Fiscal Recoveries from Fiscal & Physical Storms

eBlog

February 23, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the municipal fiscal threats to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, before taking a fiscal spin on the roulette tables of Atlantic City.

Fiscal Hurricane Fallout. Jaison R. Abel, Jason Bram, Richard Deitz, and Jonathan Hastings of the New York Federal Reserve this week, in their examination of the fallout in the wake of Hurricanes Irma and Maria on the economies of the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands noted that both were suffering from significant economic downturns and fiscal stress well before the storms hit nearly six months ago—noting that in their wake, the initial job losses in Puerto Rico totaled about 4 percent; in the U.S. Virgin Islands, job losses were double that—and there has been no rebound thus far. The authors wrote that these losses are considerably steeper than what has typically been experienced in the wake of most significant U.S. natural disasters, albeit not nearly as devastating as Hurricane Katrina’s unprecedented impact on the New Orleans economy more than a decade ago. The Fed three noted that domestic air passenger data indicate that from last September through November, more than 150,000 people left Puerto Rico, net of arrivals, and that the number who left the U.S. Virgin Islands was proportionally even larger. Thus, they opined, looking ahead, recovery will be affected by a variety of factors: especially: the level degree of out-migration, the level of external aid these economies receive, and the effectiveness of fiscal and other reforms—especially in Puerto Rico. They noted that Hurricane Maria was the most devastating hurricane to slam Puerto Rico in nearly a century—leaving an enormous toll of lives, homes, and businesses lost or suffering enormous damage, devastation of most crops and other agricultural assets, and severe havoc to its public infrastructure, adding that both for responding to the human and economic misery, the island’s experiencing of the most severe power outage in U.S. history means “it may still take months to fully restore electricity and other critical infrastructure,” describing the devastation to the U.S. Virgin Islands as similar, especially St. Croix, where I taught school long before most readers were born.

Nevertheless, the Fed Gang of Three wrote that recovery is underway in both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, reporting that, as of last month, satellite images of nighttime lights suggest roughly 75 percent power restoration for Puerto Rico overall, with the southern and western parts of the island seeing nearly full restoration, and San Juan close to that level. In contrast, however, they determined that the eastern end of Puerto Rico and many interior areas have lagged substantially. As of the end of last year, they reported that the labor market has begun to recover in Puerto Rico: employment in leisure and hospitality (largely restaurants), the sector usually most affected by natural disasters, have started to bounce back in Puerto Rico, albeit not yet in the U.S. Virgin Islands. And, as often happens following natural disasters, jobs are being added in both Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in industries involved in clean-up, restoration, and rebuilding efforts—most notably, construction. Thus, they believe Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are confronted with a long and difficult recovery process ahead—a fiscal and physical process made all the more difficult because of poor economic and fiscal conditions prior to the storms.  

Financing a Recovering City’s Emergence from a State Takeover. The Atlantic City Council has voted approval the issuance of debt to pay off millions the municipality owes to pay off deferred pension and health care contributions from 2015—after, in 2015, state officials had urged the delay of some $37.2 million in pension and health care contributions—a delay which, today, officials note has added up to about $47 million with the added interest. In the ordinance the Council voted Wednesday 6-3 to authorize, Atlantic City can now issue as much as $55 million worth of municipal bonds to help finance those accrued debts, with the vote coming in the wake of a lengthy discussion between the Council and 13 residents, each of whom spoke in opposition: some urged the elected leaders to table the matter for further review, while others questioned who had authorized the deferment, whether the city was obligated to pay the interest rate, and whether there were other options to finance the debt—debt which, as of the end of the calendar year, had reached more than $344 million in outstanding debt. Timothy Cunningham, New Jersey’s local government services director and now the state appointed takeover appointee, has explained to residents the option to bond for the deferred payments would prevent it from having to go into the general fund—that is in lieu of the city being forced to raise tax rates: the municipal bond interest payments would instead be financed via the Investment Alternative Tax from casinos, which, under state takeover regulations, are redirected to be used in Atlantic City for debt service, he noted. The City Council had originally slated the issue for a vote last month, but withdrew the scheduled vote in order to host two public hearings on the matter.

