Fiscal & Public Service Insolvency

eBlog, 03/03/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing challenges for the historic municipality of Petersburg, Virginia as it seeks to depart from insolvency; we consider, anew, the issues related to “service insolvency,” especially assisted by the exceptional insights of Marc Pfeiffer at Rutgers, then turning to the new fiscal plan by the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority, before racing back to Virginia for a swing on insolvent links. For readers who missed it, we commend the eBlog earlier this week in which we admired the recent wisdom on fiscal disparities by the ever remarkable Bo Zhao of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston with regard to municipal fiscal disparities.

Selling One’s City. Petersburg, Virginia, the small, historic, and basically insolvent municipality under quasi state control is now trying to get hundreds of properties owned by the city off the books and back on the tax rolls as part of its effort to help resolve its fiscal and trust insolvency. As Michelle Peters, Economic Development Director for Petersburg, notes: “The city owns over 200 properties, but today we had a showcase to feature about 25 properties that we group together based on location, and these properties are already zoned appropriate for commercial development.” Thus the municipality is not only looking to raise revenues from the sale, but also to realize revenues through the conversion of these empty properties into thriving businesses—or as Ms. Peters puts it: “It’s to get the properties back on the tax rolls for the city, because, currently, the city owns them so they are just vacant, there are no taxes being collected,” much less jobs being filled. Ms. Peters notes that while some of the buildings do need work, like an old hotel on Tabb Street, the city stands ready to offer a great deal on great property, and it is ready to make a deal and has incentives to offer:  “We’re ready to sit down at the table and to negotiate, strike a deal and get those properties developed.”

New Jersey & Its Taken-over City. The $72 million tax settlement between Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa and Atlantic City’s state overseers is a “major step forward” in fixing the city’s finances, according to Moody’s Investors Service, which deemed the arrangement as one that has cleared “one of the biggest outstanding items of concern” in the municipality burdened by hundreds of millions of dollars in debt and under state control. Atlantic City owed Borgata $165 million in tax refunds after years of successful tax appeals by the casino, according to the state. The settlement is projected to save the city $93 million in potential debt—savings which amount to a 22 percent reduction of the city’s $424 million total debt, according to Moody’s, albeit, as Moody’s noted: “[W]hile it does not solve the city’s problems, the settlement makes addressing those problems considerably more likely.” The city will bond for the $72 million through New Jersey’s state Municipal Qualified Bond Act, making it a double whammy: because the bonds will be issued via the state MQBA, they will carry an A3 rating, ergo at a much better rate than under the city’s Caa3 junk bond status. Nevertheless, according to the characteristically moody Moody’s, Atlantic City’s finances remain in a “perilous state,” with the credit rating agency citing low cash flow and an economy still heavily dependent upon gambling.

Fiscal & Public Service Insolvency. One of my most admired colleagues in the arena of municipal fiscal distress, Marc Pfeiffer, Senior Policy Fellow and Assistant Director of the Bloustein Local Government Research Center in New Jersey, notes that a new twist on the legal concept of municipal insolvency could change how some financially troubled local governments seek permission to file for federal bankruptcy protection. Writing that municipal insolvency traditionally means a city, county, or other government cannot pay its bills, and can lead in rare instances to a Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing or some other remedy authorized by the state that is not as drastic as a Chapter 9, he notes that, in recent years, the description of “insolvency” has expanded beyond a simple cash shortage to include “service-delivery insolvency,” meaning a municipality is facing a crisis in managing police, fire, ambulance, trash, sewer and other essential safety and health services, adding that service insolvency contributed to Stockton, California, and Detroit filings for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection in 2012 and 2013, respectively: “Neither city could pay its unsustainable debts, but officials’ failure to curb violent crime, spreading blight and decaying infrastructure was even more compelling to the federal bankruptcy judges who decided that Stockton and Detroit were eligible to file for Chapter 9.”

In fact, in meeting with Kevyn Orr, the emergency manager appointed by Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, at his first meeting in Detroit, Mr. Orr recounted to me that his very first actions had been to email every employee of the city to ensure they reported to work that morning, noting the critical responsibility to ensure that street lights and traffic lights, as well as other essential public services operated. He wanted to ensure there would be no disruption of such essential services—a concern clearly shared by the eventual overseer of the city’s historic chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, now retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes, who, in his decision affirming the city’s plan of debt adjustment, had written: “It is the city’s service delivery insolvency that the court finds most strikingly disturbing in this case…It is inhumane and intolerable, and it must be fixed.” Similarly, his colleague, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Christopher Klein, who presided over Stockton’s chapter 9 trial in California, had noted that without the “muscle” of municipal bankruptcy protection, “It is apparent to me the city would not be able to perform its obligations to its citizens on fundamental public safety as well as other basic public services.” Indeed, in an interview, Judge Rhodes said that while Detroit officials had provided ample evidence of cash and budget insolvency, “the concept of service delivery insolvency put a more understanding face on what otherwise was just plain numbers.” It then became clear, he said, that the only solution for Detroit—as well as any insolvent municipality—was “fresh money,” including hundreds of millions of dollars contributed by the state, city, and private foundations: “It is a rare insolvency situation—corporate or municipal—that can be fixed just by a change in management.”

Thus, Mr. Pfeiffer writes that “Demonstrating that services are dysfunctional could strengthen a local government’s ability to convince a [federal bankruptcy] judge that the city is eligible for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy protection (provided, of course, said municipality is in one the eighteen states which authorize such filings). Or, as Genevieve Nolan, a vice president and senior analyst at Moody’s Investors Service, notes: “With their cases focusing on not just a government’s ability to pay its debts, but also an ability to provide basic services to residents, Stockton and Detroit opened a path for future municipal bankruptcies.”

Mr. Pfeiffer notes that East Cleveland, Ohio, was the first city to invoke service insolvency after Detroit. In its so far patently unsuccessful efforts to obtain authority from the State of Ohio to file for municipal bankruptcy protection—in a city, where, as we have noted on numerous occasions, the city has demonstrated a fiscal inability to sustain basic police, fire, EMS, or trash services. East Cleveland had an approved plan to balance its budget, but then-Mayor Gary Norton told the state the proposed cuts “[would] have the effect of decimating our safety forces.” Ohio state officials initially rejected the municipality’s request for permission to file for municipal bankruptcy, because the request came from the mayor instead of the city council; the city’s status has been frozen since then.

Mr. Pfeiffer then writes:

Of concern.  [Municipal] Bankruptcy was historically seen as the worst case scenario with severe penalties – in theory the threat of it would prevent local officials from doing irresponsible things. [Indeed, when I first began my redoubtable quest with the Dean of chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy Jim Spiotto, while at the National League of Cities, the very idea that the nation’s largest organization representing elected municipal leaders would advocate for amending federal laws so that cities, counties, and other municipal districts could file for such protection drew approbation, to say the least.] Local officials are subject to such political pressures that there needs to be a societal “worst case” that needs to be avoided.  It’s not like a business bankruptcy where assets get sold and equity holders lose investment.  We are dealing with public assets and the public, though charged with for electing responsible representatives, who or which can’t be held fully responsible for what may be foolish, inept, corrupt, or criminal actions by their officials. Thus municipal bankruptcy, rather than dissolution, was a worst case scenario whose impact needed to be avoided at all costs. Lacking a worst case scenario with real meaning, officials may be more prone to take fiscal or political risks if they think the penalty is not that harsh. The current commercial practice of a structured bankruptcy, which is commonly used (and effectively used in Detroit and eventually in San Bernardino and other places) could become common place. If insolvency were extended to “service delivery,” and if it becomes relatively painless, decision-making/political risk is lowered, and political officials can take greater risks with less regard to the consequences. In my view, the impact of bankruptcy needs to be so onerous that elected officials will strive to avoid it and avoid decisions that may look good for short-term but have negative impact in the medium to long-term and could lead to serious consequences. State leaders also need to protect their citizens with controls and oversight to prevent outliers from taking place, and stepping in when signs of fiscal weakness appear.”

