Puerto Rico’s Fiscal & Governing Twilight Zone

August 28, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the shaky promise of PROMESA for the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, an entity somewhat in Rod Serling’s Twilight Zone between a state and a municipality.

A Fiscally Appealing Chapter 9 case? U.S. Representatives Raul Grijalva (D-Az.) and Nydia Velasquez (D-N.Y.) yesterday warned the U.S. First Circuit Court of Appeals that House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Rob Bishop’s (R-Utah) interpretation of the PROMESA statute to be legislation intended to offer special protections to creditors or limit the restructuring of the debt through the judicial route was erroneous, arguing, in an amicus brief in the case brought by AMBAC against Puerto Rico and the PROMESA Oversight Board that “the purpose of PROMESA was not to grant to the creditors of Puerto Rico, including the bondholders, special protections that other municipal creditors do not have, nor to avoid losses to those creditors.” In addition, they argued for rejection of the interpretation that the Congressional statute for the restructuring of the public debt of Puerto Rico by judicial means had been established as the last resort of the Promesa law. Ranking Member Rep. Raul Grijalva (D.-Az.) indicated that the statute simply requires Puerto Rico to make “good faith efforts to achieve a consensus restructuring with creditors” prior to filing a petition through the courts. The two Members noted: “Neither the legislative record, nor the legal text supports an interpretation of PROMESA that gives creditors greater rights than those of a traditional reorganization at the expense of debtors’ rights.”

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Potholes in the Motor City Road to Recovery & un Federalism in Puerto Rico

eBlog

July 20, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider some of the post chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy challenges Detroit confronts, before returning to some of the legal, governing, and judicial challenges to Puerto Rico’s fiscal recovery.

The Potholes in Recovering from Municipal Bankruptcy. Five years out from the nation’s largest ever chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy incurred in the wake of accruing some $14 billion in long-term debt, the city’s plan of debt adjustment has unrolled in a sparkling fashion, especially downtown and around Michigan Central Station. Just under 40% of jobs in Detroit are deemed high skill—higher than the surrounding neighborhoods—and especially valuable in a city which, unlike most, boast an income tax. Nevertheless, median income, at about $56,000 is the lowest in the nation among major metropolitan regions. And the sorry state of the Detroit Public School system continues to discourage families with kids to move from the city’s suburbs into the city: in excess of 90% of eighth graders lack proficiency in math and reading.

A key to the recovery has been the auto industry—and major foundations, including the Kresge, Ford, and the Community Foundation of Southeast Michigan—all of which contributed to the so-called “grand bargain” in the city’s chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment approved by Judge Steven Rhodes—an adjustment which brought in hundreds of millions of dollars to safeguard pensions and preserve the city’s jewel in its crown: the Detroit Institute of Art. Moreover, since then, foundations have contributed great sums to workforce training in Detroit, retail revival, human welfare services and more—as well as for-profit corporations, such as JP Morgan Chase, which has been pumping $150 million into the city to support a variety of efforts from retail to job training. Moreover, millennials and empty-nesters have moved downtown: in the past few years, a trickle of newcomers has swelled to a flood, meaning what, on the city’s first day in chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy when it was unsafe to walk downtown, is, today, an area of dozens of new residential developments, which have been built or are underway in the greater downtown, from the revival of classic skyscrapers like the David Whitney Building and Broderick Tower to new construction like the Auburn and DuCharme Place. If anything, an urban challenge confronting city leaders today is the escalation of rents—forcing questions with regard to displacement.

Changing the Premise of PROMESA? In the wake of Judge Laura Swain Taylor’s rulings, there appears to be increasing pressure in Congress to revise or repeal the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act [PROMESA], after a the Judge suggested the U.S. government could be liable for cuts to bond values mandated by the PROMESA Oversight Board. U.S. Court of Federal Claims Chief Judge Susan Braden issued her opinion [Altair Global Credit Opportunity Fund et al. v. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims, No. 17-970C, July 17, 2018, in the case filed by investment funds against the U.S. government concerning defaulted employment retirement system bonds. Judge Braden’s signal that she was inclined to rule in favor on the claims drew reactions from members of the Puerto Rico Task Force of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus—or as U.S. Rep. Darren Soto )D-Fl.) put it: “This ruling exposes additional problems with the PROMESA act…It may also be a catalyst to support a reform or repeal to provide Puerto Rico full bankruptcy rights.”

Rep. José Serrano (D-N.Y.), who was born in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico, agreed that the opinion may have an impact on Puerto Rico; however, he was uncertain it would be for the better—rather, he seemed apprehensive Judge Braden’s opinion placed the interests of creditors in front of those of the citizens of Puerto Rico—American citizens, noting: “By making the U.S. government liable for Puerto Rico’s debt, the court has essentially determined that bondholders can have priority over the needs of the Puerto Rican people: This would force the federal government to make the hedge funds whole, rather than focusing on the true intent of PROMESA: helping Puerto Rico get on a sustainable economic and fiscal path. We have to make sure the people of Puerto Rico come first.” In stark contrast, Manal Mehta, founder of Sunesis Capital, agreed the ruling would help bondholders, but he saw this as a positive. “The plaintiffs had to get over the hurdle to show this is actually a claim against the federal government to get to federal claims court. This is a solid win for creditors,” noting: “It looks like the court made the correct decision, as the Lebron [legal case] test emphasizes ‘federal control’ to determine whether something is ‘federal’ for takings purposes, and it’s clear Congress controls the [PROMESA] Oversight Board, as it appoints it: So there’s now a takings route for creditors, at least in situations where the PROMESA Oversight Board/government has wiped out prepetition collateral, and it’s unlikely to be overturned.” Put more starkly, he added: “Until final adjudication, this ruling strikes a dagger at the heart of the legitimacy of the Oversight Board: I suspect that this will lead Congress to remove and reappoint members of the Oversight Board in a manner that is consistent with the appointments clause of the U.S. Constitution as well as modify Title III of PROMESA to ensure that the federal government does not become liable for creditor claims.”

In her decision, Judge Swain wrote that the PROMESA Oversight Board was part of Puerto Rico’s government, not the federal government. Reminiscent of the old question ‘Who’s on first and what’s on second, Judge Braden’s ruling reached the opposite conclusion, likely, as New York Congresswoman Nydia Velázquez put it: “There’s a good chance this ruling will be appealed.”

Federalism?  Just when the House Popular Democratic Party (PDP) minority joined the suits against the PROMESA Board, Rafael Cox Alomar, a former Popular Resident Commissioner candidate, said that there appears to be consensus in federal court regarding the fact that the territorial clause grants the U.S. Congress absolute powers over the island: “The environment is completely different, and it is an environment where the theory that Congress has plenary powers, powers that are basically unlimited seems to be growing. In other words, the colonial character of the relationship has been reaffirmed,” he added, asserting that he believe the U.S. Supreme Court has established that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico does not have its own sovereignty with regard to double jeopardy cases, noting: “I do not think that, in the current environment, arguing that PROMESA is unconstitutional or that the Board does not have the power to do this, or that…or that Congress cannot get involved in legislating in internal affairs without the consent of Puerto Ricans, will be very successful,” suggesting “a new model based on the sovereignty of Puerto Rico is what is needed.”

