Amazonian Recovery

May 18, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we take a fiscal perspective on post-chapter 9 Detroit and its income and property taxes; then we dip south to assess the seemingly interminable governing challenge with regard to whom is in charge of restoring fiscal solvency in Puerto Rico.   

The Challenging Road to Recovery. Last January, Detroit failed to make the Amazon cut to make the finalists: Sandy Baruah, president and CEO of the Detroit Regional Chamber, who was on the fateful call, nevertheless described feedback from Amazon, describing the “creativity, the regional collaboration, the quality of the bid document, the international partnership with Windsor, all of that got incredibly high marks,” adding that: “We were good, but we weren’t good enough on the talent front.” The noted urban writer Richard Florida tweeted that he believed Amazon missed the mark on Detroit, if talent was the disqualifying factor—he, after all, early on, had identified Detroit as a sleeper candidate for HQ2, with a top three of greater Washington, D.C.; Chicago; and Toronto, noting that Detroit has more tech workers than many on the list, including Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, and Columbus—and that the city has access to major public research universities, not to mention its international partnership with Windsor, Ontario, in Canada gave the bid an international quality that only Toronto’s bid could match. Indeed, Mr. Florida had suggested that Detroit’s elimination was due to outdated perceptions of the Motor City’s economy, talent, and overall livability.

Nevertheless, Detroit’s near miss—when added to the city’s exit at the end of last month from state fiscal oversight, is a remarkable testament to Detroit, that, less than five years after filing for the largest municipal bankruptcy in American history, came so close to making the cut, so successfully has it overcome the adverse repercussions of nearly six decades of economic decline, disinvestment, and chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. State officials praised the city for fiscal gains that came quicker than many anticipated after its Chapter 9 exit in December 2014. The city shed $7 billion of its $18 billion in debts during the 18-month bankruptcy. Last year, the city’s income tax take rose by 8%–and assessed property values rose for the first time in nearly two decades.

No doubt the auto industry has played a driving role: in the emerging age of self-driving cars, a recent report by real estate services giant CBRE which evaluated the top 50 U.S. metro areas in the country in terms of tech talent ranked Detroit 21st, ahead of several cities which made the Amazon cut, including Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, Nashville, and Miami. Indeed, remarkably, on a percentage basis, Detroit has as many tech jobs in its metro as Washington, D.C., and Boston. The report also found that Detroit’s millennial population with college degrees grew by just under 10% between 2010 and 2015, more than double the national average of 4.6% and equivalent to rates in the Bay Area (9.5%) and Atlanta (9.3%).

Nevertheless, the Motor City continues to face taxing challenges—including a less than effective record, until recently, of collecting income and property taxes it was owed under existing law—and of improving its school system: a vital step if the city is to draw young families with kids back into the city. Moreover, it still needs to reassess its municipal tax policies: its 2.4% income tax is double that paid by non-residents working in the city. That is not exactly a drawing card to relocate from the suburbs.

The Uncertain Promise of PROMESA. While the PROMESA Oversight Board has requested Puerto Rico to amend its recommended budget, Puerto Rico has responded it would prefer to negotiate, because it understands that resorting to the Court “is not an alternative.” Puerto Rico’s Secretary of Public Affairs, Ramón Rosario Cortés, made clear, moreover, that there would be is no change of position with regard to the Board’s demand for reducing pensions or vacation and sick leave, much less eliminating the Christmas bonus. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth appears to be of the view that its differences with the PROMESA Board are “are minimal,” despite the Board’s rejection, last week, of Governor Ricardo Rosselló’s proposed budget—a rejection upon which the Board suggested that cuts in public pensions and the elimination of the mandatory Christmas bonus had not been incorporated. The Board also noted the omission of funds finance Social Security for police officers. Secretary Rosario Cortés noted: “The Governor called to the Board to sit down and review those points they exposed, as long as they do not interfere with the Governor’s public policy. In the coming days, Gov. Rosselló and his team will be responding to each of the Board’s points and providing information that supports each of the Government’s positions: The Government is open to dialogue in order to reach consensus that does not interfere or contravene those public policy positions that the Governor has already expressed; specifically: no cuts in pensions or eliminating the Christmas bonus and reducing sick leave.”

He acknowledged that the dispute could end up in Court, as PROMESA Board Executive Director, Natalie Jaresko, has warned: “Yes, certainly, they have not only resorted to Court in the past, but they have also said it is a possibility. We understand that it is not an alternative, it would delay the fiscal recovery of Puerto Rico and would require investing resources that are scarce at the moment: They made some observations, and we are willing to look at them,” adding that the work teams of the Governor and the Board are communicating and sharing information: “Dialogue continues and, along the way, we hope to reach a consensus that will avoid setbacks and reaching the courts.”

Who Is Governing? Precisely, Director Jaresko also acknowledged that not amending the budget would delay the renegotiation of Puerto Rico’s debt, warning that if the Rosselló administration does not act, the PROMESA Board will proceed to preempt its governance authority and power as provided by the PROMESA law, which authorizes the Board to amend the U.S. territory’s budget and submit its own version to the Legislature for approval—albeit, it rattles one’s fiscal imagination that Puerto Rican legislators could conceivably want to do so.

Nevertheless, the Board has advised Gov. Rosselló that his recommended budget does not reflect what is established in the fiscal plan: regarding the General Fund, the recommended budget represents about $200 million in expenses on the certified income projection; in addition, the budget information does not include public corporations or similar dependencies—meaning that Director Jaresko is of the view that the draft budget omits some 60% of the public spending. Thus, she has threatened that the Governor has until high noon on Tuesday to correct the ‘deficiencies,’ or risk the Board preempting its governing authority.  

Nevertheless, Puerto Rico’s fiscal position appears to be on the upswing: as of last week, revenues were 7% ahead of its July 2017 forecasts; last month’s revenues came in 18% stronger than projected. Notwithstanding the physical and fiscal impact of Hurricane Maria on Puerto Rico’s economy, Puerto Rico’s central bank account, the Treasury Singular Account, held $2.65 billion as of last Friday—some $211 million more than the government had anticipated last July according to information posted on the MSRB’s EMMA.

