Post Municipal Bankruptcy Leadership

08/07/17

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Good Morning! In this a.m.’s blog, we consider the fiscal challenge as election season is upon the Motor City: what kind of a race can we expect? Then we observe the changing of the guard in San Bernardino—as the city’s first post-chapter 9 City Manager settles in as she assumes a critical fiscal leadership role in the city emerging from municipal bankruptcy. Third, we consider the changing of the fiscal guard in Atlantic City, as outgoing (not a pun) Gov. Chris Christie begins the process of restoring municipal authority. Then we turn to what might be a fiscal turnaround underway in Puerto Rico, before, fourth, considering the special fiscal challenge to Puerto Rico’s municipios—or municipalities.

Post Municipal Bankruptcy Leadership. Detroit Mayor Mike Duggan, the city’s first post-chapter 9 mayor, has been sharing his goals for a second term, and speaking about some of his city’s proudest moments as he seeks a high turnout at tomorrow’s primary election mayoral primary election‒the first since the city exited municipal bankruptcy three years ago, noting he is: “very proud of the fact the unemployment rate in Detroit is the lowest it has been in 17 years: today he notes there are 20,000 more Detroiters working than 4 years ago. In January 2014, there were 40,000 vacant houses in the city, and today 25,000. We knocked down 12,000 and 3,000 had families who moved in and fixed them up,” adding: “For most Detroiters, that means the streetlights are on, grass is cut in the parks, busses are running on time, police and ambulances showing up in a timely basis and trash picked up and streets swept.” Notwithstanding those accomplishments, however, he confronts seven contenders—with perhaps the signal challenge coming from Michigan State Senator Coleman Young, Jr., whose father, Coleman Young, served as Detroit’s first African-American Mayor from 1974 to 1994. Mr. Young claims he is the voice for the people who have been forgotten in Detroit’s neighborhoods, noting: “I want to put people to work and reduce poverty of 48% in Detroit. I think that’s atrocious. I also want mass transit that goes more than 3 miles,” adding he is seeking ‘real change,’ charging that today in Detroit: “We’re doing more for the people who left the city of Detroit, than the people who stayed. That’s going to stop in a Young administration.” Remembering his father, he adds: “I don’t think there will ever be another Coleman Young, but I am the closest thing to him that’s on this planet that’s living.” (Other candidates in tomorrow’s non-partisan primary include Articia Bomer, Dean Edward, Curtis Greene, Donna Marie Pitts, and Danetta Simpson.)  

According to an analysis by the Detroit News, voters will have some interesting alternatives: half of the eight candidates have been convicted of felony crimes involving drugs, assault, or weapons—with three charged with gun crimes and two for assault with intent to commit murder, albeit, some of the offenses date back as far as 1977. (Under Michigan election law, convicted felons can vote and run for office, just as long as they are neither incarcerated nor guilty of crimes breaching public trust.

Taking the Reins.  San Bernardino has named its first post-chapter 9 bankruptcy city manager, selecting assistant City Manager and former interim city manager, Andrea Miller, to the position—albeit with some questions with regard to the $253,080 salary in a post-chapter 9 recovering municipality where the average household income is less than $36,000 and where officials assert the city’s budget is insufficient to fully address basic public services, such as street maintenance or a fully funded police department. Nevertheless, Mayor Cary Davis and the City Council voted unanimously, commenting on Ms. Miller’s experience, vision, and commitment to stay long-term, or, as Councilman Fred Shorett told his colleagues: “As the senior councilmember—I’ve been sitting in this dais longer than anybody else—I think we’ve had, if we count you twice, eight city managers in a total of 9 years: We have not had continuity.”  However, apprehension about continuity as the city addresses and implements its plan of debt adjustment remains—or, as Councilmember John Valdivia insisted, there needs to be a “solemn commitment to the people of San Bernardino” by Ms. Miller to serve at least five years, as he told his colleagues: “During Mayor (Carey) Davis’ four years in office, the Council is now voting on the third city manager: San Bernardino cannot expect a successful recovery with this type of rampant leadership turnover at City Hall…Ms. Miller is certainly qualified, but I am concerned that she has already deserted our community once before.” Ms. Miller was the city’s assistant city manager in 2012, when then-City Manager Charles McNeely abruptly resigned, leaving Ms. Miller as interim city manager to discover that the city would have to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy—a responsibility she addressed with aplomb: she led San Bernardino through the first six months of its municipal bankruptcy, before leaving without removing “interim” from her title, instead assuming the position of executive director of the San Gabriel Valley Council of Governments.

Ms. Miller noted: “I would remind the Council that I was here as your interim city manager previously, and I did not accept the permanent appointment, because I felt like I could not make that commitment given some of the dynamics…(Since then) this Council and this community have implemented a new city charter, the Council came together in a really remarkable way and had a discussion with me that we had not been able to have previously: You committed to some regular discussion about what your expectations are, you committed to strategic planning. And so, with all those things and a strategic plan that involves all of us in a stronger, better San Bernardino, yes I can make that commitment.” Interestingly, the new contract mandates at least two strategic planning sessions per year—and, she told the Council additional sessions would probably be wise. The contract the city’s new manager signed is longer than the city’s most recent ones—mayhap leavened by experience: the length and the pay are higher than the $248,076 per year the previous manager received. Although Ms. Miller is not a San Bernardino resident, she told the Mayor and Council she is committed to the city and said the city should strive to recruit other employees who do live in the city.

Not Gaming Atlantic City’s Future. New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s administration last week announced it had settled all the remaining tax appeals filed by Atlantic City casinos, ending a remarkable fiscal drain which has contributed to the city’s fiscal woes and state takeover. Indeed, it appears to—through removal of fiscal uncertainty and risk‒open the door to the Mayor and Council to reduce its tax rate over the long-term as the costs of the appeal are known and able to be paid out of the bonds sold earlier this year—effectively spinning the dial towards greater fiscal stability and sustainability. Here, the agreements were reached with: Bally’s, Caesars, Harrah’s, the Golden Nugget, Tropicana, and the shuttered Trump Plaza and Trump Taj Mahal: it comes about half a year in the wake of the state’s tax appeal settlement with Borgata, under which the city agreed to pay $72 million of the $165 million the casino was owed. While the Christie administration did not announce dollar amounts for any of the seven settlements announced last week, it did clarify that an $80 million bond ordinance adopted by the city will cover all the payments—effectively clearing the fiscal path for Atlantic City to act to reduce its tax rate over the long term as the costs of the appeal are known and can be paid out of the municipal bonds sold earlier this year.  

In these tax appeals, the property owners have claimed they paid more in taxes than they should have—effectively burdening the fiscally besieged municipality with hundreds of millions in debt over the last few years as officials sought to avoid going into chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy. Unsurprisingly, Gov. Christie has credited the state takeover of Atlantic City for fostering the settlements, asserting his actions were the “the culmination of my administration’s successful efforts to address one of the most significant and vexing challenges that had been facing the city…Because of the agreements announced today, casino property tax appeals no longer threaten the city’s financial future.” The Governor went on to add that his appointment of Jeffrey Chiesa, the former U.S. Senator and New Jersey Attorney General to usurp all municipal fiscal authority in Atlantic City when, in his words, Atlantic City was “overwhelmed by millions of dollars of crushing casino tax appeal debt that they hadn’t unraveled,” have now, in the wake of the state takeover, resulted in the city having a “plan in place to finance this debt that responsibly fits within its budget.” The lame duck Governor added in the wake of the state takeover, the city will see an 11.4% drop in residents’ overall 2017 property tax rate. For his part, Atlantic City Mayor Don Guardian described the fiscal turnaround as “more good news for Atlantic City taxpayers that we have been working towards since 2014: When everyone finally works together for the best interest of Atlantic City’s taxpayers and residents, great things can happen.”

Puerto Rican Debt. The Fiscal Supervision Board in the U.S. territory wants to initiate a discussion into Puerto Rico’s debt—and how that debt has weighed on the island’s fiscal crisis—making clear in issuing a statement that its investigation will include an analysis of the fiscal crisis and its taxpayers, and a review of Puerto Rico’s debt and issuance, including disclosure and sales practices, vowing to carry out its investigation consistent with the authority granted under PROMESA. It is unclear, however, how that report will mesh with the provision of PROMESA, §411, which already provides for such an investigation, directing the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to provide a report on the debt of Puerto Rico no later than one year after the approval of PROMESA (a deadline already passed: GAO notes the report is expected by the end of this year.). The fiscal kerfuffle comes as the PROMESA Oversight Board meets today to discuss—and mayhap render a decision with regard to furloughs and an elimination of the Christmas bonus as part of a fiscal oversight effort to address an expected cash shortfall this Fall, after Gov. Ricardo Rosselló, at the end of last month, vowed he would go to court to block any efforts by the PROMESA Board to force furloughs, apprehensive such an action would fiscally backfire by causing a half a billion dollar contraction in Puerto Rico’s economy.