Adding to the matter, the Popular Democratic Party caucus yesterday filed suit in federal court questioning the constitutionality of the creation of the PROMESA Board, as well as the alleged usurpation of powers, making it the third case filed in the wake of the PROMESA Board’s failure to certify the budget approved by the Legislative Assembly facing the breach of the agreement reached with Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares, which included repealing the Law of Unjust Dismissal (Law 80-1976) as a requirement to, among other things, retain the Christmas bonus of public employees.

Indeed, the courtroom is in a traffic jam: last week, Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares sued the Board for usurpation of his authority, while, in a separate lawsuit, the Legislative Assembly argued an excess of authority on the part of the PROMESA Board—or, as House Member Rafael “Tatito” Hernández put it: “The Board wants to rule, wants to legislate, and wants to establish public policy in Puerto Rico without being democratically elected. It does not have that power, and it does not result from any clause in PROMESA Law. We are not challenging PROMESA; we are specifically challenging the Board.”

The Fiscal Challenges of Federalism

July 13, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the legal, governing, and judicial challenges to Puerto Rico’s fiscal recovery, before turning to the very different kinds of fiscal recovery challenges confronting Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.

Who Is Preempting Whose Power & Authority? Yesterday, the PROMESA Oversight  Board requested dismissal of Gov. Ricardo Rosselló Nevares’ suit in which he is charging that the Oversight Board has usurped his power and authority, with the Board asking the federal court to issue an injunction to prevent such action, noting in its filing: “Although PROMESA relies in the sole discretion of the Board, two major policy instruments that exist, the fiscal plan and the budget, and the law expressly empowers the Board to formulate and certify them…the Governor questions whether PROMESA preserves to the government the political powers and of government to make policy decisions.”  In response, the Board asserted that the Governor’s claim lacks merit, asserting that the law provides that the Board has the final say with regard to budget and tax issues, writing: “The provisions to which the Governor objects are not recommendations in the sense of §205 of PROMESA,” with that response coming just minutes after the U.S. requested—for a second time—its insistence on the “Constitutionality of the PROMESA statute. In a motion filed Wednesday, U.S. Justice Department Assistant Attorney General Thomas Ward advised Judge Laura Taylor Swain that two recent decisions upon which Puerto Rico had relied were not pertinent to the legal issues at hand. Promise law.

In a motion filed Wednesday, Assistant U.S. Attorney General Thomas G. Ward and Jean Lin of the Justice Department asserted before Judge Taylor Swain that two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions presented by the Aurelius Management Investment Fund were not relevant to the critical issues at hand, after, earlier this week, the Fund had provided the Judge with two U.S. Supreme Court decisions which, it asserted, affirm its perception of the statute, as it continues to argue before the federal court that the actions of the PROMESA Board are null and void, because the members of the Board without the consent of the Senate as required by the U.S. Constitution, referencing two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Lucia v. SEC and Ortiz v. United States, where, in the former case, the court, last month, determined that a higher ranking SEC official should have been appointed to his position based on the Appointments Clause of the US Constitution, while, in the Ortiz decision, the Supreme Court held that it has jurisdiction to review decisions of the Armed Forces’ appellate courts—claims which the Justice Department described as incorrect, since such decisions only support his argument that the appointment clause of the U.S. Constitution does not apply to members of the PROMESA Oversight Board—or, as the Justice Department brief put it: “A finding that the clause applies to territorial officials would not only face this historic practice, but would also challenge the current governance structures of the territories and the District of Columbia that have been in place for decades,” adding to that Congress has full authority over its territories—authority which is not subject to the “complex” distribution of the powers of the government provided by the U.S. Constitution.

Last week, Gov. Rosselló had charged that the PROMESA Oversight Board has been trying to make policy decisions that the PROMESA law does not grant it authority to make, as he had petitioned Judge Swain to mandate that the Board to answer the complaint or motion to dismiss by yesterday. His attorneys stated: “The court should expedite resolution of this case to address the injury to the Commonwealth and its people occurring every day due to the Board’s attempt to seize day-to-day control of Puerto Rico’s government.” Even though the PROMESA Board asked for more time, Judge Swain ruled in favor of the Governor’s request—so, the complex federalism sessions are scheduled to resume on the 25th, when the quasi bankruptcy court will entertain oral arguments, possibly including participation by Puerto Rico Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz and House President Carlos Méndez Núñez, who filed a similar suit against the board on July 9th, asserting that the PROMESA Board was preempting the legislature’s rightful powers. Thus, even the Board and the Governor have generally been in agreement this year in their fiscal plans, the Board has insisted its policies must be followed—with its proposed quasi plan of debt adjustment showing a surplus of $6.5 billion from this fiscal year through fiscal year 2023.

In the suit, Gov. Rosselló quotes from Judge Swain’s opinion of last November and order denying the PROMESA Board’s motion to replace the then-chief executive of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority with the board’s own appointee, with the opinion noting: “Congress did not grant the [Oversight Board] the power to supplant, bypass, or replace the Commonwealth’s elected leaders and their appointees in the exercise of their managerial duties whenever the Oversight Board might deem such a change expedient.”

Mayor of Wilkes-Barre Asks State for Financial Assistance. Mayor Tony George, whose city is confronting a $3.5 million deficit in the upcoming fiscal year, is seeking financial assistance under Pennsylvania’s program for distressed communities, the Financially Distressed Municipalities Act, approval of which request would mean the municipality would be eligible for loans and grants through the state Department of Community and Economic Development. The move came as Standard & Poor’s placed the city’s “BBB-” rating on CreditWatch with negative implications, in the wake of Mayor George’s petition to the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development, with the Mayor warning the city faces an estimated $3.5 million deficit next year and in the coming years despite efforts to place Wilkes-Barre on sound financial footing with its participation in Pennsylvania’s Early Intervention Program. The credit rating agency added it will gather more information before making a determination that could make it more expensive for the city to borrow money at higher interest rates, noting: “We expect to resolve the CreditWatch status within 30 days. We could lower the rating if we believe that the city’s credit quality is no longer commensurate with the rating. However, if we believe it does remain commensurate with the current rating, we could affirm the rating and remove it from CreditWatch.” Should the credit rating be downgraded, it would be the second time during Mayor George’s administration, after, a year ago last May, S&P lowered the rating to “BBB-” from “A-” because the city’s cash flow was constrained and was relying on borrowing to make ends meet. City officials are tentatively scheduled to hold a conference call with S&P on August 7th—by which time the state is expected to have made its decision on declaring the city distressed.

