The Import of Accurate Municipal Revenue Projections in Addressing Municipal Insolvency

eBlog, 1/12/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing challenges to Detroit’s long-term recovery from the nation’s largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, before turning to the small Virginia municipality of Petersburg as it struggles to not just avoid bankruptcy, but rather to right its ship of state—both by its elected and appointed leaders.

Detroit Coming Back. Detroit, as we noted in our original report on the city, is quite different than most U.S. municipalities and, indeed, from other cities in Michigan in that its revenues, from taxes and state-shared revenues are higher than those of any other large Michigan municipality on a per capita basis, in part reflecting its reliance on a significantly broader tax base than most cities in the country: property taxes, income taxes, utility taxes, casino wagering taxes, and state-shared revenues. The property tax accounted for 13.3 percent of Detroit’s revenues in 2012, even though the city had the highest property taxes among big cities in the U.S. But it was the 22 percent decline in those revenues over the decade preceding its collapse into the nation’s largest-ever chapter 9 bankruptcy that appeared to precipitate the state takeover via the appointment by Governor Rick Snyder of an emergency manager to steer the city into—and then out of chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. The exhaustion of the city’s revenues reflected the overall loss of 15,648 business establishments between 1972 and 2007—that is, even before the massive impact of the Great Recession, or the bankruptcies and subsequent recovery of General Motors and Chrysler and the restructuring of the automotive supplier network—companies bailed out by the federal government, unlike Detroit.

Today, still, despite its lower reliance on property tax revenues, the track of those revenues can reflect the city’s fiscal direction. Indeed, the city’s housing market faces numerous challenges as the city seeks to carve out a path toward less blight, increased housing preservation, and a better functioning residential mortgage market. Zillow reports that median sale prices for metro Detroit homes and condominiums rose 7.2 percent last month compared to the year before: the median home value in Detroit is $37,000, reflecting home values which have gone up even more, by 8.5% over the past year, according to Zillow, which predicts they will rise 4.2% within the next year. At the same time, the percent of Detroit homeowners underwater on their mortgages is 0.4%, some four times higher than Detroit Metro area; the median rent price in Detroit is $750, or about 75% of the Detroit Metro median of $1,050; nevertheless, sale prices across the city have continued to grow, while both the number and share of underwater loans has continued to decline. The average household equity for all Detroit loans reached 29 percent in Q4 2015; the shares of loans in serious delinquency, foreclosure, or REO (property owned by a lender—typically a bank, government agency, or government loan insurer—after an unsuccessful sale at a foreclosure auction) in Detroit are on pace to fall below pre-crisis levels. The data demonstrate a particularly sharp decline in the share of REOs.

However, sales of single family homes in the city in 2015 (about 18,522) dropped about 18% from the previous year, even as Detroit’s median rent stabilized at around $756 a month in December 2015. Unemployment fell again in the early months of last year, and labor force size edged up as well, according to the Detroit Housing Tracker (the Detroit Housing Tracker monitors the latest development in the Detroit housing and community development arena and is updated quarterly: the publication has two sections in which it presents comprehensive market indicators including sales prices and volumes, rental prices, household equity level, delinquencies and foreclosures.) In comparison, in the surrounding four-county area of Oakland, Wayne, Macomb, and Livingston counties, median sale prices jumped from $149,200 in December 2015 to $159,900 in December 2016. According to Realcomp Ltd. II, last month’s figures fall in line with the general trends of 2016: the number of on-market listings in the four-county region last month declined nearly 43 percent year-over-year, from 19,634 to 11,255; however, sales prices in all four of the surrounding counties increased, on average, by 10%.