Self-Determination. Puerto Rico Gov. Ricardo Rosselló has submitted a 10-year fiscal plan to the PROMESA Oversight Board which would allow for annual debt payments of about 18% to 41% of debt due—a plan which anticipates sufficient cash flow in FY2018 to pay 17.6% of the government’s debt service. In the subsequent eight years, under the plan, the government would pay between 30% and 41% per year. The plan, according to the Governor, is based upon strategic fiscal imperatives, including restoring credibility with all stakeholders through transparent, supportable financial information and honoring the U.S. territory’s obligations in accordance with the Constitution of Puerto Rico; reducing the complexity and inefficiency of government to deliver essential services in a cost-effective manner; implementing reforms to improve Puerto Rico’s competitiveness and reduce the cost of doing business; ensuring that economic development processes are effective and aligned to incentivize the necessary investments to promote economic growth and job creation; protecting the most vulnerable segments of our society and transforming our public pensions system; and consensually renegotiating and restructuring debt obligations through Title VI of PROMESA. The plan he proposed, marvelously on the 100th anniversary of the Jones-Shafroth Act making Puerto Rico a U.S. territory, also proposes monitoring liquidity and managing anticipated shortfalls in current forecast, and achieving fiscal balance by 2019 and maintaining fiscal stability with balanced budgets thereafter (through 2027 and beyond). The Governor notes the Fiscal Plan is intended to achieve its objectives through fiscal reform measures, strategic reform initiatives, and financial control reforms, including fiscal reform measures that would reduce Puerto Rico’s decade-long financing gap by $33.3 billion through:

  • revenue enhancements achieved via tax reform and compliance enhancement strategies;
  • government right-sizing and subsidy reductions;
  • more efficient delivery of healthcare services;
  • public pension reform;
  • structural reform initiatives intended to provide the tools to significantly increase Puerto Rico’s capacity to grow its economy;
  • improving ease of business activity;
  • capital efficiency;
  • energy [utility] reform;
  • financial control reforms focused on enhanced transparency, controls, and accountability of budgeting, procurement, and disbursement processes.

The new Fiscal Plan marks an effort to achieve fiscal solvency and long-term economic growth and to comply with the 14 statutory requirements established by Congress’ PROMESA legislation, as well as the five principles established by the PROMESA Oversight Board, and intended to sets a fiscal path to making available to the public and creditor constituents financial information which has been long overdue, noting that upon the Oversight Board’s certification of those fiscal plans it deems to be compliant with PROMESA, the Puerto Rico government and its advisors will promptly convene meetings with organized bondholder groups, insurers, union, local interest business groups, public advocacy groups and municipality representative leaders to discuss and answer all pertinent questions concerning the fiscal plan and to provide additional and necessary momentum as appropriate, noting the intention and preference of the government is to conduct “good-faith” negotiations with creditors to achieve restructuring “voluntary agreements” in the manner and method provided for under the provisions of Title VI of PROMESA.

Related to the service insolvency issues we discussed [above] this early, snowy a.m., Gov. Rosselló added that these figures are for government debt proper—not the debt of issuers of the public corporations (excepting the Highways and Transportation Authority), Puerto Rico’s 88 municipalities, or the territory’s handful of other semi-autonomous authorities, and that its provisions do not count on Congress to restore Affordable Care Act funding. Rather, Gov. Rosselló said he plans to determine the amount of debt the Commonwealth will pay by first determining the sums needed for (related to what Mr. Pfeiffer raised above] “essential services and contingency reserves.” The Governor noted that Puerto Rico’s debt burden will be based on net cash available, and that, if possible, he hopes to be able to use a consensual process under Title VI of PROMESA to decide on the new debt service schedules. [PROMESA requires the creation of certified five-year fiscal plan which would provide a balanced budget to the Commonwealth, restore access to the capital markets, fund essential public services, and pensions, and achieve a sustainable debt burden—all provisions which the board could accept, modify, or completely redo.]  

Adrift on the Fiscal Links? While this a.m.’s snow flurries likely precludes a golf outing, ACA Financial Guaranty Corp., a municipal bond insurer, appears ready to take a mighty swing for a birdie, as it is pressing for payback on the defaulted debt which was critical to the financing of Buena Vista, Virginia’s unprofitable municipal golf course, this time teeing the proverbial ball up in federal court. Buena Vista, a municipality nestled near the iconic Blue Ridge of some 2,547 households, and where the median income for a household in the city is in the range of $32,410, and the median income for a family was $39,449—and where only about 8.2 percent of families were below the poverty line, including 14.3 percent of those under age 18 and 10 percent of those age 65 or over. Teeing the fiscal issue up is the municipal debt arising from the issuance by the city and its Public Recreational Facilities Authority of some $9.2 million of lease-revenue municipal bonds insured by ACA twelve years ago—debt upon which the municipality had offered City Hall, police and court facilities, as well as its municipal championship golf course as collateral for the debt—that is, in this duffer’s case, municipal debt which the municipality’s leaders voted to stop repaying, as we have previously noted, in late 2015. Ergo, ACA is taking another swing at the city: it is seeking:

  • the appointment of a receiver appointed for the municipal facilities,
  • immediate payment of the debt, and
  • $525,000 in damages in a new in the U.S. District Court for Western Virginia,

Claiming the municipality “fraudulently induced” ACA to enter into the transaction by representing that the city had authority to enter the contracts. In response, the municipality’s attorney reports that Buena Vista city officials are still open to settlement negotiations, and are more than willing to negotiate—but that ACA has refused its offers. In a case where there appear to have been any number of mulligans, since it was first driven last June, teed off, as it were, in Buena Vista Circuit Court, where ACA sought a declaratory judgment against the Buena Vista and the Public Recreational Facilities Authority, seeking judicial determination with regard to the validity of its agreement with Buena Vista, including municipal bond documents detailing any legal authority to foreclose on city hall, the police department, and/or the municipal golf course. The trajectory of the course of the litigation, however, has not been down the center of the fairway: the lower court case took a severe hook into the fiscal rough when court documents filed by the city contended that the underlying municipal bond deal was void, because only four of the Buena Vista’s seven City Council members voted on the bond resolution, not to mention related agreements which included selling the city’s interest in its “public places.” Moreover, pulling out a driver, Buena Vista, in its filing, wrote that Virginia’s constitution filing, requires all seven council members to be present to vote on a matter which involved backing the golf course’s municipal bonds with an interest in facilities owned by the municipality. That drive indeed appeared to earn a birdie, as ACA then withdrew its state suit; however, it then filed in federal court, where, according to its attorney, it is not seeking to foreclose on Buena Vista’s municipal facilities; rather, in its new federal lawsuit, ACA avers that the tainted vote supposedly invalidating the municipality’s deed of trust supporting the municipal bonds and collateral does not make sense, maintaining in its filing that Buena Vista’s elected leaders had adopted a bond resolution and made representations in the deed, the lease, the forbearance agreement, and in legal opinions which supported the validity of the Council’s actions, writing: “Fundamental principles of equity, waiver, estoppel, and good conscience will not allow the city–after receiving the benefits of the [municipal] bonds and its related transactions–to now disavow the validity of the same city deed of trust that it and its counsel repeatedly acknowledged in writing to be fully valid, binding and enforceable.” Thus, the suit requests a judgment against Buena Vista, declaring the financing documents to be valid, appointing a receiver, and an order granting ACA the right to foreclose on the Buena Vista’s government complex in addition to compensatory damages, with a number of the counts seeking rulings determining that Buena Vista and the authority breached deed and forbearance agreements, in addition to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, requiring immediate payback on the outstanding bonds, writing: “Defendants’ false statements and omissions were made recklessly and constituted willful and wanton disregard.” In addition to compensatory damages and pre-and post-judgment interest, ACA has asked the U.S. court to order that Buena Vista pay all of its costs and attorneys’ fees; it is also seeking an order compelling the city to move its courthouse to other facilities and make improvements at the existing courthouse, including bringing it up to standards required by the ADA.