Under that state statute, municipalities may also restructure debt. If the Mayor’s request is granted, the state will appoint a financial adviser to design a financial recovery plan for the city—one of the nation’s oldest, having been inhabited first by the Shawanese and Delaware Indian and (Lenape) tribes, so that it was in 1769 that John Durkee led the first recorded Europeans to the area, where they established a frontier settlement named Wilkes-Barre after John Wilkes and Isaac Barre, two British members of Parliament who supported colonial America. At the time, these settlers were aligned with colonial Connecticut, which had a claim on the land that rivaled Pennsylvania’s. Indeed, armed Pennsylvanians twice attempted to evict the residents of Wilkes-Barre in what came to be known as the Pennamite-Yankee Wars, so that it was not until after the American Revolution, in the 1780s, that a settlement was reached granting the disputed land to Pennsylvania. A century later, the city’s population exploded in the wake of the discovery of anthracite coal, an explosion so powerful that the city was nicknamed “The Diamond City:” hundreds of thousands of immigrants flocked to the city. By 1806, it was incorporated as a borough; it became a city in 1871—as it gradually became a major U.S. coal center, and an early home to Woolworth’s, Sterling Hotels, Planter’s Peanuts, Miner’s Bank, Bell Telephone, HBO, Luzerne National Bank, and Stegmaier. But the coal which once contributed so much to the city’s growth, subsequently let it down: not only were there terrible mine disasters, but also the country began to switch to other energy sources. So, the city where Babe Ruth knocked one of his longest ever homes runs is, today, at risk of striking out at the plate.  The city, which a dozen years ago celebrated its 200th anniversary, is now seeking assistance via the state’s Act 47, with the Mayor citing—as additional factors, the lack of cooperation with area unions and his own City Council. He appears to be of the view that there was no other alternative to help stabilize the city’s finances other than filing for status under Pennsylvania’s Act 47 for Distressed Municipalities, noting: “My goal is to bring the city forward, and we’re stifled.”

In Pennsylvania there are four general methods of oversight used to aid local governments: Intergovernmental Cooperation Authorities, which are used with Philadelphia and Pittsburgh; ƒ School district assistance, which can come in the form of technical assistance, or schools which can be deemed in Financial Watch Status or in Financial Recovery Status; Early intervention program for municipalities before Act 475; and Act 47, or Pennsylvania’s Municipalities Financial Recovery Act of 1987.  What Is Pennsylvania’s Act 47? We will go into more depth about Act 47 because that is the program for which Wilkes-Barre recently applied. We also touch on the special consideration taken for Pittsburgh and Philadelphia as it relates to Act 47 as we close this commentary. The Pennsylvania Municipalities Financial Recovery Act of 1987, or Act 47 as it is commonly called, is an assistance program to help Pennsylvania municipalities after they file and are officially designated as “distressed.” Many states, such as the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, generally believe that the status of one of its municipalities can affect others throughout the state. This is even set forth in writing in PA’s Act 47, which states: “Policy—It is hereby declared to be a public policy of the Commonwealth to foster fiscal integrity of municipalities so that they provide for the health, safety and welfare of their citizens; pay principal and interest on their debt obligations when due; meet financial obligations to their employees, vendors and suppliers; and provide for proper financial accounting procedures, budgeting and taxing practices. The failure of a municipality to do so is hereby determined to affect adversely the health, safety and welfare not only of the citizens of the municipality but also of other citizens in this Commonwealth.”

How Does a Pennsylvania Municipality Become Part of Act 47? The Municipalities Financial Recovery Act authorizes Pennsylvania’s Department of Community and Economic Development (DCED) to validate municipalities as financially distressed. According to Act 47’s criteria, a municipality could be deemed financially distressed if it meets at least one of the following criteria: The municipality has maintained a deficit over a three-year period, with a deficit of 1% or more in each of the previous fiscal years. The municipality’s expenditures have exceeded revenues for a period of three years or more. The municipality has defaulted in payment of principal or interest on any of its bonds or notes or in payment of rentals due any authority. The municipality has missed a payroll for 30 days. The municipality has failed to make required payments to judgment creditors for 30 days beyond the date of the recording of the judgment. The municipality, for a period of at least 30 days beyond the due date, has failed to forward taxes withheld on the income of employees or has failed to transfer employer or employee contributions for Social Security; it has accumulated and has operated for each of two successive years a deficit equal to 5% or more of its revenues; and it has failed to make the budgeted payment of its minimum municipal obligation as required by §§302, 303, or 602 of the act of December 18, 1984 (P.L. 1005, No. 205), per the Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act, with respect to a pension fund during the fiscal year for which the payment was budgeted and has failed to take action within that time period to make required payments.

Pennsylvania’s Municipalities Financial Recovery Act authorizes Pennsylvania’s Department of Community and Economic Development to validate municipalities as financially distressed. Key criteria include: A municipality has sought to negotiate resolution or adjustment of a claim in excess of 30% against a fund or budget and has failed to reach an agreement with creditors; a municipality has filed for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy; a municipality has experienced a decrease in a quantified level of municipal service from the preceding fiscal year, which has resulted from the municipality reaching its legal limit in levying real estate taxes for general purposes.  Act 47 offers aid to the commonwealth’s second class cities (defined as those with a population of 250,000 to 999,999) and below which are negatively affected by forces such as short-term swings in the business cycle, or those burdened by more harmful longer-term negative macro-economic shifts: state support or assistance is available in several forms in order to ensure municipalities can provide essential services without interruption.

Over the long-term, Act 47 is focused on balancing ongoing revenues with ongoing expenditures—and investing in the municipality so that growth occurs and, as in a chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment, a municipality can recover. The act provides state-sponsored emergency no-interest loans and grants in order to ensure distressed municipalities can continue meeting debt payments and creditor obligations. The Department appoints a recovery coordinator who creates and then leads in helping to implement a recovery plan. Unlike an emergency manager, the plan provides for a recovery coordinator, who may act as an intermediary between the Mayor and City Council–the recovery plan is similar to a plan of debt adjustment in that it details how the available assistance and other modifications will help the municipality regain its fiscal stability, including via commonwealth economic and community development programs, assistance while negotiating new collective bargaining contracts; and enhanced tax or revenue authority—a key of which is authority to levy a nonresident wage tax.  

Accounting for Municipal Futures

July 9, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider we consider the ongoing governance challenges in Puerto Rico—and how distinct its form of governmental bankruptcy is, before looking at some innovative efforts by Puerto Rico’s elected local leaders to institute new accounting measures.

Who’s in Charge of Puerto Rico’s Physical and Fiscal Future? U.S. District Judge Laura Swain Taylor has granted a motion by the Commonwealth to accelerate the terms of the motions and the aftershocks associated with the lawsuit filed by Gov. Ricardo Rosselló Nevares against the PROMESA Oversight Board, a judicial action which Christian Sobrino, the Governor’s representative before the Board, could be completed the end of this month, noting: “The Judge has a good appreciation of the right which will apply in the case and understands that (the dispute in the lawsuit) is a matter that is not dependent on facts, but rather on an interpretation of PROMESA statute.In the case, which was filed as an adversarial suit within the government’s quasi bankruptcy cases, Judge Swain is asked to issue an injunction and a declaratory judgment against the Oversight Board for preempting, by means of its fiscal plan and budget aims, to impose public policy decisions, rather than recommend “non-binding” recommendations. Therefore, the motion asserts the Governor does not have to comply, or, as he put it: “I think the judge appreciates how essential it is (the demand) for the government’s operation.”

