Remembering & Thanking Those Who Serve

September 11, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we remember those who died on 9/11; we remember those leaders, like then Arlington County Deputy Fire Chief Jim Schwartz, who became the incident commander that morning, in command of all local, state, and federal responders, demonstrating that while the federal government can shut down, city and county governments are the only governments in this country that can never shut down, but rather, as Detroit’s Emergency Manager, on the first day of Detroit’s chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, emailed to every employee of the city: they were to report to work, on time—and the critical operations were to ensure every street light and traffic light was working—and there was a prompt and effective response to every 911 call. This foggy morning, we consider too, the challenge to Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania—a municipality where the population has declined more than 50% since 1930–denied state fiscal assistance, and awaiting the physical wrath of Hurricane Florence, before, finally, assessing changes to halt the shipping discrimination against the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico.

The Bar against Wilkes-Barre. Officials in Wilkes-Barre are regrouping after the coordinators of Pennsylvania’s Act 47 program for struggling municipalities rejected the city’s request made last June 29th for distressed status—a denial having the effect of barring the city from filing for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Mayor Tony George and the city’s consultant, Public Financial Management, were scheduled to meet this week with representatives of the state Department of Community and Economic Development, the overseer of the state’s program for distressed cities. Under the state’s Act 47, the Dept. of Community and Economic Development is authorized to declare certain municipalities as financially distressed—a declaration which provides for the restructuring of debt of financially distressed municipalities, limits the ability of financially distressed municipalities to obtain government funding, authorizes municipalities to participate in federal debt adjustment actions and bankruptcy actions under certain circumstances, and provides for consolidation or merger of contiguous municipalities to relieve financial distress. That means a scheduled call at the end of this week with Pennsylvania DCED could be determinative with regard to a possibility the state could reverse its position and declare the municipality financially distressed.

Mayor Anthony George, last June, had applied for Act 47 “distressed” status, the same month in which S&P dropped the municipality’s credit rating to BBB (minus) with negative implications, noting: “[T]he CreditWatch listing means we believe there is at least a one-in-two chance that we will lower the rating within the coming 90 days following the receipt of information from the city regarding its plans in response to the state’s rejection…Any action on our part regarding the rating—either keeping it the same or revising it downward—hinges on our better understanding of those plans.” DCED, five weeks later, convened a hearing at City Hall, where Mayor George projected an FY2019 shortfall of $3.5 million—one which, according to a DCED overview, could spike to $16 million by FY2021. Under Act 47, the city would have been enabled Wilkes-Barre to triple its emergency services tax to $156 a year, as well as gain access to a $3 million interest free, 10-year loan—as well as gain authorization to enact a commuter tax. However, DCED hearing officer and former York Mayor Kim Bracey, in her final report, wrote that Wilkes-Barre should continue to pursue measures through the state’s early intervention program, in which the city enrolled two years ago. State lawmakers formalized early intervention in 2014 as part of the DCED Act 47 process.

With the greatest number of municipalities of any state in the nation, the process, however, appears confusing—or, as Mayor George put it: “I don’t understand what you [DCED] want us to do.” According to Professor David Fiorenza, the city can fix the deficit with two or three financial decisions that can lay the groundwork for long-term surpluses: “Cities can’t have it both ways, that is, when they have surpluses in their budgets they want less state intervention and when there are deficits they want the commonwealth to be there for the bailouts.” (Professor Fiorenza was a former chief financial officer of Radnor Township.)

The Mayor and his staff expect to learn more from the state DCED Friday via a conference call—weather, of course, permitting. In this instance, the call comes a week Pennsylvania DCED Secretary Dennis Davin stated the state would not declare the municipality financially distressed—noting that, instead, Mayor George should pursue other options to avoid the invocation of Act 47. (According to the Department, a quarter of the city’s current budget relies on intergovernmental assistance, versus 55% from local taxes.)

The municipality’s request for distressed status, however, is not supported by its state representatives, Sen. John Yudichak (D-Plymouth Township) and Rep. Eddie Day Pashinski (D-Wilkes-Barre), who had secured $260,000 in state funds to enable the municipality get Wilkes-Barre into the state’s Early Intervention Program (EIP), writing, in late July, in opposition to Mayor George’s request, noting that the intervention program also had a five-year timetable—from which the city had four years remaining, adding that the city was making progress with the help of PFM as evidenced in the municipal bond restructuring, which, they noted, had improved its cash flow, with Rep. Pashinski adding: “We’re trying to preserve the integrity of the city.”

At the end of last month, Sec. Davin had written: “Opportunities remain to keep the city out of financial distress status: Each and every viable option must be considered, including modest gains in the fund balance and earned income tax collections, the need to perform a property reassessment and recommendations for asset monetization.”

The clock on all this is ticking, with S&P indicating at least a “one-in-two chance” that it would lower its rating within 90 days of receiving any information from the city regarding its follow-up plans, adding: “Any action on our part regarding the rating–either keeping it the same or revising it downward, hinges on our better understanding of those plans.” From his perspective, Professor David Fiorenza of the Villanova School of Business noted: “The state made the right decision…I hope this decision will send the message to Pennsylvania cities and municipalities to take care of their financial house as these deficits can be remedied.” According to the Wilkes-Barre-based Pennsylvania Economy League, 44 of Pennsylvania’s cities, or 77.2%, have experienced population declines since 2010—complicating its efforts to refinance its long-term debt: the city issued $52 million in municipal bonds two years ago to refinance debt and adjust balloon payments to level, and tapped minimum municipal obligation relief under state law to reduce its 2017 pension payment to $5.6 million from $6.5 million. But the state relief program expires this year, while the city’s obligation is projected to spike to $7.1 million in 2020.

Hurricane Relief? Puerto Rico government officials are scheduled to meet at the White House this week to discuss a possible, temporary modification of the Jones Act (as opposed to the Jones-Shafroth Act) to create a five-year administrative exemption in U.S. cabotage statutes, amendments to allow maritime transportation of natural gas between the mainland and Puerto Rico on non-US ships. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also known as the Jones Act, provides for the promotion and maintenance of the U.S. merchant marine–§27 of the Act addresses cabotage, as opposed to cottage cheese: it provides for the regulation of the U.S. merchant marine and the regulation of maritime commerce in U.S. waters and between U.S. ports, mandating that all goods transported by water between U.S. ports be carried on U.S. flag ships, constructed in the United States, owned and crewed by U.S. citizens and U.S. permanent residents. Under the cabotage laws, the maritime cargo between U.S. ports and Puerto Rico must be accomplished in U.S. owned, registered, and crewed boats—that is, at a much greater than free market cost. A temporary administrative exemption, such as the one proposed by Puerto Rican leaders, would have to be granted “in the interest of the national defense” of the U.S., according to a 2013 report from the Government Accountability Office. The protectionist statute means the cost of providing relief to Puerto Rico in the wake of Hurricane Maria was far greater than for other Caribbean nations. Now, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), and Puerto Rico Senate Vice President appear hopeful that the U.S. territory and the Southern States Energy Board, a potent combination of the governors of 16 states, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, might be able to gain an exemption in these discriminatory cabotage laws, with a meeting scheduled next week at the White House to promote the idea that international vessels could also transport natural gas products between U.S. ports and Puerto Rico.

Unsurprisingly, the concept has the support of the Southern States Energy Board, which brings together 16 Republican governors along with the Democrats of the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, and proposes a more comprehensive exemption, to include all energy products. During their September 16-18 meeting in Biloxi, Mississippi, the Southern States Energy Board anticipates considering a resolution by Arkansas State Senator Gary Stubblefield (R-Branch, Arkansas) seeking to have President Trump issue an Executive Order granting a 10 year exemption in the transportation of energy products between Puerto Rico and the mainland—and urging the Congress to enact a permanent waiver.