Thus, we might be at an OK Corral showdown: PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión III has warned that if the Board were to mandate furloughs and the governor were to object, the board would sue. As proposed by the PROMESA Board, Puerto Rican government workers are to be furloughed four days a month, unless they work in an excepted class of employees: for instance, teachers and frontline personnel who worked for 24-hour staffed institutions would only be furloughed two days a month, law enforcement personnel not at all—all part of the Board’s fiscal blueprint to save the government $35 million to $40 million monthly.  However, as the ever insightful Municipal Market Advisors managing partner Matt Fabian warns, it appears “inevitable” that furloughs and layoffs would hurt the economy in the medium term—or, as he wrote: “To the extent employee reductions create a protest environment on the island, it may make the Board’s work more difficult going forward, but this is the challenge of downsizing an over-large, mismanaged government.” At the same time, Joseph Rosenblum, the Director of municipal credit research at AllianceBernstein, added: “It would be easier to comment about the situation in Puerto Rico if potential investors had more details on their cash position on a regular basis…And it would also be helpful if the Oversight Board was more transparent about how it arrived at its spending estimates in the fiscal plan.”

Pensiones. The PROMESA Board and Puerto Rico’s muncipios appear to have achieved some progress on the public pension front: PROMESA Board member Andrew Biggs asserts that the fiscal plan called for 10% cuts to pension spending in future fiscal years, while Sobrino Vega said Gov. Ricardo Rosselló has promised to make full pension payments. Natalie Ann Jaresko, the former Ukraine Minister of Finance whom former President Obama appointed to serve as Executive Director of PROMESA Fiscal Control Board, described the reduction as part of the fiscal plan that the Governor had promised to observe: the fiscal plan assumed that the Puerto Rican government would cut $880 million in spending in the current fiscal year. Indeed, in the wake of analyzing the government’s implementation plans, the PROMESA Board appeared comfortable that the cuts would save $662 million—with the Board ordering furloughs to make up the remaining $218 million. The fiscal action came as PROMESA Board member Carlos García said that the board last Spring presented the 10 year fiscal plan guiding government actions with certain conditions, Gov. Rosselló agreed to them, so that the Board approved the plan with said conditions, providing that the government achieve a certain level of liquidity by the end of June and submit valid implementation plans for spending cuts. Indeed, Puerto Rico had $1.8 billion in liquidity at the end of June, well over the $291 million that had been projected, albeit PROMESA Board member Ana Matosantos asserted the $1.8 billion denoted just a single data point. Ms. Jaresko, however, advised that this year’s government cuts were just the beginning: the Board fiscal plan calls for the budget cuts to more than double from $880 million in this year, to $1.7 billion in FY 2019, to $2.1 billion in FY2020.  No Puerto Rican government representative was allowed to make a presentation to the board on the issue of furloughs.

Not surprisingly, in Puerto Rico, where the unemployment rate is nearly triple the current U.S. rate, the issue of furloughs has raised governance issues: Sobrino Vega, the Governor’s chief economic advisor non-voting representative on the PROMESA Oversight Board, said there was only one government of Puerto Rico and that was Gov. Rosselló’s, adding that under §205 of PROMESA, the board only had the powers to recommend on issues such as furloughs, noting: “We can’t take lightly the impact of the furloughs on the economy,” adding the government will meet its fiscal goals, but it will do it according its own choices, but that the Puerto Rican government will cooperate with the Board on other matters besides furloughs. His statement came in the wake of PROMESA Board Chair José Carrión III’s statement in June that if Puerto Rico did not comply with a board order for furloughs, the Board would sue.

Cambio?  Puerto Rico Commonwealth Treasury Secretary Raul Maldonado has reported that Puerto Rico’s tax revenue collections last month were was ahead of projections, marking a positive start to the new fiscal year for an island struggling with municipal bankruptcy and a 45% poverty rate. Secretary Maldonado reported the positive cambio (in Spanish, “cambio” translates to change—and may be used both to describe cash as well as change, just as in English.): “I think we are going to be $20 to $30 million over the forecast: For July, we started the fiscal year already in positive territory, because we are over the forecast. We have to close the books on the final adjustment but we feel we are over the budget.” His office had reported the revenue collection forecast for July, the start of Puerto Rico’s 2017-2018 fiscal year, was $600.8 million: in the previous fiscal year, Puerto Rico’s tax collections exceeded forecasts by $234.9 million, or 2.6%, to $9.33 million, with the key drivers coming from the foreign corporations excise tax, the sales and use tax, and the motor vehicle excise tax. Sec. Maldonado, who is also Puerto Rico’s CFO, reported that each government department is required to freeze its spending and purchase orders at 95% of the monthly budget, noting: “I want to make sure that they don’t overspend. By freezing 5%, I am creating a cushion so if there is any variance on a monthly basis we can address that. It is a hardline budget approach but it is a special time here.” Sec. Maldonado also said he was launching a centralized tax collection pilot program, with guidance from the U.S. Treasury—one under which three large and three small municipalities have enrolled in an effort to assess which might best increase tax collection efficiency while cutting bureaucracy in Puerto Rico’s 78 municipalities, noting: “We are going to submit the tax reform during August, and we will include that option as an alternative to the municipalities.”

Trying to Recover on all Pistons

07/19/17

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Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we look back at the steep road out of the nation’s largest ever municipal bankruptcy—in Detroit, where the Chicago Federal Reserve and former U.S. Chief Bankruptcy Judge Thomas Bennett, who presided over Jefferson County’s chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy case, has noted: “[S]tates can have precipitating roles as well as preventative roles” in work he did for the Chicago Federal Reserve. Indeed, it seems the Great Recession demarcated the nation’s states into distinct fiscal categories: those with state oversight programs which either protected against or offered fiscal support to assist troubled municipalities, versus those, such as Alabama or California—with the former appearing to aid and abet Jefferson County’s descent into chapter 9 bankruptcy, and California, home to the largest number of chapter 9 bankruptcies over the last two decades, contributing to fiscal distress, but avoiding any acceptance of risk. Therefore, we try to provide our own fiscal autopsy of Detroit’s journey into and out of the nation’s largest municipal bankruptcy.

I met in the Governor’s Detroit offices with Kevyn Orr, whom Governor Rick Snyder had asked to come out from Washington, D.C. to serve as the city’s Emergency Manager to take the city into—and out of chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy: the largest in American history. Having been told by the hotel staff that it was unsafe to walk the few blocks from my hotel to the Governor’s Detroit offices on the city’s very first day in insolvency—a day in which the city was spending 38 cents on every dollar of taxes collected from residents and businesses on legacy costs and operating debt payments totaling $18 billion; it was clear from the get go, as he told me that early morning, there was no choice other than chapter 9: it was an essential, urgent step in order to ensure the provision of essential services, including street and traffic lights, emergency first responders, and basic maintenance of the Motor City’s crumbling infrastructure—especially given the grim statistics, with police response times averaging 58 minutes across the city, fewer than a third of the city’s ambulances in service, 40% of the city’s 88,000 traffic lights not working, “primarily due to disrepair and neglect.” It was, as my walk made clear, a city aptly described as: “[I]nfested with urban blight, which depresses property values, provides a fertile breeding ground for crime and tinder for fires…and compels the city to devote precious resources to demolition.” Of course, not just physical blight and distress, but also fiscal distress: the Motor City’s unbalanced fiscal condition was foundering under its failure to make some $108 million in pension payments—payments which, under the Michigan constitution, because they are contracts, were constitutionally binding. Nevertheless, in one of his early steps to staunch the fiscal bleeding, Mr. Orr halted a $39.7 million payment on $1.4 billion in pension debt issued by former Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick’s administration to make the city pension funds appear better funded than they really were; thus, Mr. Orr’s stop payment was essential to avoid immediate cash insolvency at a moment in time when Detroit’s cash position was in deepening debt. Thus, in his filing, Mr. Orr aptly described the city’s dire position and the urgency of swift action thusly: “Without this, the city’s death spiral I describe herein will continue.”

Today, the equivalent of a Presidential term later, the city has installed 65,000 new streetlights; it has cut police and emergency responder response times to 25% of what they were; it has razed 11,847 blighted buildings. Indeed, ambulance response times in Detroit today are half of what they were—and close to the national average—even as the city’s unrestricted general fund finished FY2016 fiscal year with a $143 million surplus, 200% of the prior fiscal year: as of March 31st, Detroit sported a general fund surplus of $51 million, with $52.8 million more cash on hand than March of last year, according to the Detroit Financial Review Commission—with the surplus now dedicated to setting aside an additional $20 million into a trust fund for a pension “funding cliff” the city has anticipated in its plan of debt adjustment by 2024.  