The motion would appear to set a short time frame: the Oversight Board would have to respond to the demand by Thursday; responses to the motions will continue until July 20th, with the arguments considered as part of an “omnibus” hearing scheduled for July 25th in the District Court of Puerto Rico, in Hato Rey, the most densely populated neighborhood in San Juan. In his complaint, the Governor has argued that the Board is intent upon “micro administering” the government of Puerto Rico—a governing responsibility which belongs to his administration, and not to the body created by the U.S. Congress to control the finances of the government of Puerto Rico—adding that the remedy requested by the government of Puerto Rico does not imply that the fiscal plan approved by the Oversight Board last April is nullified, but rather that the so-called ‘corrective sheets’ issued by the Board, such as the suspension of the Christmas bonus, the reduction of personnel in the public service, or the consolidation of agencies, and the way in which the pension plans will be reformed, are competences of the government—not of the Oversight Board. A key sticking point, as we have noted, has been with regard to Law 80, the Law on Unjustified Dismissal (Law 80). The Board had demanded the preemption or elimination of this law, asserting it would improve the business climate in Puerto Rico—a preemption unsurprisingly opposed by legislative leaders, who had rejected an agreement between Gov. Rosselló Nevares and the PROMESA Board in which, in exchange for the repeal of Law 80, the Board would have granted a series of increases to some budget items for the new fiscal year which commenced this month. Thus, Gov. Rosselló, last Thursday, went to court to challenge the budget imposed by the PROMESA Oversight Board, claiming the Board had overstepped its authority. Moreover,

Puerto Rico Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz said he supported the Governor’s suit against the both the Board and its proposed preemption budget, while the Board defended its authority, citing the 2016 PROMESA statute enacted, theoretically, to help the Commonwealth manage its economy and restructure its debt. In response, the PROMESA Board issued a statement: “The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico approved and certified a Commonwealth budget for FY2019 in compliance with the certified fiscal plan and in accordance with [the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act to put Puerto Rico on the road to recovery. The Oversight Board will vigorously defend against any suit attempting to thwart the carrying out of the budget and fiscal plan,”  referring to the fiscal plan it had approved on June 30th by unanimous consent and declaring it to be the valid budget for Puerto Rico—a proposed budget which allocated $8.758 billion for the General Fund and $20.664 billion for Puerto Rico’s consolidated budget—a fiscal budget intended to preempt Puerto Rico’s authority and go into effect on July 1.

Gov. Rosselló said that he would ask a court to establish that the Board’s fiscal plan and budget are recommendations—and recommendations only, adding he would seek a “declaratory judgment and an injunction” on the Board’s attempt to usurp the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s right to home rule by including components in the budget which control public policy—no doubt referencing the PROMESA Board’s approved budget’s elimination of funding for the government’s longstanding Christmas bonus, for a municipal aid program, and several other purposes supported by the Governor. The PROMESA Board had agreed with the Governor Rosselló to funding these items in exchange for a promise from the Governor that Puerto Rico would adopt at-will employment by rescinding Law 80; however, as we have noted, under the leadership of Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz, the Puerto Rico Senate refused to rescind Law 80—an action which, while it led to strained relations between the Governor and Senate leader late last month, appears to have dissipated in the face of the preemptive efforts by the unelected PROMESA Board—or, as Sen. Rivera Schatz at the end of last month put it: “We must put a stop to the Napoleonic pretensions of the fiscal control board. We have and must defend the people of Puerto Rico. That’s the right thing, Governor. I congratulate you…Puerto Rico has a democratically elected government: “We don’t accept an imposed and abusive government.”

The federalism challenge came as, on June 30th, the PROMESA Board also approved budgets for the Government Development Bank, the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority, the University of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, and the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority—approvals upon which the Governor has not yet indicated whether he planned to challenge these budgets in court as well.

Nevertheless, the Governor has called for an extraordinary session of the Legislature in a bid to pass Law 80, the controversial labor reform bill which would modify worker protections in order to make the U.S. territory more attractive for investment—an effort the PROMESA Oversight Board has long insisted upon—a call which, at least so far, has gone begging . Nevertheless, the legislature has balked, including leaders from Governor Rossello’s own political party. Absent the reform, basic assumptions about Puerto Rico’s fiscal and governance future are unclear. The Governor, in a televised address to the Commonwealth, called for a last-ditch session of lawmakers to approve a version of the reform, noting: “I’m confident that this call for an extraordinary session will serve to avert the damage that the failure to fulfill the agreement with the Board causes to the island’s economy, as well as important sectors of our society.” Previously, both Gov. Rossello and the Board had acknowledged, reluctantly, that critical questions for the island’s future may have to be settled by a court—a settlement which the Governor apparently believes the government would stand little chance of winning, as his reading of PROMESA makes clear the Board’s power in matters of the budget, ergo, he said, compromise was critical to create a sense of predictability around Puerto Rico’s future. Nevertheless, he also said that he had signed the legislature’s budget, as opposed to an alternate version advocated by the PROMESA Board, and that, for the time being, that was the version, which is in effect: the PROMESA Board’s budget was unacceptable, he noted.

The Commonwealth has defaulted on its municipal bonds; it is confronted with $120 billion in debt and pension obligations, which it simply cannot fiscally meet. And now the question of ‘Who’s on First,” in the wake of a decade of recession and then the disparate federal fiscal and physical response to the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria—combine with the fiscal hurricane of federal preemption with the imposition by Congress of a fiscal oversight board—has made the path back to self-governance its own fiscal and governance maze.

Natalie Jaresko, the Executive Director of the PROMESA Board, stated: “The Board continues to believe that comprehensive labor reform, including the repeal of Law 80 to make Puerto Rico an at-will-employment jurisdiction, is an essential component of the reforms needed to improve the island’s economy and make the business environment more competitive.” Last Friday, at a press conference, PROMESA Board members said they viewed labor reform as essential to Puerto Rico’s transformation—demonstrating that, as opposed to governance in chapter 9 municipal bankruptcies, where, under most state laws, there is an emergency manager designated to put together a plan of debt adjustment for approval by a U.S. Bankruptcy Court; in PROMESA, it is almost as if there are too many judicial/fiscal cooks in the kitchen.