In Overtime. The city of Petersburg, Virginia added another hefty bill to its payment list after a class-action lawsuit (Thomas Ewers, et al, vs. the City of Petersburg Bureau of Police) between members of the Bureau of Police and the city was settled last week, with the settlement agreement mandating the virtually insolvent municipality to make a payment of $1.35 million in recompense for law enforcement officers’ unpaid overtime. Of that amount, the City of Petersburg will have to pay $800,000, while the Virginia Division of Risk Management will chip in the remaining $550,000. For its part, Petersburg city spokesman Clay Hamner this week reported that that part of Petersburg’s payment is expected to come via a short-term $6.5 million loan secured by Petersburg from Wells Fargo last month; other funds could potentially come from the sale of the city’s municipal water and wastewater assets—especially in the wake of an unsolicited purchase proposal last month by Aqua Virginia, Inc., leading the city to advertise for competing bids. According to the city’s press release, the settlement applies to all current and former law enforcement officers employed between Jan. 11, 2013 and June 24, 2016, by the Bureau of Police at the rank of lieutenant or below who were denied overtime or other wage-related payments. The settlement came as the city’s expensive fiscal turnaround consultants reported the city’s fiscal condition remains, reporting that the fiscal plan Petersburg has been working from since the City Council’s first attempt to strip $12 million from an outsized budget last September no longer reflects its fiscal realities: some elements of those decisions, such as slashing funding for schools, canceling a youth summer program, and boosting trash fees, would provide savings; however, not every plan materialized, according to the consultant’s analysis. Moreover, when combined with the municipality’s past-due payments to companies taken from the current year’s budget for last year’s bills, the consultant’s reported the Council, next week, will likely be forced to take further actions to reduce spending or find other revenues—and will have to include a partial restoration of a 10 percent reduction in municipal worker salaries targeted toward making whole the city’s public safety workers, with Nelsie Birch, Petersburg’s interim finance director, advising: “The reduction of salaries has done significant damage to the city.”

It seems that the employee turnover and overtime costs have soared even as morale plummeted since the austerity measure was implemented: police, firefighters and emergency communications workers would see their pay rates restored this spring if the council approves the consultant’s plan. That would be important: the city’s violent crime rate is nearly 400% higher than the statewide average. On the upside, the consultant reported that of the $18.8 million that state auditors estimated Petersburg owed to vendors as of last July 1, only $6 million to $7 million remains overdue. That might help as, next month, the city is inviting about 400 of its creditors to meet for discussions relating to past-due bills, and inviting interested buyers to consider purchasing city-owned property—with both city employees and the city’s consultants taking inventory: counting cars, combing through old equipment, and tracking every nickel spent for a dime that could be saved. The consultant addressed one key issue of concern: its current inability by its tax assessors and collectors to provide administrators with accurate revenue projections.

At the same time, the consultants expressed apprehension that city council members must learn to demand that expenses not exceed revenues: in the municipality’s FY2016 books, Petersburg had a $9 million structural imbalance in the general fund used to cover the city’s day-to-day operations: the city had $67 million to work with and spent $76 million. Finally, the consultant noted what he believes to be the source of Petersburg’s fiscal crisis: for too many years (dating back to 2009) the city has spent more than it had, propping up shortfalls from a rainy day fund which had long since evaporated. In response, interim City Manager Tom Tyrrell said the Mayor and Councilmembers could meet with officials one-on-one or in pairs to discuss the details ahead of next week’s votes to balance the current year’s budget—with such sessions not triggering Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act. Under the law, an in-person or electronic meeting of three members of a public body constitutes a quorum.

Leaving Municipal Bankruptcy: Such Sweet Sorrow

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eBlog, 1/03/17

Good Morning! Happy New Year! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the next—and final—steps for the City of San Bernardino to exit the nation’s longest in U.S. history municipal bankruptcy, then we consider the underlying fiscal strengths that could be critical to Atlantic City’s emergence from state control and back to solvency. Finally, we try to assess whether one of President Obama’s final laws—expanding Petersburg’s national park—might help the fiscally ailing municipality, before finally comparing and contrasting the fiscal dilemmas of two U.S. territories: Puerto Rico and Guam.

Leaving Chapter 9. In just over three weeks, San Bernardino could receive its exit clearance from U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury from the longest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history. That will reduce court-related costs and burdens to the city; the real issue will be with regard to how it implements its plan of debt adjustment, with Mayor Carey Davis noting: “The city is poised and setting the stage for quite a bit of continued growth and improvements for 2017.” But, in the wake of the long bankruptcy, the new city which emerges will be different: it will have a new charter as soon as California Secretary of State Alex Padilla confirms the city’s election results, clearing the path for the city to begin implementing a new charter much more similar to those of other, successful cities—changes such as moving to a system where the City Council votes with the Mayor to set policy which is then implemented by the city manager. That change will take effect immediately; other changes will need to be implemented by the City Council approving changes to the municipal code. For her part, Judge Jury noted the city’s plan of debt resolution did not hinge on the charter approval; nevertheless, she praised the outcome: “(City officials) successfully amended their charter, which will give them modern-day, real-life flexibility in making decisions that need to be made…There was too much political power and not enough management under their charter, to be frank, compared to most cities in California.”

