Fiscal Recoveries from Fiscal & Physical Storms

eBlog

February 23, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the municipal fiscal threats to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, before taking a fiscal spin on the roulette tables of Atlantic City.

Fiscal Hurricane Fallout. Jaison R. Abel, Jason Bram, Richard Deitz, and Jonathan Hastings of the New York Federal Reserve this week, in their examination of the fallout in the wake of Hurricanes Irma and Maria on the economies of the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands noted that both were suffering from significant economic downturns and fiscal stress well before the storms hit nearly six months ago—noting that in their wake, the initial job losses in Puerto Rico totaled about 4 percent; in the U.S. Virgin Islands, job losses were double that—and there has been no rebound thus far. The authors wrote that these losses are considerably steeper than what has typically been experienced in the wake of most significant U.S. natural disasters, albeit not nearly as devastating as Hurricane Katrina’s unprecedented impact on the New Orleans economy more than a decade ago. The Fed three noted that domestic air passenger data indicate that from last September through November, more than 150,000 people left Puerto Rico, net of arrivals, and that the number who left the U.S. Virgin Islands was proportionally even larger. Thus, they opined, looking ahead, recovery will be affected by a variety of factors: especially: the level degree of out-migration, the level of external aid these economies receive, and the effectiveness of fiscal and other reforms—especially in Puerto Rico. They noted that Hurricane Maria was the most devastating hurricane to slam Puerto Rico in nearly a century—leaving an enormous toll of lives, homes, and businesses lost or suffering enormous damage, devastation of most crops and other agricultural assets, and severe havoc to its public infrastructure, adding that both for responding to the human and economic misery, the island’s experiencing of the most severe power outage in U.S. history means “it may still take months to fully restore electricity and other critical infrastructure,” describing the devastation to the U.S. Virgin Islands as similar, especially St. Croix, where I taught school long before most readers were born.

Nevertheless, the Fed Gang of Three wrote that recovery is underway in both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, reporting that, as of last month, satellite images of nighttime lights suggest roughly 75 percent power restoration for Puerto Rico overall, with the southern and western parts of the island seeing nearly full restoration, and San Juan close to that level. In contrast, however, they determined that the eastern end of Puerto Rico and many interior areas have lagged substantially. As of the end of last year, they reported that the labor market has begun to recover in Puerto Rico: employment in leisure and hospitality (largely restaurants), the sector usually most affected by natural disasters, have started to bounce back in Puerto Rico, albeit not yet in the U.S. Virgin Islands. And, as often happens following natural disasters, jobs are being added in both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in industries involved in clean-up, restoration, and rebuilding efforts—most notably, construction. Thus, they believe Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are confronted with a long and difficult recovery process ahead—a fiscal and physical process made all the more difficult because of poor economic and fiscal conditions prior to the storms.  

Financing a Recovering City’s Emergence from a State Takeover. The Atlantic City Council has voted approval the issuance of debt to pay off millions the municipality owes to pay off deferred pension and health care contributions from 2015—after, in 2015, state officials had urged the delay of some $37.2 million in pension and health care contributions—a delay which, today, officials note has added up to about $47 million with the added interest. In the ordinance the Council voted Wednesday 6-3 to authorize, Atlantic City can now issue as much as $55 million worth of municipal bonds to help finance those accrued debts, with the vote coming in the wake of a lengthy discussion between the Council and 13 residents, each of whom spoke in opposition: some urged the elected leaders to table the matter for further review, while others questioned who had authorized the deferment, whether the city was obligated to pay the interest rate, and whether there were other options to finance the debt—debt which, as of the end of the calendar year, had reached more than $344 million in outstanding debt. Timothy Cunningham, New Jersey’s local government services director and now the state appointed takeover appointee, has explained to residents the option to bond for the deferred payments would prevent it from having to go into the general fund—that is in lieu of the city being forced to raise tax rates: the municipal bond interest payments would instead be financed via the Investment Alternative Tax from casinos, which, under state takeover regulations, are redirected to be used in Atlantic City for debt service, he noted. The City Council had originally slated the issue for a vote last month, but withdrew the scheduled vote in order to host two public hearings on the matter.

At the session, Councilman Jesse Kurtz said he would have preferred a different resolution to making the payments, questioning whether Atlantic City would be obligated to pay back the payments’ interest if the deferment was at the suggestion of the State, noting it did not “sit right” with him to vote for the ordinance without a formal statement from Gov. Phil Murphy’s administration authorizing it: “When we’re short on money, the answer is to borrow money…I don’t like that.” Atlantic City Council President Marty Small responded that after the ordinance was pulled last month, city and state officials asked the Governor’s administration for forgiveness on the payment; however, the response was negative, adding that the city knew the day was coming to pay the deferred payments—and that such payment was the city’s obligation: to act otherwise, he noted, would be “putting the taxpayers in harm’s way” if they did not act to borrow to make the payments: “It’s not us versus you: What affects you, affects us.” Councilmember Kurtz, along with Councilmen Moisse Delgado and Jeffree Fauntleroy II, voted against the measure, while Councilmembers Small, George Tibbitt, Chuen “Jimmy” Cheng, William Marsh, Kaleem Shabazz, and Aaron Randolph voted aye. For his part, Mayor Frank Gilliam, told his colleagues in opposing the matter, the city needs to come up with “better ways to deal with our finances,” regardless of whether council passed the bond ordinance: “We’re still $400 million in debt.”

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Fiscal & Physical Imbalances

Lincoln’s Birthday, February 12, 2018

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the outcome of last week’s actions to avoid another federal government shutdown, we consider the ongoing fiscal and physical plights of Puerto Rico.

Fiscal & Physical Imbalances.  Puerto Rico’s non-voting Member of Congress, Jenniffer Gonzalez, and Gov. Ricardo Rosselló have met with a group of New Progressive Mayors to describe the terms of the new federal assistance under the just passed $16 billion recovery assistance approved by Congress—funds ranging from what Secretary of Public Affairs Ramón Rosario Cortés noted would “range from construction to agriculture programs that will allow each municipality to develop its economy and create jobs.” The Secretary anticipates there will be a second meeting with associate mayors. Naguabo Mayor Noé Marcano said that the allocation of these funds represents “a unique opportunity” to repair and/or build infrastructure projects (including roads and bridges) and housing: “Part of the projects that we-at a given moment-had planned as improvements to the municipalities, we understand that this is the best opportunity.”

That could mean a new fiscal chance for this small muncipio of just over 23,000, one founded on July 15, 1821 near the mouth of the Daguao River—founded with the intent of providing a defense for the region from the Caribe Indians, based upon, 27 years earlier, the request of several influential neighbors of the Spanish Crown: on January 9, 1798, the erection of the Naguabo parish was authorized—but construction did not commence on its church until 1841. The muncipio’s name originated from the cacique and chieftainship named Daguao—as the territory was originally populated by Taíno Indians. Naguabo is also known as Cuna de Grandes Artistas (the birthplace of Great Artists) and Los Enchumbaos, “the Soaked Ones.”

For his part, Mayor William Aliceo of Aibonito, the City of Flowers, with the city’s appellation derived from the Taíno word “Jatibonicu,” the name of a Cacique leader of the region; a name also used to refer to a river in the area—and, in addition, a name used by the tribe of Orocobix. At the same time, there is a legend that tells of a Spanish soldier, Diego Alvarez, who, on May 17, 1615, reached one of the highest peaks in the area: upon taking in the view, he exclaimed: “Ay, que bonito!” The exclamation eventually led to the name of the region. Nearly two centuries later, Pedro Zorascoechea, in 1630, was one of the early Spaniards to settle on the island—apparently establishing one of the first fincas or ranches in the region; however, it was not until 1822, when Don Manuel Veléz presented himself before the government, representing the inhabitants of the area, to request that Aibonito be officially declared a town—a request which then Governor Miguel de la Torre granted on March 13, 1824.

Hurricane Maria’s eye tore through the region’s hills on September 20th: it was especially fierce along the exposed ridgelines, whipping in at a hundred and fifty-five miles an hour: it tore apart wooden houses; along the road leading up to Aibonito from San Juan, normally a two-hour drive, Maria tore a panorama of ruined houses and businesses, toppled and twisted trees, and downed utility poles. Mayor Aliceo said he would like to use part of the recovery funds for agriculture, roads, and electrical infrastructure: “In Aibonito, we have a project submitted to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the canalization of the Aibonito River. And with poultry farming, which was well affected by Hurricane Maria, I’m interested (the funds) will find a way to help Aibonito’s poultry farmers, given the million-dollar losses they’ve had.”

