Public Trust, Public Safety, & Municipal Fiscal Sustainability: Has the Nation Experienced the Closing of its Chapter on Municipal Bankruptcies?

 

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eBlog, 04/20/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the unique and ongoing fiscal and physical challenges confronting Flint, Michigan in the wake of the drinking water crisis spawned by a state-appointed Emergency Manager, before heading far west to assess San Bernardino’s nearing formal exit from chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy—marking the last municipality to exit after the surge which came in the wake of the Great Recession.

Public Trust, Public Safety, & Due Diligence. Flint, Michigan Mayor Karen Weaver has recommended Flint continue obtaining its drinking water via the Detroit Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA), reversing the position she had taken a year ago in the wake of the lead-contaminated drinking water crisis. Flint returned to the Detroit-area authority which sends water to Flint from Lake Huron in October of 2015 after the discovery that Flint River water was not treated with corrosion control chemicals for 18 months. Mayor Weaver said she believed residents would stick with a plan to draw from a pipeline to Lake Huron which is under construction; however, she said she had re-evaluated that decision as a condition of receiving $100 million in federal funding to address the manmade disaster, noting that switching the city’s water source again might prove too great a risk, and that remaining with Detroit’s water supply from Lake Huron would cost her citizens and businesses less. Last year, Mayor Weaver had stated that the city’s nearly 100,000 residents would stay with a plan to draw from a Karegnondi Water Authority pipeline to Lake Huron—a pipeline which remains under construction, noting, then, that switching water sources would be too risky and could cause needless disruptions for the city’s residents—still apprehensive about public health and safety in the wake of the health problems stemming from the decision by a state-imposed Emergency Manager nearly three years ago to switch and draw drinking water from the Flint River, as an interim source after deciding to switch to the fledgling Genesee County regional system and sever its ties to the Detroit system, now known as the regional Great Lakes Water Authority. Even today, federal, state, and local officials continue to advise Flint residents not to drink the water without a filter even though it complies with federal standards, as the city awaits completion of the replacement of its existing lead service lines—or, as Mayor Weaver put it: “At the end of the day, I believe this is the best decision, because one of the things we wanted to make sure we did was put public health first,” at a press conference attended by county, state, federal and Great Lakes authority officials, adding: “We have to put that above money and everything else. That was what we did. And what didn’t take place last time was public health. We’ve done our due diligence.” The 30-year contract with the Great Lakes authority keeps Flint as a member of the Karegnondi authority—a decision supported by the State of Michigan, EPA, and Genesee County officials, albeit the long-term contract still requires the approval of the Flint City Council and Flint Receivership Transition Advisory Board, a panel appointed by Gov. Rick Snyder charged with monitoring Flint’s fiscal conditions in the wake of the city’s emergence from a state-inflicted Emergency Manager two years ago.

City Councilman Eric Mays this week said he will be asking tough questions when he and his eight other colleagues will be briefed on the plan. There is also a town hall tonight in Flint to take public comments. Councilman Mays notes he is concerned the city may be “giving up ownership” in the new Genesee regional authority, something he opposes, adding he would be closely scrutinizing what he deems a “valuable asset to the city.” Mayor Weaver has said she personally wanted to review the earlier decision in the wake of last month’s receipt from the Environmental Protection Agency of $100 million to assist the city to address and recover from the drinking water disaster that took such a human and fiscal toll. (EPA is mandating that Flint provide a 30-day public comment period.) Mayor Weaver notes she anticipates some opposition, making clear any final decision will depend upon “public feedback and public opinion.” Currently, the city remains under contract to make $7 million in annual municipal bond payments over 28 years to the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA); however, the Great Lakes authority said it would pay a $7 million “credit” for the KWA debt as long as Flint obligates itself to make its debt service payments. There is, at least so far, no indication with regard to how any such agreement would affect water rates. That matters, because, according to the Census Bureau, the city’s median household income is $7,059, significantly lower than the median Michigan-wide household income, and some $11,750 less than U.S. median household income. The GLWA said Flint customers would save a projected $1.8 million over 30 years compared with non-contractual charges they would have paid otherwise; in return, the Flint area authority would become a back-up system for the Detroit area authority, saving it an estimated $600 million over prior estimates and ensuring Metro Detroit communities would still receive water in the event of an interruption in Great Lakes authority service.

Robert Kaplan, the Chicago-based EPA’s acting regional administrator, said he signed off on the deal because the agency believes it protects the health of residents: “What’s best for public health is to stay on the water that’s currently being provided.” Jeff Wright, the KWA’s chief executive and drain commissioner of Genesee County, said the recommended plan not only would allow Flint to remain with the Genesee regional system, but also to be a back-up water supply, which, he noted, “is critically important to the safety of Flint’s residents who have not had a back-up system since the beginning of the Flint water crisis,” adding: “Whether (or not) Flint ultimately chooses high-quality Lake Huron water delivered through the newly constructed KWA pipeline, the highest quality treated water from Genesee County’s Water Treatment Plant or any other EPA-approved alternative, we will continue to assist Flint residents as they strive to recover from the Flint Water Crisis.” 

Keeping the Detroit system. The Great Lakes Water Authority Has embraced Mayor Weaver’s recommendation, with CEO Sue McCormick noting: “Flint residents can be assured that they will continue to receive water of unquestionable quality, at a significant cost savings.” Michigan Senate Minority Leader Jim Ananich (D-Flint) noted: “It provides us a long-term safe water source that we know is reliable. KWA could do the same thing, but this is an answer to help deal with one of the major parts of it,” adding the recommended move to stay on Detroit area water is “another example of the emergency manager sort of making a short-term terrible decision that’s cost us taxpayers half a billion dollars, if not more.” Emergency managers appointed by Snyder decided with the approval of the Flint City Council to switch to the Flint River water in part to save money. Flint officials said they thought Detroit water system price hikes were too high. For more than a year, the EPA has delayed any switch to KWA because of deficiencies including that the Flint treatment plant is not equipped to properly treat water. Staying with the Great Lakes authority may be an initial tough sell because of the city’s history, Mayor Weaver warned, but she is trying to get residents to move on. A town hall is scheduled for this evening at House of Prayer Missionary Baptist Church in Flint for public feedback. “I can’t change what happened,” Mayor Weaver said. “All I can do is move forward.”

Moody Blues in San Bernardino? As San Bernardino awaits its final judicial blessing from U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury of its plan of debt adjustment to formally exit chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, Moody’s has issued a short report, noting the city will exit bankruptcy with higher revenues and an improved balance sheet; however, the rating agency notes the city will confront significant operational challenges associated with deferred maintenance and potential service shortfalls—even being so glum as to indicate there is a possibility that, together with the pressure of its public pension liabilities, the city faces continued fiscal pressures and that continued financial distress could increase, so that a return to municipal bankruptcy is possible. Moody’s moody report notes the debt adjustment plan is forcing creditors to bear most of the restructuring challenge, especially as Moody’s analyzes the city’s plan to favor its pension obligations over bonded municipal debt and post-retirement OPEB liabilities. Of course, as we noted early on, the city’s pension liabilities are quite distinct from those of other chapter 9 municipalities, such as Detroit, Central Falls, Rhode Island, and Jefferson County. Under the city’s plan, San Bernardino municipal bondholders are scheduled to receive a major buzz cut—some 45%, even as some other creditors whom we have previously described, are scheduled (and still objecting) to receive as little as a 1% recovery on unsecured claims. Thus, Moody’s concludes that the Southern California city will continue to have to confront rising pension costs and public safety needs. Moody’s adjusted net pension liability will remain unchanged at $904 million, a figure which dwarfs the projected bankruptcy savings of approximately $350 million. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System also recently reduced its discount rate, meaning the city’s already increasing pension contributions will rise even faster. Additionally, Moody’s warns, a failure to invest more in public safety or police could exacerbate already-elevated crime levels. That means the city will likely be confronted by higher capital and operating borrowing costs, noting that, even after municipal debt reductions, the city might find itself unable to fund even 50 percent of its deferred maintenance. 