Advertisements

Will Congress Grant Puerto Rico Statehood?

June 27, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider statehood issues for Puerto Rico.

Un Estado? Commissioner Jenniffer Gonzalez, Puerto Rico’s non-voting representative in Congress is introducing legislation, H.R.6246 to modify the Jones-Shafroth Act and make the U.S. territory a state by 2021—an effort she is making with the key support of House Natural Resources Committee Chair Rob Bishop (R-Utah). As of yesterday, Commissioner Jenniffer Gonzalez reported she had 20 Republican and 14 Democratic co-sponsors, noting: “This is the first step to open a serious discussion regarding the ultimate status for the island.” In addition to Chairman Bishop, another key co-sponsor is Indian and Insular Affairs Subcommittee Chair Doug Lamalfa (R-Ca.). As proposed, the bill calls for the creation of a bipartisan, nine-member task force which would submit a report to Congress and to the President identifying laws which would need to be amended or repealed in order for Puerto Rico to be granted statehood. In response, Gov. Ricardo Rosselló Nevares noted: “In the past, this issue has been very hard to move forward…No longer do we want ambiguity. We want clarity. Either here in Congress you are with us or you are against the people of Puerto Rico.”

Under the proposed legislation, Puerto Rico would immediately become an incorporated territory; Congress would establish a Working Group with the promise of studying how the U.S. territory could become a state in January of 2021—the bill does guarantee the direct admission to statehood, nor does it propose a new referendum. The effort, however, faces a short timetable in the remaining few months of this Congress and little sense of White House support. Its chances depend upon the efforts of a bicameral, bipartisan Working Group  of nine members, eight appointed by the legislative leadership (four from the House and four from the Senate), which must be submitted within a period of 13 months, along with a report to Congress on how laws which do not apply to the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico or are enforced in the territory differently from the states would have to be “amended or eliminated” in order to provide for a transition to equal treatment of Puerto Rico, with the states, effective January 1, 2021. The effort will also have to address a transition—e.g., incorporate “flexibility in the entry of federal programs” and the development of the territorial economy through “incentives, tax arrangements, and other measures.”

As proposed, the legislation also requires proposing rules and dates for elections to federal positions in the territory, as well as studying the effect of perhaps adding as five new Members of Congress—a potential conundrum, as it would increase the number of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives to 440—effectively diluting the strength of other state delegations. Indeed, bearing in mind that one Congress cannot tie the hands of another, the bill provides that the ratification of the legislation would imply “the intention of the Congress to approve legislation based on of the final report of the Working Group.”

In reaction, Gov. Ricardo Rosselló Nevares noted; “This is the moment. The catastrophe left by the hurricanes Irma and María stripped bare the reality of the unequal treatment of the American citizens living in Puerto Rico, the Executive having to approve waivers, and the Congress to make exceptions in the laws so that we could receive help.” He added: “This is a matter of equality, justice and civil rights.” It would also be a taxing matter: statehood, were it granted, would subject Puerto Ricans to federal income taxes without the political rights of statehood, and the US Constitution would have full force.

Chairman Bishop noted that one of the obstacles to statehood would be the current PROMESA statute—which created the current PROMESA Board to oversee (along with a federal court) Puerto Rico’s quasi plan of debt adjustment—a panel of which eight of the nine named committee members were appointed by the Congressional leadership, with the Chair appointed by the Speaker of the House, who would designate the Chairman of the committee. Subcommittee Chair LaMalfa noted that the proposed legislation provides that once the Working Group presents its report to Congress, “We will make a decision” with regard to Puerto Rico’s statehood.

Puerto Rico Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz, at an event with Gov. Rosselló Nevares yesterday, noted: “This is the common front that Puerto Rico wanted to see a long time ago.” Other Members expressing support included Reps. Don Young (R-Alaska), Don Bacon (R-Neb.) Peter King (R-N.Y.) and Delegate Amata Coleman Radewagen (Samoa). For her part, Rep. Nydia Velázquez (D-NY), who is Puerto Rican and a member of the House Natural Resources Committee, emphasized that attention by Congress must be focused on the “reconstruction of Puerto Rico,” adding: “I do not know how statehood for Puerto Rico will solve the problems of Puerto Rico,” and Rep. Tom McClintock (R-Ca.) warned: “What you are going to do is cause additional problems. The fiscal mismanagement in Puerto Rico does not make them eligible for admission to the United States.” Chair Bishop noted the process towards statehood would proceed “one step at a time.”

In Puerto Rico, the possibility of statehood finds a mixed reaction, with the Popular Democratic Party and Independence Party perceiving pro-statehood legislation by Congress as futile. The Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP),  which boycotted the 2017 referendum, saw the new pro-statehood legislation as a futile and contradictory process. Puerto Rico’s Popular Democratic Party President Héctor Ferrer worries proposed changes could “lead Puerto Rico to the worst of the relationship through assuming all the responsibilities of the state, without receiving the supposed benefits of being a state.” He also noted there remain only 32 legislative days before November’s elections.

Nevertheless, Puerto Rico’s fiscal situation, as the new hurricane season is underway, is on the upswing: the May General Fund revenues were $217.7 million or 32% higher than budgeted, marking a recovery from the physical and fiscal devastation of last September’s Hurricane Maria; the territory’s budget has experienced a surge, leaving its revenues $78.9 million or 1% ahead of budget projections for the first 11 months of the fiscal year. In a non-April Fool’s report, that month’s revenues were 20.2% ahead of projections, with Puerto Rico Secretary of the Treasury Raúl Maldonado Gautier reporting that increased economic activity connected to rebuilding from the hurricanes had helped tax collections—a finding that could affect the PROMESA Board’s decision with regard to when and how Puerto Rico should resume making interst payments on its outstanding municipal bonds—or, as Puerto Rico Secretary of the Treasury Raúl Maldonado Gautier put it, the fact that revenues are now ahead of budget “is a favorable fact in view of the fiscal challenges faced by public finances since before the hurricanes collections were favorable but after the hurricanes for several months the revenues were low.” According to Secretary Maldonado Gautier, much of the increase was due to temporary economic activity of companies engaged in recovery tasks and to the flow of money from insurance payments, both in response to the two hurricanes that hit Puerto Rico in September. Key revenue changes included non-resident withholding ($63.1 million), sales and use tax revenues ($40.9 million), and the individual income tax ($25.8 million). Over the first 11 months, the tax categories deviating the most from projections in dollar terms were the corporate income tax, which came in $197.4 million ahead of budget, and the Law 154 foreign corporate profit tax, which arrived $151.2 million short. Secretary Maldonado Gautier noted he was confident that once June’s revenues are included, FY2018’s revenues will come in ahead of projections.

The Tides of Immgration: Are there Fiscal Consequences?

June 25, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the tides of emigration as they fiscally challenge the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico.

Today, more than one million Puerto Ricans live in New York City, just under one-third of Puerto Ricans who reside in Puerto Rico, with the likelihood of emigrating from Puerto Rico to Gotham increasing for single Puerto Ricans between the ages of 25 and 29 who have never married, do not own property, and whose income is limited, albeit not to the point of being below the federal poverty level. The majority are men, and the destinations of preference seem to be cities in Florida, New York, or Texas. In theory, about a fifth of those who left will return, judging by the rate of return reported on the immigration side to Puerto Rico. According to the most recent census data, in 2016, some 89,000 left Puerto Rico, a number which appears to indicate a rising trend, albeit, there is some evidence that the pattern might be changing—with that pattern affected by not only destination, but also by the level of academic achievement of those leaving Puerto Rico.