The federal allocation came just prior to Puerto Rico’s resubmission of its revised fiscal plans to the PROMESA oversight Board—plans due today, with Puerto Rico’s representative, Christian Sobrino, simply advising the board that the plans comply with the public policy of the government, noting: “[W]e will comply with the stipulated date for the delivery of the fiscal plans. It has been an intense job, but the government will comply with the appointed time. The plans will continue in accordance with the Governor’s public policy of protecting the most vulnerable and that this document serves as a tool of fiscal responsibility and at the same time a path of long-term socio-economic development for the island.”

Nevertheless, uncertainty reigns, especially in the wake of the federal government shutdown. With last week’s Congressional approval of a package to keeps federal agencies running through March 23rd, the date of certainty has now been pushed off while House and Senate appropriators in Washington, D.C. work on final 2018 spending bills. The package suspends the debt ceiling through March 1, 2019, provides $89.3 billion in disaster aid, and extends a number of expired tax provisions, including a Jan. 1, 2022 extension of the rum cover-over for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which is projected to generate an estimated $900 million for the two U.S. territories. In addition, a related tax provision calls for all low-income communities in Puerto Rico to be treated as qualified opportunity zones. The disaster aid includes $4.9 billion to provide 100% federal funding for Medicaid health services for low-income residents of Puerto Rico and  the U.S. Virgin Islands for two years, $11 billion in CDBG block grants for the two territories, including $2 billion of CDBG money to rebuild Puerto Rico’s electrical grid—with Resident Commissioner Gonzalez reporting that, in total, $16.55 billion of the disaster aid is earmarked for Puerto Rico.

With the new allocations to mitigate last year’s natural disasters, the federal government has already authorized just over $140.7 billion within the past six months to be distributed mainly between Texas, Florida, California, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands—with Puerto Rico’s government projecting its share will be approximately $18 billion, plus access to a credit line of $4 billion—albeit, to access that line, the U.S. territory would be mandated to prove lack of liquidity. Of the total, almost $16 billion will surely go to the island from the funds allocated in the budget bill and to mitigate disasters—provided the territory complies with the conditions of both the federal government and the PROMESA Oversight Board. The projected package includes $4.8 billion for Medicaid and $11 billion for CDBG: last week, HUD Deputy Secretary Pamela Hughes Patenaude announced, during a visit to San Juan, that HUD will award $1.5 billion to help repair damaged houses and businesses. In addition, another $ 300 million, half of which would be allocated as a loan, has been allocated to match the FEMA project’s cost. The package includes $6 billion, funds under the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, provided to U.S. electric companies to repair the power grid. FEMA has stated, moreover, its intent to grant an additional $13 billion to the island.

Puerto Rico’s Federal Affairs Executive Director, Carlos Mercador, notes that an official damage estimate from federal agencies is still pending; Commissioner González notes that Congress’ next disasters relief resolution may be discussed in Congress between April and May, noting: “Speaker Paul Ryan told me that there is going to be a fourth bill on supplementary allocations for Puerto Rico, with specific projects for transportation and electric power.”

Calming the Fiscal Waters

eBlog

January 24, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the physical, governance, and fiscal challenges confronted—and overcome, by the City of Flint, Michigan.

Restoring Fiscal Municipal Authority. For the first time in seven years, Flint, Michigan local officials are in control of the city’s daily finances and government decisions after, on Monday, Michigan Treasurer Nick Khouri signed off on a recommendation from Flint’s Receivership Transition Advisory Board (RTAB), the state-appointed board overseeing Flint’s fiscal recovery-to grant Mayor Karen Weaver and the Council greater authority in daily decision-making. Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, seven years ago, preempted local governance and fiscal authority after concurring with a state review panel that there was a “local government financial emergency” in Flint, and that an emergency financial manager should be appointed to oversee the city’s affairs. The Governor ultimately appointed four emergency managers to run the city from 2011 until 2015–two of whom were subsequently charged with criminal wrongdoing related to their roles in the Flint water crisis. In declaring the financial emergency in Flint, state officials said city leaders had failed to fix a structural deficit and criticized city officials for not moving with the degree of urgency required considering the seriousness of the city’s financial problems.

Notwithstanding, the State of Michigan retains authority with regard to certain fiscal and budgetary issues, including approval of the municipality’s budget, requests to issue debt, and collective bargaining agreements. Treasurer Khouri noted:  “Today is an important day for our shared goal of moving Flint forward…Thanks to the progress city leaders have made, this is an appropriate time for the Mayor and City Council to assume greater responsibility for day-to-day operations and finances.” Mayor Weaver noted: “This is an exciting development for the city of Flint…We have been waiting for this for years,” adding the state action will bring the city a step closer to its ultimate goal of home rule through rescinding Michigan’s Emergency Order 20, which mandated that resolutions approved by both Mayor Weaver and the City Council receive the state board’s approval before going into effect.

Mayor Weaver, in the wake of the long saga in which a state-imposed emergency manager had led to a massive physical and fiscal crisis, said she has hopes for the city and state to “officially divorce” by the end of this year, noting that with the appointment of CFO Hughey Newsome last  year, the newly elected City Council, and approval of a 30-year contract with the Great Lakes Water Authority; Flint is both more fiscally and physically solvent: the new water contract is projected to save Flint as much as $9 million by providing a more favorable rate—an important consideration  with GLWA and addresses $7 million in debt service payments the city is currently obligated to pay on bonds issued to finance the Karegnondi Water Authority pipeline under construction.

The city of just over 100,000, with a majority minority population where just under 30 percent of the families have a female head of household, and where 33.9 percent of all households were made up of individuals and just under 10 percent had someone living alone who was 65 years of age or older, finances its budget via a 1 percent income tax on residents and 0.5 percent on non-residents: it has a strong Mayor-council form of government. It has operated under at least four charters, beginning in 1855: its current charter provides for a strong Mayor form of government—albeit one which has instituted the appointment of an Ombudsperson; the City Council is composed of members elected from Flint’s nine wards.

In the wake of ending its water contract with Detroit via a state-appointed emergency manager, its travails—physical and fiscal were triggered: the state appointed  emergency manager shifted to Flint River water as the city awaited completion of a new KWA pipeline—but that emergency manager failed to ensure safe drinking water as part of the switch—a failure which, as we have noted, led to the contamination crisis which poisoned not just the city’s drinking water, but also its fiscal stability—leading to nearly eight years of a state takeover in the wake of Gov. Rick Snyder’s 2011 declaration of a financial emergency within the city.

Even though Gov. Snyder declared an end to Flint’s financial emergency on April 29, 2015, the RTAB, which is appointed by the Governor, had continued to review financial decisions in the city. Discussions with regard to planning the RTAB’s departure from Flint began last August as part of an annual report from the Michigan Treasury Department mandated for Michigan municipalities operating under financial receivership. Thus, Treasurer Khouri’s signature was the final stamp of approval needed to thrust the RTAB unanimous suggestion of January 11th into immediate action, repealing an order mandating that the State of Michigan review all decisions made by the Mayor and Council—and ending a long and traumatic state takeover which caused immense human physical and municipal devastation. It marked the final step from the city’s emergence two years ago in April from the control of a state-imposed emergency manager to home rule order under the guidance of a the state-imposed Board—a board devised with the aim of ensuring a smooth transition by maintaining the measures prescribed upon the emergency manager’s exit. Here, as we have previously noted, the Emergency Manager was appointed by the Governor under Public Act 436 to preempt local elected leadership and to bring long-term financial stability back to the city by addressing any and all issues which had threatened the Flint’s fiscal solvency—but which, instead, first led to greater fiscal stress, and, more critically, to physical harm and danger to Flint’s citizens, thereby jeopardizing the very fiscal help which the state purported to want. Four different individuals served as emergency manager from December 2011 to April 2015: in order, they were Michael K. Brown, Edward J. Kurtz, Darnell Earley, and Gerald Ambrose.

The action repealed Emergency Manager Order No. 20, an order imposed by former Flint Emergency Manager Jerry Ambrose in his final days with the city—an order which mandated resolutions approved by both the Mayor and City Council in order to receive the Advisory Board’s approval, prior to going into effect. as Mayor Weaver put it, the step was a “welcome end to an arranged marriage,” adding: “We are so thankful‒and I’m speaking on behalf of the proud, great city of Flint: the RTAB has been in place for several years now, and one of the things it did represent is that the city was in turmoil and financial distress. And I know over the past two years we have been fiscally responsible… I think it’s absolutely time, and time for the locally elected officials to run the city, and we’ve been anxiously ready to do so….this feels like a welcome way to end an arranged marriage.”