However, as San Bernardino’s Mayor Davis has noted, the city, in wake of the longest municipal bankruptcy in American history, is poised for growth in the wake of outsourcing fire services to the county and waste removal services to a private contractor, and reaching agreements with city employees, including police officers and retirees, to substantially reduce healthcare OPEB benefits to lessen pension reductions. Indeed, the city’s plan of adjustment agreement on its $56 million in pension obligation bonds—and in significant part with CalPERS—meant its retirees fared better, as Moody’s has noted, than the city’s municipal bondholders to whom San Bernardino committed to pay 40 percent of what they are owed—far more than its early offer of one percent. San Bernardino’s pension bondholders succeeded in wrangling a richer recovery than the city’s opening offer of one percent, but far less than CalPERS, which received a nearly 100 percent recovery. (San Bernardino did not make some $13 million in payments to CalPERS early in the chapter 9 process, but subsequently set up payments to make the public employee pension fund whole.) The city was aided in those efforts in the wake of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury’s ruling against the argument made by pension bond attorneys: in the wake of the city’s pension bondholders entering into mediation again prior to exit confirmation, substantial agreement was achieved for those bondholders—bondholders whose confidence in the city remains important, especially in the wake of the city’s subsequent issuance of $68 million in water and sewer bonds at competitive interest rates—with the payments to come from the city’s water and sewer revenues, which were not included in the chapter 9 bankruptcy. The proceeds from these municipal bonds were, in fact, issued to provide capital to meet critical needs to facilitate seismic upgrades to San Bernardino’s water reservoirs and funding for the first phase of the Clean Water Factor–Recycled Water Program.

The Art & Commitment of Municipal Fiscal Recovery

eBlog, 04/11/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing recovery of the city of Flint, Michigan, before heading east to one of the smallest municipalities in America, Central Falls, Rhode Island, as it maintains its epic recovery from chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, before finally turning south to assess recent developments in Puerto Rico. We note the terrible shooting yesterday at North Park Elementary School in San Bernardino; however, as former San Bernardino School Board Member Judi Penman noted, referring to the police department: “It is one of the most organized and well-prepared police departments around, and they are well prepared for this type of situation.” Indeed, even if sadly, the experience the city’s school police department gained from coordinating with the city’s police department in the wake of the December 2, 2015 terrorist attack appeared to enhance the swift and coordinated response—even as calls came in yesterday from the White House and California Gov. Jerry Brown to offer condolences and aid, according to San Bernardino Mayor Carey Davis.

Could this be a Jewel in the Crown on Flint’s Road to Fiscal Recovery? In most instances of severe municipal fiscal distress or bankruptcy, the situation has been endemic to the municipality; however, as we have noted in Jefferson County, the state can be a proximate cause. Certainly that appears to have been the case in Flint, where the Governor’s appointment of an emergency manager proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back at an exceptional cost and risk to human health and safety. The fiscal challenge is, as always, what does it take to recover? In the case of Flint, the city’s hopes appear to depend upon the restoration of one of the small city’s iconic jewels: the historic, downtown Capitol Theatre—where the goal is to restore it to its original glory, dating back to 1928, when it opened as a vaudeville house: it was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1985, but has been empty now for more than a decade—indeed, not just empty, but rather scheduled to become still another parking lot. Instead, however, the property will undergo a $37 million renovation to become a 1,600-seat movie palace and performance venue, which will provide 28,000 square feet of ground-floor retail and second-floor office space; an additional performance space will be created in the basement for small-scale workshops, experimental theater, and other performances. Jeremy Piper, chairman of the Cultural Center Corp., a Flint lawyer, will manage the new performing arts venue in the cultural center; he will also serve as co-chair of a committee that is raising the last $4 million of the $37 million needed to bring the theater back to life. The goal and hope is that the renovated theater will, as has been the experience in other cities, such as New York City’s Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, help serve as a foundation for Flint’s fiscal and physical recovery. The new theater is intended to become the focal point of 12,000, 13,000, or 14,000 people coming into downtown Flint for a performance and then going out for dinner—that is, to benefit and revive a downtown economy. Indeed, already, the venture firm SkyPoint is planning to open a large fine-dining restaurant on the ground floor and mezzanine timed to the rejuvenated theater’s reopening—SkyPoint Ventures being the company co-founded by Phil Hagerman, the CEO of Flint-based Diplomat Pharmacy Inc., and his wife, Jocelyn, whose Hagerman Foundation (the author, here, notes his middle name, derived from his great grandfather, is Hagerman) donated $4 million toward the Capitol’s renovation. In 2016, the Flint-based C.S. Mott Foundation announced a grant of $15 million for the Capitol Theatre project as part of $100 million it pledged to the city in the wake of the water crisis. The project also received $5.5 million from the Michigan Strategic Fund.

The ambitious effort comes as Michigan has paid $12 million to outside attorneys for work related to the Flint drinking water crisis, but out of which nearly 30% has gone to pay criminal and civil defense attorneys hired by Gov. Rick Snyder—an amount expected to climb as the lead poisoning of Flint’s drinking water has proven to be devastating for Flint and its children, but enriching for the state’s legal industry: Jeffrey Swartz, an associate professor at Western Michigan University-Cooley Law School, notes: “It’s a lot of money…I can see $10 million to $15 million being eaten up very quickly.” He added, moreover, that the state is still “on your way up the slope” in terms of mounting legal costs. The approved value of outside legal contracts, not all of which has been spent, is at least $16.6 million, adding that the Michigan Legislature may want to appoint a commission to review the appropriateness of all outside legal bills before they are approved for payment: already, Gov. Rick Snyder’s office has spent a combined $3.35 million for outside criminal and civil defense lawyers; the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality has spent $3.65 million; the Department of Health and Human Services has spent $956,000; and the Treasury Department has spent $35,555, according to figures released to the Free Press. In addition, the state has paid $340,000 to reimburse the City of Flint for some of its civil and criminal legal defense costs related to the drinking water crisis, which a task force appointed by Gov. Snyder has said was mainly brought on by mistakes made at the state level. Yet to be equitably addressed are some $1.3 million in Flint legal costs. Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette, whose investigation is still ongoing, has charged 13 current or former state and municipal officials, including five from the Dept. of Environmental Quality, the Dept. of Health and Human Safety, the City of Flint, and two former state-appointed emergency managers who ran the city and reported to the state’s Treasury Department; no one, however, from Gov. Snyder’s office has been charged.

The Remarkable Recovery of Chocolateville. Central Falls, Rhode Island Mayor James A. Diossa, the remarkable elected leader who has piloted the fiscal recovery of one of the nation’s smallest cities from chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, this week noted: “Our efforts and dedication to following fiscally sound budgeting practices are clearly paying off, leaving the City in a strong position. I would like to personally thank the Council and Administrative Financial Officer Len Morganis for their efforts in helping to lead the comeback of this great City.” The Mayor’s ebullient comments came in the wake of credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s rating upgrade for one of the nation’s smallest cities from “BB” to “BBB,” with S&P noting: “Central Falls is operating under a much stronger economic and management environment since emerging from bankruptcy in 2012. The City of Central Falls now has an investment grade credit rating from S&P due to diligently following the post-bankruptcy plan in conjunction with surpassing budgetary projections.”