Advertisements

States Roles in the Wake of Fiscal and Physical Storms

March 13, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the federalism challenges within Puerto Rico, where aid to local governments or muncipios for hurricane recovery appears nearly as derelict as federal aid to the U.S. Territory of Puerto Rico, before trying to untangle the perplexing fiscal challenges of public education in Detroit.

Unpromising? Puerto Rico Governor Ricardo Rosselló yesterday noted that from the “beginning, we (the government of Puerto Rico) have established that this is a time where you have to see the effectiveness of each penny invested. And we are all subject to that crucible,” with his comments coming in reaction a request from 11 conservative organizations demanding, in a letter to Congress, the dismissal of Natalie Jaresko, the Director of the PROMESA Oversight Board. No doubt, part of the concern relates to the exceptional disparity in pay: His claim is based on Ms. Jaresko’s salary of $625,000 per year compared to the median income in Puerto Rico of $19,429, or approximately 60% less than on the mainland. The organizations have also requested that “the basic precepts established in PROMESA‒‒precision, transparency, and the creation of a credible plan for the return of the people of Puerto Rico to the capital markets,” urging Congress to schedule a hearing to determine whether the Board is in compliance with the intent of the PROMESA provisions. The epistle was signed by the 60 Plus Retirement Association, the Taxpayers Protection Alliance, the Frontiers of Freedom, the Market Institute, the Americans for Limited Government, the Center for Freedom and Prosperity, the Independent Women’s Voice, the Consumer Action for a Strong Economy, and the Independent Women’s Forum. There is apprehension that the letter could jeopardize efforts by the New Progressive Party and the Popular Democratic Party to provide an immediate financial injection to Puerto Rico’s municipios to assist in the ongoing fiscal and physical recovery from Hurricane Maria. Senate President Thomas Rivera Schatz, who, last year, was elected to a second term as President of the Senate, thereby becoming the only reelected Senate President during the past 28 years, and the only Senate President ever elected as such to non-consecutive terms, said he would amend the Governor’s proposed legislation to grant immediate and direct financial assistance to the 78 municipal governments, as he was presiding over a public hearing of the Commission on Federal, Political and Economic Relations. The Senate President has identified a $100 million fund to be distributed among all municipios, albeit imposing a cap of $5 million to any recipient, and conditioning the aid, granted as a loan, to be administered by the Financial Advisory Authority and Fiscal Agency of Puerto Rico (Aafaf), the Office of Management and Budget, and the Department of the Treasury to authorize it.

Sen. Schatz asked his colleagues: “Who can deny that all the municipalities had losses? The hurricane devastated the island. Everyone knows that (the damage) exceeds a million dollars. If the governor of Puerto Rico has identified $ 100 million, then we have them. If we have them, I do not think it is appropriate to establish a loan and application mechanism that is a tortuous, long, and uncertain route.” In a public hearing, Rolando Ortiz and Carlos Molina, presidents of the Association and the Federation of Mayors, respectively, insisted that the municipalities should receive an allocation of funds, rather than a loan, arguing the island’s municipios lack the funds to repay the money, with Mayors Lornna Soto of Canovanas, Edwin Garcia of Camuy, and Javier Carrasquillo of Cidra, who reviewed the number of occasions in which they have had to withdraw funds from the municipal coffers to make expenses related to the process of emergency and recovery, even as distributions to the municipios from Puerto Rico’s sales and use tax were reduced.

The La Fortaleza project establishes that the Fiscal Oversight Board will have to approve the disbursement of funds—with the revised proposal coming in the wake of an earlier proposal vetoed by the PROMESA Board, because it was not tied to income and liquidity criteria of the municipios. However, Sen. Schatz argued that in the wake of Hurricane Maria, the Board had authorized the government to redirect $1 billion of the current budget for response and emergency tasks. That is, what is emerging is a consistent issue with regard to governance authority—a difference, moreover, not just between the PROMESA Board and the U.S. territory, but also between the Governor, Puerto Rico House, and Senate—differences potentially jeopardizing the proposed legislation to inject as much as $100 million into the municipal coffers damaged by the Hurricanes Irma and María: Sen. Schatz does not favor the granting of loans to municipalities for up to $5 million to mitigate the effects of hurricanes on their collections, or reductions by patents, taxes or remittances from the Municipal Revenues Collection Center; rather he favors helping municipalities with uniform allocations of $1 million, with his proposal providing that the Department of the Treasury, the Office of Management and Budget, the Fiscal Oversight Board, and the Financial Advisory Authority and Fiscal Agency of Puerto Rico must authorize the loans.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Puerto Rico House Finance Committee Chair Antonio Soto disagrees: he argues that rather than a formula allocation, each municipio should be required to justify the amount it is requesting, noting: “That justification can be part of the project. It is not to give them $100 million, but to say: ‘I have this situation, the collections have fallen, I continued to provide these services,’” even as he acknowledged that PROMESA Board would have to authorize a project such as the one promoted by Sen. Rivera Schatz. 

Presión. The intergovernmental debate is under pressure as the U.S. territory’s cash position has been determined to be 24% below the pre-Hurricane Maria projection, according to cash flow data from EMMA as of the end of last month, showing increased financial pressure after earlier reports had shown limited deterioration. According to a cash flow summary, Puerto Rico’s primary central government account, the Treasury Single Account, contained $1.56 billion as of three weeks ago; whereas, prior to Hurricane Maria’s devastation, the government had projected that on that date there would be $2.061 billion. Puerto Rico Treasury Secretary Raúl Maldonado Gautier reported that January General Fund revenues were 12.2% below pre-Maria projections, no doubt further complicating the PROMESA Board’s efforts to certify a five-year fiscal plan for Puerto Rico: In the draft submitted last month by the Rosselló administration, the government anticipated sufficient cash flow to finance close to 20% of its debt service; however, according to the Puerto Rico Treasury, General Fund net revenues were down 5.2% in the first seven months of the fiscal year compared with projections, with the largest shortfalls compared to expectations coming from foreign corporation profit taxes ($135.4 million) and sales and use taxes ($80 million): in January, net revenues were 12.2% below projection. According to Treasury Secretary Raúl Maldonado Gautier, income taxes were above expectations, because Hurricane Maria had caused employers to postpone payments for the first few months of the fiscal year.