At the session, Councilman Jesse Kurtz said he would have preferred a different resolution to making the payments, questioning whether Atlantic City would be obligated to pay back the payments’ interest if the deferment was at the suggestion of the State, noting it did not “sit right” with him to vote for the ordinance without a formal statement from Gov. Phil Murphy’s administration authorizing it: “When we’re short on money, the answer is to borrow money…I don’t like that.” Atlantic City Council President Marty Small responded that after the ordinance was pulled last month, city and state officials asked the Governor’s administration for forgiveness on the payment; however, the response was negative, adding that the city knew the day was coming to pay the deferred payments—and that such payment was the city’s obligation: to act otherwise, he noted, would be “putting the taxpayers in harm’s way” if they did not act to borrow to make the payments: “It’s not us versus you: What affects you, affects us.” Councilmember Kurtz, along with Councilmen Moisse Delgado and Jeffree Fauntleroy II, voted against the measure, while Councilmembers Small, George Tibbitt, Chuen “Jimmy” Cheng, William Marsh, Kaleem Shabazz, and Aaron Randolph voted aye. For his part, Mayor Frank Gilliam, told his colleagues in opposing the matter, the city needs to come up with “better ways to deal with our finances,” regardless of whether council passed the bond ordinance: “We’re still $400 million in debt.”

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Let there Be Light & Emergency Relief

February 12, 2018

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the courtroom efforts to secure emergency relief so that electric service is not disrupted in Puerto Rico—threatening critical services and the island’s only hopes for recovery from its quasi chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy.

Dark Fiscal Imbalances.  U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain last night rejected a motion filed by the PROMESA Oversight Board for the central government to grant an emergency loan to the Electric Power Authority (PREPA), indicating that the federal agency failed to demonstrate the need for this financing although there is an immediate need for liquidity, albeit, she indicated the Board may file a new amended motion requesting a lesser amount and make adjustments to clarify the payment priority that financing will have without affecting the rights of the creditors—with her ruling coming down in the wake of a six and a half hour hearing at which the court was unconvinced of their respective arguments that PREPA needed the nearly $1 billion it had requested in its initial motion. Judge Swain indicated that any new financing requested should not exceed about $ 300 million—telling the court: “The lights cannot be turned off in Puerto Rico,” as she advised the parties she will need a clearer understanding of the priorities for any new financing. She made that ruling notwithstanding the warning from PREPA financial advisor Todd Filsinger, who advised the court that if a loan were not received as soon as possible, PREPA would be forced to activate its emergency plan to begin the cessation of operations and an eventual suspension of electric service.

The courtroom drama came as the Chief Financial Advisor of the Electric Power Authority (AEE), Todd Filsinger, yesterday indicated that the public corporation intends to implement an emergency plan starting today which could lead to the suspension of its employees as well as disruption of the operations of its generating plants—actions which would force the “rationing” of electric services, likely plunging homes, businesses, and industries into darkness” an emergency loan from the central government.  Mr. Filsinger made clear that should the plan be triggered, there would be a warning, as early as this morning, followed by a rolling suspension of operations, and a gradual suspension of employees; services to hospitals, police stations, firefighters, and gas stations would continue.

PREPA is seeking a loan of as much as $1.3 billion—a request the Board did not reject out of hand, but rather indicated a lesser amount of as much as $1 billion might be considered. In principle, the loan would be around $ 1,300 million, but last night the Board of Fiscal Supervision (JSF), acting on behalf of the government and the AEE, modified its request to about $ 1,000 million. There is urgency: Mr. Filsinger warned that unless PREPA receives an emergency loan by this weekend, the utility would only be able to maintain its operations for several additional weeks, after which it would no longer even be able to pay for the fuel it needs to generate electricity, testifying: “If we do not have the loan, and we do not receive the cash, we could be implementing the contingency measures on Saturday.”

Earlier in the hearing, Joseph Davis, the lawyer representing the Financial Advisory Authority and Fiscal Agency, warned of the fiscal cliff the agency faces, advising the panel it has delayed payments to suppliers as much as possible in an effort to preserve as much of its funds as possible, in attempt to render the cash they have available, but that there will be little option but to trigger additional contingencies, such as rationing services, partly because fuel suppliers have already threatened to halt service. The power authority’s emergency plan would be enforced even as some 400,000 subscribers remain without power, and after approximately 1.1 million subscribers had already experienced the longest interruption of electric service in Puerto Rico’s history in the immediate wake of Hurricane Maria. The threat to human life and safety came as the respective parties in the New York City courtroom—parties representing the Board, bondholders, and Puerto Rico, as well as insurers continued to file motions.

As if these human risks were insufficient, Judge Swain has also been confronted with arguments from contractors, such as ARC, Lord Electric, and Whitefish Holdings, who claim that PREPA must meet its payment obligations for restoration of the electricity grid after Hurricane Maria, as well as bondholders—who, for the most part, live far, far from Puerto Rico, but are seeking compensation for impairment of the rights of municipal bondholders.