Mayor Weaver noted that the appointment of Hughey Newsome as Flint’s interim chief financial officer, combined with the city’s new Council members and approval of a 30-year contract with the Great Lakes Water Authority, has helped to move Flint in a fiscally and financially solvent direction.

Is the Federal Government Using a Double Standard in Responding to Puerto Rico, adding to its Fiscal and Physical Distress?

eBlog

January 19, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the ongoing federal and fiscal challenges to fiscal recovery for the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico.

Denial of Assistance. As if there has not been enough evidence of a double standard with regard to the provision of federal aid to the hurricane devastation to Puerto Rico, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Treasury have written to the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority Executive Director Gerardo Portela that, because the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s  central cash balance, as publicly reported, has consistently exceeded $1.5 billion in the months following the hurricanes, and “considering the implications of the $6.875 billion of total cash deposits across the Commonwealth, the federal government will institute, as a matter of policy, a cash balance policy that will determine the timing of Community Disaster Loans (CDLs) to the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities, including the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority.” Translated into English, that means Puerto Rico may have too much cash to be eligible for a federal loan—notwithstanding the discriminatory treatment compared to Houston or Florida, much less that still, nearly four months after the devastating storm—a storm to respond to which President Trump offered paper towels—some four months after the storm, many residents are still without electricity. Nevertheless, according to FEMA, the island is at risk of not receiving federal community disaster loans, because its cash balances may be too high.

For its part, the government of Puerto Rico has opted to pay up its arrears accounts with both the Electric Power Authority and the Aqueduct and Sewer Authority—as well as focus its efforts on legislation to address FEMA’s concerns—in a critical effort to free up federal assistance—assistance already approved by Congress. At the same time, Puerto Rico’s Financial Advisory Authority and Fiscal Agency Wednesday admitted that if FEMA opts not to grant the disaster loan to the U.S. territory, very hard decisions will confront the citizens of Puerto Rico and their leaders—or, as Sen. Anibal Jose Torres put it: the challenge will be to “ensure basic services to the population, the payment of pensions, and the payroll of public employees,” concerns which appear not to be apprehensions of the Trump Administration, even as Gerardo Portela Franco, the Executive Director and Chairman of the Board of Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Agency & Financial Advisory Authority, noted: “We will continue negotiating with the Treasury until we achieve that CDL,” adding: “We have faithfully complied with all the requirements,” referring to the negotiations his agency has had with the U.S. Treasury since last October. The contretemps emerged after El Nuevo Día Wednesday  revealed that FEMA and the U.S. Treasury had halted the disbursement of funds to Puerto Rico under the CDL program until adopting “a cash balance policy” which will determine when and how much funding FEMA will provide to Puerto Rico to address its operational expenses in trying to recover from the effects of Hurricane Maria, theoretically in “consultation” with the Fiscal Oversight Board created by Congress, even as the two stateside federal agencies made clear Puerto Rico will have to “cover its cash needs and those of the PREPA and the AAA.

Unsurprisingly, Héctor Figueroa, the President of the SEIU noted that it was “inconceivable that FEMA and the Treasury retain the aid funds approved three months ago for Puerto Rico following the scourge of Hurricane Maria…Puerto Rican working families continue to be considered second class citizens by the administration of (Donald) Trump and by Congress.”

The situation is further complicated, despite some four months of negotiations, by the fact that FEMA and the U.S. Treasury have yet to specify the specific conditions to be mandated—now, nearly four months after Congress approved a package of aid for Puerto Rico, as well as for the states of Florida, Texas, California, and the U.S. Virgin Islands: in that aid package which Congress approved, however, it appears there was a stipulation that, before the federal government could be obliged to provide aid, Puerto Rico, as collateral, had to pledge the unencumbered revenues from the Sale and Use Tax (IVU) or those paid by foreign corporations under Law 154—albeit it remains unclear whether the specific terms with regard to collateral are still being negotiated. What is clear, however, is a double standard, as the epistle from FEMA does not seem to reflect the human or fiscal urgency of the situation, especially in the wake of the fiscal warnings at the end of last September that “As a result of hurricanes Irma and María, the government, PREPA and AAA projected at the end of September 2017 that it would deplete its operational funds on or near October 31, 2017.” In their letter, however, FEMA and the Treasury opined that, as of December 29, 2017, the central government’s cash balance was approximately $1,700 million—an amount which, according to Portela Franco, does not detract from the fact that Puerto Rico is in a state of “insolvency.”

The head of the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority, the public corporation and governmental instrumentality in Puerto Rico which has assumed the majority of the fiscal agency and financial advisory responsibilities previously held by the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico, and the Puerto Rican entity in charge of collaboration, communication, and cooperation between the Government of Puerto Rico and the PROMESA Oversight Board, noted that the figure cited in the letter includes the reserves required by La Junta de Supervisión y Administración Financiera (JSF) to finance the process of renegotiation of the debt in court, as well as the payment of pensions and public payroll, two priority items for Governor Rosselló Nevares.

Indeed, a review of Puerto Rico’s most recent liquidity report seems to validate Mr. Portela Franco’s views, noting, for instance, in his January 5th report, that the Department of Hacienda projections include the collections which are regularly sent to Cofina—reports still awaiting the attention of U.S. Judge Laura Taylor Swain—a figure in the range of  $316 million. In addition, the report reveals that, so far this fiscal year, Puerto Rico’s central government has withheld $ 437 million from the Automobile Accident Administration (ACAA) and the Highway and Transportation Authority (ACT), among others—even as government suppliers are owed about $ 331 million and government agencies hold $ 276 million in debt to each other, including water and electricity bills. Thus, as Portela Franco and Andrés Méndez, in charge of liquidity matters in the Aafaf, noted: the government seems to undress a saint to dress others such as the AEE and the AAA: “As we have to inject liquidity to the AAA and the AEE, that balance of the Treasury’s TSA account will fall precipitously,” adding that, without the FEMA loan, it would be necessary to continue adopting what he termed “difficult decisions,” such as stretching payments to suppliers.

Unsurprisingly, Governor Rosselló Nevares, described the epistle from Washington, D.C. as one in which the “government of Puerto Rico and the Treasury have reached an agreement. The agreement is that when the collections go down in Puerto Rico, the loans begin to arrive. What does this mean? That at the moment, we still have resources that are going to be running out,but that they will want to transfer those loans once it happens to that.” The Governor also rejected that the Oversight Board has an additional responsibility in the process of granting the CDL, because PROMESA had already established that the federal entity will have authority to interfere in any loan that Puerto Rico receives. (The epistle from FEMA and the U.S. Treasury notes that the cash policy for the loan from Puerto Rico will be adopted “in consultation with the government and the JSF.”

As of the end of last month, Puerto Rico had $1.7 billion of available cash, notwithstanding earlier predictions by local officials that the government would run out of money in late October because of the economic toll of responding to the hurricanes: by the end of November, it still had funds in other accounts, albeit some of it was earmarked for specific uses and could not be used to keep Puerto Rico’s government operating.

In FEMA’s epistle to Gerardo Portela, the Executive Director of Puerto Rico’s Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority, FEMA noted: “Under this cash balance policy, funds will be provided through the CDL program when the commonwealth’s central cash balance decreases to a certain level.” Executive Director Portela, earlier this week, noted that, because of the delay in federal loans, Puerto Rico’s central government will begin procedures to allow it to lend money to the island’s public electricity and water utilities, even as he urged the federal government to distribute the loans, stating: “AAFAF has complied with all the demands of federal agencies; however, despite our continuous efforts, to date, the Treasury Department and FEMA have not provided the final terms and conditions under which they will disburse the funds granted by the Congress.” With damage from Hurricane Maria estimated to total as much as $100 billion, Governor Ricardo Rossello earlier this month warned that Puerto Rico’s electric utility may be unable to continue recovery work in February due to lack of funds—even though, more than 100 days after the storm slamming into an island which had already filed a record-setting quasi chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in May devastated Puerto Rico’s economy and destroyed its electrical grid: still today, about 45 percent of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority customers are still without power.