There were other critical steps to this longest-ever plan to exit municipal bankruptcy, including: catching up on audits for the first time since 2010, the city caught up on its audits, perhaps allowing it to operate in 2017 under less suspicion and with eligibility for more state and federal grants; significant outsourcing, especially with the transfer of the 137-year old Fire Department to county control; redevelopment at the Carousel Mall, and attempts to alleviate homelessness; albeit Mayor Carey Davis notes: “As you can see, there’s a full plate ahead of us in 2017…I’m sure there will be some unexpected needs that will be in place with a stronger city hall, a city hall that is doing a much better job with our financial reporting, but I think that with the changes of 2016 we’ll have a strong front to show investors.”

Spinning the Wheel of Misfortune. A key challenge for Atlantic City—and the State of New Jersey, which has assumed control over the city, relates to casinos: how to emerge from over reliance on gambling, which produces some 67 percent of the city’s revenues. Despite losing half its value in Atlantic City over the past decade, the gaming industry appears to remain a critical component of Atlantic City’s future. Notwithstanding the multiple bankruptcies of former casino owner and now President-elect Donald Trump in the fabled city, the industry still represents a more than $3.7 billion economy: in 2015, the casino industry totaled revenues of $3.7 billion, $2.4 billion of which was from gambling, according to New Jersey state figures. Through the first nine months of last year, there was $2.8 billion in total revenue. Ironically, the impact of Trump Taj Mahal Casino Resort’s closing in October remains to be determined. Still, as seemingly mouth-watering as such revenues would appear to be, they contrast with the more than double $5.2 billion in casino revenues from a decade ago—since then competition from outside the market has contributed to the closing of five casinos since 2014. So it seems to be a positive sign that over the past couple of years, Atlantic City properties increased their non-gaming attractions, with the increase in non-gaming attractions demonstrating a steady growth in non-gaming revenue. Indeed, between 2012 and last year, non-gaming revenue nearly quadrupled from $252 million to more than $998 million, according to state records.

A Fiscal Battlefield. President Obama has signed into law new federal legislation for a major expansion of Petersburg National Battlefield: the battlefield commemorates the Civil War’s longest battlefield conflict, marked by bursts of bloody trench warfare spanning some 10 months from 1864 to 1865. The new law, however, does not pay for the addition of more than 7,000 acres to the existing 2,700 acres of rolling hills, earthworks, and siege lines already under protection at Petersburg. Supporters of the new law say the larger boundary would not only protect historic sites from commercial development, but also give park visitors a more comprehensive understanding of the Petersburg campaign, which left tens of thousands of men dead. According to National Park Service figures, the park draws approximately 200,000 visitors a year, far fewer than such higher-profile sites as Gettysburg in Pennsylvania, with more than 1 million tourists annually. Nevertheless, the park has proved key to the area economy, bringing in some $10 million a year. Officials hope expanding the battlefield’s protected footprint would bring in even more visitors. However, the newly enacted legislation does not include any new funding.

The land changes come as the City of Petersburg, trying to unwind nearly $19 million in unpaid obligations, having reduced its employees’ pay and experienced the repossession of its firefighting equipment, is trying to determine how the federal changes might affect its fiscal distress. Today, according to National Park Service figures, the park draws about 200,000 visitors a year. Notwithstanding, the Petersburg park plays a key role in the regional economy, bringing in some $10 million a year. Thus, officials hope expanding the battlefield’s protected footprint would bring in even more visitors—visitors who might help enhance the city’s tax base. That might happen, as the Park Service’s first priority is expected to focus on the acquisition of still more private property and most vulnerable to commercial development. While that would risk creating a fiscal issue due to foregone property tax revenues, it might have the counter impact of raising the assessed values of property within the city limits—and create a means to help the city grapple with nearly $19 million in unpaid obligations.

Are Fiscal Crises Contagious? A question has arisen whether the promise of the newly enacted PROMESA law to provide a quasi-municipal bankruptcy mechanism for the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico to address its fiscal meltdown might be contagious for the territory’s U.S. counterpart Guam, where Fitch Ratings has cut Guam’s business-tax revenue bonds to junk, noting that PROMESA “fundamentally” alters the premise used to rate debt issued by U.S. territorial governments. Even though Guam is nearly 10,000 miles away from Puerto Rico, analysts claim the new Congressional law has set a precedent which could let other U.S. territories escape from obligations to their municipal bondholders. In contrast, S&P Global Ratings analyst Paul Dyson maintains an A rating for Guam—a rating which he notes reflects the territory’s ability to pay investors, adding that the new federal PROMESA law “currently applies only to Puerto Rico.” Indeed, Mr. Dyson points out that: “We have no indication that Guam is going to do something similar to PROMESA.” S&P reports that Guam’s economic outlook is stable: the territory is host to U.S. Air Force and Navy bases, and its economy likely to benefit from U.S. plans to expand its military operations on the island, which is the closest U.S. territory to potential hot spots in Asia. In contrast, however, Guam has not adopted a balanced budget; it has rising pension liabilities, and growing debt—debt of some $3.2 billion in obligations for a population of about 165,700, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The Daunting Road to Recovery from the Nation’s Longest Ever Municipal Bankruptcy