One of the nation’s smallest municipalities (population of 19,000, city land size of one-square-mile), Central Falls is Rhode Island’s smallest and poorest city—and the site of a George Mason University class project on municipal fiscal distress—and guidebook for municipal leaders. Its post-bankruptcy recovery under Mayor Diossa has demonstrated several years of strong budgetary performance, and has “fully adhered to the established post-bankruptcy plan,” or, as Mayor Diossa put it: “S&P’s latest ratings report is yet another sign of Central Falls’ turnaround from bankruptcy.” Mr. Morganis noted: “The City of Central Falls now has an investment grade credit rating from S&P due to diligently following the post-bankruptcy plan in conjunction with surpassing budgetary projections,” adding that the credit rating agency’s statement expressed confidence that strong budgetary performance will continue post Rhode Island State oversight. S&P, in its upgrade, credited Mayor Diossa’s commitment to sound and transparent fiscal practices, noting the small city has an adequate management environment with improved financial policies and practices under their Financial Management Assessment (FMA) methodology—and that Central Falls exhibited a strong budgetary performance, with an operating surplus in the general fund and break-even operating results at the total governmental fund level in FY2016. Moreover, S&P reported, the former mill town and manufacturer of scrumptious chocolate bars has strong liquidity, with total government available cash at 28.7% of total governmental fund expenditures and 1.9 times governmental debt service, along with a strong institutional framework score. Similarly, Maureen Gurghigian, Managing Director of Hilltop Securities, noted: “A multi-step upgrade of this magnitude is uncommon: this is a tribute to the hard work of the City’s and the Administrative Finance Officer’s adherence to their plan and excellent relationship with State Government.” The remarkable recovery comes as one of the nation’s smallest cities heads towards a formal exit from chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy at the end of FY2017. S&P, in its upgrade, noted the city is operating under a “much stronger economic and management environment,” in the wake of its 2012 exit from municipal bankruptcy, or, as Mayor Diossa, put it: “Obviously we’ve had a lot of conversations with the rating agencies, and I was hoping we’d get an upgrade of at least one notch…When we got the triple upgrade, first, I was surprised and second, it reaffirmed the work that we’re doing. Our bonds are no longer junk. We’re investment level. It’s like getting good news at a health checkup.”  S&P, in its report, noted several years of sound budgeting and full adherence to a six-year post-bankruptcy plan which state-appointed receiver and former Rhode Island Supreme Court Justice Robert Flanders crafted. The hardest part of that recovery, as Judge Flanders noted to us so many years ago in City Hall,was his swift decision to curtail the city’s pension payments—cuts of as much as 55 percent—a statement he made with obvious emotion, recognizing the human costs. (Central Falls is among the approximately one-quarter of Rhode Island municipalities with locally administered pension plans.) Unsurprisingly, Mayor Diossa, maintains he is “fully committed” to the fiscal discipline first imposed by Judge Flanders, noting the municipality had a general fund surplus of 11% of expenditures in FY2016, and adding: “That reserve fund is very important.” He noted Central Falls also expects a surplus for this fiscal year, adding that the city’s expenses are 3% below budget, and that even as the city has reduced the residential property tax rate for the first time in a decade, even as it has earmarked 107% of its annual required contribution to the pension plan and contributed $100,000 toward its future OPEB liability.

The End of an Era? Mayor Diossa, recounting the era of chapter 9 bankruptcies, noted Pennsylvania’s capital, Harrisburg, in 2011; Jefferson County, Alabama; Stockton, Mammoth Lakes and San Bernardino, California; and Detroit: “I think Central Falls is a microcosm of all of them…I followed Detroit and heard all the discussions. They had the same issues that we had…sky-high costs, not budgeting appropriately,” adding his credit and appreciation—most distinctly from California—of the State of Rhode Island’s longstanding involvement: “The state’s been very involved,” commending Governors Lincoln Chafee and Gina Raimondo. Nevertheless, he warns: fiscal challenges remain; indeed, S&P adds: “The city’s debt and contingent liability profile is very weak…We view the pension and other post-employment benefit [OPEB] liabilities as a credit concern given the very low funded ratio and high fixed costs…They are still a concern with wealth metrics and resources that are probably below average for Rhode Island, so that’s a bit of a disadvantage…That adds more importance to the fact that they achieved an investment-grade rating through what I think is pretty good financial management and getting their house in order.” The city’s location, said Diossa, is another means to trumpet the city.

The Uncertainties of Fiscal Challenges. Natalie Jaresko is the newly named Executive Director of the PROMESA federal control board overseeing Puerto Rico’s finances, who previously served during a critical time in Ukraine’s history from 2014 to 2016 as it faced a deep recession, and about whom PROMESA Board Chair Jose Carrion noted: “Ukraine’s situation three years ago, like Puerto Rico’s today, was near catastrophic, but she worked with stakeholders to bring needed reforms that restored confidence, economic vitality and reinvestment in the country and its citizens. That’s exactly what Puerto Rico needs today;” came as Ms. Jaresko yesterday told the Board that with the tools at its disposal, Puerto Rico urgently needs to reduce the fiscal deficit and restructure the public debt, “all at once,” while acknowledging that the austerity measures may cause “things to get worse before they get better.” Her dire warnings came as the U.S. territory’s recovery prospects for the commonwealth’s general obligation and COFINA bonds continued to weaken, and, in the wake of last week’s moody Moody’s dropping of the Commonwealth’s debt ratings to its lowest rating, C, which equates with a less than 35% recovery on defaulted debt. Or, as our respected colleagues at Municipal Market Analytics put it: “[T]he ranges of potential bondholder outcomes are much wider than those, with a materially deeper low-end. For some (or many) of the commonwealth’s most lightly secured bonds (e.g., GDB, PFC, etc.) recoveries could hypothetically dip into the single digits. Further, any low end becomes more likely the longer Puerto Rico’s restructuring takes to achieve as time:

1) Allows progressively more negative economic data to materialize, forcing all parties to adopt more conservative and sustainable projections for future commonwealth revenues;

2) Allows local stakeholder groups—in particular students and workers—to organize and expand nascent protest efforts, further affecting the political center of gravity on the island;

3) Worsens potential entropy in commonwealth legislative outcomes;

4) Frustrates even pro-bondholder policymakers in the US Congress, which has little interest in, or ability to, re-think PROMESA and/or Federal aid compacts with the commonwealth.”

On the other hand, the longer the restructuring process ultimately takes, the more investable will be the security that the island borrows against in the future (whatever that is). So while the industry in general would likely benefit from a faster resolution that removes Puerto Rico from the headlines, the traditional investors who will consider lending to a “fixed” commonwealth should prefer that all parties take their time. Finally, if bleakly, MMA notes: “In our view, reliable projections of bondholder recovery impossible, and we fail to understand how any rating agency with an expected loss methodology can rate Puerto Rico’s bonds at all…Remember that the Governor’s Fiscal Plan, accepted by the Oversight Board, makes available about a quarter of the debt service to be paid on tax-backed debt through 2027, down from about 35% that was in the prior plan that the Board rejected. As we’ve noted before, the severity of the proposal greatly reduces the likelihood that an agreement will be reached with creditors by May 1 (when the stay on litigation ends), not only increasing the prospect of a Title III restructuring (cram down) un-der PROMESA, but also a host of related creditor litigation against the plan itself and board decisions both large and small. The outcomes of even normal litigation risks are inherently unpredictable, but the prospects here for multi-layered, multi-dimensional lawsuits create a problem several orders of magnitude worse than normal.

What Do Today’s Fiscal Storms Augur for Puerto Rico and New Jersey’s Fiscal Futures?