Let There Be Light! Puerto Rico’s Electric Power Authority (AEE) now projects electricity service will be restored to at least 95% by the end of May, with PREPA interim Director Justo González announcing, moreover, that the public utility will locate solar panels in certain high mountain parts of the island, which, he noted, was “part of what FEMA has in its hands and agrees to do so.”

Schooled on Recovery? On June 8, 2016, Michigan Senate Majority Leader Arlan Meekhof (R-West Olive), in urging his colleagues to vote for a significant bailout of Detroit’s public schools, said the plan would be sufficient to pay off the District’s debt, would provide transition costs for when the district splits into two districts and returns the district to a locally elected school board in January, stating: “This represents a realistic compromise for a path to the future: At the end of the day, our responsibility is to solve the problem…Without legislative action, the Detroit Public Schools would head toward [municipal] bankruptcy, which would cost billions of dollars and cost every student in every district in Michigan.” Yesterday, Jonathan Oosting, writing for the Detroit News, wrote that U.S. Education Secretary Betsy DeVos said Sunday she “does not know if traditional public schools in Michigan have improved since she and others began pushing to open the state up to choice and charter schools. Recent analyses show Michigan students have continually made the least improvement nationally on standardized test scores since 2003, and it is one of only five states where early reading scores have declined over that span.” His article came in the wake of the Secretary’s interview with “60 Minutes,” where she had been pressed on her assertion that traditional public schools in places like Florida improved when students were given more choice to attend different schools, with CBS’s Lesley Stahl asking: “Now, has that happened in Michigan? “We’re in Michigan. This is your home state: “have the public schools in Michigan gotten better?” In response, the Secretary said: “I don’t know. Overall, I, I can’t say overall that they have all gotten better.” Ms. Stahl followed up, telling Secretary DeVos the “whole state is not doing well,” and that “the public schools here are doing worse than they did.” In response, Secretary DeVos said: “Michigan schools need to do better. There is no doubt about it.” Ms. Stahl then asked the Secretary if she has seen the “really bad schools” and attempted to try to figure out what has been happening in them—to which Secretary DeVos responded said she has “not intentionally visited schools that are underperforming.”

The interview resurrected a long-running debate in Michigan, which opened the door to publicly funded charter schools in 1994 and is now a leading state for charter academies; indeed, Detroit today ranks third in the nation for the percentage of students who attend charter schools, according to the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools. (Flint ranks second.) Today, according to a recent Education-Trust Midwest analysis of National Assessment of Education Progress standardized test scores, Michigan students ranked 41st in the country for fourth-grade reading performance in 2015, down from 38th in 2013, and 28th in 2003; in an analysis by University of Michigan Professor Brian A. Jacob, he found that Michigan students were at the bottom of the list when it comes to proficiency growth in the four measures of the exam; according to the NAEP results, in 2015, the average math score of eighth-grade students in Michigan was 278 out of 500, compared with the national average score, 281: the average Michigan score has not significantly changed from 280 in 2013 and 277 in 2000. Professor Jacob’s analysis found that 29% of Michigan students performed at or about the “proficient level” on the NAEP exam in 2015—results not significantly different from the 30% found in 2013, or the 28% recorded in 2000. Secretary DeVos, who had taken the lead in launching the Great Lakes Education Project to lobby for school choice in Michigan, and who has consistently said the government should invest in students, not buildings or institutions, in response to Ms. Stahl’s follow up query: “But what about the kids who are back at the school that’s not working? What about those kids?;” said: “[S]tudies show that when there is a large number of students that opt to go to a different school or different schools, the traditional public schools actually, the results get better, as well.”

Last week, the Detroit Public Schools Community District announced the launch of the 5000 Role Models of Excellence Project for minority males in grades 6 through 12: a project designed to develop a leadership pipeline for young men utilizing school-based and community mentors and role models through various methods of support, including themed weekly meetings, a monthly speaker series, community service projects, and college access support. The Detroit Board of Education members voted 7-0 to launch the 5000 Role Models Project in an effort to “create and develop a pipeline of leadership from within the walls of the District’s schools, describing thus as a proven mentoring program that prepares young men for success, generated by role models in our schools who are supported by male mentors in the community.”

Federalism obstacles to Puerto Rico’s Fiscal and Physical recovery.

February 28, 2018

Good Morning! In this morning’s eBlog, we consider the federalism obstacles to Puerto Rico’s fiscal and physical recovery.

