Is There a Checkered Flag to Mark an Exit from Municipal Insolvency?

February 5, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider: the ongoing challenge for Hartford to keep its fiscal head out of debt waters; efforts to create a municipal recovery fund in Puerto Rico for its beleaguered muncipios; and the uncertain promises of PROMESA.

Taking the Checkered Flag. Hartford city officials are concerned that they cannot find a 30-year-old insurance policy—a policy which could play a key role in any damages or settlement the capitol city would have to pay in a lawsuit filed by a man wrongly imprisoned for murder for two decades—and could weigh in the city’s efforts to regain its fiscal momentum from the brink of chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Indeed, the inability to locate the policy has prompted federal Magistrate Judge Joan Margolis to order the city to subpoena insurance companies in an effort to find it. The suit in question, filed seven years ago, against the city and police officials, alleged malicious prosecution, suppression of evidence, and violation of his civil rights. City officials deny the allegations; however, in the seven years since the suit was filed, they have been unable to come up with the policy. His lawyers have been seeking information on the city’s insurance policies since the lawsuit was filed nearly seven years ago—a lawsuit over a murder conviction—which was itself overturned based on new DNA testing that resulted in another man being convicted—so that state officials subsequently awarded the accused $6 million for his wrongful conviction. Now the missing so-called “excess” policy could turn out to be key in the lawsuit, because it would cover any damages or settlement the city would be required or directed by the court to pay above $2 million—the current Hartford liability limit. The City’s insurance carrier, Travelers, has recommended to the city that it notify the carrier of its excess policy about the lawsuit, because of the chance that any award could exceed $2 million—albeit, it remains unclear whether Hartford’s insurance policies in effect in 2011, when the lawsuit in question was filed, would cover any award to him. The litigation and potential fiscal exposure comes at a fiscally unpropitious time in the wake of Moody’s, last week, had just revised upwards the city’s credit rating, lifting its general obligation bond rating from negative to developing, citing last year’s appointment of the Municipal Accountability Review Board (MARB), which had been established by §367 of Public Act 17-2  as well as the statutory provisions contained in §§Section 349 to 376 of the Act for the purpose of providing technical, financial, and other assistance and related accountability for municipalities experiencing various levels of fiscal distress: the Board is made up of 11 members, appointed as follows: Secretary of OPM, or designee, Chairperson; State Treasurer, or designee, Co-chairperson; Five members appointed by the Governor: a municipal finance director; a municipal bond or bankruptcy attorney; a town manager; a member having significant experience representing organized labor from a list of three recommendations by AFSCME; a member having significant experience as a teacher or representing a teacher’s organization selected from a list of three joint recommendations by CEA and AFT-CT. In addition, one member is appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, one by the Speaker of the House, one by the Minority Leader of the Senate, and one by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, each of whom shall have experience in business, finance or municipal management.

The events unfolding in the courtroom occurred as Moody’s had brightened the fiscal outlook for the beleaguered city with its upward revision of the city’s rating from negative, specifically citing the creation of the review board—with its upwards revision reflecting the reduced chances of the city being forced into default or chapter 9, albeit Moody’s hedged its outlook by writing: “[T]here remains a possibility of significant bondholder impairment over the long-term, given the city’s distressed financial condition.” Moody’s has unmoodily noted it might upgrade the city’s fiscal outlook, if

  • the state oversight board designates Hartford as a Tier III municipality and executes a state debt assistance contract;
  • the city develops a long-term financial sustainability plan;
  • completes negotiations with bond insurers and bondholders which generate recovery of at least 80% of principal; and
  • makes timely payments on all debt with expressed commitments to fully honor future obligations.

In the alternative, the rating agency warns that a default on the city’s debt or an indication that bondholder recoveries would fall below 65% of principal in a potential debt restructuring would lead to a further downgrade.

Puerto Rico Municipal Recovery Fund? Governor Ricardo Rosselló is going to try again to get a legislation that creates a $ 100 million Municipal Recovery Fund to help mayors keep their governments afloat after Hurricane Maria shrunk their income. The Governor had planned to send to the Legislature a new version of the bill to establish such fund, in the wake of the PROMESA Board’s veto: in order to comply with the objections made by the Board, the Governor announced that the fund will have “transparent” eligibility requirements to evaluate the fall in municipal revenue collections. His proposal also proposes to create a structure that resembles the federal Community Disaster Loans program–and specify the accounts from which the Treasury Department would finance the aid, with amendments, including that the Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (FAFAA) certify the need for the loans, which would be limited to $5 million per muncipio. In the statement issued from his office: “The Governor had submitted a bill for these purposes, which established by law the objective criteria to certify the municipal need. However, during the legislative process modifications were made to the way of allocating the resources of the Municipal Recovery Fund.” Those modifications were discussed by FAFAA with the Oversight Board, in order to ensure its final approval, if the measure is ratified again by the Legislature. (Because it is a bill related to the budget, it requires the approval of the PROMESA Board.) Nevertheless, the Governor appeared confident, stating: “I am confident that this project will be approved quickly and this way it will provide the aid our mayors need for their recovery works as soon as possible,” as he acknowledged the crisis faced by the municipalities, many of which fear being left without liquidity this spring. Thus, he told the PROMESA Board that his revised fiscal plan seeks to postpone “the reduction of the municipal subsidy that the Board originally approved.” For the island’s municipal leaders, that means they will also seek to have access to the line of credit of the FEMA CDL program approved by Congress last October.  According to Mayor Josian Santiago, the former president of the Puerto Rico Association of Mayors,   of Comerio, a municipio of just under 21,000 with an unemployment rate of 13%, located in the center-eastern region of island, more than 40 municipalities may currently lack sufficient fiscal liquidity to operate normally, unless they receive an injection of funds from the federal line of credit or from the local fund which Governor Rosselló is once again trying to create. The Mayor noted that the Municipal Revenue Collection Center has advanced the municipalities’ months of income projections, which it distributes, but which could now be forced to sell old debts in order to meet its obligations for the remainder of the fiscal year. (The island’s mayors have already been provided guidance with regard to how to access a federal line of credit, which must not exceed 25 percent of their budget.) In the case of Comerío, with a budget of around $9 million and, according to the evidence on the loss of income that it can provide, it could be eligible to receive up to about $ 2.25 million.

The Promise of PROMESA? During the meeting of the PROMESA Board in New York City at the end of last week, several experts agreed that hurricane Maria demonstrated the lack of a clear leadership in the Puerto Rican government, creating an inability to make decisions about its energy system, a problem that is still present in the face of the transformation required by the Electric Power Authority (PREPA). Indeed, FEMA Deputy Regional Administrator Asha Trible said that, during the emergency, the high level of bureaucracy in PREPA was a major obstacle, testifying: “It does not work…when you have eight layers to be able to approve something,” adding that in the times of greatest crisis, the bureaucracy added to liquidity problems of the public company, that “could not pay for the materials they ordered.” Administrator Trible, subsequent to the session, that early in the process, FEMA had suggested ideas, such as creating a central command for the emergency, with a single coordinator for PREPA, adding: “We avoided that they thought we were there to take control…We would have established a command structure, we tried to suggest that kind of thing, but we support the process that is there.” The session came as Governor Ricardo Rosselló has proposed to privatize PREPA assets, including the generation of electricity, and as a preamble to the certification of new fiscal plans of the central government and the public corporation—and came hard on the heels of the PROMESA Board’s request to Judge Laura Taylor Swain to allow the central government to lend $ 1.3 billion to PREPA to avoid its financial collapse this month—a request which the majority of the panel’s seventeen experts, noting the challenges the public corporation faces, instead advocated for a strong and independent regulator of the energy system, even as they stressed the need to obtain financing to modernize PREPA.