Like a severe hook, the city’s municipal public course appears to have been errant from the get-go: it has never turned a profit for Buena Vista; rather it has required general fund subsidies totaling $5.6 million since opening, according to the city’s CAFR. Worse, Buena Vista notes that the taxpayer subsidies have taken a toll on its budget concurrent with the ravages created by the great recession: in 2010, Buena Vista entered a five-year forbearance agreement in which ACA agreed to make bond payments for five years; however, three years ago, the city council voted in its budget not to appropriate the funds to resume payment on the debt, marking the first default on the municipal golf course bond, per material event notices posted on the MSRB’s EMMA.

Challenges in Rebounding from Insolvency or Municipal Bankruptcy

eBlog, 02/27/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider new development plans for the insolvent, state-taken over Atlantic City, before turning to the post-chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy electoral challenges in Detroit—where the son of a former Mayor is challenging the current Mayor—and where the post-bankrupt city is seeking to confront its exceptional public pension obligations in a city with an upside down population imbalance of retirees to taxpayers.

Spinning the Fiscal Turnstile in Atlantic City? Since New Jersey’s Casino Reinvestment Development Authority (CRDA) developed its Tourism District master plan for Atlantic City five years ago, five casino have closed—casinos with assessed values of $11 billion. Those closures appeared to be the key fiscal destabilizers which plunged the city into near municipal bankruptcy and a state takeover. Now the Authority, which handles redevelopment projects and zoning in the Tourism District (The rest of Atlantic City is under the city’s zoning jurisdiction—albeit a city today taken over by the state, and where the Development Authority was given authority by the state over the Tourism District in 2011) has approved spending $2 million for refurbishing. Robert Mulcahy, the Chairman of the authority’s board of directors, states: “The master plan is done to streamline zoning, help eliminate red tape, encourage proper development in the appropriate district, and stimulate investment in commercial, entertainment, housing, and mixed-use properties…This provides a vision to what we want to do.” The proposed land-use regulations’ twenty-five objectives include providing a zoning scheme to stimulate development and maintain public confidence in the casino gaming industry as a unique tool of the city’s urban redevelopment. The new zones would allow for mixed use near the waterfront, and retail development around the Atlantic City Expressway and its waterfront under the state agency blueprint intended to make it easier for companies to turn old industrial buildings into commercial and waterfront areas, to build amusement rides off the Boardwalk, maybe even incentivize craft brewers and distillers to open businesses.  

CRDA Director Lance Landgraf noted: “The city last changed the zoning along the Boardwalk when casinos came in.” Similarly, Atlantic City Mayor Don Guardian, who is a CRDA board member, noted: “If we talked 10 years ago about the Southeast Inlet, I think most people saw it as a Miami Beach with a bunch of high-rises that would go from Revel to Brigantine Inlet…Times have changed. People are now looking for mixed-use type of things, which is certainly what is important.” According to the proposed plan, the new tourism district would be intended to maximize recreational and entertainment opportunities, including the growing craft beer trend. Smaller breweries and distilleries have expressed interest in operating in the city, according to the draft plan, which notes it “seeks to reinvigorate the Atlantic City experience by enhancing the Boardwalk, beach and nearby streets through extensive entertainment and event programming; creating an improved street-level experience on major thoroughfares; offering new and dynamic retail offerings and increasing cleanliness and safety.”

Post Chapter 9 Leadership.  Coleman Young II, a state Senator in Michigan representing Detroit, sitting beneath a photograph of his late father and former Detroit Mayor Coleman Young, has officially launched his challenge against current Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan, claiming the Motor City needs a leader who focuses on helping residents who are struggling with unemployment and other hardships, and criticizing Mayor Duggan for what he called a lack of attention to Detroit’s neighborhoods, noting: “We need change, and that is why I am running for mayor: I will do whatever it takes—blood, sweat, tears, and toil—and I will fight to the very end to make sure that justice is done for the City of Detroit…In announcing his challenge, Sen. Young recalled his father’s focus on jobs when he served as Detroit’s first black mayor: “I want to put people back to work just like my father, the honorable Coleman Alexander Young did…He is turning over in his grave right now!”

Interestingly, Sen. Young’s challenge came just days after last week’s formal State of the City address by Mayor Duggan—an address in which he focused on putting Detroiters to work and investing in neighborhoods—announcing a new city program, Detroit at Work, which is focused on training Detroit residents for available jobs—a speech which candidate Young, in his speech, deemed a “joke,” stating: “I think it’s kind of funny he waits for four years and now starts talking about the neighborhoods…As far as I’m concerned, he’s just somebody that’s in the way and needs to go. It’s time for change. It’s time for reform.” (Detroit’s primary will be in August; the election is Nov. 7th.)

Rebound? Whomever is elected next November in Detroit will confront lingering challenges from Detroit’s largest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history. That July 19th filing in 2013, which then Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr described  as “the Olympics of restructuring,” had been critical to ensuring continuity of essential services and critical to rebuilding an economy for the city—an economy besieged after decades of population decline (dropping from 1,849,568 in 1951 to 713,777 by 2010), leaving the city to confront an estimated 40,000 abandoned lots and structures and the loss of 67 percent of its business establishments and 80 percent of its manufacturing base. The city had spent $100 million more, on average, than its revenues since 2008. According to the census, 36 percent of its citizens were below the poverty level, and, the year prior to the city’s bankruptcy filing, Detroit reported the highest violent crime rate for any U.S. city with a population over 200,000. Thus, as the city’s first post-bankruptcy Mayor, Mayor Duggan has faced a city with vast abandoned properties.

Interestingly, Steve Tobocman, the Director of Global Detroit, an economic-development nonprofit which focuses on maximizing the potential of immigrants and the international community, said that enacting municipal policies which welcome foreign-born residents could be a critical strategy to reverse the population loss: “No American city has been able to rebound from population loss without getting serious about immigration growth…In 1980, 29 of the 50 largest cities lost population. Most of the cities that lost population have since reversed course due to an influx of immigrants. No American city has been able to rebound from population loss without getting serious about immigration growth.” Now that avenue could be closing with President Trump’s efforts to curtail immigration, especially from Mexico and the Middle East, leading Mr. Tobocman to note he had no reason to anticipate any help from Washington, D.C. in helping rebuild Detroit’s population, or energizing its economy, with immigrants. Rather, he warns, he is apprehensive that other policy promises, particularly the proposed border wall with Mexico, actively threaten Michigan’s economy: “Mexico is our second-largest trading partner after Canada…Metro Detroit is the largest metro area trading with Mexico. One hundred thousand jobs are supported by our trade with Mexico.”