Puerto Rico’s Obstacles to Recovery. 78 mayors are set to meet today with Governor Ricardo Rossello Nevarez and representatives of the Army Corps of Engineers to discuss the delay in the restoration of the island’s energy system—a meeting at which they intend to present the Governor with other problems they confront in their municipios or municipalities in the wake of the hurricane. Since last November, and only weeks after the goal to restore 95% of power by last Christmas has fallen way short, the government yesterday reported restoration had reached over 84%; however, the figures did not make clear whether that percentage reflected generation or subscribers with electricity. Today’s session is focused on providing the Governor the opportunity to make clear his concern that the Corps has so far not addressed the island’s issues and to receive a full explanation why not and “how to correct the situation that is still serious,” according to Rolando Cruz, the president of the Association of Mayors and first executive of Cayey. Also participating are the Mayor Francisco López López of Barranquitas and William Alicea of Aibonito, said that although their primary claim is the restoration of light, their concerns are broader. The key concern relates to the perceived inability, to date, of help from FEMA—especially with regard to bridges and highways, mental health of affected citizens, and the dire challenges of so many who have lost their homes or suffered unaffordable damages—and who have been unable to prove ownership of their property—or, as Mayors López López put it: “Here in the mountains, we are still going through very difficult situations: sectors without electricity, without drinking water, roads destroyed.” The apprehension is, if anything, worsening: yesterday, Governor Rosselló Nevares denounced the decision by the U.S. Treasury to reduce, without explanation, the amount of initial financing of $4,700 million by more than half to $2,030 million from the line of Congressionally approved credit for Puerto Rico. In his letter to Congressional leaders, the Governor wrote that the U.S. had “effectively blocked access to some $4.7 billion from the CDL (Commercial Driver’s License) program,” urging intervention to avoid “further damage and suffering to the residents of Puerto Rico,” noting that any material interruption of public services would only exacerbate the emigration of its population to the continental United States. He added that the Treasury has imposed conditions incompatible with the purpose of the program, while criticizing that the federal agency has canceled the ability to cancel any CDL issued to Puerto Rico “in clear contravention of the applicable law,” writing that the U.S. territory is approaching spring in the same precarious fiscal situation, with the possibility that the Treasury will cancel federal aid approved by law,” notwithstanding the Financial Advisory Authority and Fiscal Agency’s compliance with each request from Treasury. His epistle noted that despite the immediate cooperation of the agency, the Treasury did not provide the agency with economic terms or other material terms for the CDL program (In an effort to help Puerto Rican citizens relocating to the mainland in the wake of hurricanes Irma and Maria, the Federal Motor Carrier Administration had waived certain requirements in an effort to help them obtain commercial learner’s permits or commercial driver’s licenses: according to the Governor, last January 9th, the Treasury and FEMA had sent a letter to the local government regarding the implementation of a cash balance policy in order to facilitate access the CDL financing—but a letter requesting Puerto Rico to exhaust its own resources before the Treasury and FEMA would provide access to CDL program funds.

Chapter Nueve? Even as Puerto Rico is struggling to address its severe physical challenges, notices with regard to the deadline for filing proofs of claim in Puerto Rico’s five Title III bankruptcy cases are going out this week, as U.S. Judge Laura Taylor Swain had set a Monday deadline for the notices to be delivered. Notwithstanding, and not to be blamed on the mailman, FAFA Executive Director Gerardo Portela Franco reported the notices would start to be sent out this week—with five of the Title III entities having at least $52.5 billion in debt outstanding, in what has now become  the largest quasi municipal bankruptcy in U.S. history: the notices in question will inform creditors that they will have until May 29th to file a proof of claim in the cases. The debt issuers here include: the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corp. (COFINA), the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority, and the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority. Responding will matter: those who fail to file a timely-filed proof of claim or trustee proof of claim will lose any claim for compensation for their municipal bonds, as well as their rights to vote on any plan of debt adjustment. Indeed, yesterday, PREPA bond trustee U.S. Bank National Association posted a notice to EMMA stating it planned to file a proof of claim on behalf of the bondholders, specifying: “[I]f you believe that you may have separate or additional claims against the Authority other than the claims with respect to principal, interest and other amounts owing on your bonds or have claims against other Title III debtors or other persons or entities concerning your bonds or otherwise, you should consult with your legal professionals regarding those claims and take appropriate action within the applicable time period.”

On the physical, as opposed to the fiscal storm front, in the wake of the U.S.’s worst blackout in American history, the complicated and costly effort for a quasi-chapter 9 entity, major chunks of infrastructure and power restoration appears to have reached a plateau: while most, today, have electricity, it is unclear how much longer those in the dark will have to wait. Jay Field, a spokesman for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, notes: “The bulk of the work that is left is the hardest, requiring helicopter support and long commutes to remote, hard-to-access job sites…Weather is also an issue due to rain and heavy winds.” Last week, Puerto Rico’s unified grid-restoration command reported it expects to have 90 to 95% of the territory’s power restored by March 31st: it estimates that the hard-hit municipality of Arecibo will have its electricity restored by mid-April, and the municipality of Caguas by late May. He offered no timeline for other darkened municipios. A critical part of the physical recovery challenge has been the complicated overlapping lines of authority, as well as Puerto Rico’s insolvency: even though the U.S. Army Corps is in charge of overall recovery, PREPA has been in charge of much of the repair work—a Puerto Rican authority which is $9 billion in debt—and which, last week, suffered a fiscal blow when Judge Laura Taylor Swain  rejected its plea for a $550 million loan—leading the utility to respond it would start reducing output at some of its power plants, because it could not afford fuel. In its court filing, the utility stated that the scenario “exacerbated the risk to an already fragile system and leaves it vulnerable to outages and resulting in brownouts on the island.” That work involves nearly 6,000 repair workers now on the island, but where, seemingly on a daily basis, the workers keep finding new problems.

As of last Wednesday, 343,000 electricity customers were without grid power, the lowest number yet: in the wake of the storm, there were nearly 1.6 million customers experiencing a blackout. So, on the one hand, there has been significant progress; however, much of the progress has been followed by drops, as PREPA’s old and fragile grid has occasionally failed and plunged swaths of newly restored customers back into darkness. Most recently, a fire at a substation two weeks ago, for instance, plunged more than 343,000 and much of the capital of San Juan into darkness. Thus it means, still today, that thousands of homes and businesses are running either full or part-time on backup diesel generators—meaning those families or businesses are running generators, forcing them to pay for fuel. For PREPA, the challenge is aggravated by the uncertainty with regard to certainty about how many customers are without grid power: from the onset of Maria until early November, PREPA gave a rough estimate; then it simply stopped trying: the damage to the grid was so extensive that the utility could simply no longer determine  how many of its customers were drawing electricity. It was only near the end of last month that PREPA started reporting its percentage of “normal peak load” which had been restored. Nevertheless, that reporting indicates the percentage of power restored has risen from 19% in early October to almost 84% last week. Yet, even that restoration has been unreliable: even though parts of PREPA’s grid have crashed on numerous occasions during the recovery, only a few of those outages are shown by the data—a deficiency, because power was often restored within hours or days and, ergo, was not captured in the weekly reports.