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eBlog, 03/13/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the frigid challenges awaiting Puerto Rico in New York City’s Alexander Hamilton Building today, where even as a fierce winter storm promises heavy snow, the U.S. Territory of Puerto Rico will likely confront its own harsh challenge by the PROMESA Board to its efforts to reassert ownership and control of Puerto Rico’s fiscal future. Then we turn south to New Jersey, where there are fiscal and weather storm warnings, with the former focused on a legacy of public pension debt that Governor Chris Christie will bequeath to his successors.

Is There Promise or UnPromise in PROMESA? In the wake of changes made by Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares to update its economic growth projections to address a concern expressed by the PROMESA Oversight Board, it remains unclear whether that will be certified by today—when the Board will convene in New York City in the Alexander Hamilton building to act on measures intended to guide the fiscal future of the U.S. territory over the next decade. The update was made in an effort to close a new gap between Puerto Rico’s projected revenue and expenditure projections, since the new economic projections altered all the Government’s revenue estimates. Gov. Rosselló, in an interview with El Nuevo Día, explained his administration had ordered four new measures to correct the insufficiency, which had been estimated at $262 million: the first measure would be an increase in the tax on tobacco products, an increase projected to add around $161 million in public funds, nearly doubling the current rate. The Governor proposed eliminating Christmas bonuses from the highest salaries in the government and public corporations, albeit without providing details with regard to the distinction between an executive salary and a non-executive salary, stating the changes would generate savings of between $10 million and $20 million. He also said the revised, updated plan would reflect an additional $78 million by means of the reconfiguration of the property tax through an appraisal process, as well as modifications to achieve $35 million in savings by means of changing the amount of sick and vacation days which public servants accrue, noting: “We were able to evaluate some of the economic development projections, and, even though our economists don’t agree with the Oversight Board’s s economists, we’ve used the Board’s economic projections within our model for the sake of getting the fiscal plan certified…(Due to the changes) we’ve prepared, some initiatives to have additional savings of up to $262 million. We had already assuaged some of the Board’s concerns within the same proposal we had made, and those were clarified.”

The Governor indicated that the decision taken yesterday does not imply that he will support other proposals made by the Board, noting that he especially opposed the suggestions to reduce the working hours of public employees by almost 20% and cutting professional services in the government by 50%, in order to reduce costs immediately in an effort to ensure the government does not run out of cash by the first two quarters of the next fiscal year, admitting that current projections suggest they are short by around $190 million, and warning: “This (the Board’s proposals) has a toxic effect on workers and on the economy.”

In response to the PROMESA Board’s apprehensions about the double counting of revenues in its submitted plan, the Governor noted: “We’ve established that our public policy is to renegotiate the debt. The idea is to keep everything in one place so we can work with it. The debt service will be affected depending on economic development projections, but we haven’t touched that part of the fiscal plan. We’re focusing on preparing the collection areas, because we’re aware that (government revenues) have been overestimated in the past. We’ve answered questions about healthcare, revenue, government size, and we’ve worked on the pension category within our administration’s public policy about protecting the most vulnerable as much as possible.”

As for today’s session in New York, noting that he believes the government has succeeded in answering the Board’s questions and concerns, and, using the Board’s economic growth numbers, the Governor believes the updated plan will address the revenue gap without major cuts, noting: “That’s no small thing. We’ve been able to dilute it and make the impact progressive, in the sense that those who have more have to contribute more, and keep the most vulnerable from losing access. We’ve established a plan of cost reduction. Now, the plan guarantees structural changes in the government so it operates better, as well as changes to the healthcare model and the educational model. It defends the most vulnerable, it doesn’t reduce the payroll by 30% or 20%, and it doesn’t reduce working hours like they’ve asked, and we reduced tax measures.” Nevertheless, Gov. Rosselló noted that the Board’s proposed service delivery cuts of as much as 50% affect health care and education—defining those two vital government services as ones in which such deep proposed cuts could trigger a drop in the economy by 8% or 9%, noting: “I’m very aware that the ones that are in the middle of all this are the people of Puerto Rico.” Indeed, the plan considers cuts to retiree pensions, lapses in the basic coverage of the Mi Salud healthcare program, a freeze in tax incentives, agency mergers, privatizations, and reductions in transfers to the University of Puerto Rico and to municipalities. On the revenue side, the Governor’s proposal seeks to increase the collection of the Puerto Rico Sales and Use Tax, the property tax, and corporate taxes. In addition, it boosts the cost of insurance, penalties, and licenses granted by the Government.

With or without the endorsement of Governor Rosselló’s administration, when the PROMESA Board meets today in the Alexander Hamilton US Custom House, the agenda includes certifying a plan that some argue goes far beyond not only considering the Governor’s proposed fiscal recommendations, but to some marks a transition under which the PROMESA Board members will “will become both the Legislative and Executive powers in Puerto Rico.” That is to note that this and ensuing fiscal budgets, or at least until the government of Puerto Rico is able to balance four consecutive budgets and achieve medium- and long-term access to financial markets—will first be overseen and subject to approval by the Oversight Board, as well every piece of legislation which has a fiscal impact.

Balancing. The undelicate federalism balance of power will be subject to review next week, when the House Committee on Natural Resources’ Subcommittee on Insular Affairs has a scheduled PROMESA oversight hearing.

The Stakes & States of Yieldy—or Kicking the Pension Can Down the Road.  Alan Schankel, Janney Capital Markets’ fine analyst has now warned that the Garden State’s lack of a significant plan to address New Jersey’s deteriorating fiscal conditions will lead to more credit rating downgrades and wider credit spreads, writing that New Jersey is unique among what he deemed the nation’s “yieldy states,” because the bulk of its tax-supported debt is not full faith and credit, lacks a credit pledge, and some 90% of the debt payments are subject to annual appropriation. If that were not enough, Mr. Schankel wrote that the state is burdened by another fiscal whammy: it sports among the lowest pension funding levels of any state combined with a high debt load and other OPEB liabilities. Mr. Schankel warned the fiscal road ahead could aggravate the dire fiscal outlook, noting that the recent sales tax reduction from 7% to 6.625%, combined with phasing out the estate tax under last year’s $16 billion Transportation Trust Fund renewal, will reduce the state’s annual revenue by $1.4 billion by 2021—long after Gov. Christie has left office, noting that the state’s unfunded pension liabilities worsened when in the wake of FY2014—16 revenue shortfalls, New Jersey reduced pension funding to a level below the scheduled-ramp up Gov. Chris Christie had agreed to his as part of New Jersey’s 2011 pension reform legislation, emphasizing that public pension underfunding has been “aggravated by current leadership,” albeit noting that such underfunding is neither new, nor partisan: “This long history of kicking the can down the road seems poised to continue, and although New Jersey appropriation backed debt offers some of the highest yields among all states, we advise caution…Given the persistent lack of political willingness to aggressively address the state’s financial morass, we believe the future holds more likelihood of rating downgrades than upgrades.”

The Roads out of Municipal Bankruptcy

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eBlog, 2/24/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the post-chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy trajectories of the nation’s longest (San Bernardino) and largest (Detroit) municipal bankruptcies.