The Epistle:

Mr. Gerardo J. Portela Franco

Executive Director and Chairman of the Board

Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority

Government of Puerto Rico

Robe1io Sanchez Vilella Government Center

De Diego Avenue, Stop 22

San Juan, Puerto Rico, 00907

Dear Mr. Portela Franco:

This letter summarizes the Federal Government’s policy for providing Community Disaster Loan (CDL) Program assistance to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, its instrumentalities, and municipalities as a result of Hurricanes Irma (DR-4336-PR) and Maria (DR-4339-PR). The purpose of the CDL Program is to provide loans to eligible recipients that have suffered a substantial loss of tax and other revenues as a result of a major disaster and that demonstrate a need for Federal financial assistance to perform essential governmental functions. The Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act of 2017, signed into law by the President on October 26, 2017, included $4.9 billion for CD Ls to assist the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and local governments in Florida and Texas in maintaining essential services as a result of Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria.

Implementing the CDL Program in the Commonwealth must be undertaken in a manner that is compatible with the ongoing financial restructuring of the Commonwealth’s financial obligations, including pursuant to the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA). For example, pursuant to PROMESA the Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB) must approve any new debt incun-ed by the Conunonwealth or by any of its instrumentalities that the FOMB has designated as covered territorial instrumentalities under PRO MESA, including the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREP A) and the Pue1io Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA). Title III of PRO MESA also established a bankruptcy-like restructuring process for Puerto Rico and its covered territorial instrumentalities. As you are aware, the Commonwealth and PREPA have filed for Title III restructuring; PRASA has not.

As a result of Hurricanes Irma and Maria, the Commonwealth, PREP A, and PRASA projected in late

September 2017 that they would exhaust their operating funds on or about October 31, 2017. However, as of December 29, 2017, the Commonwealth’s central cash balance was approximately $1.7 billion. It is our understanding that the higher-than-expected central cash balance three months after the hurricanes resulted from greater-than-expected receipts, strategic management of payables, and the structure of relief funds from FEMA and other federal agencies, among other factors, although a review of the underlying detail is still underway. In addition to its central cash balance, on December 18, 2017, the Commonwealth released a report indicating that $6.875 billion in unrestricted and restricted cash was on deposit in over 800 accounts across all Commonwealth governmental entities. Despite these Commonwealth cash balances, the Commonwealth now indicates that PREPA and PRASA have an imminent need for liquidity in January 2018, and, as a result, each entity has applied for a CDL to cover operating expenditures.

Because the Commonwealth’s central cash balance, 1\S publicly reported, has consistently exceeded $1.5 billion in the months following the hurricanes, and considering the implications of the reported $6.875 billion of total cash across the Commonwealth, the Federal Government will institute, as a matter of policy, a Cash Balance Policy that will determine the timing of CD Ls to the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities, including PREP A and PRASA. Under this Cash Balance Policy, funds will be provided through the CDL Program when the Commonwealth’s central cash balance decreases to a certain level. This Cash Balance Policy level will be dete1mined by the Federal Government in consultation with the Commonwealth and the FOMB.

The current posture of the Federal Government is to disburse CDL program financing directly to the Commonwealth, which could then sub-lend to its various entities (including PREP A and PRASA), although this approach may be revised over time. Subsidiary borrowers will be expected to comply with remmitting, repayment, and collateral requirements that apply to the primary borrower. Unless the Cash Balance Policy level is reached, however, the Commonwealth will need to support its own liquidity needs and those of PREPA and PRASA.

Notwithstanding the above policy, local governments (as such term is defined in 42 U.S.C. §5122(8)) in Puerto Rico, including the 78 municipalities, will be eligible to apply directly for CD Ls independent of the Commonwealth under the traditional terms and conditions of Section 417 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §5184 (irrespective of the cash balance of the Commonwealth). Under these terms, a local government demonstrating a substantial loss of revenues may receive a streamlined CDL up to 25 percent of its annual budget, subject to a $5 million cap. FEMA will make arrangements to meet directly with the local governments and their management associations the week of January 15, 2018, in Puerto Rico to facilitate applications to the CDL Program onthe most timely basis possible consistent with program terms and requirements. If it is determined that a local government should require assistance beyond the $5 million cap, the Federal Government will consider providing additional financing under different terms and conditions, as appropriate.

FEMA and the Department of Treasury look forward to continuing to work with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities and local governments to ensure funding is available for operating expenses to perform governmental functions while respecting the PROMESA Title III proceedings, the statutory authorities granted to the FOMB under PROMESA, and the overall fiscal condition of the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities and local governments.

Respectfully,

Alex Amparo

Assistant Administrator Recovery Directorate

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Gary Grippo

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Finance

U.S. Department of Treasury

 

cc: Governor Ricardo Rossello Nevares, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Financial Oversight and Management Board, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico State Agency for Emergency and Disaster Management

U.S. Office of Management and Budget

Fiscal Challenges Under Federal or State Takeovers

December 6, 2017

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s Blog, we consider the fiscal and governing challenges of a city still under a state takeover, before heading south to assess the governing and fiscal challenges in a dissimilar, quasi-takeover of the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico.  

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

Fiscal, Intergovernmental, & Branches of Government Challenges under a State Takeover. Atlantic City’s Fire Department, which, like the City, remains under the control, as part of the ongoing state takeover, of the state Department of Community Affairs, faces another round of salary cuts as the state continues to cut spending in the municipality: the firefighters are anticipated to realize an 11.3 percent reduction in their salaries effective this Sunday, according to union officials, with the cuts coming just two months after Superior Court Judge Julio Mendez ruled the state had the authority to cut the Department by 15 members, to 180, after next February 15th. Moreover, in the wake of the state’s fiscal action, the state warned further salary cuts were possible, because Atlantic City only had sufficient fiscal resources to fund the department through November 30: Lisa Ryan, a spokesperson for the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, noted: “While we have made considerable progress in stabilizing Atlantic City, significant work remains in restraining the city’s unsustainable finances…Judge Mendez’s decision requiring 180 firefighters instead of the 148 the state and city believe is sufficient to maintain public safety in Atlantic City resulted in $3.8 million in additional costs.” Over the past couple of years, the size of the city’s Fire Department has continued to shrink: in January, the department had 225 members; currently there are 195. Indeed, over the last seven years, the department has been reduced by 82 members—leading Fire Chief Scott Evans to note that in what would have to be an understatement, the year has been tough on the department, or, as he put it, the cuts and ongoing litigation have been a “distraction” to the firefighters: “It’s tough to keep the focus on your job…What the guys have faced all year have been the toughest challenges.” Ms. Ryan noted: “The state and city refuse to have taxpayers and other city stakeholders shoulder the burden of these costs caused by the fire union, thereby resulting in the salary reduction of firefighters, who are still highly compensated when compared to other city employees…Notably, the police have chosen to mediate and find compromise, and we encourage firefighters to do the same.”

Siguiendo en Disarollo. Puerto Rico currently expects its central government revenues to come in 25% short of budget in this fiscal year. Geraldo Portelo Franco, the Executive Director of the Puerto Rico Fiscal Advisory and Financial Information Authority, advised the PROMESA Oversight Board yesterday, meaning Gov. Ricardo Rosselló and the PROMESA Board will have to address the shortfall as the island government struggles to address not just recovery from the devastation from Hurricane Maria, devastation which received far less of a U.S. response than Houston or Florida, but also left the island with a substantial loss of those who could afford to leave—and who may not return. Now Mr. Portelo Franco is warning that public corporations will be without cash this month, while the General Fund will see a 25 percent drop in revenues this fiscal year: while he did not specify how the central government would help PREPA and PRASA if the disaster loan under FEMA, a loan the final terms of which are still undefined—even as the full restoration of electricity and water services is urgent; Puerto Rico’s two main public corporations on the island, those which provide essential public services, appear to be without fiscal resources with which to cover their operations this month, according to Mr. Portela, when he spoke at the eleventh public meeting of the PROMESA Oversight Board in New York City. He noted that in the case of PREPA (the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority), which has not yet restored electricity service to most of its customers, the corporation will deplete what is left in its coffers by the end of the week of December 22nd; he anticipates PREPA will finish the calendar year with a cash deficit of $ 224 million. Meanwhile, the Puerto Rico Aqueducts and Sewers Authority (PRASA) is anticipated to end this month with a cash overdraft of about $ 1 million. The twin fiscal perils could, according to Mr. Portela, push Puerto Rico’s general fund into negative territory, because there might be no choice but to assist PREPA and PRASA if Washington does not allocate fiscal resources to Puerto Rico as soon as possible: in total, according to PAFAA, PREPA, and PRASA need $ 883 million of liquidity. Thus, Mr. Portela noted: “Our efforts are focus on obtaining liquidity for PREPA and PRASA through the CDL (Community Disaster Loan).”