Upside Down Fiscal Challenge. A key challenge to Detroit, because of the inverted fiscal pyramid creating by its population decline, is there are far fewer paying into to Detroit’s public pension system, against far more receiving post-retirement pensions, sort of an upside down fiscal dilemma—and one which, increasingly, confronts the city’s fiscal future. Now Mayor (and Candidate) Duggan has announced a plan he believes will help Detroit to city meet its 2024 balloon payment on its public pension obligation, or, as Detroit Chief Financial Officer John Hill puts it, a plan designed to be more than adequate to address the looming future payment of more than $100 million owed beginning in 2024: “What the mayor is proposing is that we take money now and put into a pension protection fund and then use that money in 2024 and beyond to help make some of those payments: So part of the money would come from the budget, and the other would come from the fund,” describing the provisions in Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment for down payments to the city’s pension obligation in Mayor Duggan’s $1 billion general fund budget for the 2017-18 fiscal year the Mayor presented to the Detroit City Council at the end of last week. Mr. Hill said that the payment plan would give the city budget longer to catch up to the $132 million it would have to pay going forward, describing it as “really a way for us to proactively address the future pension obligation payment and not wait to deal with it down the road.”

However, there appears to be a fiscal fly in the ointment: last year, in his 2016 State of the City speech, Mayor Duggan said that consultants who advised the city through its chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy had miscalculated the city’s pension deficit by $490 million—actuarial estimates at the time which projected a payment of $111 million in 2024—a figure subsequently increased by the actuary to $194.4 million—leading Mayor Duggan to assert that the payment had been “concealed” from him by former Detroit emergency manager Kevyn Orr during the city’s bankruptcy, with, according to the Mayor, Mr. Orr’s team using overly optimistic assumptions which made Detroit’s future pension payout obligations appear artificially low. The revised estimates have since forced the city to address the large future payment, beginning in FY2016, when the city set aside $20 million and another $10 million to start its pension trust fund, with the payment coming in addition to the $20 million contribution to the legacy plans the city is mandated to make under Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment. Now Mayor Duggan is proposing Detroit set aside an additional $50 million from a general fund surplus and another $10 million into the trust fund this year: the city projects it will have $90 million in the trust at the end of FY2017. In the following fiscal years, the city is proposing to add another $15 million to the fund, $20 million in FY2019, $45 million in FY2020, $50 million in FY2021, $55 million in FY2022, and $60 million for FY2023. Or, as Detroit Finance Director John Naglick describes it: “All total, we propose that the City would deposit $335 million into the trust fund through the end of FY23, with interest, the fund is projected to grow to $377 million.” Mr. Naglick adds that Detroit expects that the general fund would be required to contribute a total of $143.2 million beginning in FY2024: “We propose to make that payment by pulling $78.5 million out of the trust and appropriating $64.7 million from the general fund that year.” CFO Hill noted that by addressing the 2024 obligation payment with the plan, Detroit would remain on track to exit state oversight as projected, stating: “We believe that after we have executed three balanced budgets and met a number of other requirements that the Detroit Review Commission could vote to waive their oversight…We believe that one of the factors that they are going to want to see to support that waiver is that we have proactively dealt with the pension obligations in 2024.” There could, however, be a flaw in the ointment: Mayor Duggan warned last week that Detroit may decide to sue Mr. Orr’s law firm, Jones Day, if the city finds that Mr. Orr had an obligation to keep the city informed on the pension payments.

The Roads out of Municipal Bankruptcy

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eBlog, 2/24/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the post-chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy trajectories of the nation’s longest (San Bernardino) and largest (Detroit) municipal bankruptcies.

Exit I. So Long, Farewell…San Bernardino City Manager Mark Scott was given a two-week extension to his expired contract this week—on the very same day the Reno, Nevada City Council selected him as one of two finalists to be Reno’s City Manager—with the extension granted just a little over the turbulent year Mr. Scott had devoted to working with the Mayor, Council, and attorneys to complete and submit to U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury San Bernardino’s proposed plan of debt adjustment—with the city, at the end of January, in the wake of San Bernardino’s “final, final” confirmation hearing, where the city gained authority to issue water and sewer revenue bonds prior to this month’s final bankruptcy confirmation hearing—or, as Urban Futures Chief Executive Officer Michael Busch, whose firm provided the city with financial guidance throughout the four-plus years of bankruptcy, put it: “It has been a lot of work, and the city has made a lot of tough decisions, but I think some of the things the city has done will become best practices for cities in distress.” Judge Jury is expected to make few changes from the redline suggestions made to her preliminary ruling by San Bernardino in its filing at the end of January—marking, as Mayor Carey Davis noted: a “milestone…After today, we have approval of the bankruptcy exit confirmation order.” Indeed, San Bernardino has already acted on much of its plan—and now, Mayor Davis notes the city exiting from the longest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history is poised for growth in the wake of outsourcing fire services to the county and waste removal services to a private contractor, and reaching agreements with city employees, including police officers and retirees, to substantially reduce healthcare OPEB benefits to lessen pension reductions. Indeed, the city’s plan agreement on its $56 million in pension obligation bonds—and in significant part with CalPERS—meant its retirees fared better than the city’s municipal bondholders to whom San Bernardino committed to pay 40 percent of what they are owed—far more than its early offer of one percent. San Bernardino’s pension bondholders succeeded in wrangling a richer recovery than the city’s opening offer of one percent, but far less than CalPERS, which received a nearly 100 percent recovery. (San Bernardino did not make some $13 million in payments to CalPERS early in the chapter 9 process, but did set up payments to make the public employee pension fund whole; the city was aided in those efforts as we have previously noted after Judge Jury ruled against the argument made by pension bond attorneys two years ago. After the city’s pension bondholders entered into mediation again prior to exit confirmation, substantial agreement was achieved for th0se bondholders, no doubt beneficial at the end of last year to the city’s water department’s issuance of $68 million in water and sewer bonds at competitive interest rates in November and December—with the payments to come from the city’s water and sewer revenues, which were not included in the bankruptcy. The proceeds from these municipal bonds will meet critical needs to facilitate seismic upgrades to San Bernardino’s water reservoirs and funding for the first phase of the Clean Water Factor–Recycled Water Program.

Now, with some eager anticipation of Judge Jury’s final verdict, Assistant San Bernardino City Attorney Jolena Grider advised the Mayor and Council with regard to the requested contract extension: “If you don’t approve this, we have no city manager…We’re in the midst of getting out of bankruptcy. That just sends the wrong message to the bankruptcy court, to our creditors.” Ergo, the City Council voted 8-0, marking the first vote taken under the new city charter, which requires the Mayor to vote, to extend the departing Manager’s contract until March 7th, the day after the Council’s next meeting—and, likely the very same day Mr. Scott will return to Reno for a second interview, after beating out two others to reach the final round of interviews. Reno city officials assert they will make their selection on March 8th—and Mr. Scott will be one of four candidates.

For their part, San Bernardino Councilmembers Henry Nickel, Virginia Marquez, and John Valdivia reported they would not vote to extend Mr. Scott’s contract on a month-to-month basis, although they joined other Councilmembers in praising the city manager who commenced his service almost immediately after the December 2nd terrorist attack, and, of course, played a key role in steering the city through the maze to exit the nation’s longest ever municipal bankruptcy. Nevertheless, Councilmember Nickel noted: “Month-to-month may be more destabilizing than the alternative…Uncertainty is not a friend of investment and the business community, which is what our city needs now.” From his perspective, as hard and stressful as his time in San Bernardino had to be, Mr. Scott, in a radio interview while he was across the border in Reno, noted: “I’ve worked for 74 council members—I counted them one time on a plane…And I’ve liked 72 of them.”

Exit II. Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan says the Motor City is on track to exit Michigan state fiscal oversight by next year , in the wake of a third straight year of balancing its books, during his State of the City address: noting, “When Kevyn Orr (Gov. Rick Snyder’s appointed Emergency Manager who shepherded Detroit through the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history) departed, and we left bankruptcy in December 2014, a lot of people predicted Detroit would be right back in the same financial problems, that we couldn’t manage our own affairs, but instead we finished 2015 with the first balanced budget in 12 years, and we finished 2016 with the second, and this year we are going to finish with the third….I fully expect that by early 2018 we will be out from financial review commission oversight, because we would have made budget and paid our bills three years in a row.”