Exit I. So Long, Farewell…San Bernardino City Manager Mark Scott was given a two-week extension to his expired contract this week—on the very same day the Reno, Nevada City Council selected him as one of two finalists to be Reno’s City Manager—with the extension granted just a little over the turbulent year Mr. Scott had devoted to working with the Mayor, Council, and attorneys to complete and submit to U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury San Bernardino’s proposed plan of debt adjustment—with the city, at the end of January, in the wake of San Bernardino’s “final, final” confirmation hearing, where the city gained authority to issue water and sewer revenue bonds prior to this month’s final bankruptcy confirmation hearing—or, as Urban Futures Chief Executive Officer Michael Busch, whose firm provided the city with financial guidance throughout the four-plus years of bankruptcy, put it: “It has been a lot of work, and the city has made a lot of tough decisions, but I think some of the things the city has done will become best practices for cities in distress.” Judge Jury is expected to make few changes from the redline suggestions made to her preliminary ruling by San Bernardino in its filing at the end of January—marking, as Mayor Carey Davis noted: a “milestone…After today, we have approval of the bankruptcy exit confirmation order.” Indeed, San Bernardino has already acted on much of its plan—and now, Mayor Davis notes the city exiting from the longest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history is poised for growth in the wake of outsourcing fire services to the county and waste removal services to a private contractor, and reaching agreements with city employees, including police officers and retirees, to substantially reduce healthcare OPEB benefits to lessen pension reductions. Indeed, the city’s plan agreement on its $56 million in pension obligation bonds—and in significant part with CalPERS—meant its retirees fared better than the city’s municipal bondholders to whom San Bernardino committed to pay 40 percent of what they are owed—far more than its early offer of one percent. San Bernardino’s pension bondholders succeeded in wrangling a richer recovery than the city’s opening offer of one percent, but far less than CalPERS, which received a nearly 100 percent recovery. (San Bernardino did not make some $13 million in payments to CalPERS early in the chapter 9 process, but did set up payments to make the public employee pension fund whole; the city was aided in those efforts as we have previously noted after Judge Jury ruled against the argument made by pension bond attorneys two years ago. After the city’s pension bondholders entered into mediation again prior to exit confirmation, substantial agreement was achieved for th0se bondholders, no doubt beneficial at the end of last year to the city’s water department’s issuance of $68 million in water and sewer bonds at competitive interest rates in November and December—with the payments to come from the city’s water and sewer revenues, which were not included in the bankruptcy. The proceeds from these municipal bonds will meet critical needs to facilitate seismic upgrades to San Bernardino’s water reservoirs and funding for the first phase of the Clean Water Factor–Recycled Water Program.

Now, with some eager anticipation of Judge Jury’s final verdict, Assistant San Bernardino City Attorney Jolena Grider advised the Mayor and Council with regard to the requested contract extension: “If you don’t approve this, we have no city manager…We’re in the midst of getting out of bankruptcy. That just sends the wrong message to the bankruptcy court, to our creditors.” Ergo, the City Council voted 8-0, marking the first vote taken under the new city charter, which requires the Mayor to vote, to extend the departing Manager’s contract until March 7th, the day after the Council’s next meeting—and, likely the very same day Mr. Scott will return to Reno for a second interview, after beating out two others to reach the final round of interviews. Reno city officials assert they will make their selection on March 8th—and Mr. Scott will be one of four candidates.

For their part, San Bernardino Councilmembers Henry Nickel, Virginia Marquez, and John Valdivia reported they would not vote to extend Mr. Scott’s contract on a month-to-month basis, although they joined other Councilmembers in praising the city manager who commenced his service almost immediately after the December 2nd terrorist attack, and, of course, played a key role in steering the city through the maze to exit the nation’s longest ever municipal bankruptcy. Nevertheless, Councilmember Nickel noted: “Month-to-month may be more destabilizing than the alternative…Uncertainty is not a friend of investment and the business community, which is what our city needs now.” From his perspective, as hard and stressful as his time in San Bernardino had to be, Mr. Scott, in a radio interview while he was across the border in Reno, noted: “I’ve worked for 74 council members—I counted them one time on a plane…And I’ve liked 72 of them.”

Exit II. Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan says the Motor City is on track to exit Michigan state fiscal oversight by next year , in the wake of a third straight year of balancing its books, during his State of the City address: noting, “When Kevyn Orr (Gov. Rick Snyder’s appointed Emergency Manager who shepherded Detroit through the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history) departed, and we left bankruptcy in December 2014, a lot of people predicted Detroit would be right back in the same financial problems, that we couldn’t manage our own affairs, but instead we finished 2015 with the first balanced budget in 12 years, and we finished 2016 with the second, and this year we are going to finish with the third….I fully expect that by early 2018 we will be out from financial review commission oversight, because we would have made budget and paid our bills three years in a row.”

Nonetheless, the fiscal challenge remains steep: Detroit confronts stiff fiscal challenges, including an unexpected gap in public pensions, and the absence of a long-term economic plan. It faces disproportionate long-term borrowing costs because of its lingering low credit ratings—ratings of B2 and B from Moody’s Investors Service and S&P Global Ratings, respectively, albeit each assigns the city stable outlooks. Nevertheless, the Mayor is eyes forward: “If we want to fulfill the vision of a building a Detroit that includes everybody, we have to do a whole lot more.” By more, he went on, the city has work to do to bring back jobs, referencing his focus on a new job training program which will match citizens to training programs and then to jobs. (Detroit’s unemployment rate has dropped by nearly 50 percent from three years ago, but still is the highest of any Michigan city at just under 10 percent.) The Mayor expressed hope that the potential move of the NBA’s Detroit Pistons to the new Little Caesars Arena in downtown Detroit would create job opportunities for the city: “After the action of the Detroit city council in support of the first step of our next project very shortly, the Pistons will be hiring people from the city of Detroit.” The new arena, to be financed with municipal bonds, is set to open in September as home to the Detroit Red Wings hockey team, which will abandon the Joe Louis Arena on the Detroit riverfront, after the Detroit City Council this week voted to support plans for the Pistons’ move, albeit claiming the vote was not an endorsement of the complex deal involving millions in tax subsidies. Indeed, moving the NBA team will carry a price tag of $34 million to adapt the design of the nearly finished arena: the city has agreed to contribute toward the cost for the redesign which Mayor Duggan said will be funded through savings generated by the refinancing of $250 million of 2014 bonds issued by the Detroit Development Authority.

Mayor Duggan reiterated his commitment to stand with Detroit Public Schools Community District and its new school board President Iris Taylor against the threat of school closures. His statements came in the face of threats by the Michigan School Reform Office, which has identified 38 underperforming schools, the vast bulk of which (25) are in the city, stating: “We aren’t saying schools are where they need to be now…They need to be turned around, but we need 110,000 seats in quality schools and closing schools doesn’t add a single quality seat, all it does is bounce children around.” Mayor Duggan noted that Detroit also remains committed to its demolition program—a program which has, to date, razed some 11,000 abandoned homes, more than half the goal the city has set, in some part assisted by some $42 million in funds from the U.S Department of Treasury’s Hardest Hit Funds program for its blight removal program last October, the first installment of a new $130 million blight allocation for the city which was part of an appropriations bill Congress passed in December of 2015—but where a portion of that amount had been suspended by the Treasury for two months after a review found that internal controls needed improvement. Now, Major Duggan reports: “We have a team of state employees and land bank employees and a new process in place to get the program up and running and this time our goal isn’t only to be fast but to be in federal compliance too.” Of course, with a new Administration in office in Washington, D.C., James Thurber—were he still alive—might be warning the Mayor not to count any chickens before they’re hatched.

The Potential Consequences of a State Takeover of a Municipality

 

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eBlog, 2/03/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the long-term costs and consequences of state takeovers of a municipality, and of a broken state financial system.

The Fiscal Costs of Incompetence. Michigan taxpayers, including those in Flint, will be paying litigation and legal defense expenses for two former officials implicated in contributing to Flint’s lead-contaminated water crisis. Governor Rick Snyder’s Office confirmed that the Michigan Treasury Department will reimburse the city of Flint for legal and defense fees for former state-imposed Flint Emergency Managers Darnell Earley and Gerald Ambrose—officials appointed by the Governor who have now been charged by Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette with committing false pretenses and conspiracy to commit false pretenses, 20-year felonies. The duo also face a charge of misconduct in office, a five-year felony, and a one-year misdemeanor count of willful neglect of duty. Gov. Rick Snyder’s spokeswoman notes that state officials do not have any estimates on costs to state taxpayers for their defense—or if there is any ceiling with regard to what state taxpayers will be chipping in.