Another serious challenge has been substations: Puerto Rico has 342 distribution substations, which convert power from transmission to distribution use: improvement has occurred slowly since November, but has been basically flat in 2018: the grid’s 56 transmission substations have seen no improvement since December: these stations step up voltage for long-distance delivery or prepare it for transport along transmission lines of different voltages. Progress is a challenge: Fernando Padilla, a senior PREPA adviser, reported that damage to the substations still offline was so devastating that they need to be rebuilt from the ground up: “A portion of the substations, specifically those that are close to where the eye of the hurricane passed, remain totally destroyed. Those require complete reconstruction (engineering, design, mitigation, etc.)…The PREPA system has points of interconnection that permit energy to be carried through various zones without having to pass by these particular substations: This isn’t the norm, and it augments the risk to the reliability of the system. But in general, it can be done.”

Fiscal & Public Service Insolvency

eBlog, 03/03/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing challenges for the historic municipality of Petersburg, Virginia as it seeks to depart from insolvency; we consider, anew, the issues related to “service insolvency,” especially assisted by the exceptional insights of Marc Pfeiffer at Rutgers, then turning to the new fiscal plan by the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority, before racing back to Virginia for a swing on insolvent links. For readers who missed it, we commend the eBlog earlier this week in which we admired the recent wisdom on fiscal disparities by the ever remarkable Bo Zhao of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston with regard to municipal fiscal disparities.

Selling One’s City. Petersburg, Virginia, the small, historic, and basically insolvent municipality under quasi state control is now trying to get hundreds of properties owned by the city off the books and back on the tax rolls as part of its effort to help resolve its fiscal and trust insolvency. As Michelle Peters, Economic Development Director for Petersburg, notes: “The city owns over 200 properties, but today we had a showcase to feature about 25 properties that we group together based on location, and these properties are already zoned appropriate for commercial development.” Thus the municipality is not only looking to raise revenues from the sale, but also to realize revenues through the conversion of these empty properties into thriving businesses—or as Ms. Peters puts it: “It’s to get the properties back on the tax rolls for the city, because, currently, the city owns them so they are just vacant, there are no taxes being collected,” much less jobs being filled. Ms. Peters notes that while some of the buildings do need work, like an old hotel on Tabb Street, the city stands ready to offer a great deal on great property, and it is ready to make a deal and has incentives to offer:  “We’re ready to sit down at the table and to negotiate, strike a deal and get those properties developed.”

New Jersey & Its Taken-over City. The $72 million tax settlement between Borgata Hotel Casino & Spa and Atlantic City’s state overseers is a “major step forward” in fixing the city’s finances, according to Moody’s Investors Service, which deemed the arrangement as one that has cleared “one of the biggest outstanding items of concern” in the municipality burdened by hundreds of millions of dollars in debt and under state control. Atlantic City owed Borgata $165 million in tax refunds after years of successful tax appeals by the casino, according to the state. The settlement is projected to save the city $93 million in potential debt—savings which amount to a 22 percent reduction of the city’s $424 million total debt, according to Moody’s, albeit, as Moody’s noted: “[W]hile it does not solve the city’s problems, the settlement makes addressing those problems considerably more likely.” The city will bond for the $72 million through New Jersey’s state Municipal Qualified Bond Act, making it a double whammy: because the bonds will be issued via the state MQBA, they will carry an A3 rating, ergo at a much better rate than under the city’s Caa3 junk bond status. Nevertheless, according to the characteristically moody Moody’s, Atlantic City’s finances remain in a “perilous state,” with the credit rating agency citing low cash flow and an economy still heavily dependent upon gambling.

Fiscal & Public Service Insolvency. One of my most admired colleagues in the arena of municipal fiscal distress, Marc Pfeiffer, Senior Policy Fellow and Assistant Director of the Bloustein Local Government Research Center in New Jersey, notes that a new twist on the legal concept of municipal insolvency could change how some financially troubled local governments seek permission to file for federal bankruptcy protection. Writing that municipal insolvency traditionally means a city, county, or other government cannot pay its bills, and can lead in rare instances to a Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing or some other remedy authorized by the state that is not as drastic as a Chapter 9, he notes that, in recent years, the description of “insolvency” has expanded beyond a simple cash shortage to include “service-delivery insolvency,” meaning a municipality is facing a crisis in managing police, fire, ambulance, trash, sewer and other essential safety and health services, adding that service insolvency contributed to Stockton, California, and Detroit filings for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection in 2012 and 2013, respectively: “Neither city could pay its unsustainable debts, but officials’ failure to curb violent crime, spreading blight and decaying infrastructure was even more compelling to the federal bankruptcy judges who decided that Stockton and Detroit were eligible to file for Chapter 9.”

In fact, in meeting with Kevyn Orr, the emergency manager appointed by Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, at his first meeting in Detroit, Mr. Orr recounted to me that his very first actions had been to email every employee of the city to ensure they reported to work that morning, noting the critical responsibility to ensure that street lights and traffic lights, as well as other essential public services operated. He wanted to ensure there would be no disruption of such essential services—a concern clearly shared by the eventual overseer of the city’s historic chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, now retired U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes, who, in his decision affirming the city’s plan of debt adjustment, had written: “It is the city’s service delivery insolvency that the court finds most strikingly disturbing in this case…It is inhumane and intolerable, and it must be fixed.” Similarly, his colleague, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Christopher Klein, who presided over Stockton’s chapter 9 trial in California, had noted that without the “muscle” of municipal bankruptcy protection, “It is apparent to me the city would not be able to perform its obligations to its citizens on fundamental public safety as well as other basic public services.” Indeed, in an interview, Judge Rhodes said that while Detroit officials had provided ample evidence of cash and budget insolvency, “the concept of service delivery insolvency put a more understanding face on what otherwise was just plain numbers.” It then became clear, he said, that the only solution for Detroit—as well as any insolvent municipality—was “fresh money,” including hundreds of millions of dollars contributed by the state, city, and private foundations: “It is a rare insolvency situation—corporate or municipal—that can be fixed just by a change in management.”