Nonetheless, the fiscal challenge remains steep: Detroit confronts stiff fiscal challenges, including an unexpected gap in public pensions, and the absence of a long-term economic plan. It faces disproportionate long-term borrowing costs because of its lingering low credit ratings—ratings of B2 and B from Moody’s Investors Service and S&P Global Ratings, respectively, albeit each assigns the city stable outlooks. Nevertheless, the Mayor is eyes forward: “If we want to fulfill the vision of a building a Detroit that includes everybody, we have to do a whole lot more.” By more, he went on, the city has work to do to bring back jobs, referencing his focus on a new job training program which will match citizens to training programs and then to jobs. (Detroit’s unemployment rate has dropped by nearly 50 percent from three years ago, but still is the highest of any Michigan city at just under 10 percent.) The Mayor expressed hope that the potential move of the NBA’s Detroit Pistons to the new Little Caesars Arena in downtown Detroit would create job opportunities for the city: “After the action of the Detroit city council in support of the first step of our next project very shortly, the Pistons will be hiring people from the city of Detroit.” The new arena, to be financed with municipal bonds, is set to open in September as home to the Detroit Red Wings hockey team, which will abandon the Joe Louis Arena on the Detroit riverfront, after the Detroit City Council this week voted to support plans for the Pistons’ move, albeit claiming the vote was not an endorsement of the complex deal involving millions in tax subsidies. Indeed, moving the NBA team will carry a price tag of $34 million to adapt the design of the nearly finished arena: the city has agreed to contribute toward the cost for the redesign which Mayor Duggan said will be funded through savings generated by the refinancing of $250 million of 2014 bonds issued by the Detroit Development Authority.

Mayor Duggan reiterated his commitment to stand with Detroit Public Schools Community District and its new school board President Iris Taylor against the threat of school closures. His statements came in the face of threats by the Michigan School Reform Office, which has identified 38 underperforming schools, the vast bulk of which (25) are in the city, stating: “We aren’t saying schools are where they need to be now…They need to be turned around, but we need 110,000 seats in quality schools and closing schools doesn’t add a single quality seat, all it does is bounce children around.” Mayor Duggan noted that Detroit also remains committed to its demolition program—a program which has, to date, razed some 11,000 abandoned homes, more than half the goal the city has set, in some part assisted by some $42 million in funds from the U.S Department of Treasury’s Hardest Hit Funds program for its blight removal program last October, the first installment of a new $130 million blight allocation for the city which was part of an appropriations bill Congress passed in December of 2015—but where a portion of that amount had been suspended by the Treasury for two months after a review found that internal controls needed improvement. Now, Major Duggan reports: “We have a team of state employees and land bank employees and a new process in place to get the program up and running and this time our goal isn’t only to be fast but to be in federal compliance too.” Of course, with a new Administration in office in Washington, D.C., James Thurber—were he still alive—might be warning the Mayor not to count any chickens before they’re hatched.

A Midwestern Tale of Two Cities

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eBlog, 2/14/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the tale of two cities in Detroit: is a city set to displace Chicago as the capitol of the Midwest—or is a city with its fiscal future in re-jeopardy, because of its inability and conflicts with the state over how to educate its children in a way that will create incentives for families to want to move back into the city?

Post Chapter 9 Reinvention? In opting to relocate its regional headquarters to downtown Detroit, Microsoft has sent a message that the city’s emergence from the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in American history is a success: the city is even threatening to displace Chicago as a regional headquarters of choice for the Midwest. That’s an honor long owned by Chicago. The extraordinary changes in the city—fashioned through the path-breaking efforts not just of former emergency manager Kevyn Orr and now retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes, but also the fiscal rebuilding blueprint, the city’s court-approved plan of debt adjustment, a plan aptly described by the Detroit News an “arc of change, the redemptive power of reinvention, and critical facts on the ground say a bid by Detroit and southeast Michigan to be part of that conversation could be real for those with the courage to take a real, hard look.”  The paper, continuing its own comparison of Detroit to the Windy City—two cities which appear to be fiscally headed in opposite directions, aptly notes the respective state roles, contentious as they are, but noting that while the Michigan government is “aggressively attacking its unfunded liabilities,” instead of being (in Illinois) a state legislature “deaf to the fiscal ticking time bomb of its state pensions.” An iconic city’s recovery from bankruptcy is, after all, not just designing and implementing an architectural and fiscal turnaround, but also reversing the fiscal and economic momentum; thus, unsurprisingly, in a reminder of the old aphorism: “Go West, young man;” today it is civic leader, Quicken Loans Inc. Chairman Dan Gilbert who actively recruits young talent to the Motor City, telling potential new Detroiters: anyone can go work in Chicago and most will change nothing, but you could make a difference working and living in Detroit. Or, as the News describes it: “So could companies looking to reduce costs, find a vibrant food, arts and culture scene, and join an enthusiastic business community with global connections. They could find both in Detroit. Or in Ann Arbor, with the University of Michigan.”  

Might There Be a Fly in the State Ointment? Yet for a city one-third its former size, the more pressing challenge to its fiscal future is likely to rest on the perceived quality of its public schools—schools in a city where the Detroit Public School system became physically and fiscally insolvent—and where the state intervened to not just appoint an emergency manager, but also where the legislature created and imposed what some deem the nation’s most economically disparate school system—or, as the New Jersey nonprofit EdBuild, in its report “Fault Lines: America’s Most Segregating School District Borders,” described it: nearly half of the households in Detroit Public Schools—49.2%—live in poverty, compared with 6.5% in Grosse Pointe Public Schools—with the non-profit noting to the Detroit News: “Fault Lines shows how school finance systems have led to school segregation along class lines within communities around the country, and how judicial and legislative actions have actually served to strengthen these borders that divide our children and our communities:” its report traces the economic gap between Detroit and Grosse Pointe schools to a 1974 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Milliken v. Bradley, which blocked busing between districts to achieve racial integration, writing: “Income segregation in the Detroit metropolitan area parallels the racial segregation that inspired the Milliken case and has worsened since the case was first argued.” Today, there are some 97 traditional public schools in Detroit, 98 charter schools, and 14 schools in the Education Achievement Authority, a controversial state-run district created in 2012—that is, there are an estimated 30,000 more seats than students in the city in the wake of the state’s 2015 “rescue” of the Detroit Public Schools—a rescue of a public school district which had been under state control, and a rescue which pledged some $617 million to address the debt, but also invoked a number of unorthodox “reforms” which state legislators argued would promise a brighter future: the reforms included provisions which permit the hiring uncertified teachers, penalization of striking employees, and the outsourcing of academic roles, like the superintendent position, to surrounding districts, and the state closure of all schools that fall in the bottom 5 percent of academic performance for three years in a row: a category into which dozens of Detroit public schools fall. The state also authorized charter schools for Detroit.