Too Many Cooks in the Cocina? John Paul Rossi, a historian at Penn State University-Erie, who is an expert on the history of American business, technology, communications, and transportation, argued that  the Governor, the Governing Board of the public corporation, the Oversight Board and the Energy Commission are now in the development of public policy for PREPA—without even mentioning different voices from the nearly insolvent U.S. Congress—that “There are too many people. We are scaring consumers and investors.” His comments came as Nisha Desai, a member of PREPA’s Governing Board, noted that PREPA is close to replacing former Executive Director Ricardo Ramos, with the utility’s governing board vetting several potential hires referred by a consultant tapped to help the utility find its new leader: deeming such a decision critical to PREPA’s recovery from September’s Hurricane Maria. Ms. Desai, an executive of the Texas Renewable Energy Industries Alliance, said that, along with two other “independent” members of the Governing Board, they are poised to select the next PREPA Executive Director, noting that, in order to rejuvenate PREPA, they intend to appoint “the first chief executive officer” disconnected from Puerto Rico’s ‘partisan politics.’

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The Raceway to Recovery

Taking the Checkered Flag. Detroit, on the verge of posting its third consecutive balanced budget, appears on course to exit state oversight as early as next year in the wake of yesterday’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) demonstrating the Motor City has steadied its finances after emerging more than three years ago from the largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history. The state’s Detroit Financial Review Board could vote to waive its authority over the city as early as next month, according to Detroit Chief Financial Officer John Hill, who noted: “We believe we have met all the criteria for the waiver…I believe this will be the last budget that will be done under the FRC’s authority.” The CAFR, officially released Wednesday, appears to support the city’s hopes to soon regain full authority over its own finances: The report notes that Detroit ended its FY2017 with a $53.8 million general fund operating surplus and revenues exceeding expenditures by $108.6 million—even better than the city had originally projected: it ended its most recent fiscal year with a $63 million surplus—as well as a general fund unassigned fund balance of $169 million, better than 15% increase from the previous fiscal year, leading CFO Hill, as he prepares to present the results to the commission at a meeting later this month, to note: “It allows us to have a really good base of information as we are going into our budget process…It also gives us a chance to address some of the items that are identified as things we need to work on.” Mr. Hill added that Detroit has demonstrated vast improvements in its financial health, citing credit rating agency upgrades from rating agencies, a higher employment rate, and enhanced assessed property values: “I have to say that certainly there has been a positive impact from the financial review commission oversight: It’s been a real constructive process where the city has excelled.”

For his part, Mayor Mike Duggan noted that a third straight balanced budget proves his administration, in partnership with the City Council can “effectively manage the city’s finances: “This is another big step forward and helps set the stage for the end of the active state financial oversight,” as the Mayor preps to present the new budget later this month. Detroit Financial Review Commission member “Ike” McKinnon also credited the leadership role Mayor Duggan deserved for with getting the city’s finances back on track: “I remember when Mike Duggan took over as Mayor, we certainly had some hope and thoughts that things would happen…I did not know that it would happen this quickly. This says a lot about what he’s doing and certainly working with the state.”

The state’s financial review commission could vote to waive its authority over the city as early as next month, according to Mr. Hill. Zin any event, even if it does not, Detroit would no longer require the state board’s approval on budgeting or contracts, as it has since exiting chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. As Mr. Hill put it: “We believe we have met all the criteria for the waiver…I believe this will be the last budget that will be done under the FRC’s authority.”

Key highlights of Detroit’s CAFR include the Motor City ending FY2017 fiscal year with a $53.8 million general fund operating surplus and revenues exceeding expenditures by $108.6 million. (The City had projected a $51 million surplus for FY2017). Detroit’s general fund unassigned fund balance will be $169 million, a $26 million increase from the previous fiscal year, according to the report. 

Detroit has also reported improvements in its management of $100 million in federal grants with no questioned costs resulting from audits, for the second consecutive year—after, two years ago, the city had federal funding for blight demolition funding suspended for two months due to procedural errors. Thus, hopes are high for the release from state oversight, albeit, concerns remain with regard to the looming 2024 pension payment and subsequent debt restructuring the following year. Mr. Hill notes: “I am sure that the FRC, as well as the city–because we are dealing with those issues, will be looking at those two items to make sure that plans are in place, money has been put aside, and the budget is able to absorb the additional costs that will come in those years.” Detroit is confronted by challenges to amortize debt payments on roughly $630 million of B notes that would see payments jump from $60 million to $120 million by 2025—notes issued as part of the implementation of Detroit’s chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy plan of debt adjustment—notes which are unsecured. Indeed, pending before the City Council is a proposal pending to dedicate $50 million from the city coffers to pay begin paying off the debt. Going forward, according to Mr. Hill, the strategy would be to dedicate a combination of restructuring some of the debt as well as paying it off, with the effort to address pension obligations a critical component to shoring up Detroit’s long-term fiscal health. The Motor City’s  long-term funding model approved by the City Council to modify its pension provisions which established the Retiree Protection Trust Fund, and deposited $105 million–$90 million from amounts reserved in FY2016 and 2017, plus $15 million appropriated in Fiscal 2018—and, for FY2018-2021 including the addition of an additional $115 million, contemplates another $115 million from FY2022–FY2023.

Unequal and/or Inequitable Fiscal & Physical Responses

January 29, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the seemingly unending physical and fiscal challenges to Puerto Rico’s fiscal and   physical recovery.

Post Storm Fiscal & Physical Misery. Puerto Rico Gov. Ricardo Rosselló’s proposed privatization of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority faces opposition from local political leaders; thus, it may prove to be a tough sell to potential investors: the proposal, which the Governor has presented to privatize PREPA, the public utility burdened with some $8.2 billion of municipal bond debt—and the utility which the PROMESA Oversight Board has put into a Title III bankruptcy process, creating potential hurdles for any plan to alter its ownership, notwithstanding that Board members have expressed support for the idea. For his part, Puerto Rico House Minority Leader Rafael Hernández Montañez said he thought Governor Rosselló was seeking to distract people from his problems with his PREPA privatization proposal: “It’s a way of taking off the heat, on the re-energization of the houses and stores.” That is to write that the Gov. understands that neither the Puerto Rico House nor Senate will approve his proposal—so, Minority Leader Montañez asserts he is just posturing for public support, he said. Members of Gov. Rosselló’s own party in the legislature; moreover, appear to be opposed. Nevertheless, as part of the Title III PROMESA quasi-chapter 9 bankruptcy, parts of the utility appear certain candidates for sale–albeit, this would be a decision made by Judge Laura Taylor Swain—not Governor Rosselló.  

Moreover, there is apprehension that the Governor’s governance proposal would be unlikely to generate any support from investors, either: Tom Sanzillo, Director of Finance at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, noted: “We fail to see how any investor would put money into Puerto Rico with a regulatory system like that proposed by Gov. Rosselló: “He appoints and can fire board members at will. Under the current system, board members have staggered, fixed terms, and can only be fired for cause…This means the whim of every new Governor sets rules and contracts. This makes energy investing highly risky, contracts uncertain, and a politicized investment environment.” Indeed, Tomás Torres, Project Director at the Institute for Competitiveness and Sustainable Economy, believes the Puerto Rico Energy Commission’s oversight should be strengthened, and it should implement any transformation of PREPA.

Jose Rossi Coughlin, Chairman of the Institute for Competitiveness and Sustainable Economy has expressed apprehension about any interruption of key regulatory processes, much less permitting each new Governor to select all commission members when she or he assumes elected office—noting that is not only contrary to widely prevailing mainland U.S. practice, but also likely legally incompatible with Title V of PROMESA. For his part, Mr. Torres notes that with the Governor’s submission, last week, of a bill to eliminate the Energy Commission and substitute in its place a Public Service Commission (which would merge Telecom, Transportation & Public Services, and the Energy Commission), the “The three commissions/boards that are to be merged in this new body add to 15 commissioners, but the new boards will only be of three members…“The recently proposed Energy Commission reorganization and consolidation with other public service regulation would be a huge step backward.”