The Board, at the end of last month, alleging that PREPA faces losses in excess of $1 billion, had requested Judge Swain to approve a post-requisition loan for the public utility—a loan critical to . According to the motion issued by the JSF, seeking a super priority, as PREPA sought the fiscal and physical capacity to insure its operations until the end of the fiscal year and avoid closing operations this month—in effect, asking the court to provide a super priority of payment to the central government.

Yesterday, in a last-ditch effort to assist the power authority, the Ad Hoc-AEE group and the insurance company, Syncora, which guarantee part of the public corporation’s debt, presented a new financing proposal, a proposal which the oversight Board rejected outright, noting: “The notification of the group of bondholders of the ESA is not a valid proposal and does not have a strong reason to deny the motion for post-petition financing for the PREPA.”

A Valentine’s Day Message?

St. Valentine’s Day, 2018

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the continued scrutiny by the PROMESA Board and Puerto Rico’s progress in not just recovering from Hurricane Maria—but also from its quasi chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. That progress has been achieved through federal assistance, the Board’s vigorous oversight, and, as we note, tax and spending changes undertaken by the government of Puerto Rico.  

Fiscal Imbalances.  While states, cities, and counties operate in regular order, the federal shutdown, far into the federal fiscal year, illustrated the challenge to state and local governments of the unpredictability of federal funding that state and local governments would otherwise count upon. Now, in the wake of Congress’ vote to suspend the national debt ceiling, the package included nearly $100 billion in disaster aid, as well as extend a number of expired tax provisions, including a Jan. 1, 2022 extension of the rum cover-over for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands—an extension projected to generate an estimated $900 million for the two U.S. territories, as well as a related tax provision which would, at long last, allow low-income Puerto Rican muncipios to be treated as qualified opportunity zones: that disaster aid includes $4.9 billion to provide 100% federal funding for Medicaid health services for low-income residents of Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands for two years and $11 billion of Community Development Block Grants for the two territories, including $2 billion of CDBG money to rebuild Puerto Rico’s electrical grid. Puerto Rico anticipates it will be the recipient of as much as $18 billion—with an option to access a line of credit of as much as $4 billion—albeit, to the extent the territory can continue to demonstrate its lack of liquidity. Those amounts, including $4.8 billion in Medicaid, and $11 billion from HUD, however, are subject to conditions of both the federal government and the PROMESA Board. HUD Deputy Secretary Pamela Hughes Patenaude last week stated HUD would award $1.5 billion to assist in the repair of damaged homes and business structure, while FEMA has already awarded $300 million, half of which is via a loan. In addition, the aid includes $14 million in the Women, Infants & Children (WIC) program assistance. The package provides some $14 million for the Army Corps of Engineers to award contracts to U.S. electric companies to repair the power grid. Importantly, the FEMA funding will provide not just for improvements in the island’s public power system, but also for repairs: Puerto Rico has guestimated it will require $ 94.4 billion to rebuild the island’s public infrastructure.

Puerto Rico’s non-voting Representative in Congress, Jenniffer González, noted the next disaster relief resolution may be discussed in Congress later this Spring—at which point she anticipates the critical focus Will be on Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. She noted: “Speaker Paul Ryan told me that there is going to be a fourth bill on supplementary allocations for Puerto Rico with specific projects for transportation and electric power.” U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) noted that claims of states such as Florida and Texas were very helpful in recent efforts in favor of funds for Puerto Rico; however, he warned that Congress needs to allocate additional funds for disasters regularly: “There are other places that, by then, will have needs.”

Negocios. Meanwhile, with regard to the fiscal storm, the fiscal amendments Governor Ricardo Rosselló presented to the PROMESA this week presented a more positive outlook for creditors to reach an accumulated surplus of $3,400 million, even as his offer retained virtually unchanged the terms of fiscal measures and severe cuts in government revenues over the next 5 fiscal years. The plan the Governor presented, moreover, did not comply with the requirements to reduce the pensions of government retirees, nor to eliminate additional labor protections for private sector workers, after the notification of violation of the federal PROMESA law—demands calling for a series of amendments, including a 25% reduction in pensions exceeding $1,000 per month (in combination with social insurance), in addition to the elimination of a series of protections for private sector employees. Indeed, in an interview with El Vocero, Gov. Rosselló replied that his administration is neither contemplating reductions to pensions nor including legislation to eliminate the employer’s obligation to pay the Christmas bonus and compensation for unjustified dismissal or to reduce the requirements for vacation leave and sick leave, stating: “We are not contemplating reductions in pensions.” As for eliminating labor protections, the Governor made clear: “We have not included that in the reform of human capital… certainly, it is an area that is important for us to work: how do we raise labor participation in Puerto Rico? How do we encourage them to transition to work? “