If anything, the governance and fiscal challenge has been exacerbated, because the FEMA disaster loan, which was authorized about a month ago, but for which terms have yet to be negotiated, has yet to arrive. While Puerto Rico, as part of governing for contingencies, maintains reserves in case it needs to give liquidity to these quasi-public corporations, or, as he put it: “They (PREPA) have tried to preserve cash by managing the time of payment to suppliers,” in responding to PROMESA Board executive Arthur González, the liquidity crisis in PREPA and PRASA has complicated the governance and fiscal options facing the PROMESA Board as it confronts the challenge of approving a new fiscal plan which, among other things, seeks profound reforms of Puerto Rico’s economic framework and, in turn, will be key to the renegotiation of the debt through the cases of Title III of PROMESA. For one, if Puerto Rico uses General Fund resources, it would likely face further court challenges by Puerto Rico’s creditors—similar to a challenge already underway in the case of the bondholders of the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (Cofina). (Recently, the insurer Ambac Assurance Corporation and several investment funds have asked U.S. Judge Laura Taylor Swain to investigate how Puerto Rico’s decisions to suspend the collection of the Sales and Use Tax (IVU) will affect that debt. But, with some $700 million owed to its suppliers, Puerto Rico’s central government has no cash options. Notwithstanding the gloomy fiscal portents, Mr. Portela reported better collections in items such as the 4 percent tax, FEMA assistance, and a less severe migration than had been feared; notwithstanding, however, he noted that if the predicted drop of 25 percent in revenues materializes, the General Fund would fall short in this fiscal year by about $ 2.4 billion—ensnaring the government in delaying payments to its suppliers and contractors, as he admitted that, apart from the estimate of accounts payable already recorded (around $ 500 million), there could be up to $ 250 million in additional payments to suppliers which are pending, noting that because “certain systems were inoperative in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, there was a delay in payments and processing.”

Catch 22. With the PROMESA Board, the most likely bridge to gaining any additional fiscal help from the White House and Congress, thus a critical potential ally to Puerto Rico; the evident frustration by members of the PROMESA Board, combined with the speed with which Congress is moving on federal tax reform—but with virtually no analysis of the potential fiscal impact on Puerto Rico, albeit with a debt dwarfing Puerto Rico’s, the Board appears increasingly caught between a rock and hard place—a place Director Ana Matosantos described as “unacceptable,” adding that, for at least four times, PROMESA Board executives have asked for information on what is owed to government suppliers and contractors, stating: “This issue of not having clear things about accounts payable and the ongoing issue of late payments, at the same time that we are trying to look at what is happening economically in Puerto Rico while you have outstanding balances, is frustrating.” PRMOMESA Executive Andrew Biggs noted: “I have mostly dealt with governments at the state and federal level, but I’ve never seen a government that is so dependent on external consultants.”

The fiscal challenges, indeed, go both ways: as the exchange between the Board and officials of Gov. Ricardo Rosselló Nevares’ administration, the officials sought information and analysis of the potential fiscal impacts on Puerto Rico of the rapidly moving federal tax reform legislation in Congress—legislation, after all, which Congress’ Joint Committee on Taxation has warned will add close to $1.4 trillion to the federal debt.

Three Different Roads to Fiscal Recovery

November 6, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the next critical step in Detroit’s emergence from the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history; then we consider the ongoing legal and fiscal recovery of Ferguson, Missouri, before, finally, trying to go to school in Puerto Rico.

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

The Road Out of State Oversight. The city of Detroit expects to get the keys back to its financial house this spring for the first time since it exited bankruptcy in 2014. The question is whether it can keep the house in order once state oversight ends — and local elected officials regain control over budgets and contracts. With two balanced budgets and an audit of a third expected in May, city officials anticipate they will be released early next year from the strict financial controls required under Chapter 9 restructuring. The shift is especially important as voters cast ballots Tuesday for the Detroit leaders who will chart the city’s direction. Both Mayor Mike Duggan and challenger Coleman Young II have offered plans on how they would guide the city financially. Gov. Rick Snyder said he is optimistic about the city’s ability to manage finances on its own. “They’ve been hitting those milestones, and I hope they continue to hit them — that’s a good thing for all of us,” Snyder told The Detroit News.

There is evidence that the oversight is no longer warranted: Detroit’s credit has been upgraded among rating agencies, its employment rate is up and property values are climbing. The city, in a financial update last month, noted economic development in some neighborhoods and Detroit’s downtown, job creation efforts and growth in multifamily home construction. Experts say bankruptcy allowed Detroit to drop billions in debt, setting it on a solid financial path. But the city faces massive future payments for past borrowing and pension obligations that are difficult to plan for. “It really takes the economic environment to cooperate, as well as some very good and focused financial management. Right now, that seems to be all there,” said Lisa Washburn, managing director of the Concord, Massachusetts-based firm Municipal Market Analytics. “Eventually, I suspect there will be another economic downturn and how that affects that region, that’s something outside of their control. But it can’t be outside of their field of vision.”

Post-oversight protections. The landmark municipal bankruptcy set forth strict conditions to help Detroit avoid falling back into debt. A nine-member commission, which under the law includes Duggan and City Council President Brenda Jones, currently signs off on the city’s four-year budget plan, certain contracts and transactions. It has also empowered to review, modify and approve operational budgets. The commission was established as a condition of a financial aid package approved by the state Legislature to defray cuts to Detroit retiree pensions and shield the Detroit Institute of Arts collection from bankruptcy creditors. There are still protections even if the city is released from oversight, Detroit officials note. The state-mandated commission would continue to meet monthly and could step back in if necessary, the city’s Chief Financial Officer John Hill said. The city would continue to hold revenue estimation conferences in February and September to set budgeting limits for each fiscal year, as well as develop a four-year financial plan. Detroit’s numbers are headed in the right direction when it comes to property values, income tax collection, median income and employment. Among the positives:

■The city’s taxable value is projected to climb by about $100 million, from $6.4 billion based on the taxable values from the end of the 2016 calendar year to $6.5 billion at the end of this year, according to data from the CFO’s office.

■The city projects an increase of about $30 million in its residential real estate — the first boost in the property class in almost two decades. Detroit’s level of owner-occupied homes went from a low of 59 percent in 2010 to a projected 74 percent in 2018, based on findings from the reappraisal, officials say.

■City figures show income tax collection has gone from $263.2 million in the 2016 fiscal year to a forecast of $285 million for 2017, based on unaudited figures.

■The city’s employment has gone up from 206,568 in January 2014 to 233,068 this July, according to labor statistics.

■Detroiters’ median household income was $28,099 in 2016, a 7.5 percent hike from the previous year, according to U.S. Census estimates released in September.

Not as encouraging are poverty and crime rates. The poverty rate has dipped 4 percentage points to 35.7 percent, Detroit’s lowest since 2008. But the rate is still the highest among large U.S. cities, as is the city’s violent crime rate. “You can’t ignore what’s happening in the downtown and Midtown, but Detroit is obviously so much bigger than that,” said Matt Butler, a vice president at Moody’s Investors Service and lead analyst for Detroit. “The real story here going forward is how is Detroit able to re-create that development in other areas of the city.”

The city filed for bankruptcy in the summer of 2013 and officially exited on Dec. 10, 2014, with a plan to shed $7 billion in debt and pump $1.7 billion into restructuring and city service improvements over a decade. Last month, Moody’s Investors Service upgraded Detroit’s credit outlook and praised the city for its gains. Detroit’s economy “remains vulnerable,” the report noted, but adds it “is showing real progress.” Detroit recorded a general fund surplus of just over $63 million in fiscal year 2016 and expects an additional surplus for 2017 of about $38.5 million. For 2015, the surplus was about $71 million. But Moody’s warns of economic unknowns that could pose future problems, namely the massive contributions that loom for its two pension funds.

A funding plan forged through Detroit’s bankruptcy coined the “grand bargain” relieved the city of much of those payments through 2023. But in 2024, the city will have to start funding a substantial portion of the pension obligations from its general fund for the General Retirement System and Police and Fire Retirement System. The initial payment was first contemplated at $113.9 million, but city officials later said estimates had been off, in part because of outdated mortality tables. If earnings meet the plan of debt adjustment’s assumed return rate of 6.75 percent, the city’s contribution in 2024 would be $167 million. If there are no earnings, it could soar to $344 million or more. Contributions to the pensions would be annual and could continue for 20-30 years. Investment returns have varied greatly. To minimize a shortfall, the city’s administration established a dedicated Retiree Protection Fund that’s expected to pull together $335 million in the coming years to help meet the required contributions. The City Council would contribute a dedicated amount from its general fund each year. So far, $105 million has been set aside. Moody’s has called the fund a “credit positive action,” noting, however, that once it’s depleted in 2033 the city will be required to fund annual pension payments directly from its budget.