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eBlog, 12/09/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we look back on the long and rocky road from the nation’s longest municipal bankruptcy back to solvency taken by the City of San Bernardino, a city in a Dillon Rule state, which we described in our original study as the former gateway from the East to Midwest of the L.A. basin and former home to Norton Air Force Base, Kaiser Steel, and the Santa Fe Railroad, but which in the 1990’s, with the departure of those industries and employees, fell into hard times. By the advent of the Great Recession, 46% of its residents were on some form of public assistance—and nearly one-third below the poverty line. By FY2012, the city faced a $45 million deficit; its fund balance and reserves were exhausted—leading the city to file for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy (note California codes §§53760, 53760.1, 53760.3, 53760.5, and 53760.7—and where, effective on the first day of this year, new statutory state language specifically created a first lien priority for general obligation debt issued by cities, counties, schools, and special districts, so long as the debt was secured by a levy of ad valorum taxes pursuant to California’s Constitution.) As we have noted, in the 18 states which authorize chapter 9 filings, states have proscribed strikingly different legal mechanisms relating to the state role—varying from a state takeover, such as we have described in the case of the nation’s largest municipal bankruptcy in Detroit, but to a very different regime in Jefferson County and San Bernardino—where the elected municipal officials not only remained in office, but here the respective states—if anything—contributed to the severity of the fiscal challenges. Then we turn to what might be Congress’ last day in town this year—and whether funding to help the City of Flint might be enacted: Will Congress pass and send to the President a bill to provide emergency assistance to Flint?

Back to a City’s Viable Future. San Bernardino leaders this week issued a detailed statement on the arduous road to recovery they have travelled and what they intend for the road ahead, albeit noting the city is already well along its own blueprint for its recovery, as it awaits formal approval from U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury from its chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy early next year. In its statement, San Bernardino reported it had implemented about 70 percent of its recovery plan. That’s turned once-dire projections for the future upside down—a virtual u-turn from when the city’s fiscal analysts three years ago projected that in FY2023, the city would have a deficit of $360 million if dramatic changes were not achieved. But today, the city instead projects an unallocated cash balance for FY2023 of $9.5 million, or, as the statement reads: “Now, the city is on the cusp of emerging from bankruptcy as a changed city with a brighter future.” The municipal statement is primarily focused on the governance and fiscal changes made to create a virtual u-turn in the city’s fiscal ship of state since entering what became the nation’s longest municipal bankruptcy—a change in fiscal course without either state aid or state imposition of an emergency manager or a state takeover. The statement notes: “Given the emergency nature of its filing, it took the city several months to assess its financial condition—until April 2013, at which time the city adopted a final budget for fiscal years 2012-13 and 2013-14…The city’s initial financial assessment, however, only reflected further concern over its financial future. In September 2013, Mayor [Pat] Morris announced that absent fundamental modernization and change the city faced a 10-year deficit of a staggering $360 million. The future of San Bernardino looked bleak.”

The statement itemized what appeared to be the key steps to recovery, including achieving labor agreements—agreements which resulted in savings in excess of $100 million, and involved the termination of virtually all health insurance subsidies coverage for employees and retirees, writing that the city calculated the resulting savings to amount to about $44 million for retirees and $51 million for current employees. The statement notes some $56 million in other OPEB changes. A key—and hard-fought change—was achieved by contracting out for essential public services, with one of the most hard fought such changes coming from the annexation agreement with the San Bernardino County Fire Protection District: an agreement under which the county assumed responsibility for fire and emergency medical response—a change projected to save San Bernardino’s budget nearly $66 million over the next two decades just in public pension savings, but also as much as $5 to $6 million in its annual operating budget—and that is before adding in the parcel tax revenues which were incorporated in that agreement. San Bernardino also switched to contracting out for its trash and recycling—an action with a one-time franchise payment of $5 million, but increased estimated annual revenues of approximately $5 million to $7.6 million. The switch led to significant alterations or contracting out for an increasing number of municipal services. Or, as the paper the city released notes: “Modern cities deliver many services via contracts with third-party providers, using competition to get the best terms and price for services…The city has entered into a number of such contracts under the Recovery Plan.”