Trying to Run on all Pistons. The Detroit City Council has voted 7-1 to approve a resolution to allow the Motor City to realize millions of dollars in income tax revenues from its National Basketball Association Pistons players, employees, and visiting NBA players—with such revenues dedicated to finance neighborhood improvements across the Motor City, under a Neighborhood Improvement Fund—a fund proposed in June by Councilwoman (and ordained Minister) Mary Sheffield, with the proposal coming a week after the City Council agreed to issue some $34.5 million in municipal bonds to finance modifications to the Little Caesars Arena—where the Pistons are scheduled to play next season. Councilwoman Sheffield advised her colleagues the fund would also enable the city to focus on blight removal, home repairs for seniors, educational opportunities for young people, and affordable housing development in neighborhoods outside of downtown and Midtown—or, as she put it: “This sets the framework; it expresses what the fund should be used for; and it ultimately gives Council the ability to propose projects.” She further noted the Council could, subsequently, impose additional limitations with regard to the use of the funds—noting she had come up with the proposal in response to complaints from Detroit constituents who had complained the city’s recovery efforts had left them out—stating: “It’s not going to solve all of the problems, and it’s not going to please everyone, but I do believe it’s a step in the right direction to make sure these catalyst projects have some type of tangible benefits for residents.”

Detroit officials estimate the new ordinance will help generate a projected $1.3 million annually. In addition, city leaders hope to find other sources to add to the fund—sources the Councilmember reports, which will be both public and private: “We as a council are going to look at other development projects and sources that could go into the fund too.” As adopted, the resolution provides: “[I]t is imperative that the neighborhoods, and all other areas of the City, benefit from the Detroit Pistons’ return downtown …In turn, the City will receive income tax revenue, from the multimillion dollar salaries of the NBA players as well as other Pistons employees and Palace Sports & Entertainment employees.” The Council has forwarded the adopted proposals to Mayor Duggan’s office for final consideration and action. The proposed new revenues—unless the tax is modified or rejected by the Mayor—would be dedicated for use in the city’s Neighborhood Improvement Fund in FY2018—with decisions with regard to how to allocate the funds—by Council District or citywide—to be determined at a later date. The funds, however, could also be used to address one of the lingering challenges from the city’s adopted plan of debt adjustment from its chapter 9 bankruptcy: meeting its public pension obligations when general fund revenues are insufficient, “should there be any unforeseen shortfall,” as the resolution provides.

This fiscal recovery, however, remains an ongoing challenge: Detroit CFO John Hill laid up the proverbial hook shot up by advising the Council that the reason the city reserved the right to use the Pistons tax revenue to cover pension or debt obligation shortfalls was because of the large pension obligation payment the city will confront in 2024: “We knew that in meeting our pensions and debt obligation in 2024 and 2025 that those funds get very tight: If this kind of valve wasn’t there, I would have a lot of concerns that in those years its tighter and we don’t get revenues we expect we don’t get any of those funds to meet those obligations.”

But, as in basketball, there is another side: at the beginning of the week, the NBA, Palace Sports & Entertainment, and Olympia Entertainment were added to a federal lawsuit—a suit filed in late June by community activist Robert Davis and Detroit city clerk candidate D. Etta Wilcox against the Detroit Public Schools Community District. The suit seeks to force a vote on the $34.5 million public funding portion of the Pistons’ deal, under which Detroit, as noted above, is seeking to capture the school operating tax, the proceeds of which are currently used to service $250 million of bonds DDA bonds previously issued for the arena project in addition to the $34.5 million of additional bonds the city planned to issue for the Pistons relocation.

Emerging from Chapter 9–and the conflict between fiscal and physical safety.

07/07/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the final emergence of Orange County, California from chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy; then we consider the ongoing fiscal and fiscal challenges for Flint’s leaders from its fiscal & physical challenges.

Free at Last? Twenty-three years ago, when the former Orange County, California Treasurer, Robert Citron, then managing an investment pool for southern California municipalities, speculated unwisely, the municipal pool he managed lost $1.64 billion—plunging the county into the first chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy of the modern era (California §53760)—a chapter 9 bankruptcy from which the County emerged this week in the wake of its final payment on the $1 billion worth of municipal bonds it had issued. Orange County, however, still owes approximately $20 million to various cities and agencies that have a separate repayment agreement—debt Orange County expects to resolve by late next year. (A subsequent grand jury investigation later found that Mr. Citron, who had earned praise for his investment skills, relied on a mail order astrologer and a psychic for interest rate predictions as Orange County’s Treasurer.)

For this writer, the emergence evokes memories of how controversial the concept of municipal bankruptcy had been—at the time—for the National League of Cities to advocate for the changes in chapter 9: the then Executive Director and the then President of NLC (former New York City Council Chair Carol Bellamy) decried the notion that an association of municipal elected leaders would support facilitating filing for municipal bankruptcy; yet the Orange County case illuminated its importance by demonstrating how important it was to have a mechanism in federal law to ensure continuity in the provision of essential municipal public services.  

In the case of Orange County, the insolvency of an investment pool it ran on behalf of itself and other municipalities in the region would have, absent the kinds of protections provided under chapter 9, risked plunging municipalities in the region into insolvency without a mechanism to ensure vital public services and operations. The County’s insolvency and threat to the other municipalities in the region was its own kind of tremor: a fiscal, rather than physical tremor. In the end, the access to chapter 9 meant the county was able to issue $1 billion in municipal bonds to avoid a critical default and ensure avoidance of any disruption in essential municipal services—bonds the payments on which ($1.5 billion including interest) were finally completed at the beginning of this month when the County made its final payment on that bankruptcy bond debt. While the price to its taxpayers was steep–repayments averaged $68 million a year, and the loss of vital public improvements and services great; the shock it sent to the nation’s cities was key in helping Congress better understand that while an Eastern Airlines could file for federal bankruptcy protection and simply walk away from its services and debts; that could never be the case for a city or county: there had to be a mechanism in federal law to ensure that a city, county, or public school system could continue to operate during insolvency.  

In managing these municipalities’ investment pool, Mr. Citron made unlucky/unwise wagers on interest rates—so unwise that the multi-jurisdiction investment pool suffered a crippling $1.64 billion loss. Now California State Senator John Moorlach, who prior to his Senate service was twice re-elected Orange County Treasurer-Tax Collector after running against Mr. Citron in 1994, has noted: “The bankruptcy dramatically changed my life…I sort of feel like I lived in a movie. I was an officer of the county when those recovery bonds were issued, and I wondered if I’d live long enough to see them paid off. It was a great turn-around opportunity. A lot has changed since then, and the county is better for it. It’s been nearly 23 years, and no one has been able to pull a stunt like this again. It’s a good day.”

While the “day” is not quite over: there are still another $19.7 million which must be settled before all municipal bankruptcy-related bills are resolved; the fiscal lesson appears to have been learned—or as current Supervisor William Steiner put it: “Despite the checks and balances now, and a commitment to strategic planning, there is always the chance that institutional memory will fade as time goes by and as leadership changes…The county has essentially fared well over the years despite the bankruptcy. Still, millions of dollars have been diverted from other important county departments and priorities.” The godfather of modern-day chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, the incomparable Jim Spiotto, with whom I had the great fortune to work for so many years to achieve enactment of today’s municipal bankruptcy laws, appropriately notes: “Chapter 9 is the most extreme remedy, the last resort, if you can even call it a last resort.” Nevertheless, as he puts it, it creates a powerful tool for a municipality to avoid a potentially devastating “run on the bank.”

Out Like Flint? The State of Michigan, whose former Emergency Manager law played the critical role precipitating the grave physical and fiscal crisis affecting Flint, is now pressing the Flint City Council to vote on a long-term water contract under which Flint would lose rights to a municipal bond financed water pipeline—after the City Council two weeks ago voted to extend the city’s water delivery contract with the Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA) until September, but delayed a vote on a longer term proposal by Mayor Karen Weaver to extend the contract for 30-years. Unsurprisingly, the state is now ramping up the pressure: in the wake of this week’s City Council vote, the state Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) filed suit against the city over the delay on a long-term arrangement, with the state alleging that the City Council’s refusal to approve a long-term water contract is endangering public health in the wake of the city’s lead contamination crisis. The complaint seeks a declaration that the Council’s failure to act is a violation of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act and a mandate that the city must enter into the long-term agreement with the GLWA negotiated by Mayor Weaver. The MDEQ charges that the city would be wasting its resources if it refuses to quit its current Karegnondi water pipeline plan: “The MDEQ has determined that the City Council’s failure to approve the agreement with GLWA and continued consideration of other options that may require operation of the water treatment plant places public health at risk.”