The most dramatic modification of the tax plan proposed by Gov. Rossello is the elimination of the aggregate deficit of $3,400 million for the FY2022 budget, since the previous version of its fiscal plan was in default with the objective of eliminating structural deficits: as early as FY2019, he projects the government will achieve a surplus of $750 million, thanks in large part, according to the Governor, to the federal assistance provided by Congress. Even though it had been estimated that the aid to date has reached $16.5 million, Puerto Rican authorities assert only $12,800 million has been incorporated as a result of supplementary allocations in the fiscal plan—allocations related to the FEMA $ 35.3 billion in the public assistance program and $21 billion in private insurance. The Governor noted his administration plans to spend $13 million of disaster recovery funds for Hurricane Maria, enabling, he added, a GDP growth projection of 8.4%. He also noted he expects a reduction in the rate of emigration from Puerto Rico down to 2.4%.

Unsurprisingly, he warned, the most difficult challenge will be what he termed the FY2020 Medicaid fiscal cliff –the year when the current Congressional appropriated funds will be exhausted. To address that abyss, he said the government has intensified cuts to government programs, as well as adopted measures to increase revenues, resulting, he asserted, in a positive or surplus balance of $800 million for FY 2023, noting: “Stabilization (the surplus) continues with other structural measures and impacts that have: the reduction in expenditures by government items and the rightsizing (shrinking) that is being done.” It appears that the $800 million projected surplus was included in the analysis of the sustainability of the public debt, an element which will be considered by the PROMESA quasi-bankruptcy court for the payment arrangement to the creditors—or, as he put it: “The discussion with the creditors will go by Title III, in everything that has not been agreed by Title VI. It is a numerical exercise, without differentiating creditors, about the numbers that reflect the fiscal plan, and that will certainly be part of the elements of judgment…that the judge would use in her determinations.”

The Governor noted that cuts to agencies such as Education, Corrections, Health, as well as across the board via shrinking services and utilizing tighter payroll control have succeeded in increasing revenues by $29 million; nevertheless, he added, because the new revenues failed to meet the anticipated goals, the agency, Mi Salud, will continue to be required to face an FY2022 reduction of some $795.

Fiscal & Physical Imbalances

Lincoln’s Birthday, February 12, 2018

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the outcome of last week’s actions to avoid another federal government shutdown, we consider the ongoing fiscal and physical plights of Puerto Rico.

Fiscal & Physical Imbalances.  Puerto Rico’s non-voting Member of Congress, Jenniffer Gonzalez, and Gov. Ricardo Rosselló have met with a group of New Progressive Mayors to describe the terms of the new federal assistance under the just passed $16 billion recovery assistance approved by Congress—funds ranging from what Secretary of Public Affairs Ramón Rosario Cortés noted would “range from construction to agriculture programs that will allow each municipality to develop its economy and create jobs.” The Secretary anticipates there will be a second meeting with associate mayors. Naguabo Mayor Noé Marcano said that the allocation of these funds represents “a unique opportunity” to repair and/or build infrastructure projects (including roads and bridges) and housing: “Part of the projects that we-at a given moment-had planned as improvements to the municipalities, we understand that this is the best opportunity.”

That could mean a new fiscal chance for this small muncipio of just over 23,000, one founded on July 15, 1821 near the mouth of the Daguao River—founded with the intent of providing a defense for the region from the Caribe Indians, based upon, 27 years earlier, the request of several influential neighbors of the Spanish Crown: on January 9, 1798, the erection of the Naguabo parish was authorized—but construction did not commence on its church until 1841. The muncipio’s name originated from the cacique and chieftainship named Daguao—as the territory was originally populated by Taíno Indians. Naguabo is also known as Cuna de Grandes Artistas (the birthplace of Great Artists) and Los Enchumbaos, “the Soaked Ones.”

For his part, Mayor William Aliceo of Aibonito, the City of Flowers, with the city’s appellation derived from the Taíno word “Jatibonicu,” the name of a Cacique leader of the region; a name also used to refer to a river in the area—and, in addition, a name used by the tribe of Orocobix. At the same time, there is a legend that tells of a Spanish soldier, Diego Alvarez, who, on May 17, 1615, reached one of the highest peaks in the area: upon taking in the view, he exclaimed: “Ay, que bonito!” The exclamation eventually led to the name of the region. Nearly two centuries later, Pedro Zorascoechea, in 1630, was one of the early Spaniards to settle on the island—apparently establishing one of the first fincas or ranches in the region; however, it was not until 1822, when Don Manuel Veléz presented himself before the government, representing the inhabitants of the area, to request that Aibonito be officially declared a town—a request which then Governor Miguel de la Torre granted on March 13, 1824.