Moody’s Investor Service was not quite as pessimistic, writing: “The [proposed] privatization itself is positive, because it is another source of capital to help solve PREPA’s fiscal problems; however, there are still challenges; including negotiating a price in an environment of declining Puerto Rico population, investing in rebuilding aging infrastructure, and how PREPA’s pension liability will be handled. The 18-month timeline appears quite aggressive.” For its part, the PREPA Bondholders Group said they would support a “private operator” to “immediately” take over operations, subject to the Puerto Rico Energy Commission oversight. Indeed, in statement sent out by Gov. Rosselló’s office, some representatives of Puerto Rico’s business community indicated their support for the proposal, with Nelson Ramírez of the United Center of Retailers, noting: “The announced changes will allow Puerto Rico to become a competitive jurisdiction, ending a monopoly that discourages investment and the creation of jobs,” albeit, as Puerto Rico Senate Minority Leader Eduardo Bhatia Gautier said, the proposal was a step in the right direction but that “the devil is in the details.”  Leader Bhatia-Gautier, a co-founder and former editor of the Stanford Journal of Law and Policy, with previous service as a law clerk at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Boston, as well as Chief of Staff for the resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico in the U.S. Congress, is the 15th president of the Senate of Puerto Rico, where he has focused on the U.S. Territory’s fiscal system and authored a comprehensive energy reform law. Now, he asserts that Puerto Rico’s electrical system should be decentralized into 20 to 25 micro grids, and believes that, with federal assistance, Puerto Rico should try for widespread installation of solar panels on rooftops. Nevertheless, as he notes: even though the Governor and the Puerto Rico legislature will privatize PREPA, the reality is that Judge Swain will have to be involved.

Power to the Muncipio? Jayuya Mayor Jorge L. González Otero, a muncipio founded in 1911, at a time it featured a population of around 9,000, was certain that power would be restored to close to 10,000 residents of his northwest coast municipality of around 88,000, on Saturday. Some 35% of residents in Arecibo do not currently have electricity, he reported, albeit, he said he had received word from PREPA that one of the region’s substations, Charco Hondo, would receive a generator from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to power a temporary micro grid while repairs on the substation continue. The muncipio, which, at its founding, was separated from the larger cities of the coasts with little to no communication: it was the site of the Jayuya uprising in 1950, in which the Nationalists commenced a revolt against the U.S. Government, when a social worker, Doris Torresola, and her cousins led the group into the town square and gave a speech, declaring Puerto Rico an independent republic. Subsequently, the police station was attacked, telephone lines cut, and the post office burned to the ground. The Nationalists held the town for three days, until it was bombed by U.S. planes, which were supporting a ground attack by the Puerto Rican National Guard. Even though an extensive part of the town was destroyed, however, news of the bombing was not reported outside of Puerto Rico. Today, unsurprisingly, the Mayor notes: “Four months is way too much time for people in Puerto Rico to not have energy. All of us, the representatives, the mayors, the people, the senators, have to raise our voices to get things done.”

In fact, last month, he had reached an agreement with PREPA to temporarily restore power by means of the micro grid: last Saturday, the Mayor planned to tour the substation with PREPA’s interim director, Justo González, as the generator was being installed. However, in another example of the dysfunction which has plagued Puerto Rico’s recovery, there was no sign of the generator, nor even PREPA’s interim director at the Charco Hondo substation—meaning thousands of Arecibo’s residents remained in darkness, just like nearly one-third of all Puerto Ricans: more than one million U.S. citizens—darkness wherein there is no remote contemplation of when power might be restored: a spokesperson for PREPA told BuzzFeed News that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was overseeing the project and providing the generator. A Corps spokesperson indicated that after a second inspection of the site, the Corps had determined there was too much damage to the nearby power lines to allow the generator to be safely switched on as planned; rather, he said contractors will “begin installing” the generator over the weekend, but that it will not become operational, albeit the Corps is unable to provide “definitive time” when it will.

Renogiaciones. The Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority reports that Puerto Rico’s decision to renegotiate its public debt will cost at least $ 800 million over five years, with FAFAA, relying on an expensive cadre of attorneys, consultants, and financial advisors who have been recruited as part of an effort to cobble together a quasi-plan of debt adjustment which would reduce more than $ 70 billion owed to  Puerto Rico’s bondholders—now the cadre has to translate its fiscal algorithms before Judge Swain’s courtroom. The document, however, fails to specify whether the plan incorporates the budget for either FAFAA or the PROMESA Oversight Board, much less the vast array of advisors and lawyers who have participated in voluntary negotiations, as in the case of the Government Development Bank (GDB)—not exactly as propitious beginning as, for the first time, there is to be an assessment of the actual costs of reducing or cancelling bondholders’ debts, albeit, already, some early estimates are that such costs could exceed $1 billion—the portion of which would redound to U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico, where, in comparison to the different mainland states, Puerto Rico falls far below the poorest mainland state, with 45% of its population living below the poverty line, would be most limited. Nevertheless, despite the seemingly endless process, and despite the PROMESA oversight, or quasi-chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment, there has been as yet, no agreement with any key creditor. Rather, in what many in Puerto Rico would deem noticias falsas, President Trump, last November, reported Puerto Rico was “doing well” and “it’s healing, and it’s getting better, and we’re getting them power, and all of the things that they have to have.” That was in sharp contrast with reality—or, as District Representative José “Memo” González Mercado, of Arecibo put it: “The reality is that we are U.S. citizens, but Donald Trump treats us as second-class citizens.”

Disparate Physical & Fiscal Responses to Municipal Physical & Fiscal Distress

eBlog

January 16, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the ongoing fiscal and physical challenges of restoring power in hurricane devastated Puerto Rico, which the Trump Administration and Congress have opted to treat in a very different manner than other hurricane devastated municipalities and states.

Prospects for Recovery. Notwithstanding the opposition of his own designated coordinator for the restoration of electric power, Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rossello yesterday gave the go-ahead to sign an agreement which will allow Puerto Rico’s muncipios to hire companies and experts to repair the island’s electric distribution lines, with Puerto Rico Secretary of the Interior, William Villafañe, announcing—in the wake of a demonstration by residents of bigger muncipios which remain without electricity since Hurricanes Irma and María passed last September, that the Electric Power Authority (AEE) will sign an agreement with the muncipios to allow them to hire companies to repair power lines. The breakthrough came in the wake of a meeting with the presidents of the Federation and the Association of Mayors, Carlos Molina (Arecibo) and Rolando Ortiz (Cayey), respectively, as well as the Mayor (Alcalde) of Bayamón, Ramón Luis Rivera, and others officials. The agreement, which until yesterday had not been shown to the Mayors, is supposed to have a series of security restrictions; in addition, the agreement is intended to empower the muncipios to offer injury insurance, as well as be eligible for FEMA reimbursement. Secretary Villafañe noted that Governor disagreed with the result of last Monday’s meeting, in which the coordinator designated for the restoration efforts of electric power, Carlos Torres, and the AEE refused to establish an agreement with the municipios out of security concerns.

Thus, among the security conditions the agreement mandates, is that Mayors will be required to establish contracts exclusively with contractors who have specialized equipment and trucks. In a clarification, Secretary Villafañe assured reporters that PREPA retirees may continue to provide services, as is the case of the Pepino Power Authority, an initiative of the Mayor Javier Jiménez of San Sebastian—a muncipio founded in 1752 by Captain Cristóbal González de la Cruz, who among other neighbors, had an interest in converting some cow farms into an agricultural village. The foundation of the town from the religious aspect, was consummated in December 1762 by Mariano Martin, the then Puerto Rico Catholic Bishop: by the beginning, 1700, San Sebastian was a conglomerate of a few cow farms, owned by some residents of the Partido de Aguada. Las Vegas was the former plain site of one of the first cow farms located by the Guatemala riverside at the north; another of those cow farms was Pepinito (today’s downtown), which was a low green mountain with a white calcium carbonate face. From these geographical accidents come the first names of the then new village, albeit one of the oldest municipalities in the United States: Las Vegas del Pepino (Cucumber Fields). Indeed, the permission to found the muncipio was officially given in 1752.