Under the proposed long-term contract, Flint would lose water rights to the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA) (a new pipeline to Lake Huron, which is currently under construction). Thus, as Flint has awaited completion of the Karegnondi pipeline, it has been drawing its water from the Flint River—withdrawals which contributed to corroding pipes and lead contamination. Flint has been preparing to shift to KWA supplied, un-treated water in two years—with plans to construct vital upgrades to its treatment plant to meet EPA-mandated standards. In April, Mayor Weaver dropped the plan to make the switch to the bond-financed pipeline and recommended the city continue to purchase water from GLWA, believing that the GLWA supplied and treated water is more affordable—and apprehensive about the risk of another supply shift. With the city’s fiscal and physical health scarred by the water contamination crisis which came in the wake of the state-appointed emergency manager’s fateful decision to allow the city’s contract with Detroit for Lake Huron-treated water to expire—Mayor Weaver advised: “The recommendation I put forward months ago is the best option to protect public health and is supported by the public health community…[It] would also allow the City to avoid a projected 40 percent water rate increase and ensure the City of Flint gets millions of dollars to continue replacing lead tainted pipes and make much-needed repairs to our damaged infrastructure so we are able to deliver quality water to residents. The people of Flint have waited long enough for a reliable, permanent water source. Implementing my recommendation will provide that, and will allow us to move forward as a community and focus more on rebuilding our City.” Under her plan, Flint would recoup the roughly $7 million in annual debt service by transferring its KWA water rights to the GLWA.

Nevertheless, as Flint Councilmember Eric Mays described his apprehensions with regard to Flint losing its rights to the KWA pipeline, he recommended the city retain the asset: “My position is that the since the Governor won’t apologize, and the state has the money they can pay the bond; and whether we ever use the KWA asset, I don’t want, at this juncture, to turn over that asset and lose those rights under the deal with GLWA…I would be almost ready to vote for the GLWA deal if we could tweak it and get that bond off to the state and still retain the asset.” He added that he is the only Councilmember to propose an alternative to Mayor Weaver’s plan—a plan, he added, on which the Council “has done nothing.” Rather, he believes the State of Michigan, the precursor of the fiscal and physical crisis, should bear the burden for the municipal bond payments: “Since the MDEQ issued a suspicious administrative consent order for minor repairs and put it into the bond prospectus at the initial bond sale, my position is that Governor has the money and can pay the bond.”

Overcoming the Fiscal & Physical Challenges of Emerging from Municipal Bankruptcy

06/26/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the extra fiscal challenges of exiting chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy where the fiscal (and in this case physical) odds are stacked against your city. Nevertheless, it appears that San Bernardino’s elected and appointed leaders have overcome terrorism and fiscal challenges to emerge from the nation’s longest municipal bankruptcy. Then we look to see if Detroit’s new bridge to Canada will be not just a physical, but also a fiscal bridge to the city’s future. Finally, we toke (yes, a pun) a look at the ongoing fiscal and governing challenges in Puerto Rico between the U.S. Territory’s own government and the Congressionally appointed oversight board.

On the Other Side of Municipal Bankruptcy: How Sweet It Can Be. Exiting chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy is an exceptional challenge—there is no federal or state bailout, as we have witnessed for, say, major banks, financial institutions, or automobile manufacturers. It is, instead, especially in states like California, where the state, unlike, for instance, Rhode Island, or Michigan, plays no role in helping a city as part of the development of a plan of debt adjustment, an exceptional test of municipal leaders—and U.S. bankruptcy judges. Moreover, because California—in our post General Revenue Sharing economy—likewise provides no program or assistance focused on municipal fiscal disparities, the fiscal lifting is more challenging. An important challenge too is perception or reputation: what must change to send a message to a business or family that this is a city worth moving to?

San Bernardino, after all, has emerged in relatively hale fiscal shape, at long last—even as it faces such an unlevel fiscal playing field, as well as signal budget challenges for public safety in a city where the chances of being a victim of violent crime are nearly 400% higher than the statewide average. Thus, the post-bankrupt municipality confronts—and has plans to address a violent crime wave and a massive amount of deferred maintenance, in the wake of the Council’s adoption of a $120 million general fund operating budget, including funds to hire more police officers and replace outdated equipment—as well as to undertake a violence intervention program—modeled on a program which has proven effective in dramatically reducing homicides in other municipalities which have employed it.

San Bernardino’s new budget provides for repairs and overdue maintenance of streets, streetlights, traffic signals, storm drains, medians, and park facilities; it adds additional maintenance workers in the Public Works and Parks departments. According to City Attorney Gary Saenz: “One of the greatest effects is the perception, now, I think people should give San Bernardino a second look and see that it is an ideal place and has a lot of potential.”

The epic scale of the city’s fiscal and budgetary change from its $45 million deficit five years ago and decline in employees from 1,140 full-time to 746 budgeted for its FY2018 budget offers a perspective: the city has renegotiated contracts, restructured debts, and, as part of its approved plan of bankruptcy debt adjustment, been authorized to pay some of its creditors as little as a cent on the dollar. And, its citizens and taxpayers have elected new leaders and replaced the city’s old, convoluted charter. Moreover, if weathering municipal bankruptcy were not hard enough, the city was also subjected to a horrific terrorist attack which took 14 lives and injured 22 at the Inland Regional Center. Indeed, it somehow seems consistent, that in the middle of these terrible fiscal and terrorist challenges, the city also had to abandon its City Hall building: it was not just fiscally imbalanced, but also seismically unsound.  

A Bridge to Detroit’s Tomorrow. Mayor Mike Duggan last Friday announced the Motor City had reached an agreement with the state to sell land, assets, and some streets for more than $48 million, with the proceeds to be used in the project to construct a second bridge between Windsor, Canada and Detroit. Mayor Duggan reported the city will use the proceeds for related neighborhood programs, job training, and health monitoring—with a key set aside to assist Delray residents to voluntarily relocate to renovated houses in other neighborhoods in Detroit. Joined by Michigan officials, community leaders, as well as representatives from the Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority (the nonprofit entity managing the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the new Gordie Howe International Bridge), Mayor Duggan noted: “This is a major step forward…This is eliminating one of the last obstacles.” The new bridge named for the city’s former hockey legend, will provide a second highway link for heavy trucks at the busiest U.S.‒Canadian crossing point in the U.S.—a $2.1 billion span scheduled to open in 2020, with Canada supplying Michigan’s $550 million share of the bridge, which the donated funds to be repaid through tolls. There will be other benefits for the U.S. city emerging from the largest chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy in history: Rev. Kevin Casillas, pastor of the First Latin American Baptist Church on Fort, in thanking Mayor Duggan and other officials for hammering out the agreement, noted: “Today is a good day in our decade-long fight, advocating for residents of Delray and southwest Detroit…Residents will benefit from health-impact assessments and air monitoring in our community; residents will benefit from job training; residents will benefit from having the option of relocating to another fully updated house elsewhere in the city.” (The Mayor noted that he intends to set up a real estate office in Delray to help homeowners relocate if they wish to move, emphasizing no one would be forced to—and that “If someone want to stay, then they’re welcome to…”). Under the agreement, Detroit will sell the Michigan Department of Transportation 36 parcels of land, underground assets, and approximately five miles of streets in the bridge’s footprint for $48.4 million. Mayor Duggan said Detroit plans to use the proceeds mainly to address four goals: $33 million will be invested in a neighborhood improvement fund, with the bulk, $26 million to assist Delray residents to relocate, and $9 million to upgrade homes; $10 million for a job training initiative to prepare Detroit residents to fill both construction and operations jobs; $2.4 million for air and health monitoring in southwest Detroit over the next 10 years; and $3 million for the Detroit Water & Sewerage Department and Public Lighting Authority to purchase assets in the project’s footprint.

Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder noted: “Mayor Duggan’s announcement is the result of several years of successful collaboration between the state, the city, the Windsor-Detroit Bridge Authority, and numerous stakeholders, including community leaders…Everyone listened to one another, worked hard to understand concerns, and forged a partnership based on solutions. This shows that by working together, we can achieve great things for everyone.”

Fiscal Inhaling in Puerto Rico? Early yesterday morning, the Puerto Rico Senate voted 21-9 to approve the government’s general $ 9.562 billion FY2018 general budget, passing Joint House Resolutions 186, 187, 188, and 189 with no amendments—clearing the way for Governor Ricardo Rosselló to sign it. Giving a lift to the legislative effort, the legislature also approved a bill to regulate the medical marijuana industry—legislation that establishes that it may be used for terminal patients or when no other suitable medical alternative is available. The uplifting governmental actions came as Gov. Ricardo Rosselló opposed demands by the PROMESA Oversight Board that the government furlough employees and suspend their Christmas bonuses. According to a spokesperson for the president of the Puerto Rico House of Representatives, as of the beginning of last weekend, there was also disagreement between the Board and Gov. Rosselló’s ruling party with regard to whether to shift money from school and municipal improvements to a budget reserve fund. In his epistle to the Board, Gov. Rosselló, last Thursday, had written that the Board’s Executive Director, Natalie Jaresko, had informed him that the Board will mandate furloughs and the suspension of any bonuses—a demand which Gov. Rosselló believes usurps his authority under PROMESA, as well as contravenes the Board’s position of earlier this Spring, when it had said there would have to be furloughs and an end to the bonus, unless two conditions were met: 1) Puerto Rico would have to gain a $200 million cash reserve by this Friday, and 2) Puerto Rico would have to submit an implementation plan for reducing spending on government programs. The PROMESA Board, a week ago last Friday, had written that it believed the reserve would be met; however, the Board asserted the implementation plan was inadequate. (In insisting upon the furlough program, the Board assumed such furloughs would save the government $35 million to $40 million on a monthly basis.) Thus, in his letter, Gov. Rosselló wrote: “In contravention of PROMESA §205, the Oversight Board is now trying to strong-arm the government into accepting the expenditure controls.” He appeared especially concerned with the PROMESA Board’s mandate to shift $80 million in the budget for school improvements and reserves for the island’s municipalities.