Retooling debt structure. CFO Hill notes that today his greatest concern is restructuring the city’s debt, so, last month, the city solicited requests for proposals from investment banks which could help address debt tied to past capital borrowing and millages—or, as Mr. Hill put it: “We think revenues should increase, but if we can also deal with the structure of the debt and lower those payments then the city will be much better off,” said Hill, adding a plan, he said, would “set the city on the course to have dealt with two of its major challenges.” Indeed, the issue of the city’s debt and finance has been, unsurprisingly, an issue in the mayoral campaign, where Mayor Duggan, during a debate, said Detroit’s City Council has been rigorous in making sure that we “watch every dollar that we have,” and he expects the city will be released from state fiscal oversight this spring—adding that, under his administration, “We won’t ever lose self-determination again.” In response, his opponent, Coleman Young, counters that Detroit will not fully regain budget and contract authority back from the state; moreover, he vowed he would, if elected, find efficiencies and reduce costs—and cut what he deemed the “top heavy” staff to manager ratio, adding: “These are some of the things I am willing to do to make sure we have a balanced budget and our finances get back in order.”  “In theory, it would be great to have as much money plowed into redevelopment as possible, but that comes at a cost,” she said. “With less than seven years away from having to start making pension payments again, you don’t want to find yourself in a budgetary hole at a time when you can see it coming.”

Ferguson’s Steep Road to Recovery. Ferguson, Missouri, a small city of about 21,000, which in 2010 was 67.4% black, and 29.3% white, with 8,192 households of which 39.1% had children under the age of 18 living with them, and 31.5% had a female householder with no husband present—and where 32.9% were non-families, is a relatively young municipality: the median age in the city was 33.1 years, while 10.3% were 65 years of age or older. The gender makeup of the city was 44.8% male and 55.2% female. It is a city where the Mayor is directly elected (Mayor James Knowles ran unopposed in 2014 in an election where voter turnout was approximately 12%.) Ferguson is one of 89 municipalities in St. Louis County, where the county police have jurisdiction throughout. It is a city where the fatal police shooting of Michael Brown still weighs.

Last Friday, in Ferguson, as part of a street theater protest, activists set fire to a model depicting the Ferguson Commission report in front of City Hall: it was a demonstration intended to mock political leaders and the city police department’s response to crime and protests in the city. The demonstration came just two weeks after St. Louis police, using a technique called “kettling,” in which exits are blocked in and people are arrested en masse, arrested dozens of protesters, residents, journalists, and legal observers as people protested, for a third day, after former police officer Jason Stockley was found not guilty in the 2011 fatal shooting of Mr. Lamar–and after Mayor Lyda Krewson challenged the city to recommit itself to reforms laid out in the Ferguson Commission report—the nearly 200-page report which had proposed 189 “calls to action,” and marked the culmination of nearly 10 months of work for a commission established by former Gov. Jay Nixon in 2015, in response to the shooting death of Michael Brown, a black teenager, by a white Ferguson police officer—a report in which Commissioners grouped their post-Ferguson calls for action into three categories: Justice for All, involving urgent police and court reforms; Youth at the Center, exploring policies to promote better lives for children; and Opportunity to Thrive, laying out changes to address economic inequalities.

Regional leaders have largely focused on the “Justice for All” component of the report, overhauling municipal court practices such as jailing defendants who could not pay their fines, even as discussion has commenced on strengthening the Civilian Oversight Board, equipping police with body cameras, and developing police policies for using force and for handling public demonstrations. The report also called for improving the public’s relationship with law enforcement through community policing, by encouraging police departments to facilitate better interactions between officers and those they serve, and allowing the public to weigh in on programs and policies through forums. Starsky Wilson, the former co-chair of the Ferguson Commission, in a recent interview with the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, noted that while police accountability and reform has clearly been the starting point for those revisiting the Commission’s findings, he hoped elected leaders would not forget the aspects of the report devoted to building a better St. Louis for the city’s children: “It can’t just be about police. That’s just one piece of the puzzle.”

Nevertheless, the Ferguson protests appear to have produced changes, particularly in Ferguson itself, where new city and police leaders came into power. The state Legislature also passed a municipal reform statute, the most significant element of which lowered the cap on revenue from traffic tickets: It can now only make up 12.5 percent of a city’s general operating revenue in St. Louis County, and 20 percent elsewhere, down from 30 percent. Moreover, municipalities which fail to submit a timely and accurate report on their finances to the state auditor will immediately lose jurisdiction over their courts. (The previous law did little to punish the many courts that ignored the limits.) The impact was swift: Ferguson’s Municipal Court revenue plummeted from $2.7 million in 2014 to roughly $500,000 in 2016.

In St. Louis, Mr. Wilson cites several achievements, including the creation of a Civilian Oversight Board and the decision to raise the city’s minimum wage, both in 2015, though state lawmakers negated the wage effort this year. Meanwhile, other bills have been introduced to address some of the Ferguson Commission’s findings, including a measure being considered by the St. Louis Board of Aldermen limiting when St. Louis police could use pepper spray and tear gas. Sponsoring Alderman Megan Green, 15th Ward, reports she hopes it will serve as a starting point for officials to discuss revising the city’s vague ordinance against unlawful assembly. Asked what changes were made in the city police department in response to the Ferguson report, spokeswoman Schron Jackson said the St. Louis Police Department has begun training officers in de-escalation tactics and how implicit bias may affect their work, as well as how to work with victims of violence who are gay, transgender, and bisexual. These kinds of higher training standards were among recommendations laid out by the Ferguson Commission. Additionally, Ms. Jackson said, the department has launched its Community Engagement and Organizational Development Division, which carries out community outreach programs.

But Mr. Wilson questions these early efforts: “When we see police arrest more than 300 people over 18 days, then we have to ask how seriously the increased training requirements were implemented…and how much culture change is actually happening, around use of force: What were the lessons that were learned surrounding de-escalation?” Allegations that police have improperly used force in recent weeks have already prompted the ACLU to challenge St. Louis police tactics in federal court. They have also sparked conversations at the St. Louis Board of Aldermen about when force should be used—and who should investigate afterward. The aldermanic public safety committee has already interviewed Maj. Mary Warnecke, deputy Commander of the department’s Bureau of Professional Standards, and Circuit Attorney Kim Gardner. Attorney Gardner has pitched the formation of a new unit in her office to investigate use-of-force incidents and officer-involved shootings, arguing that it is no longer acceptable for police to be investigating themselves.

In the long-term, the Ferguson Commission recommended shifting deadly force investigations to the Missouri Highway Patrol and the state attorney general—a recommendation in response to which Gov. Eric Greitens said he was open to considering. City lawmakers, too, are exploring Attorney Gardner’s idea, crafting legislation expanding the circuit attorney’s prosecutorial powers and giving the office the ability to open investigations into police officers’ use of force, according to Board of Aldermen President Lewis Reed, who notes that events such as the Stockley verdict can be catalysts for change, if legislators work quickly enough: noting that the creation of a Civilian Oversight Board is proof of that. The Aldermen had attempted to institute an oversight board in 2006, but the bill, which included subpoena power, was vetoed by former Mayor Francis Slay. Ferguson finally opened the door for its creation, President Reed said, but subpoena power did not have the requisite support to make it into the final product. With the continued unrest, a new mayor and a more open-minded board, Mr. Reed sees a window of opportunity to revisit subpoena power: “I see a readiness for people now to step outside of what I would call their normal comfort zone and support efforts that probably in a normal state they would be a little more hesitant to support.” Mayor Krewson supports providing subpoena power to the city’s Civilian Oversight Board, which investigates complaints against police, and has said she agrees with community leaders who have demanded local police change how they handle use-of-force investigations and prosecutions. She also has committed to establishing a Racial Equity Fund, a proposed 25-year city fund dedicated to promoting racial equity in the region. “I know I don’t have the decision-making power across all of these things, but I am committed to adding my political will to the push to find the right way to get those things done,” Mayor Krewson said after the first week of protests over Stockley. One thing the Mayor says she has the power to do immediately is oust interim Police Chief Lawrence O’Toole, who declared police “owned the night” after law enforcement used a technique called “kettling” to surround and arrest more than 100 people on a single evening. She has shown no indication that she will act before the chief hiring process plays out.  “We have all the answers we need in the report. The road map exists. The longer (Krewson) chooses not to act, the longer our city hurts,” said Charli Cooksey, a catalyst with the Forward Through Ferguson advocacy group. ‘Not a short-term endeavor.’ There may be a long road ahead in making changes laid out in the report a reality, but leaders have pointed to some encouraging signs. Wilson says he has noticed a more diverse group of people engaging in disruption this time, suggesting that people understand the problems don’t amount to “black people’s issues” alone. “These are justice issues. Racial inequity harms the entire region and all people,” he said.