Now, a new Michigan School Reform Office school closing plan has reignited debate in Detroit over how to fix the Motor City’s fractured system of public schools, less than seven months after the Michigan Legislature spent $617 million relieving Detroit Public Schools of crushing debt which had hovered on the brink of its own chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Indeed, the perceived fiscal threat to the city’s future has led Mayor Mike Duggan to deem the state school closing plan “irrational,” because many of the other nearby public schools in Detroit are on the brink of being deemed failing schools—or, as Mayor Duggan noted: “You don’t throw people out of the boat without looking out to see if there’s a life raft.” Moreover, the Mayor and the newly elected Board of Education for the Detroit Public Schools Community District have threatened to sue Gov. Rick Snyder’s administration to stop the proposed closures—closures which the state is evaluating to determine whether such closures would create unreasonable hardships for students, such as distance to other schools with capacity, if the buildings are closed. Ergo, unsurprisingly, Governor Snyder is confronting pressure from school leaders, parents, businesses and civic groups to consider the impact that another round of school closings might have on Detroit’s ongoing recovery—and on its neighborhoods and commercial corridors hard hit by decades of abandonment and disinvestment—or, as Veronica Conforme, Chancellor of the Education Achievement Authority, notes: such closures would “cause disruption in the neighborhoods.”

The state-municipal tussle relates to the tug-of-rope state-local challenge about how to address Detroit’s worst-performing schools under a 7-year-old state statute which has never been fully enforced—and comes as the Michigan School Reform Office has announced that twenty-five Detroit schools may be closed in June due to persistently low student test scores—creating apprehension that these closures, coming at a time when then city’s focus on fuller implementation of its approved plan of debt adjustment envisions revitalization shifting from downtown and Midtown to Detroit’s vast neighborhoods and commercial corridors. Unsurprisingly, some business and community leaders are concerned that the impact mass school closings could undercut the city’s efforts to turn around pockets of the city which have been showing signs of rebirth, or, as Sandy Baruah, President and CEO of the Detroit Regional Chamber, who worries that abruptly closing two dozen schools could “create other crises” in city neighborhoods, puts it: “I don’t want to see neighborhoods that are on the early path to recovery be dealt a setback.” That is, in the post chapter 9 city, rebuilding neighborhoods must go hand in hand with schools: the presence of a school, after all, affects the assessed values of properties, residential and commercial, in a neighborhood.

Are Municipal Bankruptcies at the End of the Longest Stretch in U.S. History?

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eBlog, 1/29/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider an extraordinary ending to mayhap the most significant string of chapter 9 municipal bankruptcies in American history, with U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury’ milestone decision that she will issue a written confirmation order to confirm San Bernardino’s plan of debt adjustment. When San Bernardino emerges from the longest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history, it will mean that for the first time since the Great Recession, no municipality is in bankruptcy—albeit, in the case of East Cleveland, Ohio, the absence appears to be more a matter of incompetency than governance.   

The End of the Longest Road. Nearly four and a half years after filing for what has become the longest municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history, the California municipality of San Bernardino is ready to celebrate its likely last appearance before U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury, after Judge Jury on Friday agreed to issue a written confirmation order consistent with the fifty page proposal the city’s attorneys had submitted, noting: “The last words I will say is congratulations to the city…I look forward to the order and I look forward to the city having a prosperous future.” Expectations are that San Bernardino will remain in its current bankruptcy status for about two more months, as Judge Jury deals with a smattering of creditors who have said they intend to appeal her decision. One such creditor, as we have previously noted, is a citizen of the city who alleged he had been beaten by San Bernardino police officers six years ago—a beating in which he testified he had incurred brain damage; ergo he is appealing that he should be entitled to more than the one percent of the amount a jury had awarded—and should also be allowed to be to sue the officers individually, with his attorney having testified before the court that, notwithstanding San Bernardino’s municipal bankruptcy, an appellate court, in the City of Vallejo’s chapter 9 bankruptcy, had ruled that individual police officers should be held liable for excessive force. However, Judge Jury had ruled that, unlike Vallejo, San Bernardino’s plan of debt adjustment did include an injunction against claims against city employees, holding that San Bernardino “has demonstrated, with unrefuted evidence, that the city does not have the financial resources to pay the holders of litigation claims except pursuant to the terms of the plan…There certainly are no legal bases or equitable grounds for treating the four objectors any differently than all of the other holders of litigation claims.” Judge Jury did not advise the city when she would sign the confirmation order—a date which will start the two-week clock for any appeals—but not interfere with the projected official exit from the nation’s longest ever municipal bankruptcy projected for April.

In the wake of the momentous day, Mayor Carey Davis said: “The bankruptcy has been a major focus, and now we can work more on our other goals.” That is, the city’s plan of debt adjustment could best be likened to a municipal fiscal blueprint demonstrating both for the federal bankruptcy court, but also for the city’s citizens as well as credit rating agencies: a detailed 20-year recipe and guidance with regard to the city’s blueprint for reinvesting in police and infrastructure in a future of constrained fiscal options—a blueprint that emerged from a strategic plan developed via a series of meetings two years ago, where, Mayor Davis noted, leaders “had to make one of the first goals fiscal stability, although we have begun to turn that corner already, with three years of balanced budgets, two years of surpluses.”

Nevertheless, as the records demonstrate, filing for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy is a politically and fiscally expensive undertaking: San Bernardino will end up expending at least $25 million for attorneys and consultants—albeit that will likely turn out to be a pretty smart investment: the city estimates the final, court-approved plan of debt adjustment will provide for some $350 million in savings—savings reflected in substantial concessions by retirees, unions, and payment obligations to the city’s municipal bondholders—or, as San Bernardino City Attorney Gary Saenz said outside the courtroom: “I’m very proud that all of our creditors recognize that, while the deals are tough, they’re best for all involved…Each of those decisions, we made with the people of San Bernardino in mind. They are the most important reason we did anything. This was all done so they can get the service levels they deserve.”

Emerging from Municipal Bankruptcy: a Rough Ride

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eBlog, 1/04/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing challenges for the U.S. city emerging from the nation’s largest ever municipal bankruptcy, Detroit; then we veer into the warm Caribbean waters to observe the first days of the new administration of Gov. Ricardo Rosselló in Puerto Rico—where his new administration must adjust to coming to terms with its own PROMESA oversight board.

A New Detroit? The city emerging from the largest ever municipal bankruptcy is witnessing a string of major construction projects, from a massive hockey arena and street car line downtown to the resurrection of the Wayne County jail project: changes which will reshape the Motor City’s downtown in 2017—a level of activity and investment which seemed most improbable as the city shrunk and then dissolved into chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Today, the construction detours and closed sidewalks seem to offer a welcome sign of a new era for many who live and work near downtown. According to recent statistics, office vacancies in the downtown area are at their lowest point in a decade, and now the addition of the city’s new rail line could open demand in the New Center area, as well as increase demand for office space in neighborhoods near downtown such as Corktown and Eastern Market. Notwithstanding, the Detroit Financial Review Board, created as part of Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment to secure the U.S. bankruptcy court’s approval to exit bankruptcy, in its most recent oversight report, noted that the city continues to confront an unexpected gap in its public pension obligations and the absence of a long-term economic plan, reporting in its fourth annual report that could leave the city vulnerable to further fiscal challenges.(The next certification is due by October 1, 2017: under the plan of debt adjustment stipulations, the review board is charged with reviewing and approving annual four-year financial plans.) Both previous such plans have been approved. The most recent plan, submitted at the end of November, projects a general fund surplus of at least $41 million for FY2016, based on budget projections; Detroit expects to finish the current fiscal year with a general fund surplus of about $30 million. Nevertheless, the city faces a double-barreled fiscal challenge: its public pension liabilities and high costs of borrowing. Because its junk territory credit ratings from Moody’s and S&P, Detroit is forced it to pay disproportionately higher interest rates on its bonds.