Disparate Fiscal Solvency Challenges

06/23/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the serious municipal fiscal challenges in Ohio, where the decline in coal-fired power has led Adams County auditor David Gifford to warn that if its existing power plants close, the county could be forced to raise its property tax rates at least 500% in order to make its requisite school district bond interest payments. Then we turn to the steep fiscal trials and tribulations of implementing San Bernardino’s post-chapter 9 exit, before finally considering the governing challenges affecting the City of Flint’s physical and fiscal future, and then to the criminal charges related to Flint’s fiscal and moral insolvency. Finally, we turn to the potential for a new fiscal chapter for the nearly insolvent Virginia municipality of Petersburg.

Fiscal Municipal Distress in Coal Country. While President Trump has stressed his commitment to try to protect the U.S. coal industry, less attention has been focused on the municipal fiscal challenges for local elected leaders. For instance, in Adams County, Ohio, where the median income for a household is about $33,000, and where approximately 20% of families fall below the federal poverty line, the county, with a population near 22,000, has been in fiscal emergency for more than two years—making it one of 23 such jurisdictions in the state.  But now its auditor, David Gifford, warns that if its coal-fired power plants close, the county could be forced to raise the property tax by at least 500% in order to make the bond payments on its public school districts debt. (In Ohio, when so designated, the average time a municipality spends in fiscal emergency averages about five years.) Since 1980, when the state auditor was empowered to place municipalities in fiscal emergency, Ohio has declared and released 54 communities—with time spent in fiscal emergency averaging five years, albeit the Village of Manchester in Adams County (approximately 2,000 residents) holds the record for time spent in fiscal emergency — nearly 20 years and still counting. Over the past five years, some 350 coal-fired generating units have closed across the country, according to the Energy Information Administration: closures, which have cost not just jobs, but key tax revenues vital to municipal solvency. It is uncertain whether any actions by the White House could make coal viable as a source of energy generation; it is clear that neither the Trump Administration, nor the State of Ohio appear to have put together fiscal options to address the resulting fiscal challenges. Ohio Municipal League Director Kent Scarrett, in testimony before the Ohio Legislature last February, on behalf of the League’s 733 municipal members, in which close to 90% of Ohio’s citizens live, reminded legislators that “a lack of opportunity to invest in critical infrastructure projects” and “the myriad of challenges that present themselves as a result of the escalating opioid epidemic,” would require “reigniting the relationship between the state and municipalities.” 

Post Municipal Bankruptcy Challenges. San Bernardino Mayor Carey Davis this Wednesday declared the city’s municipal bankruptcy process officially over, noting San Bernardino had come “to the momentous exit from that process,” a five-year process which resulted in the outsourcing of its fire department to San Bernardino County, contracting out waste removal services, and reductions in healthcare benefits for retirees and current employees to lessen the impact on pensions. Mayor Davis noted: “The proceedings guided us through a process of rebuilding and restructuring, and we will continue to rebuild and create systems for successful municipal operations,” as the City Council confronted by what City Manager Mark Scott warned was “without a doubt among the lowest in per capita revenues per capita and in city employees per capita,” yet still confronted by what he described as:  “Among California’s largest cities, San Bernardino is without a doubt among the lowest in government revenues per capita and in city employees per capita…Furthermore, our average household income is low and our poverty rate is high.” Nevertheless, the Council adopted its first post-chapter 9 budget—a budget which is projected to achieve a surplus of $108,000, sufficient to achieve a 15% reserve. To give a perspective on the fiscal challenge, Mr. Scott warned the Mayor and City Council: “Among California’s largest cities, San Bernardino is without a doubt among the lowest in government revenues per capita and in city employees per capita…Furthermore, our average household income is low and our poverty rate is high.” Adding that San Bernardino’s property values and business spending are lower than other cities, contributing to its low revenue, he added: “At the same time, it costs roughly the same to repair a street in Rancho Cucamonga as in San Bernardino: California’s tax system rewards wealth.”

Nevertheless, even though San Bernardino’s plan of debt adjustment calls for minimal revenue growth over the next two decades, he advised that the plan is focused on making the city more attractive. Ergo, he proposed three criteria: 1) urgent safety concerns, including the relocation of City Hall to address unreinforced masonry concerns; 2) restoration of public safety, 30 new police officers, vehicle and safety equipment replacement, radio maintenance, and a violence intervention initiative; 3) greater efficiencies, via information technology upgrades, and economic development and revenue growth—to be met by hiring a transportation planner, associate planner, grant-writing, and consulting. In addition to the operating budget, the manager also focused on the city’s capital budget, proposing significant investment for the next two to three years. Some of these increased costs would be offset by reducing the city’s full-time city employees by about 4%. Nevertheless, the Manager noted: “The community’s momentum is clearly increasing, and we are building internal capacity to address our management challenges…We look forward to the next year and to our collective role in returning this city to a more prosperous condition.”

Under its plan of debt adjustment, San Bernardino began making distributions to creditors this month: Mayor Carey Davis noted: “From the beginning, we understood the time, hard work, sacrifice and commitment it would take for the city to emerge from the bankruptcy process,” in asking the Council to adopt the proposed $160 million operating budget and a $22.6 million capital budget.

Moody Blues. The fiscal challenge of recovering from municipal bankruptcy for the city was highlighted last April when Moody’s Investors Service analysts had warned that the city’s plan of debt adjustment approved by U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury would “lead to a general fund unallocated cash balance of approximately $9.5 million by fiscal 2023, down from a $360 million deficit the city projected in 2013 for the fiscal years 2013-23,” adding, however, that the city still faces hurdles with pensions, public safety, and infrastructure. Noting that San Bernardino’s plan of debt adjustment provided more generous treatment of its pension obligations than its municipal bondholders—some of its unsecured creditors will receive as little as 1% of what they are owed—and the city’s pension obligation bondholders will take the most severe cuts—about 60%–or, as Moody’s moodily noted: “The [court-approved] plan calls for San Bernardino to leave bankruptcy with increased revenues and an improved balance sheet, but the city will retain significant unfunded and rapidly rising pension obligations…Additionally, it will face operational challenges associated with deferred maintenance and potential service shortfalls…which, added to the pension difficulties, increase the probability of continued financial distress and possibly even a return to bankruptcy.”

The glum report added that San Bernardino’s finances put its aging infrastructure at risk, noting the deferral of some $180 million in street repairs and $130 million in deferred facility repairs and improvements, and that the city had failed to inspect 80 percent of its sewer system, adding: “Cities typically rely on financing large capital needs with debt, but this option may no longer exist for San Bernardino…Even if San Bernardino is able to stabilize its finances, the city will still face a material infrastructure challenge.”  Moody’s report added: “Adjusted net pension liability will remain unchanged at $904 million, a figure that dwarfs the projected bankruptcy savings of approximately $350 million.”

Justice for Flint? Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette has charged Michigan Health and Human Services Director Nick Lyon with involuntary manslaughter and misconduct in office, making the Director the fifth state official, including a former Flint emergency manager and a member of Gov. Rick Snyder’s administration, to be confronted with involuntary manslaughter charges for their alleged roles in the Flint water contamination crisis and ensuing Legionnaire’s disease outbreak which has, to date, claimed 12 lives, noting: “This is about people’s lives and families and kids, and it’s about demonstrating to people across the state—it doesn’t matter who you are, young, old, rich, poor, black, white, north, south, east, west. There is one system of justice, and the rules apply to everybody, whether you’re a big shot or no shot at all.” To date, 12 people have died in the wake of the switch by a state-appointed Emergency Manager of the city’s drinking water supply to the Flint River—a switch which led to an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease that resulted in those deaths. Flint Mayor Karen Weaver, in response, noted: “We wanted to know who knew what and when they knew it, and we wanted someone to be held accountable. It’s another step toward justice for the people Flint,” adding that: “What happened in Flint was serious: Not only did we have people impacted by lead poisoning, but we had people who died.”