Hurricane Maria’s eye tore through the region’s hills on September 20th: it was especially fierce along the exposed ridgelines, whipping in at a hundred and fifty-five miles an hour: it tore apart wooden houses; along the road leading up to Aibonito from San Juan, normally a two-hour drive, Maria tore a panorama of ruined houses and businesses, toppled and twisted trees, and downed utility poles. Mayor Aliceo said he would like to use part of the recovery funds for agriculture, roads, and electrical infrastructure: “In Aibonito, we have a project submitted to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for the canalization of the Aibonito River. And with poultry farming, which was well affected by Hurricane Maria, I’m interested (the funds) will find a way to help Aibonito’s poultry farmers, given the million-dollar losses they’ve had.”

The federal allocation came just prior to Puerto Rico’s resubmission of its revised fiscal plans to the PROMESA oversight Board—plans due today, with Puerto Rico’s representative, Christian Sobrino, simply advising the board that the plans comply with the public policy of the government, noting: “[W]e will comply with the stipulated date for the delivery of the fiscal plans. It has been an intense job, but the government will comply with the appointed time. The plans will continue in accordance with the Governor’s public policy of protecting the most vulnerable and that this document serves as a tool of fiscal responsibility and at the same time a path of long-term socio-economic development for the island.”

Nevertheless, uncertainty reigns, especially in the wake of the federal government shutdown. With last week’s Congressional approval of a package to keeps federal agencies running through March 23rd, the date of certainty has now been pushed off while House and Senate appropriators in Washington, D.C. work on final 2018 spending bills. The package suspends the debt ceiling through March 1, 2019, provides $89.3 billion in disaster aid, and extends a number of expired tax provisions, including a Jan. 1, 2022 extension of the rum cover-over for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, which is projected to generate an estimated $900 million for the two U.S. territories. In addition, a related tax provision calls for all low-income communities in Puerto Rico to be treated as qualified opportunity zones. The disaster aid includes $4.9 billion to provide 100% federal funding for Medicaid health services for low-income residents of Puerto Rico and  the U.S. Virgin Islands for two years, $11 billion in CDBG block grants for the two territories, including $2 billion of CDBG money to rebuild Puerto Rico’s electrical grid—with Resident Commissioner Gonzalez reporting that, in total, $16.55 billion of the disaster aid is earmarked for Puerto Rico.

With the new allocations to mitigate last year’s natural disasters, the federal government has already authorized just over $140.7 billion within the past six months to be distributed mainly between Texas, Florida, California, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands—with Puerto Rico’s government projecting its share will be approximately $18 billion, plus access to a credit line of $4 billion—albeit, to access that line, the U.S. territory would be mandated to prove lack of liquidity. Of the total, almost $16 billion will surely go to the island from the funds allocated in the budget bill and to mitigate disasters—provided the territory complies with the conditions of both the federal government and the PROMESA Oversight Board. The projected package includes $4.8 billion for Medicaid and $11 billion for CDBG: last week, HUD Deputy Secretary Pamela Hughes Patenaude announced, during a visit to San Juan, that HUD will award $1.5 billion to help repair damaged houses and businesses. In addition, another $ 300 million, half of which would be allocated as a loan, has been allocated to match the FEMA project’s cost. The package includes $6 billion, funds under the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, provided to U.S. electric companies to repair the power grid. FEMA has stated, moreover, its intent to grant an additional $13 billion to the island.

Puerto Rico’s Federal Affairs Executive Director, Carlos Mercador, notes that an official damage estimate from federal agencies is still pending; Commissioner González notes that Congress’ next disasters relief resolution may be discussed in Congress between April and May, noting: “Speaker Paul Ryan told me that there is going to be a fourth bill on supplementary allocations for Puerto Rico, with specific projects for transportation and electric power.”

Is There a Checkered Flag to Mark an Exit from Municipal Insolvency?

February 5, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider: the ongoing challenge for Hartford to keep its fiscal head out of debt waters; efforts to create a municipal recovery fund in Puerto Rico for its beleaguered muncipios; and the uncertain promises of PROMESA.