Accounting for Municipalities Futures. Even as the path to fiscal solvency is conflicted for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the issue of municipal accounting is drawing constructive attention among the island’s municipalities. Mayor Carlos Delgado Altiera of Isabela, a muncipio spread over 13 wards and also known as the “Garden of the Northwest,” for its many wild flowers, and as the town of “Leaf Cheeses,” for its production of white cheese wrapped in banana leaves—and as the City of Fighting Cocks,” as it has served as a home for the breeding of these birds since the 18th century, has indicated that the issue of creating a standardized municipal accounting system “generates many questions,” so that there is an interest to acquire technology to standardize the accounting systems of the municipalities. Thus, Mayors or Alcaldes of the New Progressive Party have urged Gov. Rosselló Nevares to veto a measure (Senate 550) authored by Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz, which seeks to impose a unique accounting system in the municipalities. The rejection of the so-called Senate 550 Project has also been joined by the popular municipal executives: the consensus is that such a change would represent a setback and an unnecessary and impossible economic investment for most municipalities—or, as Mayor Javier Jiménez of San Sebastian put it: “The Governor was being asked to veto that project, because, definitely, centralizing again (those functions) would create a tremendous problem for us,” noting that, in recent weeks, he has met with some 20 mayors, both popular and penepés (supporters of statehood): all are opposed to the measure. The Mayor argued that each municipality has already developed an accounting system, which meets their needs.

Indeed, it seems that for several mayors, the measure has come as a surprise, even more so when the Senate President had become their ally on other issues, such as the elevation to the constitutional rank of municipal autonomy and the development of measures aimed at having the State consult them with regard to the approval of exemptions and charges that adversely impact their collections. Mayor Jiménez explained that, in the past, the Office of Municipal Affairs was the body in charge of operating the accounting systems for the island’s municipalities. However, given the inability to maintain an updated system and in line with the progress, the mayors had been permitted to contract and use that technology that would meet their needs—or, as Mayor José A. Santiago of Comerío put it: “I cannot understand how, after so many examples of the problems caused by centralization: let us walk in the opposite direction to what should be the strengthening of local governments.” Under the proposal, which would be implemented through a contract with a private company, a requisite, so that the municipalities could access advanced services and reduce the risk of loss of essential services and municipal revenues, such a service would also give them the flexibility they need to adapt to the advances and challenges. The proposed Municipal Revenue Collection Center (CRIM) would become the entity charged, as the founders are of the perception that manymunicipalities do not have the way to know with certainty how much money they owe in municipal contributions, the debts between the different funds or their cash balances, or how many businesses have started or stopped operating in recent years.” The effort, the founders note, is necessary, because the “state government does not have the economic resources to develop such a large technology, the immersion of the private sector is of crucial importance,” with Isabel Mayor Carlos Delgado noting that among the island’s 78 municipios, a number simply lack the requisite technology and management experience.

In a letter sent to the Governor signed by the executive director of the Federation of Mayors, Mayor Isabelo Molina Hernandez, and signed by Federation President Carlos Molina Rodríguez, they wrote:The Federation of Mayors does not endorse the project…It promotes unnecessary centralization and negatively affects the public policy of greater municipal autonomy.”

According to the measure, a September 2016 report from Puerto Rican Office of the Comptroller, the “vast majority of municipios failed to comply” with the criteria considered in the components of computerized systems, such as physical security and environmental controls, logical access control and control of computers, among others.” Mayor Hernández argued that municipios are subject to oversight by the Office of the Comptroller, Government Ethics, the Federal Inspector General, as well as external audits; thus, he added, if the central government wishes to have additional tools to provide greater access to the public, it can develop an information system in which municipalities publish their financial information.

The Tides of Immgration: Are there Fiscal Consequences?

June 25, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the tides of emigration as they fiscally challenge the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico.

Today, more than one million Puerto Ricans live in New York City, just under one-third of Puerto Ricans who reside in Puerto Rico, with the likelihood of emigrating from Puerto Rico to Gotham increasing for single Puerto Ricans between the ages of 25 and 29 who have never married, do not own property, and whose income is limited, albeit not to the point of being below the federal poverty level. The majority are men, and the destinations of preference seem to be cities in Florida, New York, or Texas. In theory, about a fifth of those who left will return, judging by the rate of return reported on the immigration side to Puerto Rico. According to the most recent census data, in 2016, some 89,000 left Puerto Rico, a number which appears to indicate a rising trend, albeit, there is some evidence that the pattern might be changing—with that pattern affected by not only destination, but also by the level of academic achievement of those leaving Puerto Rico.

While we await, in December, 2017 emigration data, early indications based upon passenger counts at airports, appear to represent very high migration trends, finding, for instance, that last year, more than 281,000 Puerto Ricans left Puerto Rico than arrived there—an indication of the demographic impact of Hurricane Maria. Demographer Judith Rodríguez wrote in the 2016 Migrant Profile (published last week) that “The recent wave of migration in the last decade exceeds the Great Exodus of 1950-60, which has great impact on the social and economic level.” More recent data, however, indicates this demographic tide may finally be ebbing: during this year’s first month, January, 58,202 more arrived on the island than left, with the patter continuing the next month when there was a net positive inflow of 10, 698—a number which ebbed by March to 1,510—a change estimated to be temporary.

After New York, Florida appears to be the emigration state of choice: currently, around 30% of Puerto Rican emigrants choose a city in Florida, mainly in the central zone. At the same time, Texas is rising as a demographic state of choice. It appears more likely than not that New York City will continue to be a focal point of Puerto Rican emigration, due to cultural and family ties with Puerto Ricans since the migrations of the early twentieth century in the wake of the enactment of the Jones-Shafroth Act. According to the most recently updated Census figures, New York City is in the top three exodus destinations for emigrating Puerto Ricans.

But this is not all one-way traffic: many Puerto Ricans appear to be going home, with the largest such numbers coming from the states of Florida and New York; however, the number returning from the states of Massachusetts, Louisiana, and Washington make up more than half the total.

While it is more difficult to assess who is leaving and who is staying, Census data indicates that 48% of Puerto Ricans living in the D.C. metropolitan area have at least a bachelor’s degree, and, overall, 78% of Puerto Ricans living on the mainland have at least some level of university education, nearly three times the percentage of Puerto Ricans who have moved to Miami. Income wise, Washington, D.C. is the location, which appears to have drawn Puerto Ricans with both the greatest levels of scholastic achievement and the most income: the median household income for Puerto Ricans in the nation’s capital is $87,713. Next, after Washington DC, mainland cities with the highest median income for the Puerto Ricans are Miami ($50,945), Chicago ($47,232) and New Haven ($43,165). The disparity in annual income perhaps demonstrates the lure of emigrating from Puerto Rico, where the median income of a household is around $ 19,977, according to the Census data.

However, for Puerto Ricans leaving for the mainland, nirvana is not guaranteed: in the cities of Springfield and Boston, as well as in Hartford, there are high poverty levels are high for Puerto Ricans: in Springfield, more than one-third of the more than 100,000 Puerto Ricans live below the federal poverty level—a level comparable to the 31% below that level in the Boston metro region, and 26.5% in the Springfield metropolitan area have incomes that place them below the poverty level.  In addition, age is a discriminating factor: in Springfield, almost 50% of Puerto Ricans under the age of 18 live below the poverty line—a figure that compares unfavorably to the 46% of Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico who fall below the federal poverty line of $12,060 for an individual.