The Fiscal Costs of a Broken State Financial System. Dan Gilmartin, the Executive Director of the Michigan Municipal League, this week noted that “A lot of people feel as if we’ve turned the corner here in Michigan, you know, we’ve got more people employed, and the big three are doing better, and there’s some good things happening in the tourist economy and all kinds of different areas, so they think things are getting better…they might be getting better for state coffers; but they’re actually getting worse at the local level because of the system that we’re in right now.” Noting that, despite the state’s strong economic recovery, that recovery has not filtered down to its cities—which, in the wake of some $7 billion in state cuts to general revenue sharing since 2002—has left the state’s municipalities confronting an increasingly harder time to finance public infrastructure and public safety. The League’s report also recommends the state help cities come up with more modern health care plans which would allow them to control costs and stay competitive with other employers. Perhaps most intriguing, Mr. Gilmartin recommended that state aid for public infrastructure be allocated on a regional basis, rather than jurisdiction by jurisdiction. Finally, he urged the Michigan legislature to make up for the steep cuts made to revenue sharing in the last 15 years.

Exiting Receivership. The Michigan Department of Treasury has announced that the small municipality of Allen Park—a city of about 28,000 in Wayne County, where the annual per capita income is $27,000 and the estimated median assessed property value is $91,000, is no longer under receivership—meaning the city’s elected leaders have effectively had their authority to govern restored. The small city, which had also been charged in 2014 by the Securities and Exchange Commission with fraud, with the SEC charging public officials as “control persons,” came in the wake of a recommendation from members of the Allen Park Receivership Transition Advisory Board, which was state-appointed in 2014 in the wake of Gov. Rick Snyder’s announcement that the city’s 2012 financial emergency had been resolved after its structural and cumulative deficits had been eliminated. Gov. Snyder had imposed an Emergency Manager from March 2013 to September 2014, the same month in which the Michigan Receivership Transition Advisory Board was appointed. According to the Treasury, Allen Park “has made significant financial and operational progress,” including increasing its general fund balance; passing 10-year public safety and road millages; and saving $1.1 million by tendering 62 percent of Allen Park’s outstanding municipal bonds issued through the Michigan Finance Authority. In addition, the municipality made its required contributions into the pension and retiree healthcare systems, including an additional $500,000 annual payment toward other OPEB liabilities. Allen Park Mayor William Matakas responded: “On behalf of the city, I express my gratitude to the members of the Receivership Transition Advisory Board for their professionalism during Allen Park’s transition from emergency management to local control…I look forward to working with local and state officials to ensure we continue down a path of financial success.” Michigan Treasurer Nick Khouri, in the wake of the release of the municipality under Michigan’s Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, said Allen Park leaders are thus authorized to regain control and proceed with tasks such as approving ordinances, noting: “This is an important day for the residents of Allen Park, the city, and all who worked diligently to move the city back to fiscal stability…The cooperation of state and city officials to problem-solve complex debt issues now provides the community an opportunity to succeed independently. I am pleased to say that the city is released from receivership and look forward to working with our local partners in the future…The cooperation of state and city officials to problem-solve complex debt issues now provides the community an opportunity to succeed independently.” According to Mr. Khouri, since the state intervention, Allen Park has increased the city’s general fund balance in the wake of adopting a 10-year public safety millage and a 10-year road millage; in addition, the city completed a successful tendering of 62% of the outstanding municipal bonds issued via the Michigan Finance Authority used to fund a failed movie studio project for a savings of $1.1 million in 2015. An additional remarketing of the remaining amount was finalized in 2016, saving the city another $900,000. It makes one wonder whether New Jersey Governor Chris Christie might benefit from observing the constructive relationship between the state and Allen Park as a means to help an insolvent city regain its fiscal feet.

Governing Challenges of Federalism & Severe Fiscal Distress

eBlog, 1/20/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the deteriorating municipal fiscal conditions in Connecticut’s central cities, a new twist in New Jersey’s usurpation of municipal governance in Atlantic City, and the ongoing challenges in Puerto Rico where the PROMESA Board has provided new Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares additional time to submit a new fiscal plan—albeit a plan potentially complicated by a court ruling, as well as uncertainty with regard to potential changes in direction from Washington where, later this morning, a new Trump Administration takes the reins of power in Washington, D.C.  

Can Connecticut Help to Avert Municipal Bankruptcies? Gov. Daniel Malloy, in his State of the State address this month, stated he wanted to “ensure that no Connecticut city or town will need to explore the avoidable path of [municipal] bankruptcy,” indicating he would be working on an initiative involving statewide restructuring of local aid, especially for schools. His remarks seemed to parallel a new report, “Connecticut’s Broken Cities,” by Stephen Eide of the Manhattan Institute, in which he wrote: “State government is almost certainly going to have to get involved in the case of Hartford…Hartford may need a bailout to restore solvency.” However, the new report also examined the fiscal challenge of three other of the state’s central cities: Bridgeport, New Haven, and Waterbury—cities confronted by nearly $5 billion in OPEB and public pension obligations, estimating their combined annual OPEB liabilities at $120 million, and their unfunded pension liability to be $2.7 billion. The report paints a fiscal picture of municipalities which have the highest property taxes in the state—and the highest per capita municipal debt. Indeed, the rating agencies awarded Hartford two four-notch downgrades last year: Moody’s reduced the city’s rating to junk-level, putting it in the lowest one percent credit rating of all municipalities—even as it cited the city as at risk of further downgrades “over the medium term,” with its analysts noting that: “For the time being, Waterbury, and Bridgeport, and most likely also New Haven, can continue to muddle through without the need for extraordinary support from the state…[but] the same cannot be said for Hartford.” Hartford faces a $48 million gap on a $270 million budget, notwithstanding the steep budget cuts and layoffs the city undertook last year. The city appears to be on the wrong fiscal end of a teeter-totter: its reserves sagged 34% from FY2006 to FY2015; while its debt per capita escalated 78% over the same period, according to the report. Or, as Mayor Luke Bronin describes it: “The city used every trick up its sleeve to try to keep the lights on…I think all of those were mistakes, but in a big sense they’re a symptom of the problem, not the problem itself.” Gov. Malloy attributes the city’s property tax as the key fiscal contributor, whilst Mayor Bronin, the Governor’s former Chief Counsel, has pressed, as we have previously noted, for a regional solution—one that might, for instance, mirror some of the innovative fiscal, regional efforts in the St. Paul-Minneapolis and Denver metro areas. Mayor Bronin believes that a municipal fiscal partnership could include shared services or revising state formulas for education and health funding—a proposal that in some ways fits Connecticut Superior Court Judge Thomas Moukawsher’s order last fall directing the state to revise its state aid to education formula to better serve students in low-income municipalities—an order which Connecticut Attorney General George Jepsen is currently appealing. For his part, Gov. Malloy said a fairer distribution of Connecticut’s state aid to local governments could provide an important lifeline to avert chapter 9 bankruptcies—but that any such aid would mean the state would “play a more active role in helping less-affluent communities – in helping higher-taxed communities – part of that role will be holding local political leadership and stakeholders to substantially higher standards and greater accountability than they’ve been held to in the past: We should do it so that increased aid doesn’t simply mean more spending on local government.”