While we await, in December, 2017 emigration data, early indications based upon passenger counts at airports, appear to represent very high migration trends, finding, for instance, that last year, more than 281,000 Puerto Ricans left Puerto Rico than arrived there—an indication of the demographic impact of Hurricane Maria. Demographer Judith Rodríguez wrote in the 2016 Migrant Profile (published last week) that “The recent wave of migration in the last decade exceeds the Great Exodus of 1950-60, which has great impact on the social and economic level.” More recent data, however, indicates this demographic tide may finally be ebbing: during this year’s first month, January, 58,202 more arrived on the island than left, with the patter continuing the next month when there was a net positive inflow of 10, 698—a number which ebbed by March to 1,510—a change estimated to be temporary.

After New York, Florida appears to be the emigration state of choice: currently, around 30% of Puerto Rican emigrants choose a city in Florida, mainly in the central zone. At the same time, Texas is rising as a demographic state of choice. It appears more likely than not that New York City will continue to be a focal point of Puerto Rican emigration, due to cultural and family ties with Puerto Ricans since the migrations of the early twentieth century in the wake of the enactment of the Jones-Shafroth Act. According to the most recently updated Census figures, New York City is in the top three exodus destinations for emigrating Puerto Ricans.

But this is not all one-way traffic: many Puerto Ricans appear to be going home, with the largest such numbers coming from the states of Florida and New York; however, the number returning from the states of Massachusetts, Louisiana, and Washington make up more than half the total.

While it is more difficult to assess who is leaving and who is staying, Census data indicates that 48% of Puerto Ricans living in the D.C. metropolitan area have at least a bachelor’s degree, and, overall, 78% of Puerto Ricans living on the mainland have at least some level of university education, nearly three times the percentage of Puerto Ricans who have moved to Miami. Income wise, Washington, D.C. is the location, which appears to have drawn Puerto Ricans with both the greatest levels of scholastic achievement and the most income: the median household income for Puerto Ricans in the nation’s capital is $87,713. Next, after Washington DC, mainland cities with the highest median income for the Puerto Ricans are Miami ($50,945), Chicago ($47,232) and New Haven ($43,165). The disparity in annual income perhaps demonstrates the lure of emigrating from Puerto Rico, where the median income of a household is around $ 19,977, according to the Census data.

However, for Puerto Ricans leaving for the mainland, nirvana is not guaranteed: in the cities of Springfield and Boston, as well as in Hartford, there are high poverty levels are high for Puerto Ricans: in Springfield, more than one-third of the more than 100,000 Puerto Ricans live below the federal poverty level—a level comparable to the 31% below that level in the Boston metro region, and 26.5% in the Springfield metropolitan area have incomes that place them below the poverty level.  In addition, age is a discriminating factor: in Springfield, almost 50% of Puerto Ricans under the age of 18 live below the poverty line—a figure that compares unfavorably to the 46% of Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico who fall below the federal poverty line of $12,060 for an individual.

The Prospects and Draws for Emigration. Demographic data with regard to those leaving Puerto Rico finds that the bulk of emigrants worked in 2016 as administrative office staff (6,822), followed by operators of production lines (5,445), vendors (4,870), and food preparers (3,264). According to the date, some 382 desperately needed doctors left—while some 1,376 nursing professionals left the island. Stateside, 82% of the 2.2 million Puerto Ricans who are working on the mainland are employed in the private sector; 4% have their own business. 14% of the jobs occupied by Puerto Ricans are in the government. In Puerto Rico, that figure rises to 22%, according to data from the Census Bureau. On the other hand, most of those who immigrated or returned to Puerto Rico were vendors (1,383) or educators (1,101).

Quien Es Encargado? (Who is in charge?) The Puerto Rico Senate has killed a an agreement between Puerto Rico Gov. Ricardo Rosselló and the PROMESA Oversight Board, potentially escalating the governance conflict with regard to Puerto Rico’s operating budget and the restructuring of the central government’s $51 billion of debt. Last Friday, Puerto Rico Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz threatened a lawsuit against the Board if it continues to attempt to preempt Puerto Rico’s government in order to impose budget cuts or the repeal of worker protection measures. In a compromise with the Governor, the Board had agreed to maintain Puerto Rico’s mandatory Christmas bonus, vacation and sick day policies in exchange for Gov. Rosselló’s agreement to introduce at-will employment for all employers by repealing a 1976 law, Law 80. The House, at the end of last month, had approved the measure, before the Senate amended it to introduce at-will employment only for employees entering the workforce. Indeed, as we had previously noted, last Thursday, the Senate President had declared the Law 80 repeal to be dead, after speaking with other members of the majority New Progressive Party caucus in the Senate. Moreover, according to a video posted on the El Nuevo Día website, the Senate leader said he had consulted lawyers and was ready to fight in court, if the PROMESA Board seeks to preempt the island’s elected leaders. The power struggle came as the Puerto Rico House has added funding to a budget bill—spending which Puerto Rico House President Carlos Méndez and Treasury Committee President Antonio Soto said they expected the PROMESA Board would reject—relying on the Congressional PROMESA Act granting the Board the right to create and approve its own version of Puerto Rico’s budget—as is, for instance, the current budget. Puerto Rico’s new fiscal budget year begins this Sunday—a date by which, on normal years, like most states, but unlike the federal government, its fiscal year operating budget would normally have been adopted—but, where, last Thursday, PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión, in New York City, stated that if the government opted not to repeal Law 80, the currently certified fiscal plan would operate—a plan which would mandate at-will employment to be introduced by January 1, 2019—a plan which, unsurprisingly, Senate President Rivera Schatz is set to challenge, especially after, on May 9th, Sergio Marxuach, the New Economy Policy Director, testified before the Puerto Rico Senate Committee on Federal, Political, and Economic Relations that repealing Law 80 would be a bad idea, noting that a 2016 International Monetary Fund study showed that in times of economic weakness, eliminating job protections would have had a negative economic impact in the short and medium term, noting: “By triggering a wave of layoffs, reforming employment protections further weakens aggregate demand and delays economic recovery.” Similarly, a 2017 report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development said that in Portugal from 2006 to 2014 “reforms increasing the flexibility of the labor market negatively affect firms’ productivity both in the short- and long-run. A possible explanation is that higher job turnover reduces firms’ incentives to invest in job-specific training and reduce the scope for workers’ specialization.”

In response, Governor Rosselló released a statement: “Puerto Rico has just seen how politics is done and not how a future government should be made in challenging and difficult times, with this regrettable decision by the President of the Senate, Thomas Rivera Schatz.”

Now Senate Finance Committee President Migdalia Padilla is scheduled to meet with the Governor’s fiscal team to discuss the changes which have been included in the joint resolutions that make up the budget for the next fiscal year; he will also  meet with Financial Advisory Authority and Fiscal Agency (Aafaf) Executive Director Raul Maldonado and the Secretary of Finance, Gerardo Portelo—with the Chairman noting: “They are going to have meetings with me so that we can all harmonize what we have observed, what the Board says, and what the Executive establishes.” Chairman Padilla added that he trusts that today will be constituted the conference committee to discuss the House amendments, especially after, at the end of last week, House approval of an FY2019 budget $33.2 million higher than the one presented by PROMESA Board—followed, the next day, by Senate approval, albeit with amendments intended to force a conference committee to settle the differences.

In addition to the perception of preemption, one of the legislature’s greatest reservations with regard to the PROMESA Board’s version of the budget their perception that that version underestimates the revenue estimate is $7,000 million, according to the President of the Finance Commission of the Chamber, Antonio Soto, who noted that the government will close the year with revenues of more than $9,172 million, but the fiscal entity estimates $8,400 million for the next fiscal year, despite the fact that it proposes a growth in the economy of 6.3%.