Thus, Mr. Pfeiffer writes that “Demonstrating that services are dysfunctional could strengthen a local government’s ability to convince a [federal bankruptcy] judge that the city is eligible for chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy protection (provided, of course, said municipality is in one the eighteen states which authorize such filings). Or, as Genevieve Nolan, a vice president and senior analyst at Moody’s Investors Service, notes: “With their cases focusing on not just a government’s ability to pay its debts, but also an ability to provide basic services to residents, Stockton and Detroit opened a path for future municipal bankruptcies.”

Mr. Pfeiffer notes that East Cleveland, Ohio, was the first city to invoke service insolvency after Detroit. In its so far patently unsuccessful efforts to obtain authority from the State of Ohio to file for municipal bankruptcy protection—in a city, where, as we have noted on numerous occasions, the city has demonstrated a fiscal inability to sustain basic police, fire, EMS, or trash services. East Cleveland had an approved plan to balance its budget, but then-Mayor Gary Norton told the state the proposed cuts “[would] have the effect of decimating our safety forces.” Ohio state officials initially rejected the municipality’s request for permission to file for municipal bankruptcy, because the request came from the mayor instead of the city council; the city’s status has been frozen since then.

Mr. Pfeiffer then writes:

Of concern.  [Municipal] Bankruptcy was historically seen as the worst case scenario with severe penalties – in theory the threat of it would prevent local officials from doing irresponsible things. [Indeed, when I first began my redoubtable quest with the Dean of chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy Jim Spiotto, while at the National League of Cities, the very idea that the nation’s largest organization representing elected municipal leaders would advocate for amending federal laws so that cities, counties, and other municipal districts could file for such protection drew approbation, to say the least.] Local officials are subject to such political pressures that there needs to be a societal “worst case” that needs to be avoided.  It’s not like a business bankruptcy where assets get sold and equity holders lose investment.  We are dealing with public assets and the public, though charged with for electing responsible representatives, who or which can’t be held fully responsible for what may be foolish, inept, corrupt, or criminal actions by their officials. Thus municipal bankruptcy, rather than dissolution, was a worst case scenario whose impact needed to be avoided at all costs. Lacking a worst case scenario with real meaning, officials may be more prone to take fiscal or political risks if they think the penalty is not that harsh. The current commercial practice of a structured bankruptcy, which is commonly used (and effectively used in Detroit and eventually in San Bernardino and other places) could become common place. If insolvency were extended to “service delivery,” and if it becomes relatively painless, decision-making/political risk is lowered, and political officials can take greater risks with less regard to the consequences. In my view, the impact of bankruptcy needs to be so onerous that elected officials will strive to avoid it and avoid decisions that may look good for short-term but have negative impact in the medium to long-term and could lead to serious consequences. State leaders also need to protect their citizens with controls and oversight to prevent outliers from taking place, and stepping in when signs of fiscal weakness appear.”

Self-Determination. Puerto Rico Gov. Ricardo Rosselló has submitted a 10-year fiscal plan to the PROMESA Oversight Board which would allow for annual debt payments of about 18% to 41% of debt due—a plan which anticipates sufficient cash flow in FY2018 to pay 17.6% of the government’s debt service. In the subsequent eight years, under the plan, the government would pay between 30% and 41% per year. The plan, according to the Governor, is based upon strategic fiscal imperatives, including restoring credibility with all stakeholders through transparent, supportable financial information and honoring the U.S. territory’s obligations in accordance with the Constitution of Puerto Rico; reducing the complexity and inefficiency of government to deliver essential services in a cost-effective manner; implementing reforms to improve Puerto Rico’s competitiveness and reduce the cost of doing business; ensuring that economic development processes are effective and aligned to incentivize the necessary investments to promote economic growth and job creation; protecting the most vulnerable segments of our society and transforming our public pensions system; and consensually renegotiating and restructuring debt obligations through Title VI of PROMESA. The plan he proposed, marvelously on the 100th anniversary of the Jones-Shafroth Act making Puerto Rico a U.S. territory, also proposes monitoring liquidity and managing anticipated shortfalls in current forecast, and achieving fiscal balance by 2019 and maintaining fiscal stability with balanced budgets thereafter (through 2027 and beyond). The Governor notes the Fiscal Plan is intended to achieve its objectives through fiscal reform measures, strategic reform initiatives, and financial control reforms, including fiscal reform measures that would reduce Puerto Rico’s decade-long financing gap by $33.3 billion through:

  • revenue enhancements achieved via tax reform and compliance enhancement strategies;
  • government right-sizing and subsidy reductions;
  • more efficient delivery of healthcare services;
  • public pension reform;
  • structural reform initiatives intended to provide the tools to significantly increase Puerto Rico’s capacity to grow its economy;
  • improving ease of business activity;
  • capital efficiency;
  • energy [utility] reform;
  • financial control reforms focused on enhanced transparency, controls, and accountability of budgeting, procurement, and disbursement processes.

The new Fiscal Plan marks an effort to achieve fiscal solvency and long-term economic growth and to comply with the 14 statutory requirements established by Congress’ PROMESA legislation, as well as the five principles established by the PROMESA Oversight Board, and intended to sets a fiscal path to making available to the public and creditor constituents financial information which has been long overdue, noting that upon the Oversight Board’s certification of those fiscal plans it deems to be compliant with PROMESA, the Puerto Rico government and its advisors will promptly convene meetings with organized bondholder groups, insurers, union, local interest business groups, public advocacy groups and municipality representative leaders to discuss and answer all pertinent questions concerning the fiscal plan and to provide additional and necessary momentum as appropriate, noting the intention and preference of the government is to conduct “good-faith” negotiations with creditors to achieve restructuring “voluntary agreements” in the manner and method provided for under the provisions of Title VI of PROMESA.