Governance. The city paper writes that the voters’ approval of a new city charter will allow San Bernardino to eliminate ambiguous lines of authority which had created a lack of authority, or, as U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury put it earlier this week: “(City officials) successfully amended their charter, which will give them modern-day, real-life flexibility in making decisions that need to be made…There was too much political power and not enough management under their charter, to be frank, compared to most cities in California.”

Rechartering San Bernardino’s Public Security. San Bernardino’s Plan of Debt Adjustment calls for increasing investment into the Police Department through a five-year Police Plan—a key step, as a study commissioned to consider the city’s public safety found the city to be California’s most dangerous municipality based on crime, police presence, and other “community factors.” The study used FBI data and looked at crime rates, police presence, and investment in police departments as well as community factors including poverty, education, unemployment, and climate: The report found a high correlation between crime rates and poverty—with San Bernardino’s poverty rate topping 30.6 percent. Thus, in the city’s Police Plan portion of its plan of adjustment, the report notes:  “The Mayor, Common Council, and San Bernardino’s residents agree that crime is the most important issue the city faces,” the city says in the Police Plan, submitted to the federal bankruptcy court as part of its plan. The plan calls for $56 million over five years to add more police, update technology, and replace many of the Police Department’s aging vehicles.

The Cost of Fiscal Inattention. Unsurprisingly, the fiscal costs of bankruptcy for a city or county are staggering. The city estimates that the services of attorneys and consultants will cost at least $25 million by the time of the city’s projected formal emergence from chapter 9 next March—albeit those daunting costs are a fraction of the $350 million in savings achieved under the city’s pending plan of debt adjustment—savings created by the court’s approval of its plan to pay its creditors far less than they would have otherwise been entitled: as little as 1 cent on the dollar owed, in many instances. Or, as the city’s statement wryly notes: “In addition, the city’s bankruptcy has allowed the city a reprieve during which it was able to shore up its finances, find greater cost and organizational efficiencies and improve its governance functions…Thus, all told, while the city’s exit from bankruptcy will have been a hard-fought victory, it was one that was critical and necessary to the city’s continued viability for the future.”

Out Like Flint. The House of Representatives on what it hopes to be its penultimate day yesterday approved two bills which, together, would authorize and fund $170 million for emergency aid to Flint and other communities endangered by contaminated drinking water. The emergency assistance came by way of a stopgap spending bill to keep the federal government operating next April in a bipartisan 326-96 vote and, separately, a water infrastructure bill which directs how the $170 million package should be spent by a 360-61 vote. Nevertheless, the aid for the city is not certain in the U.S. Senate: some have vowed to stop it, at least in part because the bill includes a controversial drought provision which would boost water deliveries to the San Joaquin Valley and Southern California.

The Stark Differences in How Cities May Exit Municipal Bankruptcy, & The Hard Challenges of Municipal Governance in Insolvencies.

eBlog, 12/07/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the green light flashed by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury yesterday, clearing the way for San Bernardino to exit the longest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history—and in ways profoundly different than Detroit because of the very different state roles and laws with regard to chapter 9 and governance in municipal bankruptcy, and that San Bernardino—like Jefferson County—remained under elected local leadership throughout their respective journeys into and out of municipal bankruptcy. Then we turn to last night’s recall by voters in the small, insolvent municipality of East Cleveland, in the wake of the narrowest of margins—but at an unaffordable cost.

Smooth Sailing Out of Municipal Bankruptcy. In what San Bernardino Mayor Carey Davis yesterday described as a “monumental day…[where] the hard work has paid off,” referring to U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury’s statement yesterday: “We have a lot left to do, but this clears the way for us to do much of that work,” as she yesterday confirmed the City of San Bernardino’s plan of debt adjustment, confirming its path early in the new year to exit from the nation’s longest ever chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy as early as next March. San Bernardino City Attorney Gary Saenz expressed elation at Judge Jury’s green light, noting: “I’m so pleased and excited about where the city is now compared to where we were when we filed bankruptcy and what we were able to accomplish and that we now have a solid foundation upon which to build this city. The confirmation should certainly help the rest of the city and the world recognize that San Bernardino is back.” Even Judge Jury joined in praising the city for its endurance and stamina over the long road, noting that over the four-year span she had observed that had improved not just its finances, but also its governance, pointing to the municipality’s voter-approved new charter and better working relationships among elected officials: “The city came in financial chaos, and it’s leaving in much better shape…I have lived in this region for 40 years…and I’ve always said the city needed help. I’m glad it got it.” Under the city’s now approved plan of adjustment, it will pay the bulk of its creditors far less than they would otherwise be entitled to—in many instances merely one cent for every dollar such a creditor is owed; however, the city’s plan also outlines changes to the structure of the city, some of which, including outsourcing of refuse and fire services, and the passage of a new city charter, have already been implemented. City Attorney Saenz estimated that even though the costs to the city of its filing will be in excess of $20 million, its now approved chapter 9 plan of debt adjustment will save the city’s taxpayers more than $300 million worth of debts that will be officially discharged.