With regard to its pension liabilities, where Detroit’s plan of debt adjustment approved by now retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes left intact public safety monthly checks, but imposed a 4.5% cut on general employees—and reduced or eliminated post-retirement (OPEB) benefits, as part of a mechanism to address some $1.8 billion in post-retirement obligations, the approved plan nevertheless suspended the COLa’s only until 2024—so a longer term liability of what was originally projected to be $111 million pends. (Indeed, the city’s pension agreement withstood a challenge last Fall when a federal appeals court ruled in favor of Detroit in a lawsuit by city retirees whose pensions were cut as part of the city’s approved plan of debt adjustment, after some retirees had sued, claiming they deserved the pension which was promised before the city filed for bankruptcy in 2013, with U.S. Judge Alice Batchelder of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals noting it was “not a close call.”)

But, as Shakespeare would put it: ‘There’s the rub.” Detroit’s actuaries, in their 2015 actuarial valuation reports, projected the liability in FY2024 and beyond to be nearly $200 million, based upon a thirty year amortization, with level principal payments and declining interest payments; however, as we have previously noted, those estimates were based upon optimistic estimates of assumed rates of return of 6.75 percent. In response, Detroit set aside $20 million from this year’s FY2016 fund balance, $10 million from its FY2016 budgeted contingency fund, and added an additional $10 million for each of the next three fiscal years—or, as Detroit Finance Director John Naglick told the Bond Buyer: “The city has six fiscal years to make an impact and close the gap on the [pension] underfunding. We don’t want to create such a cliff in 2024 where there is a big budget shock…The reality is to find those kind of monies over the next six fiscal years will cause some tradeoff in services.” Director Naglick added that last month Detroit completed an updated decade-long plan to update its approved plan of debt adjustment, adding: “The 10-year model will show the FRC that this incremental funding can be folded into the budget, but we aren’t naïve, it will also create some disruption in services to accommodate that…Think of it as a master plan on how we are going to make this stable.” Nevertheless, Mr. Naglick’s challenge will be hard: Moody’s last summer warned that the city’s “very weak economic profile” makes it susceptible to future downturns and population loss—threatening its ability “to meet its requirement to resume pension funding obligations in fiscal 2024.” Detroit’s next deadline looms: The City must submit its FY18-FY21 Four-Year Financial Plan to the Financial Review Commission by the statutory deadline of March 23rd.

Puerto Rico: A New Chapter? The new Governor of Puerto Rico, Ricardo Rosselló, yesterday, in the wake of his swearing in, acted straightaway on his first day in office to cut government spending and revenues, amid greater urgency to take steps to avoid a massive out-migration and end ten years of economic recession, and increase efforts to stem vital population losses which in 2013 alone witnessed some 74,000 Puerto Ricans leave the island. The new governor has already signed five executive orders, cutting annual agency spending by 20 percent, encouraging asset privatization, and proposing a zero based budgeting standard. Efforts like these, if actually implemented (a crippling risk in the context of historical Puerto Rico governance), could represent strides towards achieving fiscal solvency and help lay the groundwork for economic recovery. Governor Rosselló directed his agency heads to implement zero-based budgeting, under which agency heads start with a $0 and only adds to it when they can provide a justification for particular programs. Gov. Rosselló also created a Federal Opportunity Center attached to the governor’s office. The center will provide technical and compliance assistance to the office to make programs eligible for federal funds. For the new Governor, the three keys to recovery appear to be: how to revive the economy, fix the territory’s fiscal situation, and address the public debt.

The key, many believe, would be to opt for Title VI of the new PROMESA law, the voluntary restructuring portion. A growing concern is to create job opportunities—with one leader noting: “Many will leave if they cannot find jobs to search off the island for a better quality of life: our cities have to be habitable and safe…it has to be a place where the world wants to come to live…” Governor Rosselló also signed six executive orders, directing his department heads to cut 10 percent in spending from the current budget and to reduce the allocations for professional services by a similar amount—with even deeper cuts in other hiring; he imposed a freeze on new hires, noting: “We do not come to merely administer an archaic and ineffective scaffolding: Ours will be a transformational government.” Nevertheless, his task could be frustrated by the Puerto Rico House, where, yesterday, El Vocero reported that Puerto Rico House of Representatives President Carlos Méndez Núñez had told the newspaper last weekend that the legislature would cut Puerto Rico’s sales and use tax rate and the oil tax rate, reversing steps by the prior governor and legislature over the last four years. Governor Rosselló also pledged to work with the PROMESA Oversight Board in a collaborative way, as he departed the island to meet with members of the new Congress in Washington, D.C., where he planned to lobby for statehood for the U.S. territory.

With new administrations in San Juan and Washington, Gov. Rosselló will also have to work out a relationship with the PROMESA board, as the absence of cash to pay debt service, combined with the current payment moratoriums and federal stay on bondholder litigation appear destined to be extended deep into the year, albeit some anticipate that under the incoming Trump administration, one which will have much closer ties to creditor groups than the outgoing Obama administration, could lead to efforts to restart formal bondholder negotiations—negotiations which could become a vehicle by means of which creditors would increase their investment in Puerto Rico risks, by means of new loans and/or partial restructuring of liabilities in ex-change for a settlement which would be intended to improve long term municipal bond-holder recoveries and, most critically, work to enhance the price evaluations of Puerto Rico’s general obligation municipal bonds. Nevertheless, the territory’s structural, long-term budget deficit of nearly $70 billion over the next decade risks crowding out any medium-term payment of debt service absent serious spending reform as well as public pension reform—especially because of the ongoing outflow of young persons seeking better economic opportunities on the mainland.

The Many & Daunting Challenges of Municipal Bankruptcy

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eBlog, 12/30/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the retirement of an exceptional public leader, retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes, who presided over Detroit’s largest in U.S, history chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy and then went on to accept the unforgiving position of emergency manager for the Detroit Public Schools—a key role in the ongoing challenges to recovery from the nation’s largest ever municipal bankruptcy. Then we head into the gale of the Northeaster to New Jersey’s Atlantic City—as the state slowly begins to unroll the mechanics of its takeover of the fiscally insolvent municipality, before finally heading to the warmer West Coast, where San Bernardino leaders are preparing for the restoration of municipal authority and coming back from the nation’s longest-ever chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy.

Retirement after Extraordinary Work.  Electronic rhythm guitar player and retired U.S. bankruptcy judge Steven Rhodes, to whom Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder presented the challenge of becoming emergency manager, an offer he accepted, came out of retirement, and became the school district’s fifth emergency manager—with the official title “transition manager”—on March 1 for a salary of $18,750 a month. Now, nearly 10 months later, a Detroit district plagued by about $515 million in operating debt has been replaced with a new, debt-free Detroit district, courtesy of a $617 million bailout for which Judge Rhodes had lobbied the Republican-led Legislature. But the legacy of Judge Rhodes, who is set to depart tomorrow, remains to be fully appreciated. Judge Rhodes, who presided over Detroit’s chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy before leaving to accept the Governor’s appointment to serve as the emergency manager for the Detroit Public Schools system—a position in which he served for about 10 months to be in charge of the state’s largest school district during one of its most tumultuous periods—and during which, last June, the state created, in effect, a dual system of charter and public schools. At the inception of this harrowing task, he inherited a school system collapsing from a string of teacher sick-outs that closed dozens of schools, sparked a lawsuit, and from a system of unsafe public buildings. As we have previously posted, the legislature and Governor had enacted a $617-million financial rescue package which created the new district to replace the old Detroit Public Schools—even as it created a separate system of charter schools—and put Judge Rhodes in charge of overseeing the complex task of overseeing the new, 45,000 student district. He leaves, unsurprisingly, with a system in fiscally and physically significantly improved condition—helping, in his final chapter of public service, to help bring in additional fiscal resources via the sale of more than a dozen small, unused parcels of land for $3 million to Olympia Development, the developer of the new Little Caesars Arena in Detroit, and future home to the Red Wings and Pistons. In addition, the school district agreed to sell its license for the radio station at the Detroit School of Arts to Detroit Public Television in an agreement valued at $9 million, pending regulatory approval. (Detroit Public TV already pays the district for being able to operate the station, WRCJ-FM (90.9). Under the agreement, the station will stay in the district. (Students will have enhanced opportunities to learn about broadcasting as a result of the deal, according to DPS officials.) As part of the transition, Judge Rhodes has transferred authority to a seven-member elected public school board which will take office in January, making it the first school board with any significant decision-making power since 2009, when a series of state-appointed emergency managers began controlling the district.