Senate President Padilla explained that one of the changes that will be introduced to the House version is aimed at addressing the $164,000 reduction for the Independent Special Prosecutor’s Panel Office (OPFEI), advising that he would be subtracting that $164,000 from the additional $2 million that the Chamber allocated in the budget to the Alliance for Alternative Education program. In its version, the Chamber dealt with the cuts contemplated in the PROMESA Board’s proposal for the oversight agencies, such as the Office of Government Ethics, the Office of the Comptroller and the Office of the Citizen Procurator, but left out the Special Prosecutor, noting: “I am not increasing the spending budget; I am simply moving part of an allocation of $2 million,” adding that it is inconsistent with the amendments submitted by the Chamber aimed at ensuring the functioning of the agencies under the Department of Public Safety, such as the Bureau of Emergency Management and Disaster Management, the Emergency Medical Bureau, the Bureau of the Corps of Firemen, and the Bureau of Forensic Sciences—all agencies with regard to which there is heightened concern in the wake of Puerto Rico’s devastating hurricanes and inequitable FEMA responses.  Indeed, Miguel Romero the vice president of the Senate Finance Committee, agreed on the need to assign the necessary funds to the Department of Public Security to ensure its operation: “There is a deficiency of over $40 million that we have to address.” In addition, Senator Padilla indicated the Senate would take a close look at the Board’s proposed $7 million cut to Court Administration, noting: “There is a need for appointment of judges and to maintain diversion programs with the correctional population.” Moreover, Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz also indicated that the controversy centers on inconsistencies between the budget and the fiscal plan, both presented by the PROMESA Board, explaining, in the wake of discussions, that it had been “established that there is a gap between the approved budget and the fiscal plan: basically, regarding the collections we will have available to cover the budget.” With the session scheduled to end on Saturday, that date falls three days after the limit established by the PROMESA Board to approve the budget, with the Board anticipating that, if Puerto Rico does not comply with the agreement reached with the Governor to repeal the Law Against Unjustified Dismissal (Law 80-1976), it will revert the fiscal plan to the approved one.

The Once & Future Puerto Rico?

April 17, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we try to assess the fiscal and future governance options for Puerto Rico: will it become a second class state? A nation? Or, at long last, an integral part of the nation? And governance: who is in charge of its governance?

Before Hurricane Maria wracked its terrible human, fiscal, and physical toll; more than 50% of Americans knew not that Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens. Still, today, some six months after the disaster, more than 50,000 have no electricity. The fiscal and physical toll on low-income Americans on the island has been especially harsh: of the nearly 1.2 million applications to FEMA for assistance to help fix damaged homes, nearly 60% have been rejected: FEMA provided no assistance, citing the lack of lack of title deeds or because the edifices in need were constructed on stolen land or in contravention of building codes. That is to write that this exceptionally powerful storm took a grievous toll not just on life and limb, but especially on the local and state economy, destroying an estimated 80% of Puerto Rico’s agricultural crop, including coffee and banana plantations—where regrowing is projected to take years. The super storm devastated 20% of businesses—today an estimated 10,000 firms remain closed. Discouragingly, the government forecasts output will shrink by another 11% in the year to June 2018.

It might be, ojala que si (one hopes) that a burst of growth will ensue, with estimates of as much as 8% next year, in no small part thanks to federal recovery assistance and as much as $20 billion in private-insurance payments—as well as Puerto Ricans dipping into their own savings to make repairs to their own homes and businesses. Yet, even those positive signs can appear to pale against the scope of the physical misery: by one estimate, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands will lose nearly $48 billion in output—and employment equivalent to 332,000 people working for a year. Of perhaps longer term fiscal concern are the estimated thousands of Puerto Ricans who left the island for Florida and other points on the mainland—disproportionately those better educated and with greater fiscal resources—leaving behind older and poorer Americans, and a greater physical and fiscal burden for Puerto Rico’s government.

The massive storm—and disparate treatment by the Trump administration and Congress—have encumbered Puerto Rico with massive debts, both to its central government and municipalities, but also to its businesses. Encumbered with massive debts—including $70 billion to its municipal bondholders and another $50 billion in public pension liabilities; Governor Ricardo Rosselló’s administration is making deep cuts: prior to the massive storm, the government had been committed to slashing funding to its local governments by $175 million, closing 184 schools, and cutting public pensions—pensions which, at just over $1,000 are not especially generous. Now, that task will be eased, provided the PROMESA oversight Board approves, to moderate the proposed cuts in services in order to do less harm the reviving economy.

Assisted by federal tax incentives, Puerto Rico’s economic model was for decades based on manufacturing, especially of pharmaceuticals. However, what Congress can bestow; it can take away. Thus it was that over the last decade, Congress steadily eroded economic incentives—Congressional actions which contributed to the territory’s massive debt crisis, and contributing to the World Bank dropping Puerto Rico 58 places in its ranking compared to the mainland with regard to the ease of doing business.

The havoc wreaked by Maria could be especially creative for the island’s private sector, which represents a chronically missed opportunity. Puerto Rico, for all its problems, is a beautiful tropical island, with white-sanded beaches, rainforest, fascinating history, lovely colonial buildings and a vibrant mix of Latin-American and European culture. Yet, with 3.5 million visitors a year, its tourism industry is less than half the size of Hawaii’s. It has an excellent climate for growing coffee and other highly marketable products, yet its agriculture sector is inefficient and tiny. The island has a well-educated, bilingual middle-class, including a surfeit of engineers, trained at the well-regarded University of Puerto Rico for the manufacturing industry, and cheap to hire. But in the wake of the departing multinationals, they are also leaving. Isabel Rullán, a 20-something former migrant, who has returned to the island from Washington to try to improve linkages to the diaspora, estimates that half her university classmates are on the mainland.

Quien Es Encargado? (Who is in charge?) Unlike a normal chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy proceeding, the process created by Congress under the PROMESA law created a distinct governance model—one which does create a quasi emergency manager, but here in the form of a board, the PROMESA Board, which, today, will submit its proposed fiscal plan, or quasi plan of debt adjustment to U.S. Judge Laura Swain Taylor; it will maintain its requirement to propose the reduction of the public pensions of Puerto Ricans by an average of 10 percent. Until last weekend, the PROMESA Board had kept under review the complaints to Governor Ricardo Rosselló with regard to the inclusion in its revised fiscal plan of the central government the base of a labor reform which, among other proposals, calls for the immediate reduction in vacation and sick leaves from 15 to 7 days for workers of private companies, according to two sources close to the Board. Under the fiscal plan proposed by the Governor Rosselló, the cuts would reach $1.45 billion in five years. The PROMESA Board has requested that they total $1.58 million by June of 2023. The proposal, unsurprisingly, has raised questions with regard to whether the Congress has the authority to impose on the government of Puerto Rico a reform of its labor laws—any more than its inability under our form of federalism to dictate changes in any state’s retirement systems—contracts which are inherent in state constitutions.

Pension reductions in chapter 9 cases, because they involve contracts, are difficult, as contracts are protected under state constitutions—moreover, as we saw in Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment approved by now retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes, the court wanted to ensure that any such reductions would not subject the retiree to income below the federal poverty level—a level which, Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rossello told Reuters, in an interview this past week, “many retirees are already under,” as he warned  that any further pension cuts could “cast them out and challenge their livelihood.” That is, in the U.S. territory struggling with a 45 percent poverty rate and unemployment more than double the U.S. national average, the fiscal challenge of how to restructure nearly $70 billion in debt, where public pensions, which owe $45 billion in benefits, are also virtually insolvent, makes the challenges which had confronted Judge Rhodes pale in comparison.  Moreover, with the current pensions already virtually insolvent, paying pension benefits out of Puerto Rico’s general fund, on a pay-as-you-go basis, could cost the virtually bankrupt Puerto Rico $1.5 billion a year. The PROMESA Board has recommended that Gov. Rossello reduce pensions by 10 percent.  