By the beginning of the 19th century, wealthy Spanish families arrived in Pepino, fleeing the revolutions of Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. Subsequently, families from Catalonia and the Basque country in Spain came to Puerto Rico as well as a significant number of isleños (Canary Islanders)—with the isleños taking over the local political power and developing a coffee industry. Much as they did in Nevada, the Basques brought some material progress to the muncipio; in addition, the new resident Basques, in remembrance of their home region and its religious patron, saw the need of upgrading the old traditional Pepino used by the Canary Islanders to the new and “up-dated” San Sebastián—even though, still today, the citizens of San Sebastián are called “pepinianos.” Permission to found the muncipio was officially given in 1752, under the leadership of the founder, Captain Cristóbal González de la Cruz, who sought to convert cattle fincas (ranches/farms) into an agricultural village—with the governmental transformation consummated in December of 1762 by Mariano Martin, the island Catholic bishop at that time. The muncipio grew by the beginning of the 19th century, with the arrival of wealthy Spanish families, fleeing the revolutions of Venezuela and the Dominican Republic. Nearly a century later, several Catalon families from northern Spain and the Canary Islands joined the large number of isleños (Canary Islanders) who had made El Pepino their home—new arrivals who, in the wake of taking over the local political power, developing a coffee industry, and changing the muncipio’s name, in remembrance of their home region and its religious patron, to the new and “up-dated” San Sebastián, notwithstanding that, still today, the citizens of San Sebastián are called “pepinianos.”

For his part, the Mayor Rivera, who had notified the government last September of his interest in collaborating in the restoration of electricity, only learned yesterday that the agreement had been approved; however, the municipal executive of Cayey and President of the Association of Mayors said that as long as they do not see the document, they will not believe it, because, to date, they have neither been allowed to see or sign the document in question: Mayor Ortiz said that during the meeting yesterday, Coordinator Torres again expressed his disagreement with allowing municipalities to collaborate in the restoration of light: “He (Torres) will have control of the materials, will have control of the brigades, control of resources–and that this resource, which is so important in the process of re-energizing the country, says that he does not agree with the Mayors intervening in this process or giving us the agreement to sign…They said that they were going to give us the power to energize the system and work with brigades that we can hire, and that they will give us brigades to work with the municipalities, and they will give us materials, (but) we leave here with nothing in the hand, with a promise of agreement.” Mayor Ortiz explained that in Cayey the muncipio has retirees from PREPA willing to start working, however, absent an agreement, they are not only barred by law from doing so, but also prevented from obtaining protection from the State Insurance Fund Corporation in case of injury to these workers. The Mayor added: “What he (Coordinator Torres) does not know is that in all of our communities and in all of our cities there are people trained with extraordinary resources to work on that system, because they have done it in all the previous events.”  Nevertheless, Mayor Rivera assured that as soon as the document is sent and signed, he has two companies with three brigades ready to work in the Bayamón distribution lines. He estimated that these works can begin today, if the legal division of La Fortaleza advances in the drafting of the agreement with the municipalities.

Unbalanced Politics? The restoration efforts have also been hampered by allegations of partisan discrimination: the number of brigades distributed among the municipalities of the northern region supposedly differed by 480 in the municipalities of the New Progressive Party (PNP) versus 174 in those led by the PPD, according to the President of the Municipal Legislature of Dorado, Carlos Alberto López. However, Secretary Villafañe refuted those data with others: he indicated that among the six municipalities with less than 20% of electric power service restored, five are NPOPs, while among the 35 that already have more than 60% service, 20 are from PPD.

What Would Rod Serling Say? The former host of the Twilight Zone, Rod Serling, who opened each week’s show by saying a “Dimension of sound, a dimension of sight, and dimension of mind: you just crossed over into The Twilight Zone,” seems consistent with Moody’s characteristically moody new report on Puerto Rico’s fiscal plan, writing: “These repeated delays in revising Puerto Rico’s fiscal plan…underscore the economic uncertainties that Puerto Rico faces as a result of post-Maria factors, including surging migration to the U.S. mainland, potentially unsustainable operating conditions for the territory’s manufacturers, and the federal recovery and rebuilding assistance that may fall short of what Puerto Rico needs to prevent lasting and severe damage to its economic base…Together, the growing challenges from these factors may further reduce already low recovery prospects for holders of Puerto Rico’s 17 rated debt types.” The insights, provided by Moody’s senior at least 200,000 Puerto Ricans have left Puerto Rico since Hurricane Maria struck, or about 6% of the pre-Maria population—adding that manufacturing, an important part of Puerto Rico’s economy, has been steadily dropping over the last two decades—and warning that, in the bitter wake of Maria, some manufactures may decide to move to other areas less likely to be hit by future hurricanes. The analysts further warned that the federal government’s new 12.5% excise tax on profits derived from patents and other intangible assets is another negative. Finally, they noted that the amount of federal aid to Puerto Rico in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria will affect Puerto Rico’s trajectory of recovery amid growing doubt and uncertainty whether Gov. Rosselló’s request for $94.4 billion in aid will be honored—especially, with the federal government on the verge of shutting down this week—and its failure, to date—in disbursing any portion of a Congressionally-approved $4.9 billion Community Disaster Loan to Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and some other jurisdictions hit by recent natural disasters. Last week, Reorg Research reported that Puerto Rico’s debt restructuring and arguments between the U.S. Treasury and Puerto Rico over the latter’s control of the funds has delayed the funds’ release.

If anything, the federal inability to act has been further clouded by unclear governance: last week, Puerto Rico Sen. Minority Leader Eduardo Bhatia, who, during his tenure as Senate President, had been selected as Chair of the Council of State Governments of the Eastern Regional Conference (CSG-ERC) and later elected as President of the National Hispanic Caucus of State Legislators, thereby becoming the first Senate President and the first Puerto Rican to preside over the organization, as well as serve on the Board of the Council of State Government (CSG), National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) and the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda (NHLA); brought up a different concern about the fiscal plan’s delay: in the new style of Trumpian governance, he tweeted to Gov. Ricardo Rosselló: “This is your great opportunity to regain lost confidence…Make your fiscal plan public today, so that there is no doubt, the people know your proposal and participate in the reconstruction of Puerto Rico,” adding that the people of Puerto Rico deserved a chance to comment prior to the draft’s submission to the PROMESA Oversight Board, tweeting: “In all countries of the world, ideas are discussed before decisions are made, not later…Otherwise, the process is a mockery of the serious people of Puerto Rico who want to contribute to the common good.”

Balancing Fiscal & Public Safety

January 9, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the potential fiscal impact of the expiration of the State of New Jersey’s public safety arbitration cap—with the expiration coming as Governor-elect Phil Murphy has been reviewing a report examining the implications for property taxes, state spending, collective bargaining agreements, and public safety. Then we journey south to witness the denouement of the fiscal siege of the historic municipality of Petersburg, Virginia.