Forward Through Ferguson, the advocacy group that grew out of the Ferguson Commission, plans to knock on as many as 4,000 doors to get feedback before kicking off a series of policy campaigns next spring. “It’s not a short-term endeavor,” Ms. Cooksey said: “Diverse stakeholders in the region have to be committed to this for years to come.” But those inspired to run for office after the events of Ferguson, such as Rasheen Aldridge, a former Ferguson commissioner and now 5th Ward Democratic Committeeman, contend that new leaders have emerged at the state and local levels who have a better understanding of why young people have been protesting in recent weeks. “We have new people at the table, folks who are for the people, who haven’t been bought out and who haven’t been around for a while,” Aldridge said: “They’re willing to do the work.”

Learning about Fiscal & Physical Recovery. The Department of Education of Puerto Rico expects to open 80 percent of the 1,113 public schools on the island next Monday after having relaxed the criteria to enable the schools by the pressure of parents, mothers and students who demand a return to normalcy. Through twitter, the Department of Education published the list of schools that will open. The slowness in the process of resumption of classes on the island has been criticized by parents, educators, and even legislators who complain that six weeks after the passage of hurricane Maria on the island, only 152 schools have been opened (13 percent of the total) in the educational regions of San Juan, Ponce, Mayagüez and Bayamón. Groups of parents and teachers have held protests; the Federation of Teachers of Puerto Rico (FMPR) has called for a massive demonstration for November 9th to press for the opening of closed schools.  Members of the school community claim that many of the schools are able to operate, with water, no debris, or damage that poses a danger to students, but have not been opened. Even a mother of a special education student started a hunger strike against the DE in Hato Rey to demand that classes be resumed at the Urban Elementary School in Guaynabo, because the prolonged closure is having adverse effects on her child’s health: “Children of special education, when you take away their world, when you take away their school, you take away their therapies, you are leaving them unarmed. It is another hurricane that is reaching them: “I am seeing my daughter break down day by day, I am seeing my daughter who has started to attack herself, something that five years ago she did not do.”

The criticism focuses on the slowness of the work of the US Army Corps of Engineers and a company that contracted to inspect the schools and certify that they do not represent a danger to students and that they have water service, they are free of debris and fumigated. Most the the re-opened schools are without electricity: even the education unions FMPR and National Union of Educators and Education Workers (Unete) maintain that the limited opening of schools could be part of a supposed plan to close schools and eliminate teacher positions, something which had been happening before the impacts of hurricanes Irma and Maria, when Puerto Rico’s public education system had, after severe budget cuts, closed 167 schools—and suffered a decline of some 44,000 students. To date, some 800 schools which have been inspected, but there are still another 300—leaving Education Secretary Keleher to describe her frustration with the “slowness of the inspection process,” and that the Department will not use the Corps of Engineers or the CSA private firm for these works. The Secretary added that there are about 44 schools which will not open because of structural damage; she noted that for schools that will not open, “We are going to relocate that population or to bring them a temporary school, which is like a wagon.”

The Human & Fiscal Prices of Insolvency

October 20, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the spread of Connecticut’s fiscal blues to its municipalities; then we consider the health and fiscal health challenge to Flint; before, finally, observing the seemingly worsening fiscal and human plight of Puerto Rico.

Visit the project blog: The Municipal Sustainability Project 

The Price of Solvency. It appears that the City of Hartford would have to restructure its debt to receive the requisite state assistance to keep it out of chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy under the emerging state budget compromise between the Governor and Legislature. Under the terms of the discussions, the State of Connecticut would also guarantee a major refunding of the city’s debt, as well as cover a major share of the city’s debt payments, at least for this fiscal year and next, with House Majority Leader Matt Ritter (D-Hartford) indicating this was part of a bipartisan compromise the legislature recognizes is needed to avert municipal bankruptcy: “This budget gives the city all of the tools it needs to be on a structural path to sustainability…This solution truly is a bipartisan one.” According to the city’s Mayor Luke Bronin, Hartford needs about $40 million annually in new state assistance to avert bankruptcy. The emerging agreement also includes $28 million per year for a new Municipal Accountability Review Board, likely similar to what the Commonwealth of Virginia has used so effectively, to focus on municipalities at risk of fiscal insolvency and to intervene beforehand: approximately $20 million of that $28 million would be earmarked for Hartford. The new state budget would require Hartford to restructure a significant portion of its capital debt, but the state would guarantee this refinancing, an action which—as was the case in Detroit—will help Hartford have access to lower borrowing costs: the agreement also calls for the state to pay $20 million of the city’s annual debt service—at least for this fiscal year and next.

The state actions came as Moody’s Investor Service this week placed ratings of 26 of the state’s municipalities, as well as three of the state’s regional school districts under review for downgrade, citing state aid cuts in the absence of a budget, warning those municipalities and districts face cuts in state funding equal to 100% or more of available fund balance or cash—with those cities most at risk: Hartford (which currently receives 50 percent of its revenues from the state), New Haven, New Britain, West Haven, and Bridgeport. Moody’s was even fiscally moodier, dropping the credit ratings of an additional 25 Connecticut cities and towns, and three other regional school districts, while maintaining the existing negative outlook on the rating of one town. Moody’s list did not, however, include Hartford. The down-gradings come as the state has continued to operate under Executive order in the absence of an approved fiscal budget, now more than a fiscal quarter overdue. Gov. Dannel Malloy, at the beginning of the week, had submitted his fourth FY2018-19 budget to lawmakers, a $41.3 billion spending plan in the wake of his veto last month of the version approved by the legislature, reporting that his most recent fiscal plan would eliminate some revenue proposals, including new taxes on second homes, cell phone surcharges, ridesharing fees, and daily fantasy sports fees—instead, he has proposed an additional $150 million in spending over the biennium, while simplifying the implementor language. According to Moody’s, under the Governor’s new executive order, state aid to local governments will be nearly $1 billion below last year’s level—or, as Moody’s put it: “The current budget impasse highlights the ongoing vulnerability of funding that Connecticut provides to its local governments.” Connecticut traditionally has provided significant funding to its local governments, largely through education cost sharing grants, but also through payments in lieu of taxes and other smaller governmental grants. Connecticut’s GO bond prices have deteriorated with 10-year credit spreads around 80 basis points, well above historical levels, according to Janney Capital Markets Managing Director Alan Schankel: “A state’s fiscal stress tends to flow downstream to local governments, and Connecticut is no exception.” The fiscal irony is that despite the state’s high per capita wealth, the state’s debt, at 9.2% of gross state product, is highest among the states, lagging only behind Illinois.

Not in Like Flint. U.S. District Court Judge David Lawson has ordered Flint’s City Council to choose a long-term water source for the city by Monday after it spent more than three months refusing to make a decision. In his 29-page opinion, he took Flint’s City Council to task for sitting on an April agreement backed by Mayor Karen Weaver, the state and the federal Environmental Protection Agencies that would see the city stay on the Detroit area water system through a new 30-year contract with the Great Lakes Water Authority, writing:. “The failure of leadership, in light of the past crises and manifold warnings related to the Flint water system, is breathtaking.” Judge Lawson’s decision came in response to a suit filed by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality last June in the wake of the Flint City Council ignoring the state’s deadline for a water supply decision, arguing the delay would “cause an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health in Flint.” The Council, in hearing and filings, had requested more time from the court; however, Judge Lawson wrote that the state had demonstrated potential for “irreparable injury” in Flint and that there was an urgency to act, because the city’s short-term water agreements have expired and the long-term agreement is time sensitive, concluding: “The City Council has not voted on the negotiated agreement, it has not proposed an alternative, and the future of Flint’s fragile water system—its safety, reliability, and financial stability— is in peril…Because of the city’s indecision, the court must issue its ruling.” Judge Lawson’s order likely ensures the City Council will approve the proposed contract with the Great Lakes Authority that it had been resisting though it was negotiated with Mayor Karen Weaver’s approval. The city could choose to risk defying the court order; however, the State of Michigan has warned that tens of millions of dollars in extensive repairs and updates need to be made to the inactive Flint water plant—repairs which would take three and a half years to complete.