With regard to the record length of time, Judge Jury said the case, which hinged significantly on deals with major creditors, took the right amount of time. Moreover, several of the city’s major creditors in the case concurred in the congratulations, contrasting the city’s process and efforts specifically to Detroit, the nation’s largest-ever chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, by noting both the significant state role and imposition of an emergency manager in the former—in contrast, the State of California was simply an absent, if not contributor to San Bernardino’s insolvency and consequent chapter 9 filing. Indeed, attorney Vincent J. Marriott, who represented municipal bondholders who held approximately $50 million of the city’s tax-exempt bonds, noted: “Here the city had the challenge of being not only economically viable but politically palatable,” said. “As is appropriate, that took time. I think the result today is really a tribute to all the work and thought that went in from the city.” Further challenging San Bernardino was the inability to gain any concessions on its public pension liabilities—in sharp contrast to the Detroit plan of debt adjustment, which provided for reductions in both Detroit’s public pension and post-retirement benefit obligations after San Bernardino’s attempts to negotiate with the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), therefore forcing the city to negotiate steeper concessions from all its other creditors. (The San Bernardino police union did reach an agreement with the city last year which includes concessions on leave time from before the bankruptcy filing, legal claims related to the imposition, and retiree health care.)

The last hurdle, as we have recounted previously, came after Judge Jury held for the city against efforts by attorneys representing clients injured by the San Bernardino Police—who had argued that the exceptionally low offer demonstrated the city, in its plan of debt adjustment efforts, had not acted “reasonably,” nor “in good faith,” provisions required for the federal court to confirm a municipality’s plan of debt adjustment. In rejecting those debtors’ claims, Judge Jury told their attorney: “I’m not trying to diminish the injuries to your client…But I’m also saying at a human level what the police and others have given back do affect the livelihoods of their families. It’s not a dispassionate institutional creditor.” Finally, Judge Jury concurred in one of the very few areas in the city’s plan of debt adjustment calling for increased spending: for the city’s police department. Judge Jury noted: “Anybody that lives in this area knows that the crime problem in San Bernardino is substantial…They have to get safe for people to want to live there.”

Pearl Harbor Day on East Cleveland. East Cleveland voters yesterday recalled both Mayor Gary Norton Jr. and City Council President Thomas Wheeler in a special election, with the final, unofficial results finding that Mayor Norton lost by a margin of 20 votes (548 to 528), according to the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections website, while City Council President Wheeler lost by an even narrow margin of 18 votes—with the official tally to be released on December 19th. Yesterday’s recall election marked the third time Councilmember Wheeler had been subject to recall: he prevailed exactly one year ago, and then, again, last June—albeit by a mere 51-49 percent margin, and with a turnout of only 7 percent of the city’s registered voters. For the ousted Mayor, the recall marked the first such election. In a statement last night, Mayor Norton noted: “I love the people of East Cleveland, and it has been an honor to have served them.” In the wake of the recall, Council Vice President Brandon King will be sworn in as the new Mayor in three weeks, and the remaining City Council members will have to appoint two leaders to the Council to fill the empty slots: under the Council’s procedures, should the Council find itself unable to agree upon such appointments, Mayor-to-be King will choose who fills those seats, according to Council President Wheeler.

For the small, insolvent municipality of East Cleveland, a city which Ohio Auditor Dave Yost’s office four years ago declared to be in a state of fiscal emergency, and last year stated that municipal bankruptcy or merging with Cleveland were the two most viable options for the suburb, the interim has been like waiting for Godot. Indeed, the small municipality has been awaiting some response from the State of Ohio with regard to its request for authorization to file for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, and some response from both the state and City of Cleveland with regard to its proposal to be annexed, the disruptive election carries a fiscal cost: yesterday’s election could cost the city between $25,000 and $30,000. (The city explored filing for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in May, but has been stymied by the state, because the Ohio Tax Commissioner’s office said the Council should ask permission from the state, not the Mayor.) Now, in the wake of last night’s results, the outcome could mean what outgoing Council President Wheeler last night described as “dramatic chaos:” “They wanted me out, and it took them three times…Obviously they don’t want the city to move forward; they want to go back to the way things used to be.” In contrast, Devin Branch, who led the effort to recall the city’s elected leaders last night said the people of East Cleveland had spoken, and while voter turnout was low, the majority of the city opposes the current mayor: “Working class people of the City of East Cleveland are soundly against Mayor Norton.” The city explored filing for bankruptcy in May, but hit a roadblock when the Tax Commissioner’s office said council should ask permission from the state, not the mayor. The letter from the commissioner also detailed the plans that the city must have prior to filing for bankruptcy.