Related to the service insolvency issues we discussed [above] this early, snowy a.m., Gov. Rosselló added that these figures are for government debt proper—not the debt of issuers of the public corporations (excepting the Highways and Transportation Authority), Puerto Rico’s 88 municipalities, or the territory’s handful of other semi-autonomous authorities, and that its provisions do not count on Congress to restore Affordable Care Act funding. Rather, Gov. Rosselló said he plans to determine the amount of debt the Commonwealth will pay by first determining the sums needed for (related to what Mr. Pfeiffer raised above] “essential services and contingency reserves.” The Governor noted that Puerto Rico’s debt burden will be based on net cash available, and that, if possible, he hopes to be able to use a consensual process under Title VI of PROMESA to decide on the new debt service schedules. [PROMESA requires the creation of certified five-year fiscal plan which would provide a balanced budget to the Commonwealth, restore access to the capital markets, fund essential public services, and pensions, and achieve a sustainable debt burden—all provisions which the board could accept, modify, or completely redo.]  

Adrift on the Fiscal Links? While this a.m.’s snow flurries likely precludes a golf outing, ACA Financial Guaranty Corp., a municipal bond insurer, appears ready to take a mighty swing for a birdie, as it is pressing for payback on the defaulted debt which was critical to the financing of Buena Vista, Virginia’s unprofitable municipal golf course, this time teeing the proverbial ball up in federal court. Buena Vista, a municipality nestled near the iconic Blue Ridge of some 2,547 households, and where the median income for a household in the city is in the range of $32,410, and the median income for a family was $39,449—and where only about 8.2 percent of families were below the poverty line, including 14.3 percent of those under age 18 and 10 percent of those age 65 or over. Teeing the fiscal issue up is the municipal debt arising from the issuance by the city and its Public Recreational Facilities Authority of some $9.2 million of lease-revenue municipal bonds insured by ACA twelve years ago—debt upon which the municipality had offered City Hall, police and court facilities, as well as its municipal championship golf course as collateral for the debt—that is, in this duffer’s case, municipal debt which the municipality’s leaders voted to stop repaying, as we have previously noted, in late 2015. Ergo, ACA is taking another swing at the city: it is seeking:

  • the appointment of a receiver appointed for the municipal facilities,
  • immediate payment of the debt, and
  • $525,000 in damages in a new in the U.S. District Court for Western Virginia,

Claiming the municipality “fraudulently induced” ACA to enter into the transaction by representing that the city had authority to enter the contracts. In response, the municipality’s attorney reports that Buena Vista city officials are still open to settlement negotiations, and are more than willing to negotiate—but that ACA has refused its offers. In a case where there appear to have been any number of mulligans, since it was first driven last June, teed off, as it were, in Buena Vista Circuit Court, where ACA sought a declaratory judgment against the Buena Vista and the Public Recreational Facilities Authority, seeking judicial determination with regard to the validity of its agreement with Buena Vista, including municipal bond documents detailing any legal authority to foreclose on city hall, the police department, and/or the municipal golf course. The trajectory of the course of the litigation, however, has not been down the center of the fairway: the lower court case took a severe hook into the fiscal rough when court documents filed by the city contended that the underlying municipal bond deal was void, because only four of the Buena Vista’s seven City Council members voted on the bond resolution, not to mention related agreements which included selling the city’s interest in its “public places.” Moreover, pulling out a driver, Buena Vista, in its filing, wrote that Virginia’s constitution filing, requires all seven council members to be present to vote on a matter which involved backing the golf course’s municipal bonds with an interest in facilities owned by the municipality. That drive indeed appeared to earn a birdie, as ACA then withdrew its state suit; however, it then filed in federal court, where, according to its attorney, it is not seeking to foreclose on Buena Vista’s municipal facilities; rather, in its new federal lawsuit, ACA avers that the tainted vote supposedly invalidating the municipality’s deed of trust supporting the municipal bonds and collateral does not make sense, maintaining in its filing that Buena Vista’s elected leaders had adopted a bond resolution and made representations in the deed, the lease, the forbearance agreement, and in legal opinions which supported the validity of the Council’s actions, writing: “Fundamental principles of equity, waiver, estoppel, and good conscience will not allow the city–after receiving the benefits of the [municipal] bonds and its related transactions–to now disavow the validity of the same city deed of trust that it and its counsel repeatedly acknowledged in writing to be fully valid, binding and enforceable.” Thus, the suit requests a judgment against Buena Vista, declaring the financing documents to be valid, appointing a receiver, and an order granting ACA the right to foreclose on the Buena Vista’s government complex in addition to compensatory damages, with a number of the counts seeking rulings determining that Buena Vista and the authority breached deed and forbearance agreements, in addition to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, requiring immediate payback on the outstanding bonds, writing: “Defendants’ false statements and omissions were made recklessly and constituted willful and wanton disregard.” In addition to compensatory damages and pre-and post-judgment interest, ACA has asked the U.S. court to order that Buena Vista pay all of its costs and attorneys’ fees; it is also seeking an order compelling the city to move its courthouse to other facilities and make improvements at the existing courthouse, including bringing it up to standards required by the ADA.

Like a severe hook, the city’s municipal public course appears to have been errant from the get-go: it has never turned a profit for Buena Vista; rather it has required general fund subsidies totaling $5.6 million since opening, according to the city’s CAFR. Worse, Buena Vista notes that the taxpayer subsidies have taken a toll on its budget concurrent with the ravages created by the great recession: in 2010, Buena Vista entered a five-year forbearance agreement in which ACA agreed to make bond payments for five years; however, three years ago, the city council voted in its budget not to appropriate the funds to resume payment on the debt, marking the first default on the municipal golf course bond, per material event notices posted on the MSRB’s EMMA.

Municipal Challenges from State Control & Preemption of Local Authority

 

Share on Twitter

eBlog, 1/0917

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider more outcomes from the Flint drinking water crisis—outcomes which raise issues with regard to the State of Michigan’s Emergency Manager law—and accountability, before taking a run to Atlantic City, a municipality in the midst of a state takeover, and, now, apparently caught between state-mandates to reduce police capacity amid an apparent dramatic surge in public safety concerns. Finally, we note a challenge to the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s so-called pay-to-play rules, under which municipal advisors and broker-dealer firms would be mandated to wait two years before doing business with municipal entities to which they have made political contributions.