Taking the Checkered Flag. Hartford city officials are concerned that they cannot find a 30-year-old insurance policy—a policy which could play a key role in any damages or settlement the capitol city would have to pay in a lawsuit filed by a man wrongly imprisoned for murder for two decades—and could weigh in the city’s efforts to regain its fiscal momentum from the brink of chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Indeed, the inability to locate the policy has prompted federal Magistrate Judge Joan Margolis to order the city to subpoena insurance companies in an effort to find it. The suit in question, filed seven years ago, against the city and police officials, alleged malicious prosecution, suppression of evidence, and violation of his civil rights. City officials deny the allegations; however, in the seven years since the suit was filed, they have been unable to come up with the policy. His lawyers have been seeking information on the city’s insurance policies since the lawsuit was filed nearly seven years ago—a lawsuit over a murder conviction—which was itself overturned based on new DNA testing that resulted in another man being convicted—so that state officials subsequently awarded the accused $6 million for his wrongful conviction. Now the missing so-called “excess” policy could turn out to be key in the lawsuit, because it would cover any damages or settlement the city would be required or directed by the court to pay above $2 million—the current Hartford liability limit. The City’s insurance carrier, Travelers, has recommended to the city that it notify the carrier of its excess policy about the lawsuit, because of the chance that any award could exceed $2 million—albeit, it remains unclear whether Hartford’s insurance policies in effect in 2011, when the lawsuit in question was filed, would cover any award to him. The litigation and potential fiscal exposure comes at a fiscally unpropitious time in the wake of Moody’s, last week, had just revised upwards the city’s credit rating, lifting its general obligation bond rating from negative to developing, citing last year’s appointment of the Municipal Accountability Review Board (MARB), which had been established by §367 of Public Act 17-2  as well as the statutory provisions contained in §§Section 349 to 376 of the Act for the purpose of providing technical, financial, and other assistance and related accountability for municipalities experiencing various levels of fiscal distress: the Board is made up of 11 members, appointed as follows: Secretary of OPM, or designee, Chairperson; State Treasurer, or designee, Co-chairperson; Five members appointed by the Governor: a municipal finance director; a municipal bond or bankruptcy attorney; a town manager; a member having significant experience representing organized labor from a list of three recommendations by AFSCME; a member having significant experience as a teacher or representing a teacher’s organization selected from a list of three joint recommendations by CEA and AFT-CT. In addition, one member is appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, one by the Speaker of the House, one by the Minority Leader of the Senate, and one by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, each of whom shall have experience in business, finance or municipal management.

The events unfolding in the courtroom occurred as Moody’s had brightened the fiscal outlook for the beleaguered city with its upward revision of the city’s rating from negative, specifically citing the creation of the review board—with its upwards revision reflecting the reduced chances of the city being forced into default or chapter 9, albeit Moody’s hedged its outlook by writing: “[T]here remains a possibility of significant bondholder impairment over the long-term, given the city’s distressed financial condition.” Moody’s has unmoodily noted it might upgrade the city’s fiscal outlook, if

  • the state oversight board designates Hartford as a Tier III municipality and executes a state debt assistance contract;
  • the city develops a long-term financial sustainability plan;
  • completes negotiations with bond insurers and bondholders which generate recovery of at least 80% of principal; and
  • makes timely payments on all debt with expressed commitments to fully honor future obligations.

In the alternative, the rating agency warns that a default on the city’s debt or an indication that bondholder recoveries would fall below 65% of principal in a potential debt restructuring would lead to a further downgrade.

Puerto Rico Municipal Recovery Fund? Governor Ricardo Rosselló is going to try again to get a legislation that creates a $ 100 million Municipal Recovery Fund to help mayors keep their governments afloat after Hurricane Maria shrunk their income. The Governor had planned to send to the Legislature a new version of the bill to establish such fund, in the wake of the PROMESA Board’s veto: in order to comply with the objections made by the Board, the Governor announced that the fund will have “transparent” eligibility requirements to evaluate the fall in municipal revenue collections. His proposal also proposes to create a structure that resembles the federal Community Disaster Loans program–and specify the accounts from which the Treasury Department would finance the aid, with amendments, including that the Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority (FAFAA) certify the need for the loans, which would be limited to $5 million per muncipio. In the statement issued from his office: “The Governor had submitted a bill for these purposes, which established by law the objective criteria to certify the municipal need. However, during the legislative process modifications were made to the way of allocating the resources of the Municipal Recovery Fund.” Those modifications were discussed by FAFAA with the Oversight Board, in order to ensure its final approval, if the measure is ratified again by the Legislature. (Because it is a bill related to the budget, it requires the approval of the PROMESA Board.) Nevertheless, the Governor appeared confident, stating: “I am confident that this project will be approved quickly and this way it will provide the aid our mayors need for their recovery works as soon as possible,” as he acknowledged the crisis faced by the municipalities, many of which fear being left without liquidity this spring. Thus, he told the PROMESA Board that his revised fiscal plan seeks to postpone “the reduction of the municipal subsidy that the Board originally approved.” For the island’s municipal leaders, that means they will also seek to have access to the line of credit of the FEMA CDL program approved by Congress last October.  According to Mayor Josian Santiago, the former president of the Puerto Rico Association of Mayors,   of Comerio, a municipio of just under 21,000 with an unemployment rate of 13%, located in the center-eastern region of island, more than 40 municipalities may currently lack sufficient fiscal liquidity to operate normally, unless they receive an injection of funds from the federal line of credit or from the local fund which Governor Rosselló is once again trying to create. The Mayor noted that the Municipal Revenue Collection Center has advanced the municipalities’ months of income projections, which it distributes, but which could now be forced to sell old debts in order to meet its obligations for the remainder of the fiscal year. (The island’s mayors have already been provided guidance with regard to how to access a federal line of credit, which must not exceed 25 percent of their budget.) In the case of Comerío, with a budget of around $9 million and, according to the evidence on the loss of income that it can provide, it could be eligible to receive up to about $ 2.25 million.