Uncapping & Fiscal Impacts. The State of New Jersey’s statute capping public safety arbitration awards at 2% has been in effect for seven years—it was last extended in 2014. Now, with a new Governor taking office, Moody’s has warned that its expiration on the last day of 2017 is a credit negative for the Garden State—and for its municipalities and counties. Indeed, the New Jersey League of Municipalities has been joined by the New Jersey Association of Counties, the New Jersey Conference of Mayors, the New Jersey Chamber of Commerce, New Jersey Business and Industry Association, and the New Jersey Realtors Association to urge the new Governor and Legislature to support permanently extending the 2% cap Interest Arbitration Cap, noting that an expired cap would have a negative impact on property taxes and jeopardize the continued delivery of critical services, as well as adversely impact residential and commercial property taxpayers, working class families, and those on fixed incomes. The League’s President, Mayor James Cassella of East Rutherford, noted that the 2% Interest Arbitration Cap has controlled costs: without the cap, municipalities could see costly arbitration awards that would force local officials to reduce services or lay off employees to satisfy the arbitrator’s award and stay within the 2% levy cap. Similarly, New Jersey Association of Counties President Heather Simmons, a Gloucester County Freeholder, noted that failure to permanently extend the 2% cap on binding interest arbitration awards would inequitably alter the collective bargaining process in favor of labor at the expense of taxpayers, and lead to awards by arbitrators with no fiduciary duty to deliver essential services in a cost-effective manner.

Now Moody’s has moodily weighed in, deeming the expiration a credit negative for the state’s cities and  counties, as has Fitch Ratings.

In New Jersey, interest arbitration is a process open only to police and fire employee unions: it is a mechanism to resolve collective bargaining disputes between local governments and unions: when a public employer is unable to reach a contract agreement with a police or fire union, an arbitrator is called in to decide the terms of the contract. When the state adopted the 2 percent property tax levy cap, a separate 2 percent cap on interest arbitration awards was also imposed: that mandates arbitrators to take property taxes into account when issuing awards and providing local officials with a now proven and effective tool to contain property tax increases. The arbitration cap expired on Dec. 31; however, the property tax levy cap is permanent. The New Jersey League noted: “For nearly a decade, the 2 percent cap on binding interest arbitration awards has kept public safety employee salaries and wages under control simply because parties have been closer to reaching an agreement from the onset of negotiations. Moreover, the 2 percent cap on binding interest arbitration awards has established clear parameters for negotiating reasonable successor contracts that preserve the collective bargaining process and take into consideration the separate 2 percent tax levy cap on overall local government spending. And, importantly, the 2 percent cap on binding interest arbitration awards has not negatively impacted public safety services or recruitment.

In the wake of the expiration of the arbitration cap, it appears likely that arbitrator contract awards would exceed 2 percent. That would likely force cities and counties in the Garden State to reduce or eliminate municipal services—or go to the voters to seek approval to exceed the 2 percent property tax cap in order to fund an arbitration award.

Moody’s analyst Douglas Goldmacher moodily noted: “Given that salary costs are among the largest of municipal expenditures, the cost implications are obvious and considerable. The effect of this is, in most cases, unlikely to be rapid, but ultimately, the loss of the arbitration cap is likely to cause the sector’s credit quality to deteriorate…Although the cap has expired, and it may not be finished. Numerous local governments and local government advocacy groups support the arbitration cap. It is possible that the new governor and New Jersey state Legislature will revisit the matter. Until and unless that occurs, there will be a potentially dangerous mismatch between revenue and expenditures.” The statute, which caps public safety arbitration awards at 2%, came into force on January 1, 2011; it was extended for a three-year period in 2014 when it was last up for renewal. Mr. Goldmacher noted: “The cap played a major role in helping local governments manage public safety costs by instituting a limit on increases in police and fire salaries in arbitration and effectively tying the salary increases to the municipality’s or county’s revenue-raising capabilities…The cap’s expiration, should it prove permanent, is a credit negative for all local governments.” Mr. Goldmacher noted the cap’s existence has been a “valuable tool” in contract negotiations when police and firefighter unions with negotiators often forced to consider small salary increases. A September report by former Gov. Chris Christie’s appointees to the Police and Fire Public Interest Arbitration Impact Task Force stated that municipal property taxes jumped at an annual average of 7.19% for the five years prior to the cap compared to 2.41% since 2011. The report also estimated that the cap has saved taxpayers a collective $429 million. Thus, Mr. Goldmacher notes: “Given that salary costs are among the largest of municipal expenditures, the cost implications are obvious and considerable: Police and fire contracts often serve as a benchmark contract for other negotiations, which had the effect of making a 2% annual increase something of a standard target for most contracts, even for non-public safety collective bargaining units.” While it is possible the cap may be reinstated, Mr. Goldmacher added that as long as no action is taken to address the lapse, New Jersey’s cities and counties confront “a potentially dangerous mismatch” aligning revenue and expenditures, because of how much a 2% property tax cap law would limit their budgetary flexibility, writing: “The effect of this is, in most cases, unlikely to be rapid, but ultimately, the loss of the arbitration cap is likely to cause the sector’s credit quality to deteriorate,” he said. “The degree of deterioration will depend on the idiosyncratic qualities of the given community.”

For its part, Fitch wrote: “…the arbitration cap is beneficial to local government credit quality as it helps to align revenue and spending measures and supports structural balance in the context of statutory caps on property tax growth…bargaining groups may become more emboldened to pursue arbitration as opposed to voluntary settlement if the arbitration cap expires. Arbitration awards were significantly higher prior to the cap, ranging from 2.50% to 5.65% from 1993-2010, according to a report of the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC.)” Fitch also noted that the elimination of the arbitration cap “could force local governments to reduce governmental services and/or rely on one-time resources to accommodate higher wage expenses.”

The Fiscal Siege of Petersburg. Jack Berry, Robert Bobb, and Nelsie Birch, writing in a piece, “Overcoming the latest siege of Petersburg, referenced the city’s then vital role in the Civil War, where, as they wrote: “The series of battles known as the Siege of Petersburg lasted nine months and consisted of devastating trench warfare. It featured the largest concentration of African-American troops in the war, who suffered enormous casualties at the Battle of the Crater.” They went on to write: “Some would say that Petersburg has been under siege ever since the Civil War, that there is a siege mentality in the city. Petersburg even has a Siege Museum…But Petersburg has not always been under siege; it is not today, and it will not be tomorrow. Noting that Petersburg was once the second largest city in Virginia—and home to the largest number of free blacks in Virginia, they noted that it was once “a wealthy city, a major industrial center, and one of the largest rail hubs in the nation,” where, in the wake of the Civil War, a “coalition of Africa-American and white, populist Republicans, controlled the state legislature, which led to the creation of two large public institutions in the region: Virginia State University and Central State Hospital. Later, Fort Lee became another major economic engine for the area.” The authors noted, however, that “Jim Crow laws and Massive Resistance devastated the hopes and dreams of black citizens and fueled racial tensions. In 1985, one of the city’s largest employers, Brown & Williamson Tobacco, shut down its Petersburg factory. Later, Southpark Mall was located north of the city, sucking retail sales out of Petersburg.” These events adversely affected assessed property values—in turn reducing investment in public schools. The historic city seemed on a route to chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy—or being, as they wrote: “relinquishing city status—and being subsumed by neighboring jurisdictions,” all because of what they described as a “self-inflicted, mismanaged city government” which “ran itself into a ditch: In July of 2016, the city faced $18 million in unpaid bills. The budget was $12 million out of balance. Petersburg had nearly run out of cash and was dipping into every available pot of money, regardless of restrictions, to pay bills. A botched water meter conversion project impacted utility billings, which made the cash situation even worse.”

Because the Commonwealth of Virginia was apprehensive that a default by Petersburg would have had severe fiscal repercussions for municipalities across the state, the Commonwealth, as we have previously written, provided a consulting team to diagnose the fiscal issues and recommend fiscal measures—including, in its recommendations, pay cuts of 10 percent pay cuts for the entire city workforce. Even as the state-imposed overseer was acting, an aroused citizenry, via a grassroots group called “Clean Sweep,” attended every City Council session, demanding greater fiscal accountability. A year ago last October, former Mayor Howard Meyers and the City Council brought in a fiscal posse in an effort to restructure, hiring former Richmond City Manager Robert Bobb and his team, who set up a temporary war room in the City Hall building where General Robert E. Lee had met with his senior Confederate officers during the Siege of Petersburg. Mr. Bobb wrote of the fiscal war room: “We dug in for the long haul, with Nelsie Birch leading efforts to peel back layers of the financial onion. We got a handle on cash flow, figured out the extent of the unpaid bills, found checks stashed in drawers, arranged short-term financing, crafted a new budget, dramatically cut spending, put pressure on the city treasurer to collect taxes, and revamped the decrepit utility system…New financial policies were put in place; debt was restructured; water and sewer rates were increased to comply with debt covenants; the organization was right-sized; new managers were hired.”