In making his charges, Attorney General Schuette declined to say whether he had subpoenaed Governor Rick Snyder—with the charges coming some 622 days after Gov. Snyder had acknowledged that Flint’s drinking water was tainted with lead—and that the state was liable for the worst water tragedy in Michigan’s history—a tragedy due, in no small part, from the state appointment of an emergency manager to displace the city’s own elected leaders.

The state Attorney General has charged HHS Director Lyon in relation to the individual death of Robert Skidmore, who died Dec. 13, 2015, “as a result of [Mr.] Lyon’s failure to warn the public of the Legionnaires’ outbreak; the court has also received testimony that the Director “participated in obstructing” an independent research team from Wayne State University which was investigating the presence of Legionella bacteria in Flint’s water. In addition, four defendants who have been previously charged, former Flint Emergency Manager Darnell Earley, former Michigan Department of Environmental Quality drinking water Director Liane Shekter-Smith, DEQ drinking water official Stephen Busch, and former City of Flint Water Department manager Howard Croft, each now face additional charges of involuntary manslaughter in Mr. Skidmore’s death—bringing, to date, 15 current or former Michigan or Flint city officials to have been charged.

Attorney General Scheutte, at a press conference, noted: “Involuntary manslaughter is a very serious crime and a very serious charge and holds significant gravity and weight for all involved.” He was joined by Genesee County Prosecutor David Leyton, Flint Water Investigation Special Prosecutor Todd Flood, and Chief Investigator Andrew Arena. (In Michigan, involuntary manslaughter is punishable by up to 15 years in prison and/or a $7,500 fine.) The announcement brings to 51 the number of charges leveled against 15 current and former local and state leaders as a result of the probe during which 180 witnesses have been interviewed—and in the wake of the release this week of an 18-page interim investigation report, which notes: “The Flint Water Crisis caused children to be exposed to lead poisoning, witnessed an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease resulting in multiple deaths, and created a lack of trust and confidence in the effectiveness of government to solve problems.”

A New City Leader to Take on Near Insolvency. Petersburg, Virginia has hired a new City Manager, Aretha Ferrell-Benavides, just days after consultants charged with the fiscal challenge of extricating the city from the brink of municipal bankruptcy advised the Mayor and Council the municipality needed a $20 million cash infusion to make up a deficit and comply with its own reserve policies: increased taxes, they warned, would not do the trick; rather, in the wake of a decade of imbalanced budgets that drained the city’s rainy day funds, triggered pay cuts, disrupted the regional public utility, and forced steep cuts in public school funding, the city needed a new manager. Indeed, on her first day, Ms. Ferrell-Benavides said: “To have the opportunity to come in and make a difference in a community like this, it’s worth its weight in gold.” The gold might be heavy: her predecessor, William E. Johnson III, was fired last year as the city fiscally foundered—leading Mayor Sam Parham to note: “We’re looking forward to a new beginning, better times for the city of Petersburg.”

Manager Ferrell-Benavides won out in a field of four aspirants, with Mayor Parham noting: “She was definitely head and shoulders above the other candidates…She had clear, precise answers and a 90-day plan of action,” albeit that plan has yet to be shared until after she meets with department heads and residents in order to get a better understanding of the city’s needs. Nevertheless, City Councilman Charles Cuthbert noted: “Her energy and her warm personality and her expressions of commitment to help Petersburg solve its problems stood out…My sense is that she truly views these problems as an opportunity.” In what will mark a fiscal clean slate, Manager Ferrell-Benavides will officially begin on July 10th, alongside a new city Finance Director Blake Rane, and Police Chief Kenneth Miller, who is coming to Petersburg from the Virginia Beach Police Department. She brings considerable governmental experience, including more than 25 years of work in government for the State of Maryland, the Chicago Public Housing Authority, the City of Sunnyvale, Calif.; and Los Alamos, New Mexico—in addition to multiple jobs with the District of Columbia.

 

Public Trust, Public Safety, & Municipal Fiscal Sustainability: Has the Nation Experienced the Closing of its Chapter on Municipal Bankruptcies?

 

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eBlog, 04/20/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the unique and ongoing fiscal and physical challenges confronting Flint, Michigan in the wake of the drinking water crisis spawned by a state-appointed Emergency Manager, before heading far west to assess San Bernardino’s nearing formal exit from chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy—marking the last municipality to exit after the surge which came in the wake of the Great Recession.

Public Trust, Public Safety, & Due Diligence. Flint, Michigan Mayor Karen Weaver has recommended Flint continue obtaining its drinking water via the Detroit Great Lakes Water Authority (GLWA), reversing the position she had taken a year ago in the wake of the lead-contaminated drinking water crisis. Flint returned to the Detroit-area authority which sends water to Flint from Lake Huron in October of 2015 after the discovery that Flint River water was not treated with corrosion control chemicals for 18 months. Mayor Weaver said she believed residents would stick with a plan to draw from a pipeline to Lake Huron which is under construction; however, she said she had re-evaluated that decision as a condition of receiving $100 million in federal funding to address the manmade disaster, noting that switching the city’s water source again might prove too great a risk, and that remaining with Detroit’s water supply from Lake Huron would cost her citizens and businesses less. Last year, Mayor Weaver had stated that the city’s nearly 100,000 residents would stay with a plan to draw from a Karegnondi Water Authority pipeline to Lake Huron—a pipeline which remains under construction, noting, then, that switching water sources would be too risky and could cause needless disruptions for the city’s residents—still apprehensive about public health and safety in the wake of the health problems stemming from the decision by a state-imposed Emergency Manager nearly three years ago to switch and draw drinking water from the Flint River, as an interim source after deciding to switch to the fledgling Genesee County regional system and sever its ties to the Detroit system, now known as the regional Great Lakes Water Authority. Even today, federal, state, and local officials continue to advise Flint residents not to drink the water without a filter even though it complies with federal standards, as the city awaits completion of the replacement of its existing lead service lines—or, as Mayor Weaver put it: “At the end of the day, I believe this is the best decision, because one of the things we wanted to make sure we did was put public health first,” at a press conference attended by county, state, federal and Great Lakes authority officials, adding: “We have to put that above money and everything else. That was what we did. And what didn’t take place last time was public health. We’ve done our due diligence.” The 30-year contract with the Great Lakes authority keeps Flint as a member of the Karegnondi authority—a decision supported by the State of Michigan, EPA, and Genesee County officials, albeit the long-term contract still requires the approval of the Flint City Council and Flint Receivership Transition Advisory Board, a panel appointed by Gov. Rick Snyder charged with monitoring Flint’s fiscal conditions in the wake of the city’s emergence from a state-inflicted Emergency Manager two years ago.

City Councilman Eric Mays this week said he will be asking tough questions when he and his eight other colleagues will be briefed on the plan. There is also a town hall tonight in Flint to take public comments. Councilman Mays notes he is concerned the city may be “giving up ownership” in the new Genesee regional authority, something he opposes, adding he would be closely scrutinizing what he deems a “valuable asset to the city.” Mayor Weaver has said she personally wanted to review the earlier decision in the wake of last month’s receipt from the Environmental Protection Agency of $100 million to assist the city to address and recover from the drinking water disaster that took such a human and fiscal toll. (EPA is mandating that Flint provide a 30-day public comment period.) Mayor Weaver notes she anticipates some opposition, making clear any final decision will depend upon “public feedback and public opinion.” Currently, the city remains under contract to make $7 million in annual municipal bond payments over 28 years to the Karegnondi Water Authority (KWA); however, the Great Lakes authority said it would pay a $7 million “credit” for the KWA debt as long as Flint obligates itself to make its debt service payments. There is, at least so far, no indication with regard to how any such agreement would affect water rates. That matters, because, according to the Census Bureau, the city’s median household income is $7,059, significantly lower than the median Michigan-wide household income, and some $11,750 less than U.S. median household income. The GLWA said Flint customers would save a projected $1.8 million over 30 years compared with non-contractual charges they would have paid otherwise; in return, the Flint area authority would become a back-up system for the Detroit area authority, saving it an estimated $600 million over prior estimates and ensuring Metro Detroit communities would still receive water in the event of an interruption in Great Lakes authority service.

Robert Kaplan, the Chicago-based EPA’s acting regional administrator, said he signed off on the deal because the agency believes it protects the health of residents: “What’s best for public health is to stay on the water that’s currently being provided.” Jeff Wright, the KWA’s chief executive and drain commissioner of Genesee County, said the recommended plan not only would allow Flint to remain with the Genesee regional system, but also to be a back-up water supply, which, he noted, “is critically important to the safety of Flint’s residents who have not had a back-up system since the beginning of the Flint water crisis,” adding: “Whether (or not) Flint ultimately chooses high-quality Lake Huron water delivered through the newly constructed KWA pipeline, the highest quality treated water from Genesee County’s Water Treatment Plant or any other EPA-approved alternative, we will continue to assist Flint residents as they strive to recover from the Flint Water Crisis.” 