TheExceptional Governing Challenges on Roads to Fiscal Recovery

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eBlog, 12/02/16

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the hard role to recovery not just from San Bernardino’s longest-ever municipal bankruptcy, but also the savage terrorist attack a year ago. Then we venture East to observe the evolving state role in New Jersey’s takeover of Atlantic City, where the new designee named by Gov. Chris Christie, Jeffrey Chiesa, yesterday introduced himself to residents and taxpayers, but offered little guidance about exactly how he will usurp the roles of the Mayor and City Council in governing and trying to get the famed boardwalk city out of insolvency and back to fiscal stability. Finally, we look north to the metropolitan Hartford, Connecticut region, where the municipalities in the region are seeking to work out fiscal mechanisms to address Hartford’s potential municipal bankruptcy in order to ensure no disruption of metropolitan water and sewer services—a different, but in this case critical element of a “sharing economy.”  

The Jagged Road to Chapter 9 Recovery. It was one year ago today that terrorists struck in San Bernardino—the city in chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy longer than any other city in U.S. history, marking, then, a day of 14 deaths—with victims caught in the crossfire of gun shots and carnage in the wake of the wanton attack by Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik—and a horror still not over, as it will be another nine months before the trial against Enrique Marquez Jr., who has been charged with buying some of the weapons which were used in the attack, commences in September—months after the beleaguered city anticipates exiting from bankruptcy. Because the shootings took place at a San Bernardino County facility in San Bernardino, the long-term recovery has been further complicated from a governance perspective: many of the shooting survivors are accusing San Bernardino County of cutting off much-needed support for the survivors of the attack, including refusing to approve counseling or antidepressant medication. Others, who were physically wounded are seeking, so far unsuccessfully, to get surgeries and physical therapy covered. The San Bernardino County Board of Supervisors earlier this week convened a closed-door session at which survivors said they felt betrayed and abandoned, left to deal with California’s complicated workers’ compensation program without guidance or help. Their health insurers will not cover their injuries because they occurred in a workplace attack. Congressman Pete Aguilar (D-Ca.), whose district includes San Bernardino, reports that his hometown had been added to a list of cities with which people are familiar for a terrible reason, such as Littleton, Colo., or Newtown, Conn. Nevertheless, he is defiant, insisting “We will not be defined by this tragedy.”

However, murder rates in the city have been climbing: the city of just over 200,000 is grappling with a spike in violent crime, homicides especially: to date, this year, the city has reported 49 killings, already more than last year’s total, which included the terrorist victims—its homicide rate tops that of Chicago, which has become the poster child for big-city violent crime and is on pace for more than 600 killings this year. San Bernardino Police Chief Jarrod Burguan, however, said the crime wave is not unique to the chapter 9 municipality—a currently bankrupt city where empty storefronts and pawn shops have long lined downtown streets. Nevertheless, Brian Levin, a criminal justice professor at California State University, San Bernardino, who studies hate crimes, yesterday noted: “we’re a better community now, even though we’re hurt.” Professor Levin is one who, in the days and weeks which ensued after the mass tragedy, met with faith leaders, law enforcement, and families of the victims—where he discovered a unity of shock and shared pain. Today, he notes: “The attack will always be a part of our history…But here’s the thing: so will the heroics of those police officers and first responders and medical staff, and so will the grace of the families. We’re writing the rest of the history. The bastards lost.” Now the city awaits early next year for emerging not just from the physical tragedy, but also the longest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy ever.  