The Prospects and Draws for Emigration. Demographic data with regard to those leaving Puerto Rico finds that the bulk of emigrants worked in 2016 as administrative office staff (6,822), followed by operators of production lines (5,445), vendors (4,870), and food preparers (3,264). According to the date, some 382 desperately needed doctors left—while some 1,376 nursing professionals left the island. Stateside, 82% of the 2.2 million Puerto Ricans who are working on the mainland are employed in the private sector; 4% have their own business. 14% of the jobs occupied by Puerto Ricans are in the government. In Puerto Rico, that figure rises to 22%, according to data from the Census Bureau. On the other hand, most of those who immigrated or returned to Puerto Rico were vendors (1,383) or educators (1,101).

Quien Es Encargado? (Who is in charge?) The Puerto Rico Senate has killed a an agreement between Puerto Rico Gov. Ricardo Rosselló and the PROMESA Oversight Board, potentially escalating the governance conflict with regard to Puerto Rico’s operating budget and the restructuring of the central government’s $51 billion of debt. Last Friday, Puerto Rico Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz threatened a lawsuit against the Board if it continues to attempt to preempt Puerto Rico’s government in order to impose budget cuts or the repeal of worker protection measures. In a compromise with the Governor, the Board had agreed to maintain Puerto Rico’s mandatory Christmas bonus, vacation and sick day policies in exchange for Gov. Rosselló’s agreement to introduce at-will employment for all employers by repealing a 1976 law, Law 80. The House, at the end of last month, had approved the measure, before the Senate amended it to introduce at-will employment only for employees entering the workforce. Indeed, as we had previously noted, last Thursday, the Senate President had declared the Law 80 repeal to be dead, after speaking with other members of the majority New Progressive Party caucus in the Senate. Moreover, according to a video posted on the El Nuevo Día website, the Senate leader said he had consulted lawyers and was ready to fight in court, if the PROMESA Board seeks to preempt the island’s elected leaders. The power struggle came as the Puerto Rico House has added funding to a budget bill—spending which Puerto Rico House President Carlos Méndez and Treasury Committee President Antonio Soto said they expected the PROMESA Board would reject—relying on the Congressional PROMESA Act granting the Board the right to create and approve its own version of Puerto Rico’s budget—as is, for instance, the current budget. Puerto Rico’s new fiscal budget year begins this Sunday—a date by which, on normal years, like most states, but unlike the federal government, its fiscal year operating budget would normally have been adopted—but, where, last Thursday, PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión, in New York City, stated that if the government opted not to repeal Law 80, the currently certified fiscal plan would operate—a plan which would mandate at-will employment to be introduced by January 1, 2019—a plan which, unsurprisingly, Senate President Rivera Schatz is set to challenge, especially after, on May 9th, Sergio Marxuach, the New Economy Policy Director, testified before the Puerto Rico Senate Committee on Federal, Political, and Economic Relations that repealing Law 80 would be a bad idea, noting that a 2016 International Monetary Fund study showed that in times of economic weakness, eliminating job protections would have had a negative economic impact in the short and medium term, noting: “By triggering a wave of layoffs, reforming employment protections further weakens aggregate demand and delays economic recovery.” Similarly, a 2017 report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development said that in Portugal from 2006 to 2014 “reforms increasing the flexibility of the labor market negatively affect firms’ productivity both in the short- and long-run. A possible explanation is that higher job turnover reduces firms’ incentives to invest in job-specific training and reduce the scope for workers’ specialization.”

In response, Governor Rosselló released a statement: “Puerto Rico has just seen how politics is done and not how a future government should be made in challenging and difficult times, with this regrettable decision by the President of the Senate, Thomas Rivera Schatz.”

Now Senate Finance Committee President Migdalia Padilla is scheduled to meet with the Governor’s fiscal team to discuss the changes which have been included in the joint resolutions that make up the budget for the next fiscal year; he will also  meet with Financial Advisory Authority and Fiscal Agency (Aafaf) Executive Director Raul Maldonado and the Secretary of Finance, Gerardo Portelo—with the Chairman noting: “They are going to have meetings with me so that we can all harmonize what we have observed, what the Board says, and what the Executive establishes.” Chairman Padilla added that he trusts that today will be constituted the conference committee to discuss the House amendments, especially after, at the end of last week, House approval of an FY2019 budget $33.2 million higher than the one presented by PROMESA Board—followed, the next day, by Senate approval, albeit with amendments intended to force a conference committee to settle the differences.

In addition to the perception of preemption, one of the legislature’s greatest reservations with regard to the PROMESA Board’s version of the budget their perception that that version underestimates the revenue estimate is $7,000 million, according to the President of the Finance Commission of the Chamber, Antonio Soto, who noted that the government will close the year with revenues of more than $9,172 million, but the fiscal entity estimates $8,400 million for the next fiscal year, despite the fact that it proposes a growth in the economy of 6.3%.

Senate President Padilla explained that one of the changes that will be introduced to the House version is aimed at addressing the $164,000 reduction for the Independent Special Prosecutor’s Panel Office (OPFEI), advising that he would be subtracting that $164,000 from the additional $2 million that the Chamber allocated in the budget to the Alliance for Alternative Education program. In its version, the Chamber dealt with the cuts contemplated in the PROMESA Board’s proposal for the oversight agencies, such as the Office of Government Ethics, the Office of the Comptroller and the Office of the Citizen Procurator, but left out the Special Prosecutor, noting: “I am not increasing the spending budget; I am simply moving part of an allocation of $2 million,” adding that it is inconsistent with the amendments submitted by the Chamber aimed at ensuring the functioning of the agencies under the Department of Public Safety, such as the Bureau of Emergency Management and Disaster Management, the Emergency Medical Bureau, the Bureau of the Corps of Firemen, and the Bureau of Forensic Sciences—all agencies with regard to which there is heightened concern in the wake of Puerto Rico’s devastating hurricanes and inequitable FEMA responses.  Indeed, Miguel Romero the vice president of the Senate Finance Committee, agreed on the need to assign the necessary funds to the Department of Public Security to ensure its operation: “There is a deficiency of over $40 million that we have to address.” In addition, Senator Padilla indicated the Senate would take a close look at the Board’s proposed $7 million cut to Court Administration, noting: “There is a need for appointment of judges and to maintain diversion programs with the correctional population.” Moreover, Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz also indicated that the controversy centers on inconsistencies between the budget and the fiscal plan, both presented by the PROMESA Board, explaining, in the wake of discussions, that it had been “established that there is a gap between the approved budget and the fiscal plan: basically, regarding the collections we will have available to cover the budget.” With the session scheduled to end on Saturday, that date falls three days after the limit established by the PROMESA Board to approve the budget, with the Board anticipating that, if Puerto Rico does not comply with the agreement reached with the Governor to repeal the Law Against Unjustified Dismissal (Law 80-1976), it will revert the fiscal plan to the approved one.