The Promise of PROMESA? During the meeting of the PROMESA Board in New York City at the end of last week, several experts agreed that hurricane Maria demonstrated the lack of a clear leadership in the Puerto Rican government, creating an inability to make decisions about its energy system, a problem that is still present in the face of the transformation required by the Electric Power Authority (PREPA). Indeed, FEMA Deputy Regional Administrator Asha Trible said that, during the emergency, the high level of bureaucracy in PREPA was a major obstacle, testifying: “It does not work…when you have eight layers to be able to approve something,” adding that in the times of greatest crisis, the bureaucracy added to liquidity problems of the public company, that “could not pay for the materials they ordered.” Administrator Trible, subsequent to the session, that early in the process, FEMA had suggested ideas, such as creating a central command for the emergency, with a single coordinator for PREPA, adding: “We avoided that they thought we were there to take control…We would have established a command structure, we tried to suggest that kind of thing, but we support the process that is there.” The session came as Governor Ricardo Rosselló has proposed to privatize PREPA assets, including the generation of electricity, and as a preamble to the certification of new fiscal plans of the central government and the public corporation—and came hard on the heels of the PROMESA Board’s request to Judge Laura Taylor Swain to allow the central government to lend $ 1.3 billion to PREPA to avoid its financial collapse this month—a request which the majority of the panel’s seventeen experts, noting the challenges the public corporation faces, instead advocated for a strong and independent regulator of the energy system, even as they stressed the need to obtain financing to modernize PREPA.

Too Many Cooks in the Cocina? John Paul Rossi, a historian at Penn State University-Erie, who is an expert on the history of American business, technology, communications, and transportation, argued that  the Governor, the Governing Board of the public corporation, the Oversight Board and the Energy Commission are now in the development of public policy for PREPA—without even mentioning different voices from the nearly insolvent U.S. Congress—that “There are too many people. We are scaring consumers and investors.” His comments came as Nisha Desai, a member of PREPA’s Governing Board, noted that PREPA is close to replacing former Executive Director Ricardo Ramos, with the utility’s governing board vetting several potential hires referred by a consultant tapped to help the utility find its new leader: deeming such a decision critical to PREPA’s recovery from September’s Hurricane Maria. Ms. Desai, an executive of the Texas Renewable Energy Industries Alliance, said that, along with two other “independent” members of the Governing Board, they are poised to select the next PREPA Executive Director, noting that, in order to rejuvenate PREPA, they intend to appoint “the first chief executive officer” disconnected from Puerto Rico’s ‘partisan politics.’

eBlog

February 2, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider U.S. Judge Laura Taylor Swain’s decision to dismiss a number of claims from bondholders of Puerto Rican debt–a challenge pitting bondholders versus Puerto Rico’s ability to finance its utilities.

Judge Laura Taylor Swain yesterday dismissed a claim that several General Obligations (GOs) bondholders in Puerto Rico filed last year in the absence of payment from the government of Puerto Rico, setting back municipal bond insurers Assured Guaranty and National Public Finance Guarantee, which had sought to protect the collections that serve as a source of repayment to the debt of the Highway and Transportation Authority (ACT), dismissing suits filed by ACP Master, Aurelius Opportunities and others, as well as the claims of Assured and NPFG, ruling their claims were insufficiently ripe to be resolved. Judge Swain held that Puerto Rico’s special revenue bonds did not have to make payments to municipal bondholders during the quasi-chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, in a Title III adversary proceeding filed by three bond insurers, holding that while the bonds may have liens on revenue, that was not the same thing as the right to receive payments during the Title III bankruptcy. Her decision came in relation to municipal bonds issued by the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority, the Convention Center District Authority, and Puerto Rico’s Infrastructure Finance Authority—a decision which Assured Guaranty, has said it will appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First District in Boston.