A Bridge to Local Experience. The New Jersey Department of Community Affairs has hired Atlantic City business administrator Jason Holt to assist in its state takeover of the distressed city, in this case adding a key individual who has worked under Mayor Donald Guardian for the last two years: Mr. Holt is charged with assisting the Department’s Division of Local Government Services in taking on the virtually insolvent city’s fiscal. He seems very well equipped, having served previously as Mayor Guardian’s solicitor, before serving as the city’s business administrator. Indeed, Mayor Guardian yesterday noted: “Over the past three years, Jason Holt has been an integral part of my team…When I originally selected him as my solicitor and then as my business administrator, I did so because of his extreme intellect and professionalism. Obviously, the State sees the same thing in Mr. Holt.” The transition is likely enhanced, because Mr. Holt has worked closely over the last two months with Local Government Services Director Tim Cunningham and Jeffrey Chiesa, the state’s designee in charge of Atlantic City financial matters. Department of Community Affairs spokesperson Lisa Ryan noted: “Mr. Holt’s hire by DLGS formalizes the work he has been doing in practice for the last two months…Mr. Holt will leave the City’s business administrator position, although the work he will do for DLGS will largely be the same as what he is doing now.” She added that Mr. Holt will continue working out of City Hall with his official first day with the DLGS set for next Monday. The state decision, however, has not been met with uniform approval: Assemblyman Chris Brown (R-Atlantic), who has been critical of the state for not producing its own fiscal recovery plan after rejecting the city’s, noted the lack of state transparency: “Without a transparent plan, even if they laid all the state’s experts end to end, they’d still never reach a solution.” In contrast, Mayor Don Guardian, who, in a statement said Mr. Holt has been an integral part of his team, added: “When I originally selected him as my solicitor, and then again as my business administrator, I did so because of his extreme intellect and professionalism. Obviously, the state sees the same thing in Mr. Holt…I look forward to working with him in his new capacity.” Indeed, Mr. Holt brings considerable experience, having previously served as corporation counsel for East Orange, Essex County, where, he provided legal counsel to both the Mayor and City Council, oversaw the complete spectrum of that city’s legal affairs, and played a key role in revamping its public-safety initiatives.

Is There Promise in PROMESA? Just as Puerto Rico enters its 12th year of economic depression, the PROMESA Oversight Board has informed new Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares that the Board is willing to grant additional time for the submission of a new fiscal plan—provided the Governor is willing to lay off public employees, reduce the pensions of thousands of retirees, make budget cuts for the University of Puerto Rico and Mi Salud, and extract an additional $1.5 billion from the pockets of corporations and individuals. In addition, the Board indicated it would be willing to extend the stay on litigation provided by PROMESA until May 1st, if Gov. Rosselló Nevares’s administration presents a plan to renegotiate Puerto Rico’ public debt. According to the calculations provided by the Board, this could mean an adjustment of $3 billion to the debt service, with the proposals gleaned from a 14-page letter, which appeared to be a warning to the new Governor that he must balance the budget in the next two fiscal years, and that the proposals for adjustments in public expenditures are “prerequisites” for the Board to certify any plan submitted. In response, Puerto Rico’s representative to the Board, Elías Sánchez Sifonte, immediately stated that Gov. Rosselló Nevares’s administration will seek to meet the Board’s conditions. He also assured that there are other mechanisms to balance the budget and close the fiscal gap—a gap the Oversight Board estimates at nearly $7.6 billion. In its letter, the Board advised the new Governor that his team could submit a new fiscal plan by the end of February, and that the document should be approved by March 15th—all subject to the Governor agreeing to balance the budget with a “one and done” approach, with “no discussion or consideration of short-term liquidity loans or near-term financings,” despite the contention by Gov. Rosselló Nevares and his team that such financing are a prerequisite in order to avoid a government shutdown. The stiff challenges, which the new Governor’s administration agreed were not so different from its own preliminary forecasts, were, nevertheless, perceived as “dramatic,” albeit key to avoid “the total collapse” of the government, blaming the previous Gov. Alejandro García Padilla’s administration’s “unwillingness to cooperate, [and] wasting time in presenting a fiscal plan that did not meet the requirements.”

The Board’s orders will affect not only Puerto Rico’s public employees, government pensioners, and foreign corporations and their tax liabilities, but also holders of Puerto Rican municipal bonds: those bondholders, in every state, could realize a reduction of as much as 80% of the annual payments that Puerto Rico must make—through different issuers—over the next two years. Sacrifices, it appears, will be widespread: the Board also proposed that Gov. Rosselló cut 23% in payroll expenses (about $900 million), which would imply a reduction in the number of public sector employees, an indicator that is already at a historical low; reduced public pensions by 10 percent—in a “progressive manner,” eliminated 100 percent of the subsidies to municipalities (about $400 million), which would be offset by a revision to property taxes, and higher payments by beneficiaries of Puerto Rico’s healthcare plan, all as part of Board recommendations that could, if implemented, save the U.S. territory as much as $1 billion. The Board added it believed the University of Puerto Rico could cut $300 million (27%) from its budget if it hiked tuitions. if it increased the amount of services among students and faculty members, raised the tuition to those who could afford it, and promoted the arrival of international and continental students to take courses in the institution.

The Board noted that to close Puerto Rico’s budget gap, Gov. Rosselló Nevares’s administration would have to meet with Puerto Rico’s municipal bondholders to make voluntary debt renegotiations through Title VI of PROMESA; albeit negotiations with the creditors would not necessarily take place in good terms: according to the numbers the Board released yesterday, the series of cutbacks and changes in the government would, on their own, be insufficient; ergo bondholders—including thousands of Puerto Rican individuals—will have to accept a cut in the debt service, which could amount to $3 billion.

But Here Come da Judge. Yet even as the PROMESA Board and the new Governor were seeking to come to terms with steps critical to fiscal recovery, the third branch of government stepped into the fiscal fray when U.S. District Judge Francisco Besosa handed a victory to holders of Puerto Rico Employment Retirement System (ERS) bonds, marking one of municipal bondholders’ first legal victories since Puerto Rico began defaulting on municipal bond interest payments about a year ago. Judge Besosa has ordered ERS to shift incoming employers’ contributions from its operating account to a segregated account at Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, directing that such funds remain in the segregated account until all parties agree on a different approach or the court orders the money to be moved out of the account. ERS had $3.1 billion in municipal bond debt outstanding as of July 2, 2016, according to the Puerto Rico government—none of it insured; all of it taxable. Normally, Puerto Rico government employers make employer contributions to support the payment of senior pension funding bonds; last year, as part of Puerto Rico’s emergency order 2016-31 in which it declared the ERS was in an emergency, the obligation of the ERS to transfer employer contributions to the bond trustee was suspended. Last November, Judge Besosa ruled against the plaintiffs in the case concerning the ERS bonds. Simultaneously, he had ruled against several other bondholder plaintiffs in other cases—leading some of the municipal bondholders to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit—which, last week, generally concurred with Judge Besosa’s opinion (see Peaje Investments, LLC v. Alejandro Garcia-Padilla et al, 4th U.S. Court of Appeals, #16-2431, January 11, 2017), affirming the continued stay on bondholder litigation stemming from the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act in several cases, albeit ordering Judge Besosa to hold a hearing for the arguments of the lead plaintiff, Altair Global Credit Opportunities Fund, and its co-plaintiffs, with the court writing: “We note that the Altair movants’ request for adequate protection here appears to be quite modest. They ask only that the employer contributions collected during the PROMESA stay be placed ‘in an account established for the benefit of movants.’ In light of ERS’s representation that it is not currently spending the funds, but instead simply holding them in an operating account, this solution seems to be a sensible one.” Thus, this week, Judge Besosa ordered such a segregated account to be set up and that all funds not transferred since the start of the PROMESA litigation stay be deposited in the account within five business days; Judge Besosa also ordered that in the future the ERS should transfer the employer contributions to the segregated account no later than the end of each month, noting that the segregated account will be “for the benefit of the holders of the ERS bonds,” adding, moreover, that said funds will simply sit in the account until a court orders otherwise, although he noted it would not preclude the ERS from transferring the employer contributions to the bond trustee for payment of the bonds, as would normally be the case.