“Who’s on First? Who’s in Charge–elected or imposed leaders?

June 22, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the physical, fiscal, and mixed governance challenges which must be overcome in Puerto Rico.

Will There Be Luz? Gov. Ricardo Rosselló has signed into law a bill to partially privatize the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, potentially affecting the authority’s $8.9 billion in outstanding debt. The new law is intended to provide for the sale of the public utility’s power generation units and make a concession of its transmission and distribution system, according to a statement by the Governor—a concession which could involve a lease arrangement, as was done for Puerto Rico’s main airport. Under the proposed privatization, revenues realized could be utilized to address PREPA’s debt. purchasers would not assume PREPA’s debt; instead the public utility would use proceeds from any sale of a power plant to pay off a portion of the debt, or, as the Governor put it on Wednesday, the money raised could be used, at least in part, to contribute to PREPA’s underfunded public pension system. The new legislation comes in the wake of, last April, the PROMESA Oversight Board’s certification of a fiscal plan which assumed PREPA privatization—but which did not impose assumptions with regard to how the proceeds would be used. Puerto Rico Senate Minority Leader Eduardo Bhatia, an attorney-at-law and the former 15th President of the Puerto Rico Senate—as well as a former Fulbright scholar, noted: “The bill that Governor Rosselló signed today essentially authorizes the Governor to proceed with a ‘market sound[ing]’ and identify any and all potential private sector interest in the development of a new energy system in Puerto Rico,” adding: “Notable is that the bill does not authorize any sale before the Puerto Rico Legislature prepares, within 180 days, a statement of public policy specifically mandating what the new system will look like in 30 years.” Gov. Rosselló noted that Puerto Rico’s Public-Private Partnerships Authority would oversee the potential leasing of the transmission and distribution grid—a process expected to occur over the next year and a half. From a governance perspective, the Governor, PROMESA Oversight Board, and advisory teams plan to form a working group to steer the process.

Quein Es Encargado II? Meanwhile, the seemingly unending governance question with regard to who is in charge appears to be escalating. In putting an end, yesterday, to Puerto Rico’s debate on Law 80-1976, the Law on Unjustified Dismissal, the Puerto Rico Senate not only opened the door to annul the agreement reached by the Executive and the Oversight Board around the budget, but also appeared to intensify the power struggle between Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz; Governor Ricardo Rosselló Nevares, and the PROMESA Oversight Board. Upon learning the Puerto Rico Senate did not support the repeal of the statute—as demanded by the PROMESA Board, the Governor accused Senate President Schatz of acting to the detriment of Puerto Rico, for political reasons, even as PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión, who, like the Senate President, was in Washington, D.C. yesterday, warned that keeping the labor statute in force would imply reversing the certified tax plan, which includes cuts in vacation leave, days of sickness, and the Christmas bonus, stating: “There is a certified plan. If not (repeal it), we revert to the fiscal plan,” in the wake of his participation at forum sponsored by the Heritage Foundation.

Chair Carrión warned that reversion to the certified fiscal plan would mean at least $300 million in additional budget cuts over the next five years. He noted that the proposed structural reforms seek to “generate economic growth: We have limited powers (to make decisions that boost economic growth), but one of them is the labor area.”

The Board is scheduled to meet a week from today to discuss the upcoming fiscal year budget—scheduled to take effect at the end of next week.

In criticizing the actions of Senate President Rivera Schatz, Gov. Rosselló Nevares said that the upper House leader had opted to “hinder” his administration, and held him responsible for the millions of dollars in cuts that may wreak fiscal harm to the island’s municipios, as well as other governmental entities, noting, in a written statement: “Puerto Rico has just seen how politics is made and not how a future government should be made in times of challenges and difficulties, with this regrettable decision by the President of the Senate. We will follow the path of change and transformation that we have forged; however, this was the time to unite and together to get out of the shameful past we inherited. He chose to hinder, chose to follow the tricks of the past that have put us in this situation: the risk of the loss of billions of dollars for Puerto Rico as a result of restructuring the debt falls on this action. Likewise, the loss of millions of dollars in appropriations for the municipal governments that we had achieved also falls on the President of the Senate. Sen. Rivera Schatz added that he anticipated he would appear before a judicial forum to challenge the powers of the unelected PROMESA Oversight Board to alter Puerto Rico’s budget, noting: “The Senate ends the matter of Law 80. It is not going to repeal Law 80. If it were up to us to go to court to litigate against the Board, I advance that I already talked with lawyers to do so.” (The repeal of Law 80 was a specific condition presented by the Board in exchange for disbursing additional financial aid to municipios, the University of Puerto Rico, and guaranteeing holiday leave and sick days for private sector employees.)

At the same time, during the meeting of the majority caucus of the New Progressive Party, a proposal by Sen. Miguel Romero to ascribe to the Law against discrimination in employment (Law 100-1959) by adding some amendments to Law 80 was defeated  15 -5, with the prevailing majority choosing to defer consideration of the issue during the current session—which ends Monday. Sen. Romero proposed creating a system of fixed payments for dismissals that violate only the Anti-Discrimination Law 100, but insisted on repealing Law 80, which deals with another area of ​​labor law by providing remedies for severance without just cause.

Not unlike in the U.S. Congress, the Puerto Rico House and Senate do not always see ojo to ojo (eye to eye). The House intends to address Puerto Rico’s relationship with the Oversight Board differently, with House President Carlos “Johnny” Méndez stating, yesterday, that he has to study what is the probability of prevailing in a lawsuit with the Oversight Board defense of budget items, adding that he considers the controversy over Law 80 to be over. In response to a question whether the House would join a lawsuit initiated by the Senate to combat the cuts applied by the Board, Senate President Méndez replied: “We have to sit down to see what the arguments are and make a decision: the Promise law has supremacy over everything. It does not even allow us to sue the Oversight Board. We have to see what the arguments are, the legal basis for making a decision. It is not going to be a futile exercise. If we have more than a 50% chance of prevailing, of course we will be there.” He added that, if he opts for litigation, he would challenge the authority and ability of the unelected Oversight Board to establish public policy.

What about Manana? Even as the question of governance proceeded, two PROMESA Board members yesterday concurred with a panel of other experts that an overhaul Puerto Rico’s local labor laws is a key for the territory’s future growth. At a session in Washington, D.C. at the Heritage Foundation, PROMESA Chair Jose Carrion joined Anne Krueger, economics Professor at Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, and fellow Board Member Andrew Biggs—with their discussion coming on some of the same issues. With Puerto Rico’s elected leaders considering instituting the same at-will employment statutes used in many states, as well as adding more restrictive rules for receiving food stamps and instituting an earned income tax credit to encourage work, the panelists described Puerto Rico’s labor laws as more restrictive than any state—a factor, perhaps, that could help explain the exodus from Puerto Rico of so many better economic opportunities on the mainland. The panelists noted the challenge will be to convince the people of Puerto Rico that a more competitive labor market will produce more jobs, with PROMESA Board member Andrew Biggs, noting that economists predict there would be an additional one percentage point of annual economic growth if the reforms were adopted. PROMESA Board Chair Jose Carrión noted he, as an employer in Puerto Rico, is only too well aware of how “onerous” the labor laws are, adding: “[I]t does not make Puerto Rico competitive with places to where we are losing our population such as Florida.” Employers in Puerto Rico, for instance, are required to give workers 24 hours off after they work 8 hours, said Professor Anne Krueger of Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, noting that the labor force participation rate is only 38% on Puerto Rico compared to 63% on the mainland, she said. In the end, the PROMESA Board appeared to reach an agreement with the Governor on proposed labor law changes. Now, warns Chair Carrión, if the legislature does not agree, the PROMESA Board will govern in place of Puerto Rico’s elected leaders.