Atlantic City Blues.  Jeffrey Chiesa, a former New Jersey Attorney General, U.S. Senator, and, now, Governor Chris Christie’s designee to run the state takeover of Atlantic City, yesterday introduced himself at a City Council meeting and took questions from city taxpayers and residents. He provided, however, in this first public meeting no details on plans to address either the city’s fiscal plight—or its interim governance. He reported the State of New Jersey does not yet have a plan to address the city’s $100 million budget hole, much less to pay down the Atlantic City’s $500 million debt, noting: “It has been two weeks…My plan is to do what I think is necessary to create a structural financial situation that works not for six months, not for a year, but indefinitely so that this place can flourish in a way that it deserves to flourish.” He noted he and his law firm will be paid hourly for their work, albeit he did not report what that hourly rate will be—especially as the state retention agreement remains incomplete, albeit promising: “We’ll make sure that’s available once it’s been finalized.” Related to governance, he noted that—related to his state-granted authority to sell city assets, hire or fire workers or break union contracts, among other powers—he would listen to residents and stakeholders before making major decisions: “What this designation has done is consolidate authority, per the legislation, in the designee to make those decisions…That does not mean that I’m not listening. That does not mean I’m pretending I have all the answers without consulting with other people.” Describing the seaside city as a “jewel” and “truly unique,” he added that he understood concerns about an outsider overseeing the city: “I know that most of you don’t know who I am…All I can do is be judged by my actions and the decision that I make, and I hope you give me time to do that.” He did say that he would have to move swiftly to address immediate issues, likely referring to reaching agreements with casinos to make payments in lieu of property taxes, and then focusing on the city’s expenses—noting: “That timeframe is pretty compressed…So we will take the steps we need to take.”

Fiscally Hard for Hartford. As we have recounted in the fiscally strapped municipality of Petersburg, Virginia, municipal fiscal insolvency cannot occur in a geographic vacuum: whether in Detroit—or as we note above today, in San Bernardino, fiscal insolvency has repercussions for adjacent municipalities. So too in Hartford, the Metropolitan District Commission (MDC) completed its planned $173 million municipal bond sale late last week, temporarily ending the controversy over a $5.5 million reserve fund. Under the provisions, that fund would be paid by seven of the eight MDC municipalities to cover the sewage fee for the second half of 2017 if the City of Hartford is unable to contribute its share, as it has indicated it will be unable to do. Ergo, it means that adjacent Windsor, the first English settlement in the state which abuts Hartford on its northern border, with a population of under 30,000 would contribute over $700,000, with East Hartford contributing about $900,000. The other group members in the metro region, Bloomfield, Newington, Rocky Hill, West Hartford, and Wethersfield, would pay the remaining $900,000, proportionately. One outcome of this watery alliance and experience is that the MDC will, when the state legislature convenes next February, propose two laws to avoid the necessity for a reserve fund in the future, with MDC Chairman William DiBella suggesting that the eight member municipalities be required to set aside as untouchable the percentage of their property taxes the cities and towns already know they will owe to the MDC for sewage services. (Currently, property taxes go into the municipalities’ general funds, and the cities extract the sewage fee when it is due, provided the funds are, in fact, available; however, like water at the tap, that has not always been the experience.) In effect, the consortium is recommending a selves-imposed budgeting municipal mandate, with Chairman DiBella noting: “Every town would have to do it. That way, one town can’t stiff us. You wouldn’t have to go out and borrow money or take charity and hope you get it back.” As the Chairman noted: “We never had a problem like this…Who thought a town would go bankrupt? With the proposed law, if a town were to go bankrupt, the sewage fund would be in a dedicated account and can’t be reached,” or touched in a bankruptcy proceeding. Another potential resolution would be to allow the MDC to borrow money over a long-term for operating expenses. The MDC would then be able to pay Hartford’s $5.5 million bill and look for a city reimbursement in other ways.

There has been increased pressure for a resolution—especially in the wake of municipal bond holders of the MDC, holders who, last week, made clear to the authority they would not buy its municipal bonds if a reserve fund was not put into place. That appeared to be a key incentive for the board’s action earlier this week for the MDC board, including representatives of all eight municipal members, to vote unanimously to adopt the water and sewer service provider’s 2017 budget, which contains the unwelcome “bail-out” fund for Hartford—albeit Chair DiBella said there would be no guarantee the agency could cover a Hartford default or continue operating or pay the bondholders. A key part of the incentive to try to work together relates to potential fiscal contagion: because of concerns over Hartford’s finances and fiscal condition, credit rating agencies have recently downgraded MDC’s bond rating from AA+ to AA, a downgrade expected to cost the agency and its member towns an estimated $500,000 in a higher interest rate for the bonds. The towns, unsurprisingly, are apprehensive the credit rating agencies will now consider changing their credit ratings. In contrast, creating the reserve fund would keep MDC’s credit rating where it is: thus, MDC officials hope that passing the two proposed laws would prompt the credit rating agencies to return its rating to AA+.