In each case, Judge Swain’s dismissal rulings occurred in relation to PROMESA’s §305, a section which appears to grant the government of Puerto Rico a shield exempting it from paying off the debt for the time being. Judge Swain wrote: “The federal courts do not have the power to issue advisory opinions when there is no dispute.” In this case, Aurelius and others had sued in the wake of the Board of Fiscal Oversight (JSF)’s invoking PROMESA’s Title III, the party of general obligation bondholders seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction remedy to, among other things, declare that the resources available from the U.S. territory’s Treasury should be devoted primarily to the service of the municipal debt, especially those subject to retention through the so-called “claw back” clause; the plaintiffs also alleged that the actions of the government and those of the JSF were contrary to the U.S. Constitution, particularly the confiscation clause. In her decision, Judge Swain wrote: “Decisions on abstract or isolated points that will primarily be useful in formulating or litigating other future elections that may or may not be are beyond the authorized scope of the declaratory (sentencing) relief,” adding that  Swain explained the government has not yet taken definitive action regarding the property rights that its creditors would have, the controversy is not mature to determine if it is a confiscation of goods. Further, Judge Swain noted that PROMESA Title III cases are barely in an initial stage, noting that “at this point, even, the content of the fiscal plan is subject to constant change after the devastating hurricane of September 2017.” Judge Swain added that she could not grant a remedy of declaratory judgment or interdict the creditors with regard to the use that the government gives to its collections, because since §305 forbids it, providing that “unless the Board consents,” or the debt adjustment plan “provides” it, the court may not by any order, decree or suspension, “interfere” with the political powers or powers of government of the debtor, nor with “any of the property or collections” of the debtor or with “the use and enjoyment of any property” which leaves income to the government, noting: “The Board has not consented to any of those remedies. 

Inconsistent or Biased Federal Fiscal & Physical Recovery Role?

February 1, 2017

Good Morning! In today’s Blog, we consider the inconsistent FEMA response to Puerto Rico’s human, physical, and fiscal challenges.

Post Storm Fiscal & Physical Misery. Less than 24 hours after Puerto Ricans were alarmed to learn that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) intended to halt emergency aid shipments of food and water to the devastated U.S. territory, FEMA has announced it is not planning to leave; nor will the federal disaster assistance agency stop handing out crucial supplies; FEMA made clear it intends to continue the distribution of some 46 million liters of water and four million meals and snacks—an amount FEMA believes should be sufficient to allow Puerto Rico to recover—an assessment with which Puerto Rico Secretary of Public Safety and state coordinating officer Hector Pesquera concurred yesterday, after, earlier, making clear Puerto Rico’s emergency management leaders had not been “informed that supplies would stop arriving, nor did the government of Puerto Rico agree with this action.” Nonetheless, the resumption after the inexplicable interruption, still appears insufficient to assess whether the aid which FEMA has stockpiled will suffice: Jorge Pratts, a full-time volunteer with Operation Blessing, who oversees the US nonprofit’s operations in Puerto Rico, noted: “The numbers just don’t add up.” His organization, so far, has distributed 35,000 water filters since Hurricane Maria hit. From a personal perspective, he added: “The cry for help comes from fathers and mothers, people in their 60s, 70s and 80s…It’s a very, very delicate situation that we’re going through. FEMA is not being sensitive at all, and they’re not understanding what’s going on here.”

His perspective was echoed by Mayor Ernesto Irizarry of Utuado, known by its residents as “El Pueblo del Viví,” which was founded in 1739 by Sebastían de Morfi—the pueblo or muncipio’s name is derived from a local Indian Chief Otoao, which means between mountains, reflecting the municipio’s location in Puerto Rico’s Central Mountains. The muncipio has a population of about 33,000 today, spread across 113 square miles—the median age is 38.  The per capita income is what gives one a more acute perspective of the human and fiscal challenges left in Maria’s wake: In 2013, the average per capita income was $7,235—some 30% below Puerto Rico’s average; more than 55% are below the poverty line. It is in the part of Puerto Rico where Hurricane Maria wreaked the greatest human, physical, and fiscal damage, devastating bridges and isolating communities for weeks—leaving the municipality, as Mayor Irizarry describes it‒still very dependent on FEMA’s relief aid, noting that 71% of the 33,000 residents do not have power, and more than 30% do not have clean water. Even though Mayor Irizarry believes his muncipio has enough supplies to last about another week, he fears that if FEMA’s stockpile in Puerto Rico runs out, his municipality would likely face a “humanitarian crisis: Utuado is not in recovery mode…We are still in disaster mode, because we don’t have access to basic services.”