For their part, the island’s pensioners have formed a negotiating committee, advised by Robert Gordon, an attorney who advised retirees in Detroit’s chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, as well as Hector Mayol, the former administrator of Puerto Rico’s public pensions. The fiscal challenge in Puerto Rico, however, promises to be more stiff than Detroit—or, as Moody’s put it: Puerto Rico’s “unusual circumstances mean that it will not conform exactly” to recent public bankruptcies, in which “judges reduced creditor claims far more than amounts owed to pensioners.” Moreover, the scope or size of Puerto Rico’s public pension chasm is exacerbated by the ongoing emigration of young professionals from Puerto Rico to the mainland—making it almost like an increasingly unbalanced teeter totter.  The U.S. territory’s largest public pension, the Employee Retirement System (ERS), which covers nearly 100,000 retirees, is projected to run out of cash this year: it is confronted by a double fiscal whammy: in addition to paying retiree benefits, ERS owes some $3.1 billion to repay debts on municipal bonds it issued in 2008—bonds issued to finance Puerto Rico’s public pension obligations. Last year, Governor Rosselló had agreed to a reduction in pensions for government retirees, indicating a willingness to seek as much as a 6% reduction. That appears not, however, to be something he currently supports.

A few weeks ago, in the wake of negotiations with the PROMESA Board, Governor Rosselló proposed a labor reform similar to the one he negotiated with members of the Board, with differences with regard to how to balance it with an increase in the minimum wage and when to implement such changes. The Governor, however, withdrew the proposal when the Board required that the labor reform be in full force by next January, instead of applying it gradually over the next three years, and conditioned the increase from $ 7.25 to $ 8.25 per hour in the minimum wage to the increase in labor participation rates. It seems the PROMESA Board is intent upon labor reform as an essential element for future economic growth.

The Challenge of “Shared” Governance. Unlike in Central Falls, San Bernardino, Detroit, Jefferson County, or other chapter 9 cases where state enacted chapter 9 statutes prescribed governance through the process, the PROMESA statute created a territorial judicial system to restructure Puerto Rico’s public debt, creating a Board empowered to reign until four consecutive balanced budgets and medium and long-term access to the financial markets are achieved—or, as our colleague and expert, Gregory Makoff, of the Center for International Governance Innovation, who worked for a year as an advisor to the Department of Treasury in the Puerto Rican case, put it: “While the lack of cooperation with the Board may be good in political terms in the short-term, it simply delays the return of confidence and extends the time it will take for the Oversight Board to leave the island.” Mr. Makoff has recommended the Board and Gov. Rosselló propose to Judge Swain a cut of from $45 down to $6 billion of the public debt backed by taxes, with a payment of only 13.6 cents per each dollar owed, with the intent of equating it with the average that the states have. His suggestion comes as the Board aims to disclose its plans as early as this evening in advance of its scheduled sessions at the end of the week at the San Juan Convention Center, where, Thursday, the Board wants to certify Puerto Rico’s and PREPA’s proposed plans, and then, Friday, vote on the plans of the other public corporations: the Aqueducts and Sewers Authority (PRASA), the Highways and Transportation Authority (PRHTA), the Government Development Bank, the University of Puerto Rico (UPR) and the Cooperatives Supervision & Insurance Corporation (COSSEC).

Fiscal Balancing. The PROMESA law authorizes the Board the power to impose a fiscal plan and propose to Judge Swain a quasi plan of debt adjustment, as under chapter 9, on behalf of the government, much as in a chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment‒albeit the PROMESA statute does not grant the Board the power to enact laws or appoint or replace government officials. The Congressional act retained for the government of Puerto Rico the capacity and responsibility to enact laws consistent with the fiscal plan and the fiscal adjustment plan, as well as, obviously, to operate the government.

The Promise & Unpromise of PROMESA: Who Is Encargado II? Unlike in a, dare one write “traditional” chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, where state enacted legislation defines governing authority in the interim before a municipality receives approval of its plan of debt adjustment to exit municipal bankruptcy, the Congressional PROMESA statute has left blurred the balance—or really imbalance—of authority between the power of the Board to approve a budget and fiscal plans, with its possible lack of authority to implement reforms, such as changes to federal regulations it promotes. An adviser to House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Rob Bishop ((R-Utah) recently noted that if the Rosselló administration does not implement the labor reform proposed by the PROMESA Board, the option for the Board would be to further reduce the expenses of the government of Puerto Rico—or, as Constitutional Law Professor Carlos Ramos González, at the Interamerican University of Puerto Rico, describes it, notwithstanding the impasse, “in one way or another, the Board will end up imposing its criteria. How it will do it remains to be seen.” An adviser to Chair Bishop said recently that if Gov. Rosselló’s administration does not implement the labor reform proposed by the Board, the option for the PROMESA Board would be to further reduce the expenses of the government of Puerto Rico—or, as Professor González put it: “In one way or another, the Board will end up imposing its criteria. How it will do it remains to be seen.”

The Uncertain State of the State. An ongoing challenge to full recovery for Puerto Rico is its uncertain status—a challenge that has marked it from its beginning: in February of 1917, during debate on the Senate floor of HR 9533 to provide for a civil government for Puerto Rico, when Sen. James Wadsworth (R-N.Y) inquired of Senate sponsor John F. Shafroth of Colorado whether it would “provide woman suffrage in Puerto Rico?” Sen. Shafroth made clear his intent that the eligibility of voters in Puerto Rico—as in other states—“may be prescribed by the Legislature of Puerto Rico.” That debate, more than a century ago, lingers as what some have described as “the albatross hanging around the island’s neck: the uncertainty over its status.” Is it a state? A country? Or some lesser form of government?  Even though thousands of Puerto Ricans have fought and died serving their country in World Wars I and II, in Vietnam and Afghanistan, Puerto Rico has never been treated as a state—and its own citizens have been unable to decide themselves whether they wish to support statehood.

Some believe Puerto Rico will become a state eventually. But to get there, especially without risking a violent nationalist repulse, Puerto Rico needs to understand what the federal requirements and barriers will be—and what the promise of PROMESA really will mean. And, as they used to say in Rome: tempus fugit. Time is running out: for, absent economic and fiscal recovery soon, the flood of emigration of young Americans from Puerto Rico will become a brain-drain boding a demographic death-spiral, leaving the island with too few taxpayers to cover its more rapidly growing health care costs for an aged population.

April 3, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the challenges of governance in insolvency. Who is in charge of steering a municipality, county, or U.S. territory out of insolvency? How? How do we understand and assess the status of the ongoing quasi chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy PROMESA deliberations in the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico. Then we head north to assess the difficult fiscal balancing challenges in Connecticut.

Governance in Insolvency.  Because, in our country, it was the states which created the federal government, making the U.S. unique in the world; chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy is only, in this country, an option in states which have enacted state legislation to authorize municipal bankruptcy. Thus, unsurprisingly, the process is quite different in the minority of states which have authorized municipal bankruptcy. In some states, such as Rhode Island and Michigan, for instance, the Governor has a vital role in which she or he is granted authority to name an emergency manager–a quasi-dictator to assume governmental and fiscal authority, usurping that of the respective city or county’s elected officials. That is what happened in the cases of Detroit and Central Falls, Rhode Island, where, in each instance, all authority was stripped from the respective Mayors and Councils pending a U.S. Bankruptcy Court’s approval of respective plans of debt adjustment, allowing the respective jurisdictions to emerge from municipal bankruptcy. Thus, in the case of those two municipalities, the state law preempted the governing authority of the respective Mayors and Councils.

That was not the case, however, in Jefferson County, Alabama–a municipal bankruptcy precipitated by the state’s refusal to allow the County to raise its own taxes. Nor was it the case in the instances of Stockton or San Bernardino, California: two chapter 9 cases where the State of California played virtually no role. 

Thus, the question with regard to governance in the event of a default or municipal bankruptcy is a product of our country’s unique form of federalism.