Mr. Bobb described this war room process as one in which—at the same time—his team teamed with Mayor Sam Parham and the members of the Petersburg City Council “every step of the way,” to make the tough decisions, adding that, during this process, “Our strongest ally was the Governor’s Office, in particular, Virginia Secretary of Finance Ric Brown.” Indeed, by last November, external auditors reported a signal fiscal turnaround: Petersburg reported a year-end surplus of $7.2 million—and the report was on time; the auditor’s opinion was clean.

The Precipitous Chapter 9 Road to Recovery

January 3, 2018

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s Blog, we consider the fiscal, scholastic, and governing challenges of the city emerging from the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history.

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

The Steep Fiscal Road to Recovery.  After years of failed leadership, financial mismanagement, quasi-chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy which led to a state takeover; the state of Detroit’s Public Schools Community District remains vital to encouraging young families to move back into the city—especially in the wake, last month, of DPS failing to meet critical deadlines necessary to be eligible for vital state aid.  (In 2016, Michigan enacted a $617 million DPS bailout, as we have previously noted.) That action separated the district’s debt from a new district that could start fresh. Now, renewed state intervention would be a critical fiscal step backwards; thus it is fortunate that Superintendent Nikolai Vitti appears to be on top of the situation: he warns that disciplinary action will follow in the wake of DPS’ failure to meet these deadlines, making it critical the Superintendent can trust his staff. It is especially vital now in the wake of a second credit rating upgrade—with the report card having recorded, last month, that DPS that Detroit Public Schools had lost out on $6.5 million in fiscal assistance to whittle down its old debt, because DPS officials had failed to turn in paperwork homework on time, according to Superindent Vitti (Michigan reimburses its public school districts for debt loss under Public Act 86 if they met the Aug. 15 deadline; thus, Superindent Vitte, on Monday, reported: “At this point, Detroit Public Schools is not eligible for the $6.5 million-dollar reimbursement from the state…After speaking with state officials, the available funds have already been disbursed to other qualifying entities. However, we will continue to petition the state to receive the reimbursement.”

Under the agreement, Detroit’s old district is still obligated to pay down its past operating debt; thus, the system’s failure to meet two deadlines last year cost not $6.5 million in aid from the state to help pay down its debt, but also a loss of public trust and confidence. As Superintendent Vitte noted last month: “At this point, Detroit Public Schools is not eligible for the $6.5 million-dollar reimbursement from the state: After speaking with state officials, the available funds have already been disbursed to other qualifying entities.” According to Superintendent Vitti, former CFO Marios Demetriou received the documents, but never completed them or sent them to the state. Even though the missed payout from the state is not expected to harm the day-to-day operations of the new district, it appears to curry a D grade; more importantly, it delays repayment of DPS’ legacy debt—or, as Superintendent Vitti notes: it is “unacceptable….The inability to submit the reimbursement form on time is a vestige of the past that continues to haunt the district…This is directly associated with the need for stronger leaders, systems, and processes. The individuals who were closest to the responsibility to submit the form will no longer be with the district.”

The unscholarly missteps appear to have contributed to ongoing doubts about the city’s fiscal acumen: The Motor City’s credit ratings remain deep in junk-bond territory, even after S&P Global Ratings last month upgraded Detroit’s credit rating from B to B+, while Moody’s last October had lifted its to B1 in the wake of the city’s launch of a new web portal to improve investor access to its financial data and bond offerings, Stephen Winterstein, a Managing Director and chief municipal fixed income strategist at Wilmington Trust Investment Advisors, Inc. to note he was “really optimistic about what they have been doing in terms of disclosure and the investor website is definitely a move in the right direction: The road to recovery is a long one, and I think that Detroit is doing the right things.”

Since exiting from the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in American history just three years ago last month, Detroit has issued debt twice: in August 2015 with $245 million of local government loan program revenue bonds, and in August 2016 with a $615 million general obligation/distributable state aid backed bond sale—albeit both issuances were via the Michigan Finance Authority, with the first enhanced with a statutory lien and intercept feature on the city’s income taxes. CFO John Naglick said that Detroit is also close to deciding on the underwriting team for a request for proposals it launched in October to find banks to lead a tender offer and refunding of its unsecured financial recovery municipal bonds with the aim of lowering its costs and easing a future escalation of debt service. For its part, S&P, in its upgrade, cited positive momentum the city is building with regard to stabilizing its operations and being better prepared to address future significant increases in pension contributions—or, as the agency noted: “We believe the city’s financial position is now more transparent compared with recent years, as is Detroit’s long-term financial strategy, which relies on fairly conservative growth assumptions…We also believe that the city has a stronger capacity to service its debt obligations than in years past.” Indeed, Detroit’s credit ratings are the highest since March of 2012, just over a year before Kevin Orr filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy in July of 2013. Nevertheless, Detroit’s credit rating remains deep in junk territory and vulnerable to another recession, say market participants. Or, as Michigan Attorney General and gubernatorial Bill Scheutte notes: “We still believe Detroit faces a long path that will require years of prudent decision-making from management and the avoidance of major economic shocks before its debt makes sense for investors looking for high-quality municipal exposure…The city still has an abundance of extremely high-risk characteristics and speculative-grade qualities that investors should be very cognizant of and understand what they are taking on.” Notwithstanding, Detroit appears to be on course to exit state oversight this year: it has presented deficit-free budgets for two consecutive years, enabling it to exit from oversight by the Financial Review Commission oversight; it ended FY2016 with a $63 million surplus; Detroit’s four-year forecast predicts an anemic annual growth rate of only about 1%; thus, any adverse public school news could have repercussions.

 

Three Different Roads to Fiscal Recovery

November 6, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the next critical step in Detroit’s emergence from the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history; then we consider the ongoing legal and fiscal recovery of Ferguson, Missouri, before, finally, trying to go to school in Puerto Rico.

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

The Road Out of State Oversight. The city of Detroit expects to get the keys back to its financial house this spring for the first time since it exited bankruptcy in 2014. The question is whether it can keep the house in order once state oversight ends — and local elected officials regain control over budgets and contracts. With two balanced budgets and an audit of a third expected in May, city officials anticipate they will be released early next year from the strict financial controls required under Chapter 9 restructuring. The shift is especially important as voters cast ballots Tuesday for the Detroit leaders who will chart the city’s direction. Both Mayor Mike Duggan and challenger Coleman Young II have offered plans on how they would guide the city financially. Gov. Rick Snyder said he is optimistic about the city’s ability to manage finances on its own. “They’ve been hitting those milestones, and I hope they continue to hit them — that’s a good thing for all of us,” Snyder told The Detroit News.

There is evidence that the oversight is no longer warranted: Detroit’s credit has been upgraded among rating agencies, its employment rate is up and property values are climbing. The city, in a financial update last month, noted economic development in some neighborhoods and Detroit’s downtown, job creation efforts and growth in multifamily home construction. Experts say bankruptcy allowed Detroit to drop billions in debt, setting it on a solid financial path. But the city faces massive future payments for past borrowing and pension obligations that are difficult to plan for. “It really takes the economic environment to cooperate, as well as some very good and focused financial management. Right now, that seems to be all there,” said Lisa Washburn, managing director of the Concord, Massachusetts-based firm Municipal Market Analytics. “Eventually, I suspect there will be another economic downturn and how that affects that region, that’s something outside of their control. But it can’t be outside of their field of vision.”