Keeping the Detroit system. The Great Lakes Water Authority Has embraced Mayor Weaver’s recommendation, with CEO Sue McCormick noting: “Flint residents can be assured that they will continue to receive water of unquestionable quality, at a significant cost savings.” Michigan Senate Minority Leader Jim Ananich (D-Flint) noted: “It provides us a long-term safe water source that we know is reliable. KWA could do the same thing, but this is an answer to help deal with one of the major parts of it,” adding the recommended move to stay on Detroit area water is “another example of the emergency manager sort of making a short-term terrible decision that’s cost us taxpayers half a billion dollars, if not more.” Emergency managers appointed by Snyder decided with the approval of the Flint City Council to switch to the Flint River water in part to save money. Flint officials said they thought Detroit water system price hikes were too high. For more than a year, the EPA has delayed any switch to KWA because of deficiencies including that the Flint treatment plant is not equipped to properly treat water. Staying with the Great Lakes authority may be an initial tough sell because of the city’s history, Mayor Weaver warned, but she is trying to get residents to move on. A town hall is scheduled for this evening at House of Prayer Missionary Baptist Church in Flint for public feedback. “I can’t change what happened,” Mayor Weaver said. “All I can do is move forward.”

Moody Blues in San Bernardino? As San Bernardino awaits its final judicial blessing from U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury of its plan of debt adjustment to formally exit chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, Moody’s has issued a short report, noting the city will exit bankruptcy with higher revenues and an improved balance sheet; however, the rating agency notes the city will confront significant operational challenges associated with deferred maintenance and potential service shortfalls—even being so glum as to indicate there is a possibility that, together with the pressure of its public pension liabilities, the city faces continued fiscal pressures and that continued financial distress could increase, so that a return to municipal bankruptcy is possible. Moody’s moody report notes the debt adjustment plan is forcing creditors to bear most of the restructuring challenge, especially as Moody’s analyzes the city’s plan to favor its pension obligations over bonded municipal debt and post-retirement OPEB liabilities. Of course, as we noted early on, the city’s pension liabilities are quite distinct from those of other chapter 9 municipalities, such as Detroit, Central Falls, Rhode Island, and Jefferson County. Under the city’s plan, San Bernardino municipal bondholders are scheduled to receive a major buzz cut—some 45%, even as some other creditors whom we have previously described, are scheduled (and still objecting) to receive as little as a 1% recovery on unsecured claims. Thus, Moody’s concludes that the Southern California city will continue to have to confront rising pension costs and public safety needs. Moody’s adjusted net pension liability will remain unchanged at $904 million, a figure which dwarfs the projected bankruptcy savings of approximately $350 million. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System also recently reduced its discount rate, meaning the city’s already increasing pension contributions will rise even faster. Additionally, Moody’s warns, a failure to invest more in public safety or police could exacerbate already-elevated crime levels. That means the city will likely be confronted by higher capital and operating borrowing costs, noting that, even after municipal debt reductions, the city might find itself unable to fund even 50 percent of its deferred maintenance. 

However, as San Bernardino’s Mayor Davis has noted, the city, in wake of the longest municipal bankruptcy in American history, is poised for growth in the wake of outsourcing fire services to the county and waste removal services to a private contractor, and reaching agreements with city employees, including police officers and retirees, to substantially reduce healthcare OPEB benefits to lessen pension reductions. Indeed, the city’s plan of adjustment agreement on its $56 million in pension obligation bonds—and in significant part with CalPERS—meant its retirees fared better, as Moody’s has noted, than the city’s municipal bondholders to whom San Bernardino committed to pay 40 percent of what they are owed—far more than its early offer of one percent. San Bernardino’s pension bondholders succeeded in wrangling a richer recovery than the city’s opening offer of one percent, but far less than CalPERS, which received a nearly 100 percent recovery. (San Bernardino did not make some $13 million in payments to CalPERS early in the chapter 9 process, but subsequently set up payments to make the public employee pension fund whole.) The city was aided in those efforts in the wake of U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Meredith Jury’s ruling against the argument made by pension bond attorneys: in the wake of the city’s pension bondholders entering into mediation again prior to exit confirmation, substantial agreement was achieved for those bondholders—bondholders whose confidence in the city remains important, especially in the wake of the city’s subsequent issuance of $68 million in water and sewer bonds at competitive interest rates—with the payments to come from the city’s water and sewer revenues, which were not included in the chapter 9 bankruptcy. The proceeds from these municipal bonds were, in fact, issued to provide capital to meet critical needs to facilitate seismic upgrades to San Bernardino’s water reservoirs and funding for the first phase of the Clean Water Factor–Recycled Water Program.

The Art & Commitment of Municipal Fiscal Recovery

eBlog, 04/11/17

Good Morning! In this a.m.’s eBlog, we consider the ongoing recovery of the city of Flint, Michigan, before heading east to one of the smallest municipalities in America, Central Falls, Rhode Island, as it maintains its epic recovery from chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, before finally turning south to assess recent developments in Puerto Rico. We note the terrible shooting yesterday at North Park Elementary School in San Bernardino; however, as former San Bernardino School Board Member Judi Penman noted, referring to the police department: “It is one of the most organized and well-prepared police departments around, and they are well prepared for this type of situation.” Indeed, even if sadly, the experience the city’s school police department gained from coordinating with the city’s police department in the wake of the December 2, 2015 terrorist attack appeared to enhance the swift and coordinated response—even as calls came in yesterday from the White House and California Gov. Jerry Brown to offer condolences and aid, according to San Bernardino Mayor Carey Davis.

Could this be a Jewel in the Crown on Flint’s Road to Fiscal Recovery? In most instances of severe municipal fiscal distress or bankruptcy, the situation has been endemic to the municipality; however, as we have noted in Jefferson County, the state can be a proximate cause. Certainly that appears to have been the case in Flint, where the Governor’s appointment of an emergency manager proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back at an exceptional cost and risk to human health and safety. The fiscal challenge is, as always, what does it take to recover? In the case of Flint, the city’s hopes appear to depend upon the restoration of one of the small city’s iconic jewels: the historic, downtown Capitol Theatre—where the goal is to restore it to its original glory, dating back to 1928, when it opened as a vaudeville house: it was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1985, but has been empty now for more than a decade—indeed, not just empty, but rather scheduled to become still another parking lot. Instead, however, the property will undergo a $37 million renovation to become a 1,600-seat movie palace and performance venue, which will provide 28,000 square feet of ground-floor retail and second-floor office space; an additional performance space will be created in the basement for small-scale workshops, experimental theater, and other performances. Jeremy Piper, chairman of the Cultural Center Corp., a Flint lawyer, will manage the new performing arts venue in the cultural center; he will also serve as co-chair of a committee that is raising the last $4 million of the $37 million needed to bring the theater back to life. The goal and hope is that the renovated theater will, as has been the experience in other cities, such as New York City’s Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, help serve as a foundation for Flint’s fiscal and physical recovery. The new theater is intended to become the focal point of 12,000, 13,000, or 14,000 people coming into downtown Flint for a performance and then going out for dinner—that is, to benefit and revive a downtown economy. Indeed, already, the venture firm SkyPoint is planning to open a large fine-dining restaurant on the ground floor and mezzanine timed to the rejuvenated theater’s reopening—SkyPoint Ventures being the company co-founded by Phil Hagerman, the CEO of Flint-based Diplomat Pharmacy Inc., and his wife, Jocelyn, whose Hagerman Foundation (the author, here, notes his middle name, derived from his great grandfather, is Hagerman) donated $4 million toward the Capitol’s renovation. In 2016, the Flint-based C.S. Mott Foundation announced a grant of $15 million for the Capitol Theatre project as part of $100 million it pledged to the city in the wake of the water crisis. The project also received $5.5 million from the Michigan Strategic Fund.

The ambitious effort comes as Michigan has paid $12 million to outside attorneys for work related to the Flint drinking water crisis, but out of which nearly 30% has gone to pay criminal and civil defense attorneys hired by Gov. Rick Snyder—an amount expected to climb as the lead poisoning of Flint’s drinking water has proven to be devastating for Flint and its children, but enriching for the state’s legal industry: Jeffrey Swartz, an associate professor at Western Michigan University-Cooley Law School, notes: “It’s a lot of money…I can see $10 million to $15 million being eaten up very quickly.” He added, moreover, that the state is still “on your way up the slope” in terms of mounting legal costs. The approved value of outside legal contracts, not all of which has been spent, is at least $16.6 million, adding that the Michigan Legislature may want to appoint a commission to review the appropriateness of all outside legal bills before they are approved for payment: already, Gov. Rick Snyder’s office has spent a combined $3.35 million for outside criminal and civil defense lawyers; the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality has spent $3.65 million; the Department of Health and Human Services has spent $956,000; and the Treasury Department has spent $35,555, according to figures released to the Free Press. In addition, the state has paid $340,000 to reimburse the City of Flint for some of its civil and criminal legal defense costs related to the drinking water crisis, which a task force appointed by Gov. Snyder has said was mainly brought on by mistakes made at the state level. Yet to be equitably addressed are some $1.3 million in Flint legal costs. Michigan Attorney General Bill Schuette, whose investigation is still ongoing, has charged 13 current or former state and municipal officials, including five from the Dept. of Environmental Quality, the Dept. of Health and Human Safety, the City of Flint, and two former state-appointed emergency managers who ran the city and reported to the state’s Treasury Department; no one, however, from Gov. Snyder’s office has been charged.