In the case of Puerto Rico, the U.S. territory created under the Jones-Shafroth Act, however, the issue falls under Rod Sterling’s Twilight Zone–as Puerto Rico is neither a municipality, nor a state: a legal status which has perplexed Congress, and now appears to plague the author of the PROMESA law, House Natural Resources Committee Chair Rob Bishop (R-Utah) with regard to who, exactly, has governing or governance authority in Puerto Rico during its quasi-chapter 9 bankruptcy process: is it Puerto Rico’s elected Governor and legislature? Is it the PROMESA Board imposed by the U.S. Congress? Is it U.S. Judge Laura Swain, presiding over the quasi-chapter 9 bankruptcy trial in New York City? 

Chairman Bishop has defended the PROMESA’s Board’s authority to preempt the Governor and Legislature’s ruling and governance authority, stressing that the federal statute gave the Board the power to promote “structural reforms” and fiscal authority, writing to Board Chair Jose Carrion: “It has been delegated a statutory duty to order any reforms–fiscal or structural–to the government of Puerto Rico to ensure compliance with the purpose of PROMESA, as he demanded the federally named Board use its power to make a transparent assessment of the economic impact of Hurricanes Irma and Maria on Puerto Rico’s fiscal conditions–and to ensure that the relative legal priorities and liens of Puerto Rico’s public debt are respected–leaving murky whether he intended that to mean municipal bonholders and other lien holders living far away from Puerto Rico ought to have a priority over U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico still trying to recover from violent hurricanes which received far less in federal response aid than the City of Houston–even appearing to link his demands for reforms to the continuity of that more limited federal storm recovery assistance to compliance with his insistence that there be greater “accountability, goodwill, and cooperation from the government of Puerto Rico…” Indeed, it seems ironic that a key Chairman of the U.S. Congress, which has voted to create the greatest national debt in the history of the United States, would insist upon a quite different standard of accountability for Puerto Rico than for his own colleagues.

It seems that the federal appeals court, which may soon consider an appeal of Judge Swain’s opinion with regard to Puerto Rico’s Highway and Transportation Authority not to be mandated to make payments on its special revenue debt during said authority’s own insolvency, could help Puerto Rico: a positive decision would give Puerto Rico access to special revenues during the pendency of its proceedings in the quasi-chapter 9 case before Judge Swain.

Stabilizing the Ship of State. Farther north in Connecticut, progressive Democrats at the end of last week pressed in the General Assembly against Connecticut’s new fiscal stability panel, charging its recommendations shortchange key priorities, such as poorer municipalities, education and social services—even as the leaders of the Commission on Fiscal Stability and Economic Growth conceded they were limited by severe time constraints. Nevertheless, Co-Chairs Robert Patricelli and Jim Smith asserted the best way to invest in all of these priorities would be to end the cycle of state budget deficits and jump-start a lagging state economy. The co-chairs aired their perspectives at a marathon public hearing in the Hall of the House, answering questions from members of four legislative committees: Appropriations; Commerce; Finance, Revenue and Bonding; and Planning and Development—where Rep. Robyn Porter (D-New Haven) charged: “I’m only seeing sacrifice from the same people over and over again,” stating she was increasingly concerned about growing income inequality, asking: “When do we strike a balance?” Indeed, New York and Connecticut, with the wealthiest 1 percent of households in those states earning more than 40 times the average annual income of the bottom 99 percent, demonstrate the governance and fiscal challenge of that trend. In its report, the 14-member Commission made a wide array of recommendations centered on a major redistribution of state taxes—primarily reducing income tax rates across the board, while boosting the sales and corporation levies. Ironically, however, because the wealthy pay the majority of state income taxes, the proposed changes would disproportionately accrue to the benefit of the state’s highest income residents—in effect mirroring the federal tax reform, leading Rep. Porter to question why the Commission made such recommendations, including another to do away immediately with the estate tax on estates valued at more than $2 million, but gradually phase in an increase to the minimum wage over the next four years.  From a municipal perspective, Rep. James Albis (D-East Haven), cited a 2014 state tax incidence report showing that Connecticut’s heavy reliance on property taxes to fund municipal government “is incredibly regressive,” noting it has the effect of shifting a huge burden onto lower-middle- and low-income households—even as the report found that households earning less than $48,000 per year effectively pay nearly one-quarter of their annual income to cover state and local taxes. Rep. Brandon McGee (D-Hartford), the Vice Chair of the legislature’s Black and Puerto Rican Caucus, said the Committee’s recommendations lack bold ideas on how to revitalize Connecticut’s poor urban centers—with his concerns mirrored by Rep. Toni E. Walker (D-New Haven), Chair of the House Appropriations Committee, who warned she fears a commission proposal to cut $1 billion from the state’s nearly $20 billion annual operating budget would inevitably reduce municipal aid, especially to the state’s cities. Co-Chair Patricelli appeared to concur, noting: “Candidly, I would agree we came up a little short on the cities,” adding that the high property tax rates in Hartford and other urban centers hinder economic growth: “They really are fighting with one or more hands tied behind their backs.”

The ongoing discussion comes amidst the state’s fiscal commitment to assume responsibility to pay for Hartford’s general obligation debt service payments, more than $50 million annually—a fiscal commitment which understandably is creating equity questions for other municipalities in the state confronted by fiscal challenges. Like a teeter-totter, balancing fiscal needs in a state where the state itself has a ways to go to balance its own budget creates a test of fiscal and moral courage.

Catalysts to Fiscal Recoveries

November 10, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the ongoing challenges to Detroit’s recovery from the nation’s largest ever chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy; the State of Michigan’s winnowing down of municipalities under state oversight; and the ongoing physical and fiscal challenges to Puerto Rico.

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

Reframing the Motor City’s Post Chapter 9 Future. Nolan Finley, a wonderful contributor to the editorial page of the Detroit News, this week noted “elections are a wonderful catalyst for refocusing priorities, as evidenced by the just-completed Detroit mayoral campaign, which moved the city’s comeback conversation away from the downtown development boom and centered it on the uneven progress of the neighborhoods. Never before has such an intense spotlight shown on the places where most Detroit voters actually live.” He attributed some of the credit to the loser in this week’s mayoral election, challenger Coleman Young II, who forced Mayor Mike Duggan to defend his record on improving quality of life in the neighborhoods. He perceptively wrote that while candidate Young’s ugly “Take back the Motherland” rallying cry was dispiriting, it spoke to the governing challenge the newly, re-elected Mayor confronts, writing: “Detroit is not a city united. It must become one. There were too many skirmishes along the racial divide in this mayoral contest. The old city versus suburb story line was replaced by a neighborhood versus downtown narrative, but both are code for black versus white. Four years ago, Duggan’s election as Detroit’s first white mayor in 40 years suggested much of the city was ready to stop looking back at its dark and divisive past and begin focusing on a brighter future.” Now, he wrote, after Mayor Duggan focused his first term on meeting the city’s plan of debt adjustment, and trying to improve the quality of life for residents—and as developers are beginning to add community projects to their downtown portfolios, “too many in the neighborhoods feel as if their lives are not getting better, or at least not fast enough.” Thus, he noted, Mayor Duggan needs to redouble his efforts to restore the city’s residential communities, and push ahead the timetable: “Four years from now, Detroit cannot still be wearing the mantle of America’s most violent city.” He added that while Mayor Duggan has little—too little—authority to address education in Detroit; nevertheless—just as his colleague Rahm Emanuel, the Mayor of Chicago recognized, needs to strongly back Detroit Public School Superintendent Nikolai Vitti’s efforts to rapidly boost the performance of the Detroit Public Schools Community District: it is a key to bringing young families back into the city. And, Mr. Finley wrote, the mayor “must also find a way to connect the neighborhoods to downtown, to instill in all residents a sense of ownership and pride in the rejuvenation of the core city. That means getting way better at inclusion. Downtown’s comeback must be more diverse, and include many more of the people who have grown up and stayed in the city. Encouraging and supporting more African-American entrepreneurs is a great place to begin breaking down the perception that downtown is just for white people: Detroit needs more diversity everywhere in the city, both racial and economic,” referring especially to young millennials who are steeped in social justice and imbued with the obsession to give back that marks their generation. “They are committed Detroiters. And they deserve to be appreciated for their contributions, not made to feel guilty or viewed as a threat to hard-won gains.”