Post-oversight protections. The landmark municipal bankruptcy set forth strict conditions to help Detroit avoid falling back into debt. A nine-member commission, which under the law includes Duggan and City Council President Brenda Jones, currently signs off on the city’s four-year budget plan, certain contracts and transactions. It has also empowered to review, modify and approve operational budgets. The commission was established as a condition of a financial aid package approved by the state Legislature to defray cuts to Detroit retiree pensions and shield the Detroit Institute of Arts collection from bankruptcy creditors. There are still protections even if the city is released from oversight, Detroit officials note. The state-mandated commission would continue to meet monthly and could step back in if necessary, the city’s Chief Financial Officer John Hill said. The city would continue to hold revenue estimation conferences in February and September to set budgeting limits for each fiscal year, as well as develop a four-year financial plan. Detroit’s numbers are headed in the right direction when it comes to property values, income tax collection, median income and employment. Among the positives:

■The city’s taxable value is projected to climb by about $100 million, from $6.4 billion based on the taxable values from the end of the 2016 calendar year to $6.5 billion at the end of this year, according to data from the CFO’s office.

■The city projects an increase of about $30 million in its residential real estate — the first boost in the property class in almost two decades. Detroit’s level of owner-occupied homes went from a low of 59 percent in 2010 to a projected 74 percent in 2018, based on findings from the reappraisal, officials say.

■City figures show income tax collection has gone from $263.2 million in the 2016 fiscal year to a forecast of $285 million for 2017, based on unaudited figures.

■The city’s employment has gone up from 206,568 in January 2014 to 233,068 this July, according to labor statistics.

■Detroiters’ median household income was $28,099 in 2016, a 7.5 percent hike from the previous year, according to U.S. Census estimates released in September.

Not as encouraging are poverty and crime rates. The poverty rate has dipped 4 percentage points to 35.7 percent, Detroit’s lowest since 2008. But the rate is still the highest among large U.S. cities, as is the city’s violent crime rate. “You can’t ignore what’s happening in the downtown and Midtown, but Detroit is obviously so much bigger than that,” said Matt Butler, a vice president at Moody’s Investors Service and lead analyst for Detroit. “The real story here going forward is how is Detroit able to re-create that development in other areas of the city.”

The city filed for bankruptcy in the summer of 2013 and officially exited on Dec. 10, 2014, with a plan to shed $7 billion in debt and pump $1.7 billion into restructuring and city service improvements over a decade. Last month, Moody’s Investors Service upgraded Detroit’s credit outlook and praised the city for its gains. Detroit’s economy “remains vulnerable,” the report noted, but adds it “is showing real progress.” Detroit recorded a general fund surplus of just over $63 million in fiscal year 2016 and expects an additional surplus for 2017 of about $38.5 million. For 2015, the surplus was about $71 million. But Moody’s warns of economic unknowns that could pose future problems, namely the massive contributions that loom for its two pension funds.

A funding plan forged through Detroit’s bankruptcy coined the “grand bargain” relieved the city of much of those payments through 2023. But in 2024, the city will have to start funding a substantial portion of the pension obligations from its general fund for the General Retirement System and Police and Fire Retirement System. The initial payment was first contemplated at $113.9 million, but city officials later said estimates had been off, in part because of outdated mortality tables. If earnings meet the plan of debt adjustment’s assumed return rate of 6.75 percent, the city’s contribution in 2024 would be $167 million. If there are no earnings, it could soar to $344 million or more. Contributions to the pensions would be annual and could continue for 20-30 years. Investment returns have varied greatly. To minimize a shortfall, the city’s administration established a dedicated Retiree Protection Fund that’s expected to pull together $335 million in the coming years to help meet the required contributions. The City Council would contribute a dedicated amount from its general fund each year. So far, $105 million has been set aside. Moody’s has called the fund a “credit positive action,” noting, however, that once it’s depleted in 2033 the city will be required to fund annual pension payments directly from its budget.

Retooling debt structure. CFO Hill notes that today his greatest concern is restructuring the city’s debt, so, last month, the city solicited requests for proposals from investment banks which could help address debt tied to past capital borrowing and millages—or, as Mr. Hill put it: “We think revenues should increase, but if we can also deal with the structure of the debt and lower those payments then the city will be much better off,” said Hill, adding a plan, he said, would “set the city on the course to have dealt with two of its major challenges.” Indeed, the issue of the city’s debt and finance has been, unsurprisingly, an issue in the mayoral campaign, where Mayor Duggan, during a debate, said Detroit’s City Council has been rigorous in making sure that we “watch every dollar that we have,” and he expects the city will be released from state fiscal oversight this spring—adding that, under his administration, “We won’t ever lose self-determination again.” In response, his opponent, Coleman Young, counters that Detroit will not fully regain budget and contract authority back from the state; moreover, he vowed he would, if elected, find efficiencies and reduce costs—and cut what he deemed the “top heavy” staff to manager ratio, adding: “These are some of the things I am willing to do to make sure we have a balanced budget and our finances get back in order.”  “In theory, it would be great to have as much money plowed into redevelopment as possible, but that comes at a cost,” she said. “With less than seven years away from having to start making pension payments again, you don’t want to find yourself in a budgetary hole at a time when you can see it coming.”

Ferguson’s Steep Road to Recovery. Ferguson, Missouri, a small city of about 21,000, which in 2010 was 67.4% black, and 29.3% white, with 8,192 households of which 39.1% had children under the age of 18 living with them, and 31.5% had a female householder with no husband present—and where 32.9% were non-families, is a relatively young municipality: the median age in the city was 33.1 years, while 10.3% were 65 years of age or older. The gender makeup of the city was 44.8% male and 55.2% female. It is a city where the Mayor is directly elected (Mayor James Knowles ran unopposed in 2014 in an election where voter turnout was approximately 12%.) Ferguson is one of 89 municipalities in St. Louis County, where the county police have jurisdiction throughout. It is a city where the fatal police shooting of Michael Brown still weighs.

Last Friday, in Ferguson, as part of a street theater protest, activists set fire to a model depicting the Ferguson Commission report in front of City Hall: it was a demonstration intended to mock political leaders and the city police department’s response to crime and protests in the city. The demonstration came just two weeks after St. Louis police, using a technique called “kettling,” in which exits are blocked in and people are arrested en masse, arrested dozens of protesters, residents, journalists, and legal observers as people protested, for a third day, after former police officer Jason Stockley was found not guilty in the 2011 fatal shooting of Mr. Lamar–and after Mayor Lyda Krewson challenged the city to recommit itself to reforms laid out in the Ferguson Commission report—the nearly 200-page report which had proposed 189 “calls to action,” and marked the culmination of nearly 10 months of work for a commission established by former Gov. Jay Nixon in 2015, in response to the shooting death of Michael Brown, a black teenager, by a white Ferguson police officer—a report in which Commissioners grouped their post-Ferguson calls for action into three categories: Justice for All, involving urgent police and court reforms; Youth at the Center, exploring policies to promote better lives for children; and Opportunity to Thrive, laying out changes to address economic inequalities.

Regional leaders have largely focused on the “Justice for All” component of the report, overhauling municipal court practices such as jailing defendants who could not pay their fines, even as discussion has commenced on strengthening the Civilian Oversight Board, equipping police with body cameras, and developing police policies for using force and for handling public demonstrations. The report also called for improving the public’s relationship with law enforcement through community policing, by encouraging police departments to facilitate better interactions between officers and those they serve, and allowing the public to weigh in on programs and policies through forums. Starsky Wilson, the former co-chair of the Ferguson Commission, in a recent interview with the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, noted that while police accountability and reform has clearly been the starting point for those revisiting the Commission’s findings, he hoped elected leaders would not forget the aspects of the report devoted to building a better St. Louis for the city’s children: “It can’t just be about police. That’s just one piece of the puzzle.”

