy: The city has reduced its unpaid bills to $5.5 million, with the largest remaining obligation a $1.49 million payment to the Virginia Retirement System—a payment the city has agreed to pay by the end of December. The city’s school system has some $1.3 million in debt to its public retirement system due next month for teacher pensions. Nevertheless, in the school of lost and found, Mr. Bobb reports that city employees have scoured “every desk drawer” and discovered an additional $300,000 in unpaid bills, some of them dating back to 2015—unsurprisingly describing it as “[A] mess to clean up things from the past to where we are today.” Petersburg also has a gaping $1.9 million hole in the school system budget, in no small part by making payments this year to last year’s budget, a practice Mr. Bobb notes to be a [mal]practice the city has followed for 10 years—putting the city’s school budget near the minimum required by the Virginia Standards of Quality.

Nevertheless, Petersburg completed the first phase of recovery, focusing on short-term financing concerns, at the end of March. That has allowed it to focus on long-term financing and a fiscal plan, including developing policies for capital improvements, debt, and reserves to ensure financial stability. In the final stage, from July 1 until Mr. Bobb’s contract ends on September 30th, the city will develop five-year financial and capital improvement plans, as well as a budget transition plan, for ongoing financial performance and monitoring—as well as refilling the fiscal architecture via filling critical positions, including a finance director, which Mr. Brown notes, will be critical to filling middle management positions, such as accountants, which are vital to maintain the city’s financial stability: “If they don’t get that in place, there’s a real risk they’ll slide back.”

Petersburg wasn’t even at the top of the list of the most fiscally stressed localities ranked by the Virginia Commission on Local Government in 2014. It was third, behind Emporia and Buena Vista, and just ahead of Martinsville and Covington. “We’re only as strong as our weakest link,” said Sen. Rosalyn R. Dance, D-Petersburg, who served as the city’s mayor from 1992 to 2004. “We’re not the only ones there.”

Whither Chicago? The Windy City, nearly 350 years old, named “Chicago,” based upon a French rendering of the Native American word “shikaakwa,” from the Miami-Illinois language, is today defined by the Census Bureau as the city and suburbs extending into Wisconsin and Indiana; however, it is, today, a city experiencing population decline: last year it lost just under 20,000 residents—and its surrounding state, Illinois, saw its population decline more than any other state: 37,508 people, according to census data released last December. During the Great Recession, families chose to stay in or move to core urban areas, and migration to the suburbs decelerated; however, in the recovery, there is a reverse trend: families are deciding it is time to move back to the suburbs.

Thus, by most estimates, Chicago’s population will continue to decline, with the Chicago Tribune, from a survey of dozens of former residents, reporting the depopulation stems from reactions to: high taxes, the state budget stalemate, crime, the unemployment rate, and weather—with black residents among those leaving in search of safe neighborhoods and prosperity: it seems many are heading to the suburbs and warm-weather states: Chicago lost 181,000 black residents between 2000 and 2010, according to census data. Just under 90,000 Chicagoans left the city and its immediately surrounding suburbs for other states last year, according to an analysis of census data released in March, marking the greatest outflow since at least 1990. It appears that, more than any other city, Chicago has relied upon the increase in Mexican immigrants to offset the decline of its native-born population: during the 1990s, that immigration accounted for most of Chicago’s growth. After 2007, when Mexican-born populations began to fall across the nation’s major metropolitan areas, most cities managed to make up for the loss with the growth of their native populations, but that has not been the case for Chicago (nor Detroit, which, according to census data, realized a decline of 3,541 residents from 2015 to 2016). While Chicago’s changes may be small in context, they could be a harbinger of more losses to come.

As we had noted in our fiscal report on Chicago, Mayor Rahm Emanuel focused on drawing in new businesses, concerned that any perception that assessed property taxes might have to increase—or that schools and crime rates would not improve—would adversely affect companies’ willingness to come to Chicago—meaning an intense focus on confronting fiscal challenges: such as credit quality threats: e.g. avoiding having a disproportionate percent of the city’s budget devoted to long-term pension borrowing obligations instead of critical future investments: the more of its budget the city had to divert to meeting unsustainable pension obligations, the less it would have to address its goal of investments in the city’s infrastructure, schools, and public safety—investments the Mayor believed fundamental to the city’s economic and fiscal future.  We noted a critical change: Investing in the Future: Mayor Emanuel created enterprise funds so that a greater portion of municipal services were not financed through property taxes and the operating budget: some 83 percent of its budget was focused on schools and public safety, in an effort to draw back young families. Nevertheless, amid growing perceptions that Chicago’s cost of living has become too high, rising property taxes, and perceived growth in crime; some are apprehensive Chicago could be at a tipping point: the period in a city’s time when an increasing number of residents believe it is time to leave—or, as one leaver noted: “It’s just sad to see that people have to leave the city to protect their own future cost of living.”

Does East Cleveland Have a Fiscal Future? In the small Ohio municipality of East Cleveland, a city waiting on the State of Ohio for nearly a year to obtain permission to file for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, there is an upcoming Mayoral election—an election which could decide whether the city has a fiscal future—and where voters will have to decide among an array of candidates: who might they elect as most likely to turn the fortunes of the City around, and avert its continuing slide towards insolvency? One candidate, who previously served as Chairman of the East Cleveland Audit Committee, noted a report to the Council detailing twenty-four budget appropriations totaling approximately $2,440,076 in unauthorized and questionable expenditures—and that his committee had provided documentation to the Auditor of State’s Office of Local Government Services regarding the hiring of 10 individuals in violation of a Council-mandated hiring freeze, costing the City approximately $408,475 in unauthorized payroll costs, adding: “All told, the Audit Committee uncovered approximately $3,055,351 in illegal and suspicious spending by the Norton Administration…The truth is, as I stated in the beginning, the municipal government of East Cleveland is afflicted with the cancer of corruption that has been allowed to grow because of two main reasons: The first being, the indifference displayed by Ohio and Cuyahoga County government officials who failed in their respective responsibility when confronted with documented facts.  They collectively have turned a blind eye to what was, and is, happening in East Cleveland.  No one wants to get their hands dirty with so-called ‘black politics,’ even if the legal and financial evidence is given to them on a ‘silver platter.’  Personally, I smell the stench of secret political deals which produced a ‘hands off policy.’”

He added that a symptom of what he described as “this cancer” included some “$41, 857, 430 in unwarranted expenses and debt that was generated during the first 3 years of Mayor Norton’s first term as Mayor. I anticipate that whenever an audit is conducted for 2013 thru 2016, the $41 million figure will grow by an additional $25 million to $35 million.” Addressing the unresponsiveness of the State of Ohio, he described the Governor’s Financial Planning and Supervision Commission as a “joke:  It has been wholly unimpressive and has not provided the necessary oversight and forced accountability one would have expected from the Commission at the beginning.  Furthermore, The Commission became tainted when Governor Kasich appointed Helen Forbes Fields to the Commission.  She has a number of personal conflicts of interests that prevent her from being an impartial member of the Commission.  I can recall a conversation I had with the former Commission Chair, Sharon Hanrahan when she admitted to me that the State Government did not have the ‘political will’ to clean up the mess we were trying to get them to address.” He added, that, if elected, in order to bring accountability for the mismanagement of public funds, he would seek assistance from Ohio and federal law enforcement agencies to ensure those responsible for the mismanagement of East Cleveland’s financial resources would be held accountable, estimating that between $5 million and $15 million dollars could be recovered.