Motor City Rising

June 1, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the remarkable turnaround of Detroit—a city which, when I inquired on its very first day in chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, for walking directions from my hotel to the Governor’s Detroit office—in response to which I was told the one mile route was not doable—not because I would be too physically challenged,  but rather because I would be slain. Yet now, as the  fine editorial writers for the Detroit News, Daniel Howes and Nolan Finley, wrote: “A regional divide that appeared to be healing since Detroit’s historic bankruptcy is busting wide open over a plan for regional transit, exposing anxiety that the city is prospering at the expense of the suburbs,” noting that the trigger is a is a proposed millage to fund expansion of the Regional Transit Authority of Southeast Michigan, a $5.4 billion plan that would seem to promise an exceptional reshaping of the metro region—indeed: a reversal a what had been a decades-long shift of the economy from downtown Detroit to is suburbs: an exodus that contributed to a wasteland and the nation’s largest ever chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy.” Or, as they wrote: “That battle reveals growing suburban resentments over the region’s shifting economic fortunes: decades-long capital flow is reversing directions as more jobs and tax revenue flee the ‘burbs for a rejuvenated downtown.”

Mr. Finley noted that Mayor Mike Duggan, this week, told him: “I can’t explain why Oakland and Macomb (suburban counties) are doing what they’re doing” three weeks ago Microsoft brought 400 employees from Southfield into the city of Detroit. And last week, Tata Technologies said they were moving 200 people from Novi and into Detroit. Google is in the process of moving people from Birmingham into the city of Detroit.” What the Mayor was alluding to was a u-turn from a decade of moderate and upper income families leaving Detroit for its suburban counties in the days when former Mayor Coleman Young had advised criminals to “hit Eight Mile” has the relationship between the Metro Motor City’s regional leaders become so difficult in the wake of the unexpected reverse exodus: this time from Detroit’s suburbs back into the city. Billions in private sector investment, spearheaded by Dan Gilbert’s Quicken Loans Inc., the Ilitch family, and growing enthusiasm among other business leaders to be part of the city’s post-chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy have been changing demographic and economic patterns.

As the city continues under decreasing state oversight to carry out its judicially approved plan of debt adjustment, Mayor Duggan notes: “Expectations are rising.” This, after all, is not a City Hall bound mayor, but rather what the editors described as a “short, stocky, balding white guy who is no stranger to block after block of dilapidated houses—and who was reelected to a second term with an amazing 72% of the vote in a city where slightly more than 82% of the voters are black—and where, when he took office, there were about 40,000 abandoned homes. He is not a stay at City Hall type fellow either—rather an inveterate inspector of this mammoth rebuilding of an iconic city, who listens—and with his cell phone—takes action immediately in response to constituents concerns. After all, as the Mayor notes: “Expectations are rising…People are putting more demands on me and more demands on the administration, and I think that’s a really good thing and that will keep us motivated to work hard.”

Already, the urban wasteland is changing—almost on a daily basis: already, under a city program which supports renovation over demolition to try to preserve the mid-century architectural character of neighborhoods, that number of abandoned homes has been halved—with many of the units set aside for affordable housing. In his State of the City address this year, Mayor Duggan said he wants 8,000 more homes demolished, 2,000 sold, another 1,000 renovated and 11,000 more boarded up by the end of next year.

On that first day of the nation’s largest ever municipal bankruptcy, Kevin Orr, whom the Governor had tapped to become the Emergency Manager for Detroit, had flown out from the Washington, D.C. region, and told me his first actions were to email every employee of Detroit that he would be filing that morning in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, but that he expected every employee to report to work—and that the most critical priorities were that every traffic and street light work—and that there be a professional, courteous, and prompt response to every 911 call.  

That was a challenge—especially for a municipality in bankruptcy, but, by 2016, the city had completed a $185 million streetlight repair project; 911 response times have been reduced from 50 minutes in 2013 to 14.5 minutes last year, and ambulance response times fell from 20 minutes in 2014 to the national average of 8 minutes this year.

As we have previously noted, two months ago, just three and a half years after Detroit emerged from chapter 9, the city has exited from state oversight; its homeless population has, for the third consecutive year, declined—and, its unemployment rate, which had peaked during the fiscal crisis at 28%, is now below 8%. No wonder the suburbs are becoming fiscally jealous. And the downtown, which was unsafe for pedestrians when the National League of Cities hosted its annual meeting there in the 1980’s and on the city’s first day in bankruptcy, has been transformed into a modern, walkable metropolis.

Nevertheless, the seeming bulldog, relentless leader has refused to sugarcoat the fiscal and physical challenge—or, as he puts it: “I don’t spend a lot of time promising. I just say, here’s what we’re doing next and here’s why we’re doing it and then we do what we say…Over time, you don’t restore trust by making more promises; you restore trust by actually doing what you said you were going to do.”

Mr. Finley wrote that the Mayor, deemed a “truth teller” by Detroit Housing Director Arthur Jemison, has been direct in confronting the city’s harsh legacy of racist policies after the Great Depression lured thousands upon thousands of African-Americans north in the early decades of the 20th century to work in auto factories—luring them to a city at a time when Federal Housing Administration guidelines barred blacks in the city from obtaining home mortgages and even led to the construction in 1941 of a wall bordering the heavily African-American 8 Mile neighborhood to segregate it from a new housing development for whites.

Aaron Foley — the 33-year-old author of How to Live in Detroit Without Being a Jackass, noted: “When you deliver that kind of message about this is why black people are on this side of the wall in 8 Mile versus the other side of the wall, that gets people talking: This is a history that we all know in Detroit, and for the city government to acknowledge that in the way that it did on that platform, it did resonate.”

Mayor Duggan’s concern for Detroit’s people—and not forcing low-income families out, is evidenced too by his words: “Every single time that we had a building where the federal [housing] credits were expiring and people were going to get forced out of their affordable units, I had to sit down for hours with the building owner to convince them why those who stayed were entitled to be there, and I thought: I need to do just one speech and explain that this is the right thing to do…Since then there’s been just great support for the direction we’re going in the city. We have very little pushback now from our developers over making sure that what they’re doing is equitable.”