Nevertheless, the Ferguson protests appear to have produced changes, particularly in Ferguson itself, where new city and police leaders came into power. The state Legislature also passed a municipal reform statute, the most significant element of which lowered the cap on revenue from traffic tickets: It can now only make up 12.5 percent of a city’s general operating revenue in St. Louis County, and 20 percent elsewhere, down from 30 percent. Moreover, municipalities which fail to submit a timely and accurate report on their finances to the state auditor will immediately lose jurisdiction over their courts. (The previous law did little to punish the many courts that ignored the limits.) The impact was swift: Ferguson’s Municipal Court revenue plummeted from $2.7 million in 2014 to roughly $500,000 in 2016.

In St. Louis, Mr. Wilson cites several achievements, including the creation of a Civilian Oversight Board and the decision to raise the city’s minimum wage, both in 2015, though state lawmakers negated the wage effort this year. Meanwhile, other bills have been introduced to address some of the Ferguson Commission’s findings, including a measure being considered by the St. Louis Board of Aldermen limiting when St. Louis police could use pepper spray and tear gas. Sponsoring Alderman Megan Green, 15th Ward, reports she hopes it will serve as a starting point for officials to discuss revising the city’s vague ordinance against unlawful assembly. Asked what changes were made in the city police department in response to the Ferguson report, spokeswoman Schron Jackson said the St. Louis Police Department has begun training officers in de-escalation tactics and how implicit bias may affect their work, as well as how to work with victims of violence who are gay, transgender, and bisexual. These kinds of higher training standards were among recommendations laid out by the Ferguson Commission. Additionally, Ms. Jackson said, the department has launched its Community Engagement and Organizational Development Division, which carries out community outreach programs.

But Mr. Wilson questions these early efforts: “When we see police arrest more than 300 people over 18 days, then we have to ask how seriously the increased training requirements were implemented…and how much culture change is actually happening, around use of force: What were the lessons that were learned surrounding de-escalation?” Allegations that police have improperly used force in recent weeks have already prompted the ACLU to challenge St. Louis police tactics in federal court. They have also sparked conversations at the St. Louis Board of Aldermen about when force should be used—and who should investigate afterward. The aldermanic public safety committee has already interviewed Maj. Mary Warnecke, deputy Commander of the department’s Bureau of Professional Standards, and Circuit Attorney Kim Gardner. Attorney Gardner has pitched the formation of a new unit in her office to investigate use-of-force incidents and officer-involved shootings, arguing that it is no longer acceptable for police to be investigating themselves.

In the long-term, the Ferguson Commission recommended shifting deadly force investigations to the Missouri Highway Patrol and the state attorney general—a recommendation in response to which Gov. Eric Greitens said he was open to considering. City lawmakers, too, are exploring Attorney Gardner’s idea, crafting legislation expanding the circuit attorney’s prosecutorial powers and giving the office the ability to open investigations into police officers’ use of force, according to Board of Aldermen President Lewis Reed, who notes that events such as the Stockley verdict can be catalysts for change, if legislators work quickly enough: noting that the creation of a Civilian Oversight Board is proof of that. The Aldermen had attempted to institute an oversight board in 2006, but the bill, which included subpoena power, was vetoed by former Mayor Francis Slay. Ferguson finally opened the door for its creation, President Reed said, but subpoena power did not have the requisite support to make it into the final product. With the continued unrest, a new mayor and a more open-minded board, Mr. Reed sees a window of opportunity to revisit subpoena power: “I see a readiness for people now to step outside of what I would call their normal comfort zone and support efforts that probably in a normal state they would be a little more hesitant to support.” Mayor Krewson supports providing subpoena power to the city’s Civilian Oversight Board, which investigates complaints against police, and has said she agrees with community leaders who have demanded local police change how they handle use-of-force investigations and prosecutions. She also has committed to establishing a Racial Equity Fund, a proposed 25-year city fund dedicated to promoting racial equity in the region. “I know I don’t have the decision-making power across all of these things, but I am committed to adding my political will to the push to find the right way to get those things done,” Mayor Krewson said after the first week of protests over Stockley. One thing the Mayor says she has the power to do immediately is oust interim Police Chief Lawrence O’Toole, who declared police “owned the night” after law enforcement used a technique called “kettling” to surround and arrest more than 100 people on a single evening. She has shown no indication that she will act before the chief hiring process plays out.  “We have all the answers we need in the report. The road map exists. The longer (Krewson) chooses not to act, the longer our city hurts,” said Charli Cooksey, a catalyst with the Forward Through Ferguson advocacy group. ‘Not a short-term endeavor.’ There may be a long road ahead in making changes laid out in the report a reality, but leaders have pointed to some encouraging signs. Wilson says he has noticed a more diverse group of people engaging in disruption this time, suggesting that people understand the problems don’t amount to “black people’s issues” alone. “These are justice issues. Racial inequity harms the entire region and all people,” he said.

Forward Through Ferguson, the advocacy group that grew out of the Ferguson Commission, plans to knock on as many as 4,000 doors to get feedback before kicking off a series of policy campaigns next spring. “It’s not a short-term endeavor,” Ms. Cooksey said: “Diverse stakeholders in the region have to be committed to this for years to come.” But those inspired to run for office after the events of Ferguson, such as Rasheen Aldridge, a former Ferguson commissioner and now 5th Ward Democratic Committeeman, contend that new leaders have emerged at the state and local levels who have a better understanding of why young people have been protesting in recent weeks. “We have new people at the table, folks who are for the people, who haven’t been bought out and who haven’t been around for a while,” Aldridge said: “They’re willing to do the work.”

Learning about Fiscal & Physical Recovery. The Department of Education of Puerto Rico expects to open 80 percent of the 1,113 public schools on the island next Monday after having relaxed the criteria to enable the schools by the pressure of parents, mothers and students who demand a return to normalcy. Through twitter, the Department of Education published the list of schools that will open. The slowness in the process of resumption of classes on the island has been criticized by parents, educators, and even legislators who complain that six weeks after the passage of hurricane Maria on the island, only 152 schools have been opened (13 percent of the total) in the educational regions of San Juan, Ponce, Mayagüez and Bayamón. Groups of parents and teachers have held protests; the Federation of Teachers of Puerto Rico (FMPR) has called for a massive demonstration for November 9th to press for the opening of closed schools.  Members of the school community claim that many of the schools are able to operate, with water, no debris, or damage that poses a danger to students, but have not been opened. Even a mother of a special education student started a hunger strike against the DE in Hato Rey to demand that classes be resumed at the Urban Elementary School in Guaynabo, because the prolonged closure is having adverse effects on her child’s health: “Children of special education, when you take away their world, when you take away their school, you take away their therapies, you are leaving them unarmed. It is another hurricane that is reaching them: “I am seeing my daughter break down day by day, I am seeing my daughter who has started to attack herself, something that five years ago she did not do.”

The criticism focuses on the slowness of the work of the US Army Corps of Engineers and a company that contracted to inspect the schools and certify that they do not represent a danger to students and that they have water service, they are free of debris and fumigated. Most the the re-opened schools are without electricity: even the education unions FMPR and National Union of Educators and Education Workers (Unete) maintain that the limited opening of schools could be part of a supposed plan to close schools and eliminate teacher positions, something which had been happening before the impacts of hurricanes Irma and Maria, when Puerto Rico’s public education system had, after severe budget cuts, closed 167 schools—and suffered a decline of some 44,000 students. To date, some 800 schools which have been inspected, but there are still another 300—leaving Education Secretary Keleher to describe her frustration with the “slowness of the inspection process,” and that the Department will not use the Corps of Engineers or the CSA private firm for these works. The Secretary added that there are about 44 schools which will not open because of structural damage; she noted that for schools that will not open, “We are going to relocate that population or to bring them a temporary school, which is like a wagon.”