The Remarkable Recovery of Chocolateville. Central Falls, Rhode Island Mayor James A. Diossa, the remarkable elected leader who has piloted the fiscal recovery of one of the nation’s smallest cities from chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy, this week noted: “Our efforts and dedication to following fiscally sound budgeting practices are clearly paying off, leaving the City in a strong position. I would like to personally thank the Council and Administrative Financial Officer Len Morganis for their efforts in helping to lead the comeback of this great City.” The Mayor’s ebullient comments came in the wake of credit rating agency Standard and Poor’s rating upgrade for one of the nation’s smallest cities from “BB” to “BBB,” with S&P noting: “Central Falls is operating under a much stronger economic and management environment since emerging from bankruptcy in 2012. The City of Central Falls now has an investment grade credit rating from S&P due to diligently following the post-bankruptcy plan in conjunction with surpassing budgetary projections.”

One of the nation’s smallest municipalities (population of 19,000, city land size of one-square-mile), Central Falls is Rhode Island’s smallest and poorest city—and the site of a George Mason University class project on municipal fiscal distress—and guidebook for municipal leaders. Its post-bankruptcy recovery under Mayor Diossa has demonstrated several years of strong budgetary performance, and has “fully adhered to the established post-bankruptcy plan,” or, as Mayor Diossa put it: “S&P’s latest ratings report is yet another sign of Central Falls’ turnaround from bankruptcy.” Mr. Morganis noted: “The City of Central Falls now has an investment grade credit rating from S&P due to diligently following the post-bankruptcy plan in conjunction with surpassing budgetary projections,” adding that the credit rating agency’s statement expressed confidence that strong budgetary performance will continue post Rhode Island State oversight. S&P, in its upgrade, credited Mayor Diossa’s commitment to sound and transparent fiscal practices, noting the small city has an adequate management environment with improved financial policies and practices under their Financial Management Assessment (FMA) methodology—and that Central Falls exhibited a strong budgetary performance, with an operating surplus in the general fund and break-even operating results at the total governmental fund level in FY2016. Moreover, S&P reported, the former mill town and manufacturer of scrumptious chocolate bars has strong liquidity, with total government available cash at 28.7% of total governmental fund expenditures and 1.9 times governmental debt service, along with a strong institutional framework score. Similarly, Maureen Gurghigian, Managing Director of Hilltop Securities, noted: “A multi-step upgrade of this magnitude is uncommon: this is a tribute to the hard work of the City’s and the Administrative Finance Officer’s adherence to their plan and excellent relationship with State Government.” The remarkable recovery comes as one of the nation’s smallest cities heads towards a formal exit from chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy at the end of FY2017. S&P, in its upgrade, noted the city is operating under a “much stronger economic and management environment,” in the wake of its 2012 exit from municipal bankruptcy, or, as Mayor Diossa, put it: “Obviously we’ve had a lot of conversations with the rating agencies, and I was hoping we’d get an upgrade of at least one notch…When we got the triple upgrade, first, I was surprised and second, it reaffirmed the work that we’re doing. Our bonds are no longer junk. We’re investment level. It’s like getting good news at a health checkup.”  S&P, in its report, noted several years of sound budgeting and full adherence to a six-year post-bankruptcy plan which state-appointed receiver and former Rhode Island Supreme Court Justice Robert Flanders crafted. The hardest part of that recovery, as Judge Flanders noted to us so many years ago in City Hall,was his swift decision to curtail the city’s pension payments—cuts of as much as 55 percent—a statement he made with obvious emotion, recognizing the human costs. (Central Falls is among the approximately one-quarter of Rhode Island municipalities with locally administered pension plans.) Unsurprisingly, Mayor Diossa, maintains he is “fully committed” to the fiscal discipline first imposed by Judge Flanders, noting the municipality had a general fund surplus of 11% of expenditures in FY2016, and adding: “That reserve fund is very important.” He noted Central Falls also expects a surplus for this fiscal year, adding that the city’s expenses are 3% below budget, and that even as the city has reduced the residential property tax rate for the first time in a decade, even as it has earmarked 107% of its annual required contribution to the pension plan and contributed $100,000 toward its future OPEB liability.

The End of an Era? Mayor Diossa, recounting the era of chapter 9 bankruptcies, noted Pennsylvania’s capital, Harrisburg, in 2011; Jefferson County, Alabama; Stockton, Mammoth Lakes and San Bernardino, California; and Detroit: “I think Central Falls is a microcosm of all of them…I followed Detroit and heard all the discussions. They had the same issues that we had…sky-high costs, not budgeting appropriately,” adding his credit and appreciation—most distinctly from California—of the State of Rhode Island’s longstanding involvement: “The state’s been very involved,” commending Governors Lincoln Chafee and Gina Raimondo. Nevertheless, he warns: fiscal challenges remain; indeed, S&P adds: “The city’s debt and contingent liability profile is very weak…We view the pension and other post-employment benefit [OPEB] liabilities as a credit concern given the very low funded ratio and high fixed costs…They are still a concern with wealth metrics and resources that are probably below average for Rhode Island, so that’s a bit of a disadvantage…That adds more importance to the fact that they achieved an investment-grade rating through what I think is pretty good financial management and getting their house in order.” The city’s location, said Diossa, is another means to trumpet the city.

The Uncertainties of Fiscal Challenges. Natalie Jaresko is the newly named Executive Director of the PROMESA federal control board overseeing Puerto Rico’s finances, who previously served during a critical time in Ukraine’s history from 2014 to 2016 as it faced a deep recession, and about whom PROMESA Board Chair Jose Carrion noted: “Ukraine’s situation three years ago, like Puerto Rico’s today, was near catastrophic, but she worked with stakeholders to bring needed reforms that restored confidence, economic vitality and reinvestment in the country and its citizens. That’s exactly what Puerto Rico needs today;” came as Ms. Jaresko yesterday told the Board that with the tools at its disposal, Puerto Rico urgently needs to reduce the fiscal deficit and restructure the public debt, “all at once,” while acknowledging that the austerity measures may cause “things to get worse before they get better.” Her dire warnings came as the U.S. territory’s recovery prospects for the commonwealth’s general obligation and COFINA bonds continued to weaken, and, in the wake of last week’s moody Moody’s dropping of the Commonwealth’s debt ratings to its lowest rating, C, which equates with a less than 35% recovery on defaulted debt. Or, as our respected colleagues at Municipal Market Analytics put it: “[T]he ranges of potential bondholder outcomes are much wider than those, with a materially deeper low-end. For some (or many) of the commonwealth’s most lightly secured bonds (e.g., GDB, PFC, etc.) recoveries could hypothetically dip into the single digits. Further, any low end becomes more likely the longer Puerto Rico’s restructuring takes to achieve as time:

1) Allows progressively more negative economic data to materialize, forcing all parties to adopt more conservative and sustainable projections for future commonwealth revenues;

2) Allows local stakeholder groups—in particular students and workers—to organize and expand nascent protest efforts, further affecting the political center of gravity on the island;

3) Worsens potential entropy in commonwealth legislative outcomes;

4) Frustrates even pro-bondholder policymakers in the US Congress, which has little interest in, or ability to, re-think PROMESA and/or Federal aid compacts with the commonwealth.”

On the other hand, the longer the restructuring process ultimately takes, the more investable will be the security that the island borrows against in the future (whatever that is). So while the industry in general would likely benefit from a faster resolution that removes Puerto Rico from the headlines, the traditional investors who will consider lending to a “fixed” commonwealth should prefer that all parties take their time. Finally, if bleakly, MMA notes: “In our view, reliable projections of bondholder recovery impossible, and we fail to understand how any rating agency with an expected loss methodology can rate Puerto Rico’s bonds at all…Remember that the Governor’s Fiscal Plan, accepted by the Oversight Board, makes available about a quarter of the debt service to be paid on tax-backed debt through 2027, down from about 35% that was in the prior plan that the Board rejected. As we’ve noted before, the severity of the proposal greatly reduces the likelihood that an agreement will be reached with creditors by May 1 (when the stay on litigation ends), not only increasing the prospect of a Title III restructuring (cram down) un-der PROMESA, but also a host of related creditor litigation against the plan itself and board decisions both large and small. The outcomes of even normal litigation risks are inherently unpredictable, but the prospects here for multi-layered, multi-dimensional lawsuits create a problem several orders of magnitude worse than normal.