Free, Free at Last. Michigan State officials have released Royal Oak Township, a municipality of about 2,500 just north of Detroit, from its consent agreement: Michigan Treasurer Nick Khouri said the Oakland County municipality has resolved its financial emergency and is ready to emerge from the state oversight imposed since 2014, stating: “I am pleased to see the significant progress Royal Oak Charter Township has made under the consent agreement…Township officials went beyond the agreement and enacted policies that provide the community an opportunity to flourish. I am pleased to say the township is released from its agreement and look forward to working with them as a local partner in the future.” The township’s financial emergency resulted in an assets FY2012 deficit of nearly $541,000. Township Supervisor Donna Squalls noted: “Royal Oak Charter Township is in better shape than ever…The collaboration between state and township has provided an opportunity to enact reforms to ensure our long-term fiscal sustainability.” Treasurer Khouri also said the township was the last Michigan remaining municipality following a consent agreement: Over the last two years, Wayne County, Inkster, and River Rouge were released from consent agreements because of fiscal and financial improvements and operational reforms. The Treasurer noted that today only three communities, Ecorse, Flint, and Hamtramck, remain under state oversight through a Receivership Transition Advisory Board.

Preempting Authority. House Natural Resources Committee Chair Rob Bishop (R—Utah) this week said the PROMESA Oversight Board should be granted even more power to preempt the authority of the government of Puerto Rico, stating: “Today’s testimony will inform the work of Congress to ensure the Oversight Board and federal partners have the tools to coordinate an effective and sustained recovery,” in a written statement after a hearing of the House Committee on Natural Resources: “It is clear that a stronger mechanism will be necessary to align immediate recovery with long-term revitalization and rebuilding.” Chairman Bishop added: “This committee will work to ensure [the Puerto Rico Oversight Board] has the tools to effectively execute that mission and build a path forward for this island and its residents.” The Board was created last year to oversee fiscal management by the island government, which had said more than $70 billion of debt was unpayable under current economic conditions. Since the hurricane, the Board has clashed with the territorial government over leadership at the power utility. During the hearing the board’s Executive Director, Natalie Jaresko, said the ability of Puerto Rico’s government to repay its debt was “gravely worse” than it was before Hurricane Maria, which arrived Sept. 20. By the end of December, the Board plans to complete a 30 year debt sustainability analysis with Puerto Rico’s government, she said: “After the hurricane, it is even more critical that the Board be able to operate quickly and decisively…to avoid uncertainty and lengthy delays in litigation, Congressional reaffirmation of our exercise of our authority is welcome.” On Oct. 27, the board had filed a motion in the Title III bankruptcy case for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) seeking the court’s permission to appoint Noel Zamot as the authority’s new leader. The government of Gov. Ricardo Rosselló has made it clear that it intends to challenge this motion. The court is scheduled to hold a hearing on the matter on Monday, November 13th.

In calling for more board power, Chairs Bishop and Jaresko probably were at least partly referring to the struggle over PREPA’s leadership. They may also want the Board’s power augmented in other ways: the Board has already announced that it will be creating five-year fiscal plan for Puerto Rico’s government and for its public authorities this winter. Puerto Rico’s government will have substantial needs for federal aid in the coming years, Ms. Jaresko said. Congress plans to tie this aid to the government following the Board’s fiscal plan and this would be appropriate, she said. “Before the hurricanes, the board was determined that Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities could achieve balanced budgets, work its way through its debt problems, and develop a sustainable economy without federal aid,” Ms. Jaresko said in her written testimony. “That is simply no longer possible. Without unprecedented levels of help from the United States government, the recovery we were planning for will fail.” She also said that over the next 1.75 years Puerto Rico’s government will need federal help closing a gap of between $13 billion and $21 billion for basic services. She added the federal government should change tax laws to benefit the island: “The representatives of the Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB) who appeared before the House Committee on Natural Resources insist on jeopardizing the necessary resources for the payment of pensions and job stability,” Gov. Rosselló testified in his written statement, adding to that the testimony of Ms. Jaresko and Mr. Zamot “evidenced ignorance about the recovery process in Puerto Rico, presenting incorrect figures relating to the existing conditions on the island,” adding: “I again invite the FOMB to collaborate so that the government of Puerto Rico, together with the support of the federal government, facilitates the fastest possible recovery of our island.” He noted that such assistance should not depend on the Board “assuming the administrative role” which belongs to the elected government of Puerto Rico.

Sanctioned Discrimination. The endorsement that the House Ways and Means Committee effectively incorporated in its “tax reform” legislation reported out of Committee this week appears to discriminate against Puerto Rico, imposing a tariff on the products which Puerto Rico exports to the mainland—threatening to deal a devastating blow to Puerto Rico’s industrial base at the very moment in time the territory is striving to recover from the already disparate hurricane recovery blows. According to economists Joaquín Villamil: “None of these measures, nor the repatriation of profits, the corporate rate and the 20% tax on imports is positive for the island…The companies are not going to pay a 4% royalty to Puerto Rico and a 20% tax to bring their product to the United States. They will leave the island, especially if the tax rate is lowered there.” Mr. Villamil added: “If that happens, 21% of the income received by the Puerto Rican Treasury is eliminated,” he added, referencing P.L. 154, the statute which established a 4% tax on sales of an operation in Puerto Rico to its parent company in the mainland. In its markup, yesterday, the House Ways and Means Committee left almost intact §4303 which establishes a 20% tariff on all imported goods for resale by companies and businesses in the United States. Moreover, the disposition forces multinationals with operations in places such as the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico to repatriate their income to the U.S. What that means is that the production of drugs, medical devices, and many other goods in Puerto Rico is done on U.S. soil; however, for federal tax purposes, Puerto Rico is deemed an international jurisdiction—or, as economist Luis Benítez notes: “This (House Ways and Means bill) generates greater uncertainty about what the economic future of the island should be: with this, the figure of the controlled foreign corporation (CFC) loses the competitive advantage it had (under §936).” He noted that by reducing the corporate rate to multinationals operating in Puerto Rico, the benefit of giving them tax exemptions at the local level is also reduced, as is the case of Law 73 on Industrial Incentives: via the elimination of §936, Puerto Rico, as a place to do business, went from competing with the continental U.S. to competing with countries such as Singapore and Ireland, adding that now a reduction in the corporate rate would cause Puerto Rico not only to compete with the rest of the world, but with jurisdictions on the mainland: “I think that if I were the Secretary of the Treasury, I would tremble with this situation.”

In Puerto Rico, he estimates manufacturing employs approximately 75,000 people directly—a number which rises to 250,000 when indirect and induced jobs are calculated, adding that even though the manufacturing sector has shrunk in the past years, the productive and contributory base rests on that activity, adding that: “As much as it is said that they do not pay taxes, this sector contributes 33% of the revenues…As long as jobs are lost there, the treasury will erode,” noting that the industrial sector plays such a large role in Puerto Rico’s economy that no other sector of the service economy can counterbalance it. He worries that if Congress fails to address the apparent discrimination, the chances that the PROMESA Board and the government of Puerto Rico can put together an economic recovery plan is minimal: “These are implications for all of Puerto Rico: It is difficult to think about options, because if this is approved, it would be disastrous, because of everything that has happened after Hurricane Maria.”

Last night, the former president of the Association of Certified Public Accountants, Kenneth Rivera Robles, who has been part of several lobbying delegations to Washington, remained relatively optimistic that the project language will be amended.