Out Like Flint. Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder Friday signed into law new state legislation mandating municipalities in the state to warn residents of dangerous lead levels in drinking water within three days’ notification by the state of contamination, marking the enactment of the first piece of legislation stemming from the Flint water crisis. Gov. Snyder described it as an “important step…This is not the last piece of legislation we should see on this. This is a good start of getting faster notification to the public when there is a water issue.” The bill, sponsored by state Rep. Sheldon Neeley (D-Flint), a former Flint council member, is aimed at strengthening water quality control in Michigan to ensure a water crisis such as Flint’s will not happen in a Michigan municipality again, or, as Rep. Neeley put it: “The water crisis in Flint has left the community and its allies reeling with a sense of urgency, and rightfully so…During this difficult time, I have valued the governor’s partnership in helping to steward legislation that will have a positive impact on the residents of Flint.” Previously, owners or operators of municipal water plants were legally required to notify customers of any noncompliance with state drinking water standards, within 30 days, according to the representative; now, under the new law, operators must issue a public advisory within three business days of notification from the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. Such alerts may be disseminated via radio or television, notices delivered to customers or advisories posted in conspicuous areas throughout the community. The bill had been adopted unanimously in both the Michigan House and Senate. The new state law comes in the wake of criminal charges filed against more than a dozen government officials related to the Flint water crisis. Last month, the Michigan Attorney General’s Office filed criminal charges against former Flint emergency manager Darnell Earley, former emergency manager Gerald Ambrose, and two former city public works employees. Mr. Earley had served as Flint’s emergency manager from 2013-15, before going on to be named by Gov. Snyder as Emergency Manager for the Detroit Public Schools, where he resigned nearly a year ago in the face of severe criticism. Mr. Earley, who had refused to testify about his role and responsibility with regard to the Flint drinking water crisis, was subsequently charged with false pretenses, conspiracy to commit false pretenses, misconduct in office, and willful neglect of duty while in office–charges which carry up to 20 years in prison.

Recent testing of Flint water suggests lead levels have dropped, but residents in the city of roughly 100,000 residents continue to rely on bottled and filtered water for their daily needs.

A City’s Fiscal and Physical Safety. According to a review of crime data by The Press of Atlantic City, the two-decade long decline in crime in Atlantic city has not only halted, but reversed itself in 2015, according to the Press’s review of New Jersey state crime data, reporting that in 2015, crime increased in nearly every major category, including homicides, rapes, and aggravated assaults—with the homicide increase extending into last year. The city’s violent crime rate is more than 500 percent higher than the statewide average—the murder rate a thousand percent—posing a stark governing challenge as, last week, New Jersey’s Local Finance Board, which is managing the city, alerted the city’s police and fire unions that it would press drastic cuts, including reduced staffing and imposing longer shifts. The Board has the authority to hire and fire employees, authorize raises and promotions, renegotiate service and labor contracts, restructure or pay off debt, approve the municipal budget, and make changes with regard to the delivery of municipal services. The state is seeking to force a restructuring of the city’s police department, including salary reductions, higher health care benefit contributions, moving to 12-hour shifts, and a more aggressive police response to nuisance issues in neighborhoods. Nevertheless, Anthony Marino, a retired executive with the South Jersey Transportation Authority, who has studied Atlantic City’s crime figures, reports that crime statistics have been on the wane since a high in 1989 and that the trend shows Atlantic City is, for the most part, a reasonably safe city, noting that in 1977, before the city had casinos, its crime index, or the total number of the seven categories tracked by State Police, was 4,391. In 1989, it peaked at over 16,000 before declining almost annually. Nevertheless, the apparent turnaround—in addition to the state-mandated changes in the city’s police department could not only limit the city’s capacity to address the seeming turnaround, but also adversely affect tourism and assessed property values.

Paying to Play. Tennessee and Georgia Republican groups are challenging the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s (MSRB) so-called pay-to-play rules under which municipal advisors and broker-dealer firms would be mandated to wait two years before doing business with municipal entities to which they have made political contributions (the pay-to-play rule also prohibits an investment adviser from soliciting contributions for a government official or the official’s political party at the same time the adviser is providing services to the government entity for which the official works.). The two political organizations have filed the suits charging that the rules violate their First Amendment rights; in addition, they claim that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and MSRB exceeded their authority and have not demonstrated a sufficient legal interest in restricting political contributions. In response, the Campaign Legal Center, in its brief to the 6th U.S. Court of Appeals, argues the rules are important to prevent municipal advisors from engaging in pay-to-play practices—and the rules are needed to address the potential for corruption in the municipal market. The amicus brief opposes attempts by the Tennessee Republican Party, Georgia Republican Party, and New York Republican State Committee seeking to have the court vacate the SEC’s approval of the rule changes.

Last summer, the SEC issued notice that it intends to approve the rules proposed by the MSRB and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, noting it would issue orders finding that the self-regulatory organizations’ rules impose “substantially equivalent or more stringent restrictions” on municipal advisors and broker-dealers than its own pay-to-play rule. The Center’s brief notes: “Substantial campaign contributions from a municipal advisor to officeholders with control over awards of municipal advisory business are likely to give rise to quid pro quo exchanges, or at a minimum, the appearance of such exchanges…That is the premise not only of the challenged amendments, but also the underlying rule, which was upheld by the D.C. Circuit.” Under the proposed changes to the rule, municipal advisors, like dealers, are barred from engaging in municipal advisory business with a municipal issuer for two years if the firm, one of its professionals, or a political action committee controlled by either the firm or an associated professional, makes significant contributions to an issuer official who can influence the award of municipal advisory business. As proposed, the modified rule contains a de minimis provision, which allows a municipal finance professional associated with a dealer or a municipal advisor professional to make a contribution of up to $250 per election to any candidate for whom she or he can vote without triggering the two-year ban. This is not a first: there was a previous challenge to an earlier version of Rule G-37 by an Alabama bond dealer in Blount v. SEC after it was first approved for dealers in 1994—a challenge which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected, noting, in its opinion, the rule had been “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”