In an interview with the Detroit Free Press, Judge Rhodes said that at the “very highest level, the most challenging part of the job for me was the politics of it. Because, as a judge, I was never involved in politics. We had a fixed process. We engaged that process, the process concluded with a result, and we moved on. But here, there are political considerations to everything, and I was not prepared for that.” In response to a follow-up question with regard to the greatest challenges of his emergency position, Judge Rhodes responded: “What surprised and disappointed me the most was the level of antagonism between Detroit on one side and the rest of the state and Lansing on the other side. Each side has predisposed views of the other side that are not based on fact, and that are not only unproductive, but counterproductive, and are not in the best interest of the children in the city. Both sides need to find very specific ways and methods to break through that, and they need to do it very soon.”

Now, he notes, the newly elected school board will have to take “very specific actions to reach out to decision- and policy-makers in Lansing to work with them on achieving Detroit’s goals, to educate them on where DPSCD is, the progress it has made, and how it’s going to make progress in the future. And it has to do that outreach in a spirit of collaboration, cooperation, and reaching out for help, and with the assumption that people in Lansing want to help, not with the assumption that they are anti-Detroit.” He added that the school board will also have to do something few other school boards in the U.S. must: it will have to carve out a constructive relationship with the Detroit Financial Review Commission (FRC): “I hope and expect that the board’s relationship will simply continue the relationship that I and the staff here have already established, which is a cooperative, collaborative working relationship that recognizes our autonomy, (and) at the same time recognizes the value that the FRC brings to enhancing the credibility of DPSCD…We have an example, a concrete example, of how the work of the FRC benefited DPSCD financially. It was the adviser that the FRC retained that helped us to identify a health insurance provider that was more comprehensive and less money.

Arithmetic. As to the new system’s fiscal viability, Judge Rhodes noted: “It’s better than where I hoped it would be. My goal was to have a balanced budget for this year, meaning revenues equaling expenditures. It turned out, through the hard work of the staff, and selling certain assets that we were not using and would never use, we actually will have a surplus this year, which we will use to create a much-needed fund balance…It’s not as much of a fund balance as we need, but it’s a really good start, and not one that I would have predicted or foreseen when we were putting our budget together last spring. (The school district has a $48.2-million projected fund balance, or reserve fund. It’s roughly $650-million, the FY2017 budget is balanced.) With regard to the system’s fiscal stability going forward, Judge Rhodes noted: “I’m confident that we are in a position to maintain a balanced budget going forward. I think there are also opportunities to increase the fund balance, which is something we should be doing. There are aspects of school finance, however, that do concern me. In order to achieve academic success, which is our goal, as it is every school district’s, funding provided by the Legislature has to recognize two fundamental distinctions between Detroit and other school districts. No. 1 is that 60 percent of our students live in poverty, which means it’s more challenging to educate them, and therefore more expensive to educate them. And you can attribute those expenses to enhanced reading services, enhanced wraparound services, and enhanced truancy and attendance services.

He noted a second, distinguishing factor and challenge: “A second factor (is) our special needs and special education children. We have a higher percentage than other districts. They are of course more expensive to educate, and in some cases, significantly more expensive to educate. And I don’t want to give the impression that we don’t want those students. We do, we absolutely do. They are as entitled to an education as any other child. But the reality is they are more expensive to educate. While some of that difference is made up by federal grants, it’s not all of it. And so, that puts an extra strain on the budget….School funding is based now, generally speaking, on the concept that equality is equity. We give the same amount for every child in the state. The problem is equality is not equity, or I should say is not always equity. In this case, it’s not.”

The State of the City. As the State of New Jersey takeover of Atlantic City continues to unroll, it appears one of the final actions of 2016 will be a state imposed mandate to the city for an across-the-board pay cut, a 15-step salary guide with pay capped at $90,000, increased health-care contributions from employees, and the imposition of 12-hour work shifts for police officers.  The orders by Mr. Chiesa, the quasi-ruler of the city, appear to be the beginning of what will be a more comprehensive effort on how part to address the city’s $500 million of debt–with Mr. Chiesa indicating he now intends to meet with all of the groups involved. In an email to members obtained by the Press of Atlantic City, union President Matt Rogers recapped a meeting the union delegation had the day before yesterday with representatives from the state who are in command of Atlantic City as part of the state takeover. Among the state’s emerging demands are an across-the-board pay cut, a 15-step salary guide with pay capped at $90,000, increased health-care contributions from union members, and tasking officers to work 12-hour shifts. It seems that some of the state’s demands were similar to a new contract the city and union had already agreed upon; however, the state had refused to approve. It appears the state will insist upon the layoff of an additional to 250 members. The actions mark some of the first under the reign of former New Jersey Attorney General Jeffrey Chiesa as he has insisted upon meeting with all of the groups involved in the city’s budget and vital operations prior to focusing on addressing the city’s $500 million of debt.

Prepping to Exit Chapter 9. As San Bernardino prepares to exit municipal bankruptcy—the nation’s longest ever—next month, City Manager Mark Scott reports he will be meeting with Mayor Carey Davis and the City Council, as well as his key managers to put together an action-focused work plan, noting: U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury will put out a “written ruling on January 27, and then there will be several months of paperwork before we officially exit bankruptcy.” Ergo, his goal is to be ready by that date in the wake of approval of its plan of debt adjustment under which the beleaguered city eliminated some $350 million in one-time and ongoing expenditures—a goal immeasurably helped by city voter approval last November of a new charter—albeit a charter which still awaits approval by California Secretary of State Alex Padilla, paving the way for the city to transition from a strong mayor council-manager form of governance—and one without an elected city attorney—which the manager described as one which led to multiple agendas and infighting which had contributed to pushing “the city into bankruptcy. No one was working together.” Under the newly adopted charter, the mayor will have a tiebreaker vote except when it comes to appointing or removing the city attorney, city manager, or city clerk positions, at which point, the mayor would have one vote. Indeed, as part of his agreement to work for the city, Mr. Scott informed the city’s elected officials he was unwilling to stay at San Bernardino long-term absent adoption of a new charter, noting: “I was not interested in working in such a confusing form of government for long…I wanted to help, but it was contingent on the charter being able to pass. The pre-existing form of governance was unrecognizable to anyone who studied government.”

If it can be deemed easy to slide into municipal bankruptcy, getting out and long-term recovery is a challenge—one which will require innovative policies to attract new economic growth via zoning and land use policies that attract investment in key locations—a challenge made more difficult in the city’s case not only because of its bankruptcy, but also because of last year’s terrorism incident—one which could hardly be expected to serve as an incentive for new families or businesses. Another critical hurdle is the city’s 34% poverty rate–the highest of any large city in the state, along with the worst homicide rate per capita in the state. Thus, unsurprisingly, Mr. Scott notes that San Bernardino will be fiscally solvent before it is service level solvent: he has predicted the city’s police service levels will be where they should be in a few years; however, it will probably take a decade for parks and recreation to reach pre-bankruptcy levels; moreover, the city is in no position to issue new capital debt, because it lacks the requisite fiscal resources to pay bondholders.