President Woodrow Wilson signed the Jones-Shafroth Act into law on March 2, 1917, with the law providing U.S. citizenship to Puerto Rico’s citizens, granting civil rights to its people, and separating the Executive, Judicial, and Legislative branches of its government. The statute created a locally elected bicameral legislature with a House and Senate—but retained authority for the Governor and the President of the United States to have the authority to veto any law passed by the legislature. In addition, the statute granted Congress the authority to override any action taken by the Puerto Rico legislature, as well as maintain control over fiscal and economic matters, including mail services, immigration, defense, and other basic governmental matters. 

Fiscal, Legal, Physical & Human Challenges

October 4, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the President’s visit to address the fiscal, legal, physical, and human challenges to Puerto Rico.

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

Physical & Fiscal Mayhem. President Trump, visited Puerto Rico yesterday (nearly two weeks after Hurricane Maria, only 6.89% of the island has electricity, 22.54% of the telecommunications towers operate, 24% of the commercial flights operate, while the water and gas distribution problems persist in means of enormous damage to infrastructure. More than 9,000 people still live in shelters, according to official figures.). The President suggested the removal of Puerto Rico’s large debt so that Puerto Rico can to respond, short and long-term, to the emergency: “We have to work on something,” albeit adding Puerto Rico should be proud that only 16 died, unlike what he deemed “the real catastrophe” of Katrina. The devastating hurricane left some $90 billion in damage—on top of the $74 billion in debt Puerto Rico and the PROMESA Board (relocated to New York City) are confronting. The President added: “You have to look at the whole structure of the debt‒you owe a lot of money to your friends on Wall Street, and we’ll have to eliminate that. We’ll have to say good-by to that. I do not know if it’s Goldman-Sachs, but whoever it is, you can say goodbye to that. We will have to do something, because the island’s debt is huge.” The President’s remarks, however, coming as the PROMESA Board was meeting in New York City, created a question with regard to his intentions: did he mean the Administration is contemplating forgiving its debts? If so, what would that mean to the territory’s bondholders? Moreover, it is unclear whether the President even has such authority.

President Trump has called for Puerto Rico to have its crippling debt forgiven, describing the potential precedent as tough luck for the Wall Street holders of the debt, telling Fox New’s Geraldo Rivera: “They owe a lot of money to your friends on Wall Street, and we’re going to have to wipe that out,” with his comments coming in the wake of considerable political heat for one of his earliest tweets on Hurricane Maria, in which he had written that Puerto Rico was already suffering because of its huge debt burden, which liberals interpreted as blaming the victim.

The President told Puerto Rico officials they should feel “very proud” they haven’t lost thousands of lives like in “a real catastrophe like Katrina,” while adding that the devastated island territory has thrown the nation’s budget “a little out of whack,” with his comments coming as he touched down in San Juan amid harsh criticism of the slow federal response to the natural disaster, and after he had praised himself earlier in the day for his administration’s “great job” and “A-plus” response to Hurricane Maria, marking his brief, only visit to Puerto Rico since the storm ravaged the U.S. territory nearly two weeks ago. The President commented: “Every death is a horror, but if you look at a real catastrophe like Katrina, and you look at the tremendous—hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of people who died, and you look at what happened here, with really a storm that was just totally overpowering, nobody’s ever seen anything like this.”  The President said this, then turned to a local official to ask how many people had died in storm. “What is your death count as of this moment? 17? 16 people certified, 16 people versus in the thousands.”

The hurricane, which killed at least 36, left millions without power and tens of thousands without access to drinkable water; it compounded a volatile economic situation in the territory, which is roughly $70 billion in debt. The President, at one point, stated that Puerto Rico had “thrown our budget a little out of whack.” President Trump, who in the past week has boasted about the federal government’s response to the disaster, evidence to the contrary notwithstanding, told Govs. Ricardo Rosselló of Puerto Rico and Kenneth Mapp of the U.S. Virgin Islands:  “You can be very proud of all of your people, all of our people working together,” adding, however, “I hate to tell you, Puerto Rico, but you’ve thrown our budget a little out of whack.”

San Juan Mayor Carmen Yulín Cruz, who has been deeply critical of the government’s relief efforts and whom the President Trump has criticized on Twitter, also joined the President for his first briefing. The President said: “I think it’s now acknowledged what a great job we’ve done, and people are looking at that…And in Texas and in Florida, we get an A-plus. And I’ll tell you what, I think we’ve done just as good in Puerto Rico, and it’s actually a much tougher situation. But now the roads are cleared, communication is starting to come back. We need their truck drivers to start driving trucks,” adding his thanks to Governor Rosselló for positive comments he had made about the Trump administration’s work in Puerto Rico, saying, “He has said we have done an incredible job, and that’s the truth.”

Unsurprisingly, the President’s statements were also marked by the controversy he has had with the San Juan Mayor Carmen Yulin Cruz, who had earlier stated publicly that citizens were dying on the island for lack of federal assistance—in response to which the President had tweeted “poor leadership” demonstrated by the Mayor. Her comments came shortly after the President said she should be proud that only 16 Americans died, unlike the “real catastrophe” of Katrina. Actually, so far, the storm has taken the lives of 34 Americans, leading the Mayor to state, in the wake of the President’s visit: “This is not a joke.”

In a subsequent interview, the President yesterday declared he would eliminate Puerto Rico’s debts, stating he has many friends on Wall Street, noting: they will have to say good-by to their investments, “I don’t know whether it is Goldman Sachs, but whoever it is, they will have to say good-by.” The President added, however, that what he had seen was not a “real catastrophe.”

While the cost of replacing and restoring critical public infrastructure destroyed by Hurricane Maria will largely fall to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, funding for other essential services, such as police and emergency rescue appears likely to remain Puerto Rico’s responsibility, according to FEMA experts—albeit something fiscally virtually out of reach: Puerto Rico’s fiscal capacity, beset by a shrinking population, spiking pension costs, and a looming health-care-funding cliff, now is confronted by hundreds of thousands of its citizens still without power and other basic necessities; its economic activity will take some time to restart, and it can expect severe interruptions in its tax collections for a time, according to Jim Millstein, a financial restructuring adviser to Gov. Ricardo Rosselló’s administration. Mr. Millstein adds: “On the revenue assumption side, you can assume they’re going to fall short: While they have a huge influx of FEMA funds over the next 6 months, those are for designated purposes, and not necessarily for running the government.”

He predicted that Puerto Rico could lose up to two months’ of tax collections, even as the government lacks resources to finance essential services and other government operations—likely leading to seeking critical assistance from the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury—requests, however, already, unsurprisingly, opposed by the territory’s existing creditors, who are battling the PROMESA Board for payments on $73 billion in municipal-bond debt—or, as ACG Analytics has noted: a U.S. loan package “would, presumably, be structured to have priority” over payments to current bondholders.

The White House did, this week, act to ease the potential liquidity squeeze, waiving certain cost-sharing requirements for six months. Meanwhile, PREPA creditors offered $1 billion in new loans this week to jump-start rebuilding efforts, an offer which Gov. Rosselló’s fiscal advisers rejected as “not viable.” In Congress, meanwhile, no immediate action appears likely: Congressional leaders anticipate passing a second disaster aid package later this year with more specific directives with regard to how federal dollars sent to Puerto Rico should be spent, even as the Trump administration, facing criticism for its response to Hurricane Maria, has installed a U.S. Army commander to oversee federal relief efforts, and the PROMESA oversight Board has said Puerto Rico can afford to pay bondholders roughly a quarter of what they are owed over the next decade. While the Treasury Department had considered the option of authorizing so-called “super municipal bonds,” the concept found little support in Congress, where there is antipathy about setting any precedents for federal bailouts of financially struggling municipalities.