Emerging from Municipal Bankruptcy: a Rough Ride

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eBlog, 1/04/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing challenges for the U.S. city emerging from the nation’s largest ever municipal bankruptcy, Detroit; then we veer into the warm Caribbean waters to observe the first days of the new administration of Gov. Ricardo Rosselló in Puerto Rico—where his new administration must adjust to coming to terms with its own PROMESA oversight board.

A New Detroit? The city emerging from the largest ever municipal bankruptcy is witnessing a string of major construction projects, from a massive hockey arena and street car line downtown to the resurrection of the Wayne County jail project: changes which will reshape the Motor City’s downtown in 2017—a level of activity and investment which seemed most improbable as the city shrunk and then dissolved into chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Today, the construction detours and closed sidewalks seem to offer a welcome sign of a new era for many who live and work near downtown. According to recent statistics, office vacancies in the downtown area are at their lowest point in a decade, and now the addition of the city’s new rail line could open demand in the New Center area, as well as increase demand for office space in neighborhoods near downtown such as Corktown and Eastern Market. Notwithstanding, the Detroit Financial Review Board, created as part of Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment to secure the U.S. bankruptcy court’s approval to exit bankruptcy, in its most recent oversight report, noted that the city continues to confront an unexpected gap in its public pension obligations and the absence of a long-term economic plan, reporting in its fourth annual report that could leave the city vulnerable to further fiscal challenges.(The next certification is due by October 1, 2017: under the plan of debt adjustment stipulations, the review board is charged with reviewing and approving annual four-year financial plans.) Both previous such plans have been approved. The most recent plan, submitted at the end of November, projects a general fund surplus of at least $41 million for FY2016, based on budget projections; Detroit expects to finish the current fiscal year with a general fund surplus of about $30 million. Nevertheless, the city faces a double-barreled fiscal challenge: its public pension liabilities and high costs of borrowing. Because its junk territory credit ratings from Moody’s and S&P, Detroit is forced it to pay disproportionately higher interest rates on its bonds.

With regard to its pension liabilities, where Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment approved by now retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes left intact public safety monthly checks, but imposed a 4.5% cut on general employees—and reduced or eliminated post-retirement (OPEB) benefits, as part of a mechanism to address some $1.8 billion in post-retirement obligations, the approved plan nevertheless suspended the COLa’s only until 2024—so a longer term liability of what was originally projected to be $111 million pends. (Indeed, the city’s pension agreement withstood a challenge last Fall when a federal appeals court ruled in favor of Detroit in a lawsuit by city retirees whose pensions were cut as part of the city’s approved plan of debt adjustment, after some retirees had sued, claiming they deserved the pension which was promised before the city filed for bankruptcy in 2013, with U.S. Judge Alice Batchelder of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals noting it was “not a close call.”)

But, as Shakespeare would put it: ‘There’s the rub.” Detroit’s actuaries, in their 2015 actuarial valuation reports, projected the liability in FY2024 and beyond to be nearly $200 million, based upon a thirty year amortization, with level principal payments and declining interest payments; however, as we have previously noted, those estimates were based upon optimistic estimates of assumed rates of return of 6.75 percent. In response, Detroit set aside $20 million from this year’s FY2016 fund balance, $10 million from its FY2016 budgeted contingency fund, and added an additional $10 million for each of the next three fiscal years—or, as Detroit Finance Director John Naglick told the Bond Buyer: “The city has six fiscal years to make an impact and close the gap on the [pension] underfunding. We don’t want to create such a cliff in 2024 where there is a big budget shock…The reality is to find those kind of monies over the next six fiscal years will cause some tradeoff in services.” Director Naglick added that last month Detroit completed an updated decade-long plan to update its approved plan of debt adjustment, adding: “The 10-year model will show the FRC that this incremental funding can be folded into the budget, but we aren’t naïve, it will also create some disruption in services to accommodate that…Think of it as a master plan on how we are going to make this stable.” Nevertheless, Mr. Naglick’s challenge will be hard: Moody’s last summer warned that the city’s “very weak economic profile” makes it susceptible to future downturns and population loss—threatening its ability “to meet its requirement to resume pension funding obligations in fiscal 2024.” Detroit’s next deadline looms: The City must submit its FY18-FY21 Four-Year Financial Plan to the Financial Review Commission by the statutory deadline of March 23rd.

Puerto Rico: A New Chapter? The new Governor of Puerto Rico, Ricardo Rosselló, yesterday, in the wake of his swearing in, acted straightaway on his first day in office to cut government spending and revenues, amid greater urgency to take steps to avoid a massive out-migration and end ten years of economic recession, and increase efforts to stem vital population losses which in 2013 alone witnessed some 74,000 Puerto Ricans leave the island. The new governor has already signed five executive orders, cutting annual agency spending by 20 percent, encouraging asset privatization, and proposing a zero based budgeting standard. Efforts like these, if actually implemented (a crippling risk in the context of historical Puerto Rico governance), could represent strides towards achieving fiscal solvency and help lay the groundwork for economic recovery. Governor Rosselló directed his agency heads to implement zero-based budgeting, under which agency heads start with a $0 and only adds to it when they can provide a justification for particular programs. Gov. Rosselló also created a Federal Opportunity Center attached to the governor’s office. The center will provide technical and compliance assistance to the office to make programs eligible for federal funds. For the new Governor, the three keys to recovery appear to be: how to revive the economy, fix the territory’s fiscal situation, and address the public debt.

The key, many believe, would be to opt for Title VI of the new PROMESA law, the voluntary restructuring portion. A growing concern is to create job opportunities—with one leader noting: “Many will leave if they cannot find jobs to search off the island for a better quality of life: our cities have to be habitable and safe…it has to be a place where the world wants to come to live…” Governor Rosselló also signed six executive orders, directing his department heads to cut 10 percent in spending from the current budget and to reduce the allocations for professional services by a similar amount—with even deeper cuts in other hiring; he imposed a freeze on new hires, noting: “We do not come to merely administer an archaic and ineffective scaffolding: Ours will be a transformational government.” Nevertheless, his task could be frustrated by the Puerto Rico House, where, yesterday, El Vocero reported that Puerto Rico House of Representatives President Carlos Méndez Núñez had told the newspaper last weekend that the legislature would cut Puerto Rico’s sales and use tax rate and the oil tax rate, reversing steps by the prior governor and legislature over the last four years. Governor Rosselló also pledged to work with the PROMESA Oversight Board in a collaborative way, as he departed the island to meet with members of the new Congress in Washington, D.C., where he planned to lobby for statehood for the U.S. territory.

With new administrations in San Juan and Washington, Gov. Rosselló will also have to work out a relationship with the PROMESA board, as the absence of cash to pay debt service, combined with the current payment moratoriums and federal stay on bondholder litigation appear destined to be extended deep into the year, albeit some anticipate that under the incoming Trump administration, one which will have much closer ties to creditor groups than the outgoing Obama administration, could lead to efforts to restart formal bondholder negotiations—negotiations which could become a vehicle by means of which creditors would increase their investment in Puerto Rico risks, by means of new loans and/or partial restructuring of liabilities in ex-change for a settlement which would be intended to improve long term municipal bond-holder recoveries and, most critically, work to enhance the price evaluations of Puerto Rico’s general obligation municipal bonds. Nevertheless, the territory’s structural, long-term budget deficit of nearly $70 billion over the next decade risks crowding out any medium-term payment of debt service absent serious spending reform as well as public pension reform—especially because of the ongoing outflow of young persons seeking better economic opportunities on the mainland.