The warnings of Wayne State University Professor Nicholas Schroeck with regard to the risk to public health and the financial stability of the water supply system appeared key to persuading Judge Lawson to side with the state and issue a pre-emptive order. The Judge, in early August, had appointed a mediator in an effort to try gain an agreement between the city and the state Dept. of Environmental Quality; however, when the sides were unable to settle, he warned that  extending Flint’s contract with the Detroit area water system beyond 30 days could result in funding problems: “It seems to me that inaction is inviting intervention.” The Weaver administration analyzed various long-term water options for Flint, and the Mayor said Tuesday the Great Lakes agreement “proved to be in the best interest of public health by avoiding another water source switch, which could result in unforeseen issues.” The Michigan DEQ praised Judge Lawson for “recognizing there is no need to wait…and remains committed to working with the City of Flint to implement a plan once a source water determination has been finalized to ensure compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act.” In its arguments before Judge Lawson, the State of Michigan had warned: “The City Council’s failure to act will result in at least a 55-63% increase in the water rate being charged to Flint residents, create an immediate risk of bankrupting the Flint water fund, will preclude required investment in Flint’s water distribution system, and create another imminent and substantial endangerment to public health in Flint.” That was similar to a statement from a key aide to Gov. Rick Snyder who had warned that stalling the water contract decision was costing the City of Flint an extra $600,000 a month, because it was paying for two sources—Great Lakes, from which it currently gets its treated water, and Karegnondi, from which it contractually would receive water by 2019 to 2020. Under the 30-year agreement with Great Lakes, Flint would no longer have to make payments to Karegnondi.

Unresponsiveness. President Trump last week awarded himself a perfect rating for his response to the hurricane that devastated Puerto Rico: “I would give myself a 10,” he responded when asked by reporters how he would score his efforts, on a one to 10 scale. He told Fox News correspondent Geraldo Rivera that Puerto Rican governments “owe a lot of money to your friends on Wall Street, and we’re going to have to wipe that out. You can say goodbye to that.” A comment to which OMB Director Mick Mulvaney noted: “I wouldn’t take it word for word.” Indeed, a week later, Congressional Republicans unveiled a relief plan that would only add to Puerto Rico’s unsustainable debt load. In his meeting this week with Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rosselló, who was in Washington to press for federal disaster relief, the President claimed: “We have provided so much, so fast.” Yet, today nearly 80 percent of the island remains without electricity, and almost 30 of the island still does not have access to clean water, according to Puerto Rican government figures.

In contrast with Texas after Hurricane Harvey and Florida after Irma, where thousands of repair workers rushed in to restring power lines, only a few hundred electrical workers from outside Puerto Rico have arrived to help: it was not until last Saturday that the Puerto Rican government said it had the federal funding needed to bring in more workers. That compares to some 5,300 workers from outside the region who converged on coastal Texas in the days after Hurricane Harvey to restore a power loss about a tenth of the size that struck Puerto Rico. Similarly, in Florida, 18,000 outside workers went in after Hurricane Irma knocked out electricity to most of the state last month, according to Florida Power and Light; whereas, in Puerto Rico, the challenge of restoration has fallen on the shoulders of about 900 members of local crews—an outcome industry experts report to be a result of poor planning, a slow response by power officials, and Puerto Rico’s dire fiscal situation—a sharp contrast to the President’s claim that his administration deserved a 10 for its response to the hurricanes which struck Puerto Rico and other parts of the United States.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, charged by FEMA with restoring Puerto Rico’s power, estimated that it needed at least 2,000 additional workers. So far, the Corps has brought only about 200 workers, and most of them were dedicated not to restoring power, but to installing generators at crucial locations. In the wake of major storms, such as Katrina, power companies typically rely on mutual aid agreements to get electricity restored: such outside companies send thousands of workers, and electric companies pay for the service with funds from FEMA. However, providing such assistance to Puerto Rico is not just logistically a greater challenge—but also a discriminatorily greater challenge: the Jones Act—which the President only suspended for ten days—means that the time and cost of shipping comes at a 20% premium.  

The Human Storm. Maria risks accelerating the trend of the last decade of economic decline and depopulation, described as “a slower-moving catastrophe,” which is wreaking a devastating toll: The number of residents had plunged by 11 percent, the economy had shrunk by 15 percent, and the government has become fiscally insolvent. Already ranked among the worst cycles of economic decline and depopulation in postwar American history, the aftermath of Maria threatens an acceleration of residents fleeing en masse: accelerating economic decline and potentially accelerating a vicious cycle. Lyman Stone, an independent migration researcher and economist at the Agriculture Department notes: “We are watching a real live demographic and population collapse on a monumental scale.” At a news conference last week, Gov. Rosselló warned that without significant help, “millions” could leave for the U.S. mainland: You’re not going to get hundreds of thousands of Puerto Ricans moving to the States—you’re going to get millions…You’re going to get millions, creating a devastating demographic shift for us here in Puerto Rico.” Puerto Rico Treasury Secretary Raúl Maldonado has warned, meanwhile, that without more aid, the government could suffer a shutdown by the end of the month.

Today, only about 40 percent of Puerto Ricans in the territory are employed or seeking work—more than 33% below levels on the mainland. The danger, now, is of increased flight—but flight by the young and those with college degrees. After all, with the PROMESA Board charged with fashioning a fiscal plan to pay off more than $70 billion in Puerto Rico’s municipal debt calling for efforts to raise taxes and significant cuts to the government, the Board has predicted continuing shrinkage of the Puerto Rican economy. Thus, there is a real apprehension

As a result, for Washington and Puerto Rican officials planning a recovery, the ongoing exodus poses a multifaceted dilemma. “They’ve got to start from the ground up,” a former U.S. Treasury official said of any new plan for the island. In the short-term, at least, the island is likely to see an economic boost; rebuilding after a hurricane often injects a jolt of spending into local economies. But, according to recent research of 90 years of natural disasters in the United States, published as a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper, major natural disasters also have unfavorable effects: They increase out-migration, lower home prices, and raise poverty rates. Like many on the island, Sergio M. Marxuach, policy director for the Center for a New Economy, a San Juan-based think tank, said a massive federal investment is necessary. “We’re going to need some significant government intervention — essentially a big rescue package, not only to rebuild the economy but get it growing…People are saying, ‘I don’t want my children to grow up in a place where the economy is going to be devastated for the next 10 years.’ If enough people think that way, it’s going to be a self-reinforcing downward spiral.”

In addressing complaints about ongoing struggles on the island, President Trump noted this week that the disaster in Puerto Rico in many ways had begun years ago. Puerto Rico “was in very poor shape before the hurricanes ever hit. Their electrical grid was destroyed before the hurricanes got there. It was in very bad shape, was not working, was in bankruptcy.”

At the Level of a Muncipio. While many have considered the fiscal and physical impact on the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, fewer have considered the fiscal challenge to Puerto Rico’s municipalities. Consider, for instance, Juncos, one of Puerto Rico’s 78 municipalities: it is located in the eastern central region of the island; it is spread over 9 wards and Juncos Pueblo (the downtown area and the administrative center of the city). The city, one of the oldest in the United States,was founded on the request of Tomas Pizarro on August 2, 1797, having previously been a village which evolved from a small ranch, the Hatillo de los Juncos. Hurricane Maria has changed this municipality forever: more than 1,000 families in Juncos lost it all that unforgettable September 20th, when Hurricane Maria struck. Yet, in a remarkable effort, residents of the La Hormiga sector of Las Piñas neighborhood, in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, organized to help recover the humble community that is often highlighted by criminal incidents in the area: one of the community leaders of the sector, Wanda Bonilla, highlighted the deed of the trash rescuers: “Thanks to them, they have also relieved the pick up of the rubble.” The city’s community board worked immediately to install a shelter in the neighborhood community center given the circumstances that some 17 families, with between five and seven members each, where the storm tore the roofs off their homes—and most of those homes have single mothers. She noted: “Our president, Ivelisse Esquilín, who also lost everything, is helping us through the Municipality and with other donations.” Juncos Mayor Alfredo Alejandro noted that, in the wake of the storm, crossing arms was not an option for anyone “in the neighborhood” even though many of the 60 families living in the sector experienced the grief of having lost their home: “You have to do it because imagine …right now, look here, I have these pieces of a car to see if I invent a type of small generator to, even be, to turn on a fan.” The Mayor described Maria’s devastation to be of “great proportions:” Out of population of 42,000 people, more than 1,000 lost their homes and a comparable number suffered major damage to their structures; 85% of the city’s residents are still without potable water, while there are few expectations that